JUDGMENT P.R. Shivakumar, J. 1. The unsuccessful plaintiff in the Original Suit No. 548 of 2004 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Uthamapalayam, is the appellant in the Second Appeal. After suffering a decree of dismissal of his suit in the hands of the trial Court, he prosecuted an appeal before the lower Appellate Court in Appeal Suit No. 9 of 2007 on the file of the Sub Court, Uthamapalayam and before the lower Appellate Court also, he suffered a set back as the said appeal was dismissed by the lower Appellate Court by a Judgment and Decree dated 31.10.2007. Thus, the appellant in the Second Appeal has been forced to approach this Court with the present Second Appeal. 2. Notice before admission was ordered and the respondents are before this Court and they are represented by counsel. The first respondent is represented by Mr. M.Karuppasamy Pandian, whereas the second respondent is represented by Mr. R.Anandraj, learned Special Government Pleader. 3. The following have been suggested as the substantial questions of law involved in the Second Appeal:- "1. Whether the lessee continuing to be in possession of the property let out to him could be considered to be in illegal occupation and as such whether he would be liable to be thrown away from the property otherwise than in accordance with law? 2. When the landlord had not issued notice of termination of tenancy after the expiry of the lease period, whether the lease shall have deemed to be renewed or extended or whether the person shall be deemed to be a tenancy holding over? 3. Whether the possession of lessee after expiry of the period of lease could not be considered to be as a legal possession?" 4. The arguments advanced by Mr. S.Subbiah, learned counsel for the appellant, by Mr. M.Karuppasamy Pandian, learned counsel for the first respondent and by Mr. R.Anandraj, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the second respondent are heard. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the Second Appeal being one which can be disposed of without sending for the records from the lower Court based on the facts which are not in dispute, the Second Appeal can be disposed of now itself. 6. R.Anandraj, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the second respondent are heard. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the Second Appeal being one which can be disposed of without sending for the records from the lower Court based on the facts which are not in dispute, the Second Appeal can be disposed of now itself. 6. Accordingly, after hearing the arguments advanced on both sides and perusing the copies of the Judgments of the Courts below and copies of the other records produced in the form of typed set of papers, this Court pronounces the following Judgment. 7. The admitted facts are as follows. 8. The suit property belongs to Poolananteeswarar Temple, Chinnamanur and it was leased out in an auction conducted by the Executive Officer of the said Temple for a initial period of three years from 01.07.2000 to 30.06.2003. In the subsequent auction also, the lease was granted in favour of the appellant for another three years from 01.07.2003 to 30.06.2006. On the expiry of the second term of the lease by 30.06.2006, the appellant failed to surrender possession. He was also in arrears of rent to some extent. Not willing to part with the property, the appellant approached the trial Court with the suit in Original Suit No. 548 of 2004 for a bare injunction not to evict him forcibly without adopting due process of law. The said prayer was made based on his contention that though he was ready to have a negotiation with the Temple authorities and the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Authorities for getting a fresh lease in accordance with law, the Executive Officer of the Temple was determined to prevent him to do so by making an attempt to throw him out without following the procedure contemplated in the general law or in the special law, namely the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 and that he had no other option than to approach the trial Court for a limited injunction as indicated supra. 9. The suit was resisted by the respondents contending that the status of the appellant after the expiry of the lease period being one equivalent to trespasser, he could not seek an injunction against the Temple, the real owner and the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Authorities unless he has got a better right restricting the right of the real owner. The suit was resisted by the respondents contending that the status of the appellant after the expiry of the lease period being one equivalent to trespasser, he could not seek an injunction against the Temple, the real owner and the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Authorities unless he has got a better right restricting the right of the real owner. It was also contended that since the appellant was in arrears in payment of rent, he was not entitled to the equitable relief of injunction. On the other hand, it was contended by the appellant that though he was ready to pay the arrears of rent, the Executive Officer, who had determined to throw him out, refused to accept the same. In the above said background of the case, the parties proceeded with the trial and the learned trial Judge, at the conclusion of trial, non-suited the plaintiff for the reliefs sought for by him on the following two grounds. (i) The lease period having expired, the appellant could not hold the Temple for a ransom and claim equitable relief of injunction in the civil Court against the Temple, which is the owner of the property. (ii) The appellant having failed to pay the arrears of rent was not entitled to the relief of injunction. 10. On appeal, the learned lower Appellate Judge concurred with the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. 11. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant does not claim any right of perpetual lease or a right of renewal of the lease and that on the other hand, he wanted to persuade the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Authorities in a legal manner to grant him lease on terms to be agreed for a further period in respect of the suit property and that only in order to scuttle the chance of the appellant doing so, the Executive Officer of the Temple wanted to throw him out without even following the procedure contemplated under Section 78 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959. 12. 12. According to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant who continues to be in possession after the expiry of the lease period shall be deemed to be a trespasser for the purpose of Section 78 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 and a procedure has been contemplated under the said Section for eviction of such trespassers. It is the further contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the very attitude of the Executive Officer, who is adamant in throwing out the appellant without even adopting the summary procedure contemplated under the Act, will exhibit the intention of the Executive Officer not to follow due process of law and that hence, the appellant should be granted a limited relief of injunction not to evict him without following the procedure contemplated under Sections 78 and 79 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 or the procedures contemplated in the general law. 13. Per contra, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the first respondent that the petitioner cannot be considered to be a trespasser to attract Section 78 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959. It is his further contention that even assuming that the appellant could be deemed to be a trespasser as per the explanation found in Section 78 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, the Courts below rightly refused to grant equitable relief of injunction as it had been sought for against the real owner that too without even paying the arrears of rent. 14. The learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the Joint Commissioner (second respondent) is fair enough to concede that evil consequences can be avoided by the first respondent by giving an undertaking to the Court or proving that he is not intending to take any auction without following the procedure contemplated under Section 78 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959. 15. From the argument advanced on behalf of the first respondent, it transpires that the first respondent is not even prepared to give such an undertaking and on the other hand, claims that the appellant, who has come to the Court not with clean hands, can be thrown out disregarding whatever procedure that might have been contemplated under law. 16. 15. From the argument advanced on behalf of the first respondent, it transpires that the first respondent is not even prepared to give such an undertaking and on the other hand, claims that the appellant, who has come to the Court not with clean hands, can be thrown out disregarding whatever procedure that might have been contemplated under law. 16. Of course, it is true that a person coming to the Court seeking the equitable relief of injunction should come with clean hands and that the fact that he has come with unclean hands may be a ground for not granting such a relief. We cannot brush aside the contention of the appellant that though the appellant was ready to pay the rent and in fact he tendered the amount, the Executive Officer refused to receive it with the aim of throwing him out. The mere fact that the appellant has not chosen to seek the leave of the Court to deposit arrears of rent to the credit of the suit shall not be enough to show lack of bonafide on his part. On the other hand, the projected refusal on the part of the Executive Officer to receive the rent and the proved determination of the Executive Officer to throw the appellant even without adopting the summary procedure contemplated under Section 78 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 will be enough to hold that the appellant has made out a case for the exercise of the discretion in his favour for the grant of the relief of the limited injunction not to disturb his possession otherwise than by adopting due process of law. 17. Admittedly, the lease period expired by 30.06.2006. Even thereafter, the appellant continues to be in possession and enjoyment of the suit property. His possession after the expiry of the lease period cannot be termed as a possession by a lessee holding over or a legal possession than the possession of a trespasser in view of the explanation found in Section 78 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, stating that a person, who continues to remain in the property after the expiry of the lease, shall be deemed to be a trespasser for the purpose of the said provision. Hence, the questions sought to be projected as second and third substantial questions of law are bound to be answered against the appellant. 18. So far as the question that is projected as the first substantial question of law is concerned, this Court cannot reject it as there is no substance in it. Though the possession of the lessee after the expiry of the lease period shall be deemed to be a trespasser, such a possession being an established possession cannot be disturbed without following due process of law. The property being a Temple property and the first respondent being a public Temple, two alternative courses are open to the first respondent; the first one being the procedure contemplated under Section 78 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 whereby the Assistant Commissioner either suo motu or on a complaint made by the Trustee (here the Executive Officer cum fit person), can submit a report to the second respondent, namely the Joint Commissioner, who shall there upon pass an order for removal of encroachment following the procedure contemplated under sub- Section 2 of Section 78 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 which can be enforced as per the procedure contemplated under Section79 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959; and the second one by approaching the civil Court for ejectment. 19. As the stand taken by the first respondent reveals that the first respondent is not intending to adopt either of the above said courses, the said question projected as the first substantial question of law is bound to be answered in favour of the appellant and against the respondents and accordingly, the said question is answered. 20. In view of the answer to the first question projected as the substantial question of law, this Court comes to the conclusion that the decree of the trial Court, which was confirmed by the lower Appellate Court, has got to be interfered with and set aside and at the same time, the appellant has to be granted the relief of a limited perpetual injunction not to interfere with his possession without adopting due process of law as indicated supra. 21. Resultantly, the Second Appeal succeeds and the same is allowed. 21. Resultantly, the Second Appeal succeeds and the same is allowed. The decree of the trial Court and the decree of the lower Appellate Court confirming the decree of the trial Court are set aside and the original suit is decreed as prayed for. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.