ORDER By this writ petition, the petitioner is challenging the impugned order dated 05.07.2013 and impugned letter dated 11.09.2013 for re-fixation of his seniority position in the inter-se seniority list of Naib Subedars (GD) working at 31 Assam Rifles disturbing the inter-se seniority list which had been settled as early as 2005 and remained undisturbed for a considerable number of years by placing the name of the petitioner, who was promoted on 15.05.2005 to the post of Naib Subedar (GD) below one Naib Subedar (GD) S.D. Joshi, who was promoted only on 01.12.2005 to the post of Naib Subedar (GD). 2. Heard Mr. S Nath, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. SC Shyam, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. B Deb, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No.1-3. None appears for the respondent No.4. 3. The concise fact of the respective case of the party sufficient for deciding the matter in issue in the present writ petition is noted. The petitioner was initially appointed as Rifleman (Cook/WC) on 24.03.1987 and he was remustered from Rifleman (Cook/WC) to Rifleman (GD) on 11.08.1988. The petitioner was promoted to the rank of Lance Naik (GD) on 04.12.1989. Considering his good service, the petitioner was promoted to the rank of Nk (GD) on 27.10.1990 and further promoted to the rank of Havildar (GD) on 10.10.1997. In the Assam Rifles, promotion from the rank of Havildar (GD) to the Naib Subedar (GD) is made on the basis of selection through Departmental Promotion Committee (for short ‘DPC’). The DPC and promotion is made Unit wise. When the petitioner was working at 31 Assam Rifles in the year 2005, there was a vacancy of Naib Subedar (GD) occurred due to promotion of one Shri. Surendra Prasad and the petitioner being the senior most Havildar (GD) at that point of time in the Unit was recommended by the DPC for promotion against the vacant post of Naib Subedar (GD). The Commandant, 31 Assam Rifles vide letter No. 2301/31/AR/2005/1355 dated 20.03.2005 forwarded the recommendation of the DPC to HQ 5 Sect. Assam Rifles and same was further forwarded to the DGAR, Shillong vide letter bearing No. 21016/31 AR/DPC/A-2005/1990 dated 22.05.2005. Vide order No. I.19012/31/2004/Adm-I (A) dated 31.05.2005 (translated from Hindi), promoted the petitioner to the rank of Naib Subedar (GD) against the vacancy due to promotion of JC – 3100218 Naib Subedar (GD) Surendra Prasad w.e.f. 15.05.2005. Assam Rifles and same was further forwarded to the DGAR, Shillong vide letter bearing No. 21016/31 AR/DPC/A-2005/1990 dated 22.05.2005. Vide order No. I.19012/31/2004/Adm-I (A) dated 31.05.2005 (translated from Hindi), promoted the petitioner to the rank of Naib Subedar (GD) against the vacancy due to promotion of JC – 3100218 Naib Subedar (GD) Surendra Prasad w.e.f. 15.05.2005. On the day of promotion of the petitioner to the post of Naib Subedar (GD), the petitioner had completed his 18 years 1 month 23 days of service and also he had already completed more than 18 years on 15.05.2005 from this date, the promotion of the petitioner to the post of Naib Subedar (GD) became effective. The next promotional avenue of the petitioner is to the post of Subedar (GD). The 31 Assam Rifles vide Signal No. A 1944 dated 15.01.2011 forwarded the service record of the petitioner to HQ 25 Sector/ARTC & S for DPC and the DPC proceeding had been forwarded to the HQ 7 Sector vide 31 AR letter No. 31 AR/A/13/1415 dated 20.07.2013 for promotion of the petitioner to the rank of Subedar (GD). The inter-se seniority list of the Naib Subedars working at 31 Assam Rifles, which was fixed in the year 2005 and remained undisturbed for a number of years is as follows:- “1. Nb Sub (GD) Rupa Chandra 2. Nb Sub (GD) L.P. Phukan 3. Nb Sub (GD) Banbari Lal (Petitioner) Promoted on 15.05.2005 4. Nb Sub (GD) Anand Singh Bisth Promoted on 01.07.2005 5. Nb Sub (GD) Sohan Singh Promoted on 01.08.2005 6. Nb Sub (GD) Om Prakash Promoted on 01.11.2005 7. Nb Sub (GD) S D Joshi (respondent No.4) Promoted on 01.12.2005” 4. Most surprisingly after 8 years of promotion of the petitioner to the rank of Naib Subedar (GD), the Captain SO3 (Coord) for Brigadier (Pers), Directorate General Assam Rifles vide impugned order bearing No. I.19012/31/2013/Adm-I (A)/561 dated 05.07.2013, had informed that the petitioner is assumed to have been promoted w.e.f. 01.05.2006 and his seniority in the rank of Naib Subedar (GD) is re-fixed below JC – 3100389W Naib Subedar S.D. Joshi and above JC – 3100379M Naib Subedar Sathish Chandra without affecting the pay and allowances. The ground assigned for re-fixation of date of promotion of the petitioner from 15.05.2005 to 01.05.2006 is that the petitioner was not possessing qualitative requirement (QR) for promotion, as he was not completing mandatory 18 years of service on crucial date i.e. 01.01.2005. It was also alleged that this aspect was inadvertently not taken into account by the DPC and the petitioner should have been screened by the DPC 2006 and supposed to be promoted on first available vacancy i.e. 01.05.2006. Being aggrieved with the impugned order dated 05.07.2013, the petitioner submitted one representation dated 11.08.2013 addressed to the respondent No.2 against re-fixation of his date of promotion to the rank of Naib Subedar (GD). In the said representation, the petitioner categorically stated that he has been made junior by one year by the impugned order dated 05.07.2013, but due to sudden change of the date of promotion and seniority, his due promotion would be considered after his junior. For a number of years i.e. 8 years, there was no controversy of the petitioner’s promotion to the rank of Naib Subedar (GD) w.e.f. 15.05.2005 on this date, he had completed more than 18 (eighteen) years of service. In that representation, the petitioner had requested the respondent No.2 not to disturb his seniority in the rank of Naib Subedar (GD). By the impugned letter dated 11.09.2013, had informed the petitioner that he was not eligible for promotion in the year 2005 since he did not fulfill all the requirements for promotion on 01.01.2005 and therefore, he had no right for promotion in 2005. SO1 (Rec) for Brigadier (Pers) vide impugned letter bearing No. I.19012/GD/Adm-1/2013/858 dated 07.10.2013 had replied to the representation of the petitioner submitted on 11.08.2013 that he had completed his 18 years of service on 15.05.2005 but on 1st January of that year his 18 years of service was not completed and also that as per the D.O.P. & T letter dated 08.09.1998, he was supposed to fulfill all the conditions on 01.01.2005 for getting promotion and therefore, right of promotion of the petitioner in that calendar year was invalid and also that right for promotion of the petitioner was in the year 2006, therefore, seniority of the petitioner had been placed in the top amongst all JCOs promoted in the year 2006 and placed immediate next to the last Naib Subedar promoted in the year 2005. It is also mentioned in the impugned letter dated 07.10.2013 that as per enrollment, the petitioner was junior to Naib Subedar S.D. Joshi, the petitioner was given accelerated promotion to the rank of Naib Subedar (GD) as per the rules and regulations of that time, whereas, Naib Subedar S.D. Joshi had completed 18 years of qualifying service on the crucial date, for which he got promoted. 5. Respondents No. 1-3 had filed joint affidavit-in-opposition dated 15.04.2014. In their joint affidavit-in-opposition, the respondents are not denying that the petitioner was promoted to the rank of Havildar w.e.f. 10.10.1997 and he came up in seniority for promotion to the rank of Naib Subedar (GD) in the year 2005. As per the Recruitment Rules, 2000 and Appendix ‘B’ to Record Office Instructions 4/2002, the qualitative requirement (QR) for promotion from Havildar to Naib Subedar is 18 years in service. The respondents in their joint affidavit-in-opposition further stated that under the Recruitment Rules i.e. method of recruitment to Group ‘C’ combatized posts in the Assam Rifles under the Ministry of Home Affairs framed/made by the President in exercise of the powers conferred by proviso under Article 309 of the Constitution of India called “the Assam Rifles (Group ‘C’ combatised posts) Recruitment Rules, 2000”, Havildar having a minimum of 5 years service as Havildar (GD) together with total 18 years of service is eligible for promotion to Naib Subedar. Column 12 of the said Rules, 2000 which is relevant in the present case, is reproduced hereunder:- “In case recruitment by promotion/deputation/absorption, grades from which promotion/deputation/absorption to be made. 12. Promotion from amongst members of Assam Rifles holding the rank of Havildar (General Duty), who – (a) must have a minimum of 5 years service as Havildar (General Duty) together with total of 18 years of service. (b) must be in Medial Category AYE (ONE) except for low medical categories attributable to actual hostilities/insurgency operations and aggravated due to service; and (c) must be promotion cadre passed. Map Reading Standard Two and Technical Trade Test One.” 6. The copy of the Recruitment Rules, 2006 is available at Annexure-I to the joint affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondents No.1-3 and on perusal of it, it is crystal clear that the qualifying service for promotion of Havildar (GD) to Naib Subedar (GD) is minimum 5 years of service as Havildar (GD) together with total of 18 years of service. The copy of the Recruitment Rules, 2006 is available at Annexure-I to the joint affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondents No.1-3 and on perusal of it, it is crystal clear that the qualifying service for promotion of Havildar (GD) to Naib Subedar (GD) is minimum 5 years of service as Havildar (GD) together with total of 18 years of service. The further case of the respondents in their joint affidavit-in-opposition is that under the Office Memorandum being No. 22011/9/98-Estt (D), North Block, New Delhi – 110001 dated 08.09.1998 issued by the Govt. of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions (Department of Personnel and Training) prescribing the procedure to be observed by the DPC and suggested model calendar for DPCs, the crucial date for determining the eligibility is January 1 of the year. The relevant portions of the Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1998 is quoted hereunder:- “ ***** ***** ***** ***** Thus, the Model Calendar of events for ACC/non-ACC cases may follow the following illustrative pattern and the DPCs may ordinarily be held accordingly- SUGGESTED MODEL CALENDAR FOR DPCs EVENTS FINANCIAL YEAR-BASED CALENDAR YEAR-BASED (1) (2) (3) (i) Vacancy year (ii)Crucial date for determining eligibility ACC CASES [Cases where ACC approval is required (including SAG/HAG grades/posts)] (A) Completion of ACRs/Integrity Certificates/Vigilance clearance/Seniority List/Penalty and Vacancy position etc and forwarding DPC proposal to the UPSC April-July 15,1999 January-April 15, 1999 B) Last date for sending complete proposal along with relevant Recruit/Service Rules to the UPSC. (Effort should be made to send the proposal to the UPSC as soon as possible without waiting for the last date) (C) DPC to be held (D) On receipt of DPC minutes from the UPSC, Post-DPC follow-up action by the administrative Ministry/Department (E) Approval of the ACC including communication of its approval to the administrative Ministry/Department (F) Last date for getting ready the approved select panel by the administrative Ministry/Department. NOTE:- Dates/Periods suggested in the Model Calendar for DPC put no bar on earlier completion of various pre/post-DPC related actions. Every effort may, as such, be made for taking speedy action in the matter without waiting for the last date or completion of the period as suggested by the Model Calendar for DPCs. NOTE:- Dates/Periods suggested in the Model Calendar for DPC put no bar on earlier completion of various pre/post-DPC related actions. Every effort may, as such, be made for taking speedy action in the matter without waiting for the last date or completion of the period as suggested by the Model Calendar for DPCs. ***** 2000-2001 January 1, 2000 April-July 15,1999 July 15, 1999 July, 15 – November, 1999 December, 1999 January-March, 2000 March 21, 2000 ***** 2000 January 1, 2000 January-April 15, 1999 April 15, 1999 April 15 – August, 1999 September, 1999 October-December, 1999 December 31, 1999 ***** 10. With a view to providing adequate time for circulation/general awareness of these instructions, it is considered desirable to make the aforesaid Model Calendar for DPCs operational with effect from April 1, 1999 in relation to the financial year-based vacancy year (2000-2001) commencing from April 1, 2000. In the case of calendar year-based vacancy year commencing from January 1, 2000, the Model DPC Calendar may take operational effect from January 1, 1999. In keeping with the decision noted in para-9 above to adopt, on uniform basis, January 1 as the crucial date for determining eligibility, it is provided that January 1, 2000 may be adopted as the crucial date in relation to the vacancy years commencing from January 1/April 1, 2000. 11. As for practical reasons, it may not be possible to adopt the aforesaid Model Calendar for DPC in relating to the transitory vacancy years commencing from January 1/April 1, 1999, it is considered adequate, in order to accelerate DPC-related activities, to provide that efforts should be made by the Ministries/Departments to hold the DPC meetings and preparation of panels in advance even for these transitory vacancy years without waiting for the latest ACRs. The crucial date for determining eligibility would, however, in keeping with the decision noted in para-9, fall on January 1, 1999 in relation to these transitory vacancy years commencing from January 1/April 1, 1999.” 7. The said Recruitment Rules, 2000 framed under Article 309 of the constitution does not state that 18 years of service for promotion of Havildar (GD) to Naib Subedar (GD) in a particular vacancy year should be completed on the January 1 of that vacancy year. The said Recruitment Rules, 2000 framed under Article 309 of the constitution does not state that 18 years of service for promotion of Havildar (GD) to Naib Subedar (GD) in a particular vacancy year should be completed on the January 1 of that vacancy year. The petitioner by the promotion order dated 31.05.2005 had promoted to the post of Naib Subedar (GD) w.e.f. 15.05.2005 and admittedly, the petitioner had completed more than 18 years of service on 15.05.2005. The respondents in their joint affidavit-in-opposition had clearly admitted that the petitioner is qualified for promotion to the post of Naib Subedar (GD) for the vacancy year 2005. But the case of the respondents in their joint affidavit-in-opposition is that even though the petitioner had been considered by the DPC for the year 2005, the petitioner had been recommended through mistake for promotion to the post of Naib Subedar (GD) for the vacancy year 2005 inasmuch as, the petitioner had not completed 18 years of service on 1st January, 2005, which is a crucial date for determining the qualifying service under the said Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1998. To the contra, it is the case of the petitioner that the crucial date for determining the qualifying service for promotion to a particular post by the DPC constituted for that particular post is the date of holding the DPC under normal service law parlance and also that the effective date for promotion on the recommendation of the DPC would be the date of holding the DPC. It is also the case of the petitioner that in compliance of the said Recruitment Rules, 2000 under which the qualifying service for promotion of Havildar (GD) to Naib Subedar (GD) is 18 years, the effective date of promotion of the petitioner to Naib Subedar (GD) was 15.05.2005 under the said promotion order dated 31.05.2005. 8. It is also the case of the petitioner that in compliance of the said Recruitment Rules, 2000 under which the qualifying service for promotion of Havildar (GD) to Naib Subedar (GD) is 18 years, the effective date of promotion of the petitioner to Naib Subedar (GD) was 15.05.2005 under the said promotion order dated 31.05.2005. 8. The grounds amongst other taken in the present writ petition for assailing the impugned order are:- (i) the said Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1998 is only a model code prescribing suggested date for determining the eligibility of the employee, whose service is to be considered by the DPC for promotion and therefore, it is only a directory; (ii) the Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1998 cannot be taken as amendment of the said Recruitment Rules, 2000 by inserting the crucial date for determining the eligibility of the employee, whose case has to be considered by the DPC under the said Recruitment Rules, 2000; (iii) the seniority list once settled and followed invariably for more than 8 years cannot be unsettled by the impugned orders by fixing the seniority of the petitioner below the respondent No.4 JC – 3100399 Naib Subdear (GD) S.D. Joshi 31 Assam Rifles, who was promoted to the rank of Naib Subedar (GD) about 7 months after the petitioner was promoted to the rank of Naib Subedar (GD) inasmuch as, the date of promotion of Naib Subedar (GD) S.D. Joshi was on 01.12.2005, and the date of the petitioner was on 15.05.2005. 9. It is fairly settled law that the guidelines are issued for compliance and not for disobedience. No doubt, there should be substantial compliance looking into the type of the instruction or executive order. 9. It is fairly settled law that the guidelines are issued for compliance and not for disobedience. No doubt, there should be substantial compliance looking into the type of the instruction or executive order. But it is also well settled that the points require to be considered and decided when determining if a particular guideline or executive instruction is mandatory or directory are (i) whether the guidelines involve the penal provisions or not?; (ii) whether the consequence of the failure to comply with the guidelines are mentioned in the guidelines itself or not?; (iii) is the guidelines itself mentioned that the failure of compliance would amount to invalidating the action taken or would have the penal consequences; (iv) whether the guidelines or policy decision is taken by the statutory authority in exercise of the statutory powers; (v) whether the guidelines or policy decision or executive order can be taken as the law in a given case? and; (vi) whether the executive instruction is mandatory or directory depends upon the purpose which the Govt. intend to achieve as disclosed by the object, purpose and scope of the order. We may refer to the decisions of the Apex Court in M/s Rubber House v. M/s Excelsior Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd.: (1989) 2 SCC 413 and P.T. Ranjan v. T.P.M. Sahir & Ors: (2003) 8 SCC 498 . Para 31 of the SCC in M/s Rubber House’s case (Supra) read as follows:- “31. The word “shall” in its ordinary import is obligatory. Nevertheless, the word “shall” need not be given that connotation in each and every case and the provisions can be interpreted as directory instead of mandatory depending upon the purpose which the legislature intended to achieve as disclosed by the object, design, purpose and scope of the statute. While interpreting the concerned provisions, regard must be had to the context, subject matter and object of the statue in question.” Para 50 of the SCC in P.T. Ranjan’s case (Supra) read as follows:- “50. The Court cannot, it is trite, supply casus omissus. Reference in this regard may be made to Balram Waman Hiray (Dr.) v. Justice B. Lentin: (1988) 4 SCC 419 , wherein it was observed: (SCC p.443, para 27) “27. Law must be definite, and certain. The Court cannot, it is trite, supply casus omissus. Reference in this regard may be made to Balram Waman Hiray (Dr.) v. Justice B. Lentin: (1988) 4 SCC 419 , wherein it was observed: (SCC p.443, para 27) “27. Law must be definite, and certain. If any of the features of the law can usefully be regarded as normative, it is such basic postulates as the requirement of consistency in judicial decision-making. It is this requirement of consistency that gives to the law much of its rigour. At the same time, there is need for flexibility. Professor H.L.A. Hart regarded as one of the leading thinkers of our time observes in his influential book ‘The Concept of Law’, depicting the difficult task of a Judge to strike a balance between certainty and flexibility: ‘Where there is obscurity in the language of a statute, it results in confusion and disorder. No doubt the Courts so frame their judgments as to give the impression that their decisions are the necessary consequence of predetermined rules. In very simple cases it may be so; but in the vast majority of cases that trouble the Courts, neither statute nor precedents in which the rules are legitimately contained allow of only one result. In most important cases there is always a choice. The judge has to choose between alternative meanings to be given to the words of a statute or between rival interpretations of what a precedent amounts to. It is only the tradition that judges ‘find’ and do not ‘make’ law that conceals this, and presents their decisions as if they were deductions smoothly made from clear pre-existing rules without intrusion of the judges’ choice.” 10. The executive instruction or executive order is mandatory or not is to be ascertained looking into the subject matter and the object to be achieved. If penal consequences of non-compliance is not provided by the executive instruction or order itself, requirement may be treated as directory. This principle is also applied to the statutory rules. The executive instruction or executive order is mandatory or not is to be ascertained looking into the subject matter and the object to be achieved. If penal consequences of non-compliance is not provided by the executive instruction or order itself, requirement may be treated as directory. This principle is also applied to the statutory rules. The Apex Court in Ram Deen Maurya (Dr) v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors: (2009) 6 SCC 735 held that the executive instruction or executive action or statutory rules is mandatory or not is to be decided looking into the consequences of non-compliance and if penal consequences of non-compliance is not provided by the executive instruction or order or statutes, it may be treated as directory. Para 47 of the SCC in Ram Deen Maurya’s (Dr) case (Supra) read as follows:- “47. The third part of the Rules says that the Director (Higher Education) shall submit his recommendation within one month to the State Government; if there is any delay in making the recommendation, the Rules do not provide that the recommendations so made, will not be considered by the State Government nor the Rules says, if the recommendations are not received within the stipulated time, the State Govt. would ignore the recommendation and proceed to decide the request of the applicant independently. Therefore, this requirement of this part of the Rule is only directory and not mandatory, the non-compliance therewith will not make the application invalid.” 11. Normally, if the statute or executive instruction specifies a time for completion of a certain thing without any penal consequences, it will be treated as directory where a statutory functionary is asked to perform duty within the time prescribed. The Apex Court in P.T. Rajan’s case (Supra) held that: “48. Furthermore, even if the statute specifies a time for publication of the electoral roll, the same by itself could not have been held to be mandatory. Such a provision would be directory in nature. It is a well-settled principle of law that where a statutory functionary is asked to perform a statutory duty within the time prescribed therefor, the same would be directory and not mandatory. (See Shiveshwar Prasad Sinha v. District Magistrate of Monghyr: AIR 1966 Pat 144 : ILR 45 Pat 436 (FB), Nomita Chowdhury v. State of W.B.: (1999) 2 Cal LJ 21 and Garbari Union Coop. (See Shiveshwar Prasad Sinha v. District Magistrate of Monghyr: AIR 1966 Pat 144 : ILR 45 Pat 436 (FB), Nomita Chowdhury v. State of W.B.: (1999) 2 Cal LJ 21 and Garbari Union Coop. Agricultural Credit Society Ltd. v. Swapan Kumar Jana: (1997) 1 CHN 189 ). 49. Furthermore, a provision in a statue which is procedural in nature although employs the word “shall” may not be held to be mandatory if thereby no prejudice is caused. (See Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v Municipal Board, Rampur: AIR 1965 SC 895 : (1965) 1 SCR 970 , State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma: (1996) 3 SCC 364 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 717, Venkataswamappa v. Special Dy. Commr. (Revenue): (1997) 9 SCC 128 and Rai Vimal Krishna v. State of Bihar: (2003) 6 SCC 401 ).” The Apex Court in Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v. Central Bureau of Investigation: (2009) 8 SCC 1 held that: “58. Whether a circular letter issued by a statutory authority would be binding or not or whether the same has a statutory force, would depend upon the nature of the statute. For the said purpose, the intention of the legislature must be considered. Having regard to the fact that the Reserve Bank of India exercises control over the Banking Companies, we are of the opinion that the said Circular letter was binding on the Banking Companies. The officials of UCO Bank were, therefore, bound by the said circular letter.” The Apex Court in Jayantilal Amratlal Shodhan v F. N. Rana: AIR 1964 SC 648 held that: “17. … This is not to say that every order issued by an executive authority has the force of law. If the order is purely administrative, or is not issued in exercise of any statutory authority it may not have the force of law. But where a general order is issued even by an executive authority which confers power exercisable under a statute, and which thereby in substance modifies or adds to the statute, such conferment of powers must be regarded as having the force of law.” 12. It is also fairly settled that the manner of appointment and condition prescribed under Article 309 of the Constitution cannot be amended by an executive order and instructions issued under Article 162 of the Constitution. It is also fairly settled that the manner of appointment and condition prescribed under Article 309 of the Constitution cannot be amended by an executive order and instructions issued under Article 162 of the Constitution. Therefore, the said Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1998 cannot be taken as amendment of the Recruitment Rules, 2000 for the post of Naib Subedar (GD) framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India (Ref: Punjab State Warehousing Corpn., Chandigarh v. Manmohan Singh & Anr: (2007) 9 SCC 337 ). However, it is clear from the Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1998 that it is the model code of DPC so that DPC could be held timely. As discussed above, if an instruction/executive instruction specifies a time for completion of a certain thing without any penal consequences, it will be treated as directory where a statutory functionary is asked to perform duty within the time prescribed. Therefore, the said Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1998 is directory and it should be interpreted by observing the maxim of ut res magis valeat quam pereat (it is better for a thing to have effect than to be made void). The Apex Court in H.S. Vankani & Ors v. State of Gujrat & Ors: (2010) 4 SCC 301 held that: “43. ….. The legislature expects the court to observe the maxim of ut res magis valeat quam pereat (it is better for a thing to have effect than to be made void). The principle also means that if the obvious intention of the statute gives rise to obstacle in implementation, the court must do its best to find ways of overcoming those obstacles, so as to avoid absurd results. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation of statutes that a construction should not be put on a statutory provision which would lead to manifest absurdity, futility, palpable injustice and absurd inconvenience or anomaly.” 13. The Apex Court in a catena of cases held that the seniority of the officer/employee which has been once fixed and invariably followed for a long time, should not be unsettled after a lapse of time. (Ref:- (i) Union of India & Ors v. S.K. Goel & Ors: (2007) 14 SCC 641; (ii) H.S. Vankani’s case (Supra) and; (iii) Shiba Shankar Mohapatra & Ors v. State of Orissa & Anr: (2010) 12 SCC 471 ). 14. The Apex Court in S.K. Goel’s case (Supra) held that: “28. ….. (Ref:- (i) Union of India & Ors v. S.K. Goel & Ors: (2007) 14 SCC 641; (ii) H.S. Vankani’s case (Supra) and; (iii) Shiba Shankar Mohapatra & Ors v. State of Orissa & Anr: (2010) 12 SCC 471 ). 14. The Apex Court in S.K. Goel’s case (Supra) held that: “28. ….. In the absence of any violation, the impugned order of the High Court while undertaking a judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is wholly unjustified. Since the matter of seniority has been well settled and this Court in a plethora of cases has held that the seniority/promotion granted on the strength of DPC selection should not be unsettled after a lapse of time. …..” The Apex Court in H.S. Vankani’s case (Supra) held that: “34. We are of the view that the Government has committed a grave error in unsettling the inter se seniority of the graduates and non-graduates which was settled as early as in the year 1982. The State Government in its letter dated 12.10.1982 had taken the view that two years’ training was imparted to non-graduates of 1979-81 batch and one year training was imparted only to graduates of 1980-81 batch since candidates with lesser qualification required thorough training compared to the candidates with higher qualification. Due to this basic difference in the educational qualification between the 1979-81 and 1980-81 batches, the Government took a conscious decision that it was not proper to unsettle the settled seniority even if there was a delay in the appointment of non-graduates. Subsequent to that decision, three gradation lists were published, recognizing the seniority of the respondents over the appellants. 35. Neither the Government order dated 12.10.1982 nor the Gradation lists were challenged before any forum which in our view had attained finality. After a period of two years yet another representation was submitted which was rejected by the Conservator of Forests vide his communication dated 5.3.1987 referring to the earlier Government order dated 12.01.1982. Fresh gradation list was published on 1.1.1989 where also respondent’s seniority was recognized. Representations dated 23.05.1989 and 03.05.1990 preferred by the appellants were also not favourably considered by the Government or the Chief Conservator of Forests. 38. Seniority is a civil right which has an important and vital role to play in one’s service career. Fresh gradation list was published on 1.1.1989 where also respondent’s seniority was recognized. Representations dated 23.05.1989 and 03.05.1990 preferred by the appellants were also not favourably considered by the Government or the Chief Conservator of Forests. 38. Seniority is a civil right which has an important and vital role to play in one’s service career. Future promotion of a Government servant depends either on strict seniority or on the basis of seniority-cum-merit or merit-cum-seniority etc. Seniority once settled is decisive in the upward march in one’s chosen work or calling and gives certainty and assurance and boosts the morale to do quality work. It instills confidence, spreads harmony and commands respect among colleagues which is a paramount factor for good and sound administration. If the settled seniority at the instance of one’s junior in service is unsettled, it may generate bitterness, resentment, hostility among the Government servants and the enthusiasm to do quality work might be lost. Such a situation may drive the parties to approach the administration for resolution of that acrimonious and poignant situation, which may consume lot of time and energy. The decision either way may drive the parties to litigative wilderness to the advantage of legal professionals both private and Government, driving the parties to acute penury. It is well known that salary they earn, may not match the litigation expenses and professional fees and may at times drive the parties to other sources of money making, including corruption. Public money is also being spent by the Government to defend their otherwise untenable stand. Further it also consumes lot of judicial time from the lowest court to the highest resulting in constant bitterness among parties at the cost of sound administration affecting public interest. 48. The above legal principles clearly indicate that the courts have to avoid a construction of an enactment that leads to an unworkable, inconsistent or impracticable results, since such a situation is unlikely to have been envisaged by the Rule making authority. Rule making authority also expects rule framed by it to be made workable and never visualises absurd results. 48. The above legal principles clearly indicate that the courts have to avoid a construction of an enactment that leads to an unworkable, inconsistent or impracticable results, since such a situation is unlikely to have been envisaged by the Rule making authority. Rule making authority also expects rule framed by it to be made workable and never visualises absurd results. The decision taken by the government in deputing the non-graduates (1979-81 batch) to a two year training course and graduates (1980-81 batch) to a one year training is in due compliance with Rule 10 of 1969 Rules and Rule 18 of 1974 Rules and the seniority of both the batches has been rightly settled vide orders dated 12.10.1982 and 5.3.1987 and the government has committed an error in unsettling the seniority under its proceedings dated 29-9-1993.” The Apex Court in Shiba Shankar Mohapatra’s case (Supra) held that: “27. In Dinkar Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra: (1999) 1 SCC 354 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 216 this Court held that delay and laches in challenging the seniority is always fatal, but in case the party satisfies the Court regarding delay, the case may be considered. 28. In K.A. Abdul Majeed v. State of Kerala: (2001) 6 SCC 292 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 955 this Court held that seniority assigned to any employee could not be challenged after a lapse of seven years on the ground that his initial appointment had been irregular, though even on merit it was found that seniority of the petitioner therein had correctly been fixed. 30. Thus, in view of the above, the settled legal proposition that emerges is that once the seniority had been fixed and it remain in existence for a reasonable period, any challenge to the same should not be entertained. In K.R. Mudgal, this Court has laid down, in crystal clear words that a seniority list which remains in existence for 3 to 4 years unchallenged, should not be disturbed. Thus, 3-4 years is a reasonable period for challenging the seniority and in case someone agitates the issue of seniority beyond this period, he has to explain the delay and laches in approaching the adjudicatory forum, by furnishing satisfactory explanation.” 15. Thus, 3-4 years is a reasonable period for challenging the seniority and in case someone agitates the issue of seniority beyond this period, he has to explain the delay and laches in approaching the adjudicatory forum, by furnishing satisfactory explanation.” 15. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the seniority position of the petitioner in the inter-se seniority list of the Naib Subedars (GD) working at 31 Assam Rifles, which had been settled about 8 years ago and followed invariably cannot be unsettled by the impugned orders dated 05.07.2013, 11.09.2013 and letter dated 07.10.2013 by modifying the proceedings of the DPC held on 2005 (in fact as per records there was no review of the DPC of the year 2005 by holding review DPC) by taking the Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1998 as an amendment to the said Recruitment Rules, 2000 for the post of Naib Subedar (GD) and also taking it is a mandatory one and not directory having completely lost sight of the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat and also that the seniority list once settled cannot be unsettled after the lapse of a number of years. Accordingly, the impugned orders dated 05.07.2013, 11.09.2013 and letter dated 07.10.2013 are hereby quashed and set aside. 16. However, this judgment and order in the given case of this writ petition is qua the writ petitioner only and it shall not be taken as a precedent for non-compliance of the Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1998 in any other case, and ordered accordingly. 17. Writ petition is allowed. 18. Parties are to bear their own costs.