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2015 DIGILAW 2309 (BOM)

ICICI Bank Limited v. Anil Printers Limited

2015-10-08

R.M.SAVANT

body2015
JUDGMENT : 1. Admit. With the consent of the Learned Counsel for the parties heard forthwith. 2. The Revisionary Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked against the order dated 02.05.2015 passed by the Learned 7th Joint Civil Judge Senior Division, Nashik, by which order the application Exh.19 filed by the Applicant herein i.e. Defendant No.1 to the suit in question invoking Section 9A of the CPC to question the jurisdiction of the Civil Court came to be rejected and the Trial Court ruled that it has jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit in question. 3. The facts which are necessary to be cited for the adjudication of the above Civil Revision Application can in brief be stated thus. The parties would be referred to as per their status in the suit. The Plaintiff i.e. the Respondent No.1 herein is having a printing industry and has factories in Satpur, Ambad and Gonde in Nashik District. The Plaintiff applied for various loan facilities including Working Capital Credit Facility to the Defendant No.1 i.e. Applicant herein. The Plaintiff was granted Working Capital Credit Facility to the tune of Rs.6,00,00,000/ (In short “WC Facility”), Non Fund Based Credit Facility by way of Letter of Credit (One time) facility of Rs.30,00,00,000/as a sub limit of Foreign Currency Term Loan/External Commercial Borrowings (In short “LC Facility”) and Derivative Facility of Rs.3,00,00,000/( In short “Derivative Facility”). On the Plaintiff committing default in making payment towards the various loan facilities granted to it, the accounts of the Plaintiff with the Defendant No.1 became irregular and were declared as NonPerforming Assets (NPA) on 31.03.2011. The Defendant No.1 thereafter recalled the entire loan facilities vide letter dated 18.01.2013 addressed to the Plaintiff with a copy of the same marked to the Directors and Guarantors of the Plaintiff. By the said letters/recall notices the Defendant No.1 called upon the Plaintiff and its Directors and Guarantors and demanded payment of the outstanding dues aggregating to Rs.43,68,83,887.30. A statutory notice was thereafter issued under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (For short “SARFAESI Act”) came to be issued on 15.07.2013. The outstanding dues from the Plaintiff as on 30.06.2013 were in the sum of Rs.45,51,32,765.90. A statutory notice was thereafter issued under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (For short “SARFAESI Act”) came to be issued on 15.07.2013. The outstanding dues from the Plaintiff as on 30.06.2013 were in the sum of Rs.45,51,32,765.90. The Defendant No.1 thereafter took measures under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act in relation to which the Plaintiff has filed a Securitization Application No.109 of 2014 and the same is pending before the DRTII, Mumbai. The Defendant No.1 has filed Original Application No.47 of 2014 under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (For short “RDDBFI Act”), wherein the Plaintiff has not filed its Written Statement and the same is pending before the DRTII, Mumbai. In so far as the outstanding dues are concerned, the same as on 31.01.2014 are in the sum of Rs.49,03,43,568.12. 4. It is after the notice dated 30.04.2014 came to be issued under the SARFAESI Act that the Respondent No.1 herein filed Special Civil Suit No.533 of 2014 in the Court of the Learned Civil Judge Senior Division, Nashik. The reliefs sought in the said suit read thus: “a. To order and decree that the Defendant No.1 shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of Rs.22,90,39,138.00 (Rupees twenty two crores ninety lacs thirty nine thousand and one hundred thirty eight only) and also to order and decree that both the Defendants jointly and severally shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of Rs.100,00,00,000.00 (Rupees hundred crores only) together with interest thereon @ 18% p.a. from the date of this suit until final realization thereof. b. To declare that the Defendant No.1 is not entitled to recovery any amount from the Plaintiff. c. To restrain the Defendant No.1, its officers, agents and any persons claiming through them from selling, transferring, alienating and or creating any sort of third party interest in the said property under the scheduled auction dated 30.12.2014 and or in any other future date and auction as may be rescheduled thereafter. d. Pending the final disposal of the present suit the Plaintiff be granted with the interim and or adinterim relief in terms of prayer clause (c). d. Pending the final disposal of the present suit the Plaintiff be granted with the interim and or adinterim relief in terms of prayer clause (c). e. Further to order and decree in respect of the amounts by way of expenses incurred by the Plaintiff from the date of filing of the suit till decree together with interest at 18% p.a. and/or as may be ascertained and allowed at the time of passing the decree from the Defendants jointly and severally. f. The Hon'ble Court be pleased to allow the Plaintiffs in the interest of justice to add, alter or amend the present suit and pleadings for properly establishing the facts therein considering the circumstances prevailing then. g. Any other relief deemed fit under the circumstances of the case favouring the Plaintiff.” 5. In so far as the prayer clause (a) is concerned, the Plaintiff as can be seen is seeking damages in the sum of Rs.22,90,39,138.90 and Rs.100,00,00,000.00 for emotional distress and mental agony. The foundation for which is sought to be laid in the plaint. The foundation for the same is to the effect that the Plaintiff was in the process of negotiating with the Defendant No.2 for the sale of the properties. However, in view of the interference of the Defendant No.1 that the sale did not materialize and it is alleged by the Plaintiff that the Defendants have committed the acts, omissions and/or commissions under hatched conspiracy to grab the said properties of the Plaintiff at throw away prices to the loss of the Plaintiff whereby the Defendants shall gain illegally. In support of the said case, the Plaintiff seeks to rely upon the Letters of Intent (LOIs) dated 17.06.2014 and 04.08.2014 of the Defendant No.2. Hence, the case of the Plaintiff in respect of the said claim of Rs.22,90,39,138.90 and Rs.100,00,00,000.00 is to the effect that the transaction did not materialize on account of the officers of the Defendant No.1 who were according to the Plaintiff interested in selling the property at throw away price to the Defendant No.2. This appears to be the sum and substance of the allegation of the Plaintiff in so far as the claim for the amount of Rs.22,90,39,138.90 and Rs.100,00,00,000.00 is concerned. 6. This appears to be the sum and substance of the allegation of the Plaintiff in so far as the claim for the amount of Rs.22,90,39,138.90 and Rs.100,00,00,000.00 is concerned. 6. Having regard to the frame of the suit and considering the reliefs which have been sought, the Defendant No.1 filed the instant application invoking Section 9A of the CPC and questioning the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try the suit on the touchstone of Section 34 r/w Section 18 and 19 of RDDBFI Act. The Trial Court by its order dated 31.01.2015 framed the following two issues. “1) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this Suit ? 2) What order ?” 7. The Trial Court considered the said application principally on the ground that it is the case of the Plaintiff that the Defendant No.1 has hatched civil conspiracy to grab the costly properties of the Plaintiff at a throw away price and since the relief of damages and declaration cannot be adjudicated by any of the Tribunal or Authority created under the SARFAESI Act or under any other Act held that it has the jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit. As indicated above, it is the said order dated 02.05.2015 which is taken exception to by way of the above Petition. 8. The Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Applicant i.e. original Defendant No.1 Mr. Mayur Khandeparkar would contend that having regard to the reliefs sought and especially the relief sought vide prayer clause (b) and (c), the suit is exfacie barred by virtue of Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. The Learned Counsel would contend that though it was the case of the Plaintiff in the suit that a fraud was practiced by the officers of the Defendant No.1 Bank, significantly no evidence was adduced in the course of adjudication of the instant application filed under Section 9A. The Learned Counsel would contend that the pleadings if taken as a whole hardly make out a case of fraud, and a case for grant of damages to the Plaintiff so as to maintain the suit before the Civil Court. The Learned Counsel would contend that the pleadings if taken as a whole hardly make out a case of fraud, and a case for grant of damages to the Plaintiff so as to maintain the suit before the Civil Court. The Learned Counsel would contend that the case of the Plaintiff in the plaint that it was negotiating with the Defendant No.2 and that the transaction between the Plaintiff and the Defendant No.2 did not go through on account of the conduct of the Defendant No.1 has to be considered in the context of the fact that the asset is a secured asset and in support of which Section 13(13) would be applicable. The Learned Counsel would contend that the claim for damages has been merely introduced in the suit so as to see to it that the suit is maintainable before the Civil Court as otherwise the Plaintiff has admitted in the plaint that the Defendant had not consented to the proposed transaction between the Plaintiff and the Defendant No.2 on the ground that the outstanding dues are more than Rs.45 crores. 9. Per contra, the Learned Counsel Mr. M. S. Karnik appearing for the Respondent No.1/original Plaintiff would support the impugned order, in so far as it holds that the Civil Court has jurisdiction. The Learned Counsel would contend that the damages are sought on the basis that the deal between the Plaintiff and the Defendant No.2 did not go through on account of the Defendant No.1 and it is the case of the Plaintiff that the Defendant No.2 backed out from the deal on account of the fact that the Defendant No.2 in conspiracy with the officers of the Defendant No.1 wanted to grab the property at throw away price. The Learned Counsel would seek to buttress his submission as regards the claim of damages on account of the alleged fraud by drawing this Court's attention to the Petitioners averments in the plaint. The Learned Counsel sought to buttress his case that the transaction between the Plaintiff and the Defendant No.1 was in the process of being finalized by placing reliance upon the two LOIs dated 17.06.2014 and 04.08.2014. 10. Having heard the Learned Counsel for the parties, I have considered the rival contentions. The Learned Counsel sought to buttress his case that the transaction between the Plaintiff and the Defendant No.1 was in the process of being finalized by placing reliance upon the two LOIs dated 17.06.2014 and 04.08.2014. 10. Having heard the Learned Counsel for the parties, I have considered the rival contentions. The vexed issue as to whether a suit filed by a borrower in respect of the measures adopted under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act is maintainable before the Civil Court has once again engaged the attention of this Court. The provisions of the SARFAESI Act and the RDDBFI Act which are relevant in the context of the challenge raised in the above Petition are Section 13(2), 13(4), 13(13), 34 and Section 19(8) of the RDDBFI Act, the same are reproduced hereunder for the sake of ready reference : “13. Enforcement of security interest. (1) ............................. (2) Where any borrower, who is under a liability to a secured creditor under a security agreement, makes any default in repayment of secured debt or any instalment thereof, and his account in respect of such debt in classified b the secured creditor as nonperforming asset, then, the secured creditor may require the borrower by notice in writing to discharge in full his liabilities to the secured creditor within sixty days from the date of notice failing which the secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of the rights under subsection (4). (3) ............................... (3) ............................... (4) In case the borrower fails to discharge his liability in full within the period specified in subsection (2), the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the following measures to recover his secured debt, namely : (a) take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset; [(b) take over the management of the business of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset: Provided that the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale shall be exercised only where the substantial part of the business of the borrower is held as security for the debt: Provided further that where the management of whole of the business or part of the business is severable, the secured creditor shall take over the management of such business of the borrower which is relatable to the security for the debt;] (c) appoint any person (hereafter referred to as the manager), to manage the secured assets the possession of which has been taken over by the secured creditor; (d) require at any time by notice in writing, any person who has acquired any of the secured assets from the borrower and from whom any money is due or may become due to the borrower, to pay the secured creditor, so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the secured debt. (5) …................. (6) …................. (7) …................. (8) …................. (9) …................. (10) …................. (11) …................. (12) …................. (13) No borrower shall, after receipt of notice referred to in subsection (2), transfer by way of sale, lease or otherwise (other than in the ordinary course of his business) any of his secured assets referred to in the notice, without prior written consent of the secured creditor. 34. Civil Court not to have jurisdiction. (11) …................. (12) …................. (13) No borrower shall, after receipt of notice referred to in subsection (2), transfer by way of sale, lease or otherwise (other than in the ordinary course of his business) any of his secured assets referred to in the notice, without prior written consent of the secured creditor. 34. Civil Court not to have jurisdiction. - No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993). 19. Application to the Tribunal. (1) ........................ (2) ….................... (3) ….................... (4) ….................... (5) ….................... (6) ….................... (7) ….................... (8) A defendant in an application may, in addition to his right of pleading a setoff under subsection (6), set up, by way of counterclaim against the claim of the applicant, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the applicant either before or after the filing of the application but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such counterclaim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not.” 11. At this stage, it would also be apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in Mardia Chemicals Limited and others Vs. Union of India and others reported in 2004(2) Mh.L.J. 1090 and especially paragraph 51 of the said judgment which for the sake of ready reference is reproduced hereinunder : “51. However, to a very limited extent jurisdiction of the Civil Court can also be invoked, where for example, the action of the secured creditor is alleged to be fraudulent or their claim may be so absurd and untenable which may not BGP. 12 of 20 require any probe, whatsoever or to say precisely to the extent the scope is permissible to bring an action in the Civil Court in the cases of English mortgages. 12 of 20 require any probe, whatsoever or to say precisely to the extent the scope is permissible to bring an action in the Civil Court in the cases of English mortgages. We find such a scope having been recognized in the two decisions of the Madras High Court which have been relied upon heavily by the learned Attorney General as well appearing for the Union of India, namely V. Narasimhachariar (supra) P.135 at p. 141 and 144, a judgment of the learned single Judge where it is observed as follows in para 22 : “The remedies of a mortgagor against the mortgagee who is acting in violation of the rights, duties and obligations are two fold in character. The mortgagor can come to the Court before sale with an injunction for staying the sale if there are materials to show that the power of sale is being exercised in a fraudulent or improper manner contrary to the terms of the mortgage. But the pleadings in an action for restraining a sale by mortgagee must clearly disclose a fraud or irregularity on the basis of which relief is sought: 'Adams vs. Scott, (1859) 7 WR (Eng.) 213 (Z49). I need not point that this restraint on the exercise of the power of sale will be exercised by Courts only under the limited circumstances mentioned above because otherwise to grant such an injunction would be to cancel one of the clauses of the deed to which both the parties had agreed and annul one of the chief securities on which persons advancing money on mortgages rely. (See Rashbehary Ghose Law of Mortgages, Vol.II, Fourth Edn., page 784).” 12. The judgment of the Apex Court in Mardia Chemicals Limited's case (supra) is an exposition in the Apex Court in so far as the SARFAESI Act and the powers of the Tribunals under the said Act and the bar of jurisdiction postulated in the said SARFAESI Act is concerned. The Apex Court in paragraph 51 has stated that only in the cases where there is a fraud alleged that a suit would be maintainable before the Civil Court. 13. It is in the said context that the facts of the present case would have to be considered. The Apex Court in paragraph 51 has stated that only in the cases where there is a fraud alleged that a suit would be maintainable before the Civil Court. 13. It is in the said context that the facts of the present case would have to be considered. As adverted to hereinabove, the main three substantive reliefs sought in the suit are the damages of Rs.22,90,39,138.00 and Rs.100,00,00,000.00 for emotional distress and loss of reputation. The second prayer i.e. prayer (b) is to the effect that the Defendant No.1 is not entitled to recover any amount from the Plaintiff and vide prayer clause (c), the Plaintiff is claiming the relief that the Defendant No.1, its officers, agents and any persons claiming through them be restrained from selling, transferring, alienating and or creating any sort of third party interest in the said property. In so far as prayer clauses (b) and (c) are concerned, they are exfacie referable to the measures taken under Section 13 and therefore, the suit in respect of the said prayers is barred by Section 34. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1 Mr. M. S. Karnik though was at pains to justify the maintainability of the suit was not able to justify the same having regard to prayer clauses (b) and (c) with any deal of conviction. It is prayer clause (a) which can be said to be the defining prayer on the touchstone of which the issue as regards the maintainability of the suit as it were is to be adjudicated. The foundation for claiming the amounts as mentioned in prayer clause (a) i.e. Rs.22,90,39,138.00 and Rs.100,00,00,000.00 as per the submission of the Learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1 Mr. M. S. Karnik has been laid in the plaint. The gist of the said averments can be referred to in brief. The relevant excerpts of the relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereinunder for the sake of ready reference : Paragraph No.7 : “Thus during August 2011 the Defendant No.1 restructured the credit limits of the Plaintiff and fictitiously released the amount of Rs.03.75 crores to the Plaintiff under the head Working Capital Term Loan (WCTL). The relevant excerpts of the relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereinunder for the sake of ready reference : Paragraph No.7 : “Thus during August 2011 the Defendant No.1 restructured the credit limits of the Plaintiff and fictitiously released the amount of Rs.03.75 crores to the Plaintiff under the head Working Capital Term Loan (WCTL). In fact these funds were not allowed to be utilized by the Plaintiff as those were directed to be kept in fixed deposits with them for the purpose of payment of interest as may have been applied by the Defendant No.1 to the loan accounts of the Plaintiff from time to time.” “The entire exercise on the part of the Defendant No.1 is nothing but an unsuccessful effort to dodge the RBI norms and to maintain the balance sheet is good state to the heavy costs of the Plaintiff.” Paragraph No.8 : “Thereafter in its further efforts the Plaintiff located a buyer engaged to an extent with similar business activities and to whom Gonde unit of the Plaintiff was most suitable. Thus the Defendant No.2 got introduced to the Plaintiff.” Paragraph No.9 : “The entire amount of the sale proceeds were to be utilized by the Plaintiff towards the repayment of the Defendant No.1 hence to an extent the Defendant No.1 was also involved initially in the deal talks. However, in between the Defendant No.1 took a stand that its recoveries from the Plaintiff are to the extent of Rs.45.00 crores hence they did not consented to the deal as was to be completed with Defendant No.2. However, in between the Defendant No.1 took a stand that its recoveries from the Plaintiff are to the extent of Rs.45.00 crores hence they did not consented to the deal as was to be completed with Defendant No.2. In view of the circumstances the repayment under settlement with the Defendant No.1 was not possible hence the deal was closed.” Paragraph No.10 : “It is further submitted that due to above adamant stand of the Defendant No.1 the deal could not progress as envisaged therefore the Plaintiff once again made efforts and in response to the hectic efforts on the part of the Plaintiff, the Defendant No.2 agreed to improve its earlier offer and thus quoted fresh LOI wherein the Defendant No.2 agreed to purchase the assets of the Plaintiff as above for total consideration of Euro 4.1 million (Rs.33.00 crores approx.) which amount could have taken care of the recoveries of the Defendant No.1 under one time settlement (OTS).” Paragraph No.11 : “However after having their meeting with the Defendant No.1 the Defendant No.2 did not remain in touch with the Plaintiff and even did not respond to the calls of the Plaintiff. For the reasons best known to the Defendant No.2 it did not come ahead to complete the deal as agreed.” Paragraph No.13 : “Subsequent to the issuance of notice U/s 13(4) of The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 the Defendant No.1 invited public offers by publishing a auction notice in local newspapers and in response thereto the Defendant No.2 has collected the tender forms and is in process of tendering its bid for the said properties and intends to now acquire the assets of the Plaintiff through bank instead of performing the LOI which it had executed with the Plaintiff.” Paragraph No.14 : “The Defendants have committed the acts, omissions and/or commissions under hatched conspiracy to grab the said properties of the Plaintiff at throw away prices to the loss of the Plaintiff whereby the Defendants shall gain illegally.” 14. Hence, as indicated hereinabove, the sum and substance of the case of the Plaintiff is that the Defendants i.e. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 have jointly conspired to grab the properties of the Plaintiff at throw away prices to the loss of the Plaintiff. Hence, as indicated hereinabove, the sum and substance of the case of the Plaintiff is that the Defendants i.e. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 have jointly conspired to grab the properties of the Plaintiff at throw away prices to the loss of the Plaintiff. As indicated above, though the averments revolving around the conduct of the Defendant No.1 are appearing in the plaint significantly in the adjudication of the application filed under Section 9A, no evidence was led by the Plaintiff. The Trial Court has proceeded on a totally erroneous basis by accepting the averments made in the plaint when the same have not been supported by any evidence led by the Plaintiff. The averments which revolve around the conduct of the Defendant No.1 could not have been accepted by the Trial Court without the same being supported by any evidence of the Plaintiff. In so far as Section 9A is concerned, it is well settled that the adjudication of the preliminary issue framed under Section 9A is in the nature of a mini trial as the decision rendered on the jurisdictional issue stands concluded and is no more open for adjudication in the suit. The Trial Court did not proceed on the basis that in the instant case the application was under Section 9A but erroneously proceeded on the basis as if the application was under Order VII Rule (11)(d) by accepting the averments in the plaint and held that since it is the case of the Plaintiff that there is conspiracy, the suit in question would fit within the exception carved out in Mardia Chemicals Limited's case (supra) and would therefore be maintainable. 15. Apart from this, a reference to the provisions of SARFAESI Act would have to be made. As indicated, the Bank has filed Original Application for recovery of the amount of Rs.22,90,39,138.00 and Rs.100,00,00,000.00. If the Plaintiff has any grievance in respect of the computation of the said amount or any matter related thereto, the Plaintiff can file an application under the SARFAESI Act or even a counterclaim under Section 19(8) of the RDDBFI Act. The Plaintiff for the reasons best known to him has not done so and has preferred to file the suit in question for the reliefs claimed. The Plaintiff for the reasons best known to him has not done so and has preferred to file the suit in question for the reliefs claimed. In so far the allegations of the Plaintiff are concerned, even on a bare minimum inquiry being conducted in the context of the averments in the plaint, primafacie the claim made by the Plaintiff for damages on the basis of the said allegations seems to be speculative in nature. Though the Plaintiff claims that the deal between the Plaintiff and the Defendant No.2 was on the verge of materializing, the fact cannot be lost sight of that the deal in respect of the secured assets would not fructify without the consent of the Bank. In fact in terms of Section 13(13) of the SARFAESI Act, no borrower shall, after receipt of notice referred to in subsection (2), transfer by way of sale, lease or otherwise (other than in the ordinary course of his business) any of his secured assets referred to in the notice, without the prior written consent of the secured creditor. The said provision therefore militates against the case of the Plaintiff that the deal was materializing between it and the Defendant No.2, the Plaintiff was in fact aware of the said fact as can be seen from the averments made in paragraph 9 of the plaint extracted above and hence, primafacie, this Court is of the view that the claim made by the Plaintiff is speculative in nature. The averments in the plaint hardly make out a case of the instant suit being covered by the exception in Mardia Chemicals Limited's case (supra). 16. In so far as the judgment in Mardia Chemicals Limited's case (supra) is concerned, this Court had occasion to consider the applicability of the exception carved out in Mardia Chemicals Limited's case (supra). A useful reference could be made to the judgment reported in 2015(4) Mh.L.J. 699 in the matter of Authorised Officer, Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd., Pune Vs. Brahmo Construction Pvt. Ltd., Pune, wherein the factual position can be said to be similar to the factual position prevailing in the instant case as the suit was filed after the measure under Section 13 was taken and the property in fact was auctioned. The auction purchaser had filed the suit alleging a fraud on account of the nondisclosure of the attachment of the Income Tax Department. The auction purchaser had filed the suit alleging a fraud on account of the nondisclosure of the attachment of the Income Tax Department. In the facts of the said case this Court had held that the suit was not maintainable. In the instant case, the Trial Court without going into the relevant aspects has by merely relying upon the averments in the plaint which have not even been substantiated by any evidence led by the Plaintiff in the application under Section 9A has held the suit to be maintainable. The order passed by the Trial Court therefore suffers from an error of jurisdiction. The Trial Court has ruled that it has the jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit, when it had none, in view of Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. The suit is therefore not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed. The Civil Revision Application is allowed to the aforesaid extent, with parties to bear their respective costs. 17. Needless to state that the dismissal of the suit by the instant order would not preclude the Plaintiff from adopting remedies under the SARFAESI Act or the RDDBFI Act by filing appropriate proceedings. If any such proceedings are filed the observations made in the instant order which are in the context of maintainability of the suit would not come in the way of the Plaintiff from prosecuting such proceedings.