Order M.M. Sundresh, J. 1. The petitioner, who has been arrayed as A2 in Crime No. 391 of 2006 of Kadayanallur Police Station for the alleged offences under 120(b) r/w 343, 344, 348, 323, 355, 302, 201, 218 r/w 109 I.P.C. on the file of I Additional Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli, has come forward to file this petition. Before analyzing the legal issue raised, it is imperative to go into the factual matrix surrounding the case. 2. The second respondent's husband was taken for interrogation by the Aralvoimozhi Police and Kadayanallur Police. He has been taken thereafter to Keeriparai Police Station under the guise of interrogation. He was tortured there and done away with. The body was disposed of thereafter. 3. The petitioner was not having any jurisdiction over the Keeriparai Police Station. On the other hand, he was working as Deputy Superintendent of Police at Nagercoil Town. Admittedly, the place of alleged occurrence viz., Keeriparai Police Station does not come within the jurisdiction of the petitioner. 4. The case original registered for man missing was referred to CBCID viz., respondent No. 1. On investigation, the petitioner/A2 was implicated along with other accused for resorting to physical torture. The Revenue Divisional Officer's enquiry was also ordered, which implicated all other accused except the petitioner. After the investigation was over, a charge sheet was laid arraying the petitioner as A2. The alleged occurrence was in the year 2005. The present petition has been filed in the year 2015, seeking to quash the proceedings pending before the Court from the year 2011 onwards. 5. This is the prosecution case in a nutshell. Submissions of the Petitioner: 6. At the outset, the learned counsel for the petitioner has made it very clear that he did not want to go into the alleged facts governing the case. His emphasize was only on the non-observation of Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as no prior sanction was obtained before taking cognizance of the offences against the petitioner. It is contended by the learned counsel that as the petitioner was working as a public servant, in the absence of any prior sanction, the proceedings as against him is liable to be set aside. The learned counsel made reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das, AIR 2006 SC 1599 : (2006) 4 SCC 584 . The learned counsel made reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das, AIR 2006 SC 1599 : (2006) 4 SCC 584 . Submissions of the Respondents: 7. Both the learned Government Advocate (Criminal side) appearing for the first respondent and the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent submitted that when on facts the petitioner did not discharge his official duty, there is no requirement for prior sanction under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The petitioner was not acting in the discharge of his official duty. The statements given by the police officials under Section 164 Cr.P.C. clearly implicate the petitioner. As the allegations against the petitioner fall outside the domain of public duty, no sanction is required. Even otherwise the alleged offences are not in furtherance of the official duty. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner has been rendered on different facts. Even otherwise, the same has been taken note of in Choudhury Parveen Sultana v. State of West Bengal and Another, AIR 2009 SC 1404 : (2009) 3 SCC 398 : (2009) 2 MLJ (Crl) 361 (SC) and explained by holding that all acts done by a public servant in purporting discharge of his official duties cannot as a matter of course be brought under the protective umbrella of Section 197 Cr.P.C. The learned counsel also made reliance upon the following judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court as well. (i) Urmila Devi v. Yudhvir Singh, JT-2013-14-262 : (2013) 15 SCC 624 and (ii) Inspector of Police and Another v. Battenapatla Venkata Ratnam and Another in Criminal Appeal No. 129 of 2013 Batch cases dated 13.04.2015. The Scope of Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code: 8. To bring it under the fold of Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which mandates prior sanction before taking cognizance by a Court, an act must have been done by an officer while doing his official duty. What is important is the action in discharge of his official duty. If there are allegations to the effect that an action of an officer forms any offence not in the discharge of his official duty, not acting or purported to act in discharge of his official duty, then the rigour of Section 197Cr.P.C. would not get attracted. What is important is the action in discharge of his official duty. If there are allegations to the effect that an action of an officer forms any offence not in the discharge of his official duty, not acting or purported to act in discharge of his official duty, then the rigour of Section 197Cr.P.C. would not get attracted. While the allegation is to the effect that the officer has committed the offences alleged, there has to be an established fact that he has acted while discharging his official duty. 9. There has to be a connection between the offences alleged and the discharge of official duty, which will have to be direct and reasonable. In other words, an indirect or unreasonable connection would not bring an action or inaction within the protective umbrella of Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The accused person cannot use his official person to enable him to commit an offence and for that he cannot rely upon Section 197 of Cr.P.C. seeking protection umbrage. Therefore, while an offence alleged can never be done as an official duty, if it is connected in discharge of such a duty, only then, the protection would arise. The question as to whether the offence alleged is while acting or purported to act in discharge of official duty is one of fact, to be decided on the peculiarity of each case. Therefore, construing Section 197 Cr.P.C., a balanced and a moderate approach is mandatory. While an official discharging his official duty is required to be protected for his bona fide action he cannot be allowed to use his official position for indulging in unlawful and illegal activities. All the more reason the provision will not apply to an officer, who is alleged to have committed an offence merely based upon his status and position as a public servant, when such alleged offence is committed not in his official duty. The term official duty takes in its sweep dereliction of duty as well. Discussion: 10. Considering the legal position, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Choudhury Parveen Sultana v. State of West Bengal and Another (supra) holding that when a prohibited act is done by an authority misusing his position, then the protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. cannot be pressed into service. The following paragraph would be apposite: "14. Discussion: 10. Considering the legal position, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Choudhury Parveen Sultana v. State of West Bengal and Another (supra) holding that when a prohibited act is done by an authority misusing his position, then the protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. cannot be pressed into service. The following paragraph would be apposite: "14. The direction which had been given by this Court, as far back as in 1971 in Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava's case (supra) holds good even today. All acts done by a public servant in the purported discharge of his official duties cannot as a matter of course be brought under the protective umbrella of Section 197 Cr.P.C. On the other hand, there can be cases of misuse and/or abuse of powers vested in a public servant which can never be said to be a part of the official duties required to be performed by him. As mentioned in Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava's case (supra), the underlying object of Section 197 Cr.P.C. is to enable the authorities to scrutinize the allegations made against a public servant to shield him/her against frivolous, vexatious or false prosecution initiated with the main object of causing embarrassment and harassment to the said official. However, as indicated hereinabove, if the authority vested in a public servant is misused for doing things which are not otherwise permitted under the law, such acts cannot claim the protection of Section 197 Cr.P.C. and have to be considered de hors the duties which a public servant is required to discharge or perform. Hence, in respect of prosecution for such excesses or misuse of authority, no protection can be demanded by the public servant concerned." 11. In Urmila Devi v. Yudhvir Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has given the ingredients which are required to be satisfied for protection against the prosecution. A fruitful recapitulation is hereunder: "34. ... A careful reading of the above would show that protection against prosecution will be available only if the following ingredients are satisfied: (a) The person concerned is or was a judge or magistrate or public servant. (b) Such person is not removable from his office save by the sanction of the Government. A fruitful recapitulation is hereunder: "34. ... A careful reading of the above would show that protection against prosecution will be available only if the following ingredients are satisfied: (a) The person concerned is or was a judge or magistrate or public servant. (b) Such person is not removable from his office save by the sanction of the Government. (c) Such person is accused of commission of an offence and (d) Such offence is committed while the person concerned was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. 35. THERE is in the instant case no dispute that the first three of the four requirements set out above are satisfied inasmuch as the Respondent public servant was not removable from the office held by him save by or with the sanction of the Government and that he is accused of the commission of offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code. What constituted the essence of the forensic debate at the bar was whether the offences allegedly committed by the Respondents were committed while he was 'acting or purporting to act in the discharging of his official duty'. The words "acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty" appearing in Section 197 (supra) are critical not only in the case at hand but in every other case where the accused invokes the protection of that provision. What is the true and the correct interpretation of that provision is no longer res integra. The provision has fallen for consideration on several occasions before this court. Reference to all those decisions may be unnecessary for the law has been succinctly summed up in the few decisions to which we shall presently refer. But before we do so we may point out that the expression "official duty" appearing in section 197 has not been defined. The dictionary meaning of the expression would, therefore, be useful for understanding the expression both literally and contextually. The term "official" has been defined in Black'S Law Dictionary as under: Official... Of or relating to an office or position of trust or authority." 12. After making reliance on the two decisions viz. The dictionary meaning of the expression would, therefore, be useful for understanding the expression both literally and contextually. The term "official" has been defined in Black'S Law Dictionary as under: Official... Of or relating to an office or position of trust or authority." 12. After making reliance on the two decisions viz. the Three Judges Bench and Two Judges Bench, the Apex Court in the judgment referred to supra defined the term 'official duty' and the test of direct and requisite connection between the official duty of the accused and the acts constituting the commission of offences in the following paragraphs: "37. The term "duty" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary in the following words: Duty. 1. A legal obligation that is owed or due to another and that needs to be satisfied; an obligation for which somebody else has a corresponding right. 38. THE expression "official duty" would in the absence of any statutory definition, therefore, denote a duty that arises by reason of an office or position of trust or authority held by a person. It follows that in every case where the question whether the accused was acting in discharge of his official duty or purporting to act in the discharge of such a duty arises for consideration, the court will first examine whether the accused was holding an office and, if so, what was the nature of duties cast upon him as holder of any such office. It is only when there is a direct and reasonable nexus between the nature of duties cast upon the public servant and the act constituting an offence that protection under section 197 code of criminal procedure may be available and not otherwise. Just because the accused is a public servant is not enough. A reasonable connection between his duties as a public servant and the acts complained of is what will determine whether he was acting in connection between his duties as a public servant and the acts complained of is what will determine whether he was acting in connection between his duties as a public servant and the acts complaint of is what will determine whether he was acting discharge of his official duties or purporting to do so, even if the acts were in excess of what was enjoined upon him as a public servant. Within the meaning of that expression under section197 of the code we are supported in that view by the decision of this Court in P. Arulsami v. State of Madras, AIR 1967 SC 776 where a three-Judge bench of this Court held: It is not therefore every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under section 197 of the code of criminal procedure; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary... It is only when either within the scope of a official duty or in the excess of it that the protection is claimable. (Emphasis supplied) The legal position was further elaborated and explained by another three Judge Bench decision of this Court in B. Saha and Others v. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177 , where this Court held that while section 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure was capable of both liberal and narrow interpretations, a moderate and balanced approach was a correct way to interpret that provision to avoid an unfair advantage or disadvantage to the accused. This Court, therefore, evolved the test of a "direct and reasonable" connection between the official duty of the accused and the act constituting the commission of offence. The Court observed: The words 'any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty' employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, "it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence and never can be" in the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between two extremes. The right approach to the import of these words lies between two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of the section 197(1), an Act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his office duty will require sanction for prosecution and the said provision. (Emphasis supplied.) 39. The law was reviewed once again by this Court in General Officer Commanding etc. v. CBI and Another etc., (2012) 6 SCC 228 , where this Court relying upon the decision in P. Arulsami v. State of Madras (supra) and B. Saha and Others v. M.S. Kochar (supra) summed up legal position in the following words: The protection given under Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure is to protect responsible public servants against the institution of possible vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or purporting to act as public servants. The policy of the legislature is to afford adequate protection to the public servants to ensure that they are not prosecuted anything done by them in the discharge of their official duties without reasonable cause, and if the sanction is granted, to confer on Government, if they choose to excise it complete control of the prosecution. This protection has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his "official duty" implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public in the course of his service and that it should have been done in the discharge of his duties. This section does not extent its protection cover to every act or omission done by a public servant in service but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omission which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duty. If on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that the act or omission for which the accused was charged had reasonable connection with discharge of his duty, then it must be held to official to which applicability of section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be disputed." (Emphasis supplied) 13. If on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that the act or omission for which the accused was charged had reasonable connection with discharge of his duty, then it must be held to official to which applicability of section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be disputed." (Emphasis supplied) 13. In a recent pronouncement the Apex Court in Inspector of Police and Another v. Battenapatla Venkata Ratnam and Another in Criminal Appeal No. 129 of 2013 Batch cases dated 13.04.2015, been held that the official capacity of the public servant cannot be used to fabricate records and misappropriate public funds, in which case the Section 197 Cr.P.C. would not come to the rescue. The following paragraph would be apposite: "7. No doubt, while the respondents indulged in the alleged criminal conduct, they had been working as public servants. The question is not whether they were in service or on duty or not but whether the alleged offences have been committed by them "while acting or purporting to act in discharge of their official duty". That question is no more res Integra. In Shambhoo Nath Misra v. State of U.P. and Others, (1997) 5 SCC 326 , at paragraph-5, this Court held that: "5. The question is when the public servant is alleged to have committed the offence of fabrication of record or misappropriation of public fund etc. can he be said to have acted in discharge of his official duties. It is not the official duty of the public servant to fabricate the false records and misappropriate the public funds etc. in furtherance of or in the discharge of his official duties. The official capacity only enables him to fabricate the record or misappropriate the public fund etc. It does not mean that it is integrally connected or inseparably interlinked with the crime committed in the course of the same transaction, as was believed by the learned Judge. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the view expressed by the High Court as well as by the trial court on the question of sanction is clearly illegal and cannot be sustained." The applicability of the decision rendered in Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das (supra): 14. As the counsel for the petitioner made substantial reliance on this decision, it is imperative to consider the case. As the counsel for the petitioner made substantial reliance on this decision, it is imperative to consider the case. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents, the facts of the case is totally different. The petitioner therein was acting in his official duty. He was disposing the crowd gathered by using the Lathi. As the deceased died, the petitioner therein was prosecuted. Considering the said fact, the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to hold that the petitioner therein was acting in discharge of his official duty. This decision has already been taken note by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the subsequent decision in Choudhury Parveen Sultana v. State of West Bengal and Another, (supra). 15. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the ratio laid down would only militate against the case of the petitioner. Case on hand: 16. On a query raised by this Court, all the learned counsels would submit that the petitioner was not acting in discharge of his official duty. Admittedly, he was working as the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Nagercoil Town. Keeriparai Police Station did not come within his jurisdiction. He was also not supposed to investigate the case. Therefore, merely because the petitioner happened to be the Deputy Superintendent of Police, it cannot be stated that he would come automatically under the protective umbrella under Section 197 Cr.P.C. Suffice, it is to state that there are prima facie evidence to show the participation of the petitioner as 164 Cr.P.C. statements were given by the police personals including the one who was working at Keeriparai Police Station. Conclusion: 17. This case has a chequered history. Though the complaint has been registered in the year 2006, several petitions have been filed before this Court by different parties and the trial is yet to commence even after a decade. Even after the committal made in the year 2011, the trial could not be completed till now. The present petition has been filed in the year 2015. Though this Court would not like to dismiss the petition on the ground of delay, certainly it can be a factor to direct the trial Court to expedite the trial. Even after the committal made in the year 2011, the trial could not be completed till now. The present petition has been filed in the year 2015. Though this Court would not like to dismiss the petition on the ground of delay, certainly it can be a factor to direct the trial Court to expedite the trial. Therefore, while holding no prior sanction is required under Section 197 Cr.P.C. before taking cognizance as against the petitioner, a direction is issued to the learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli to dispose of S.C. No. 195 of 2011 within a period of nine months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. This Criminal Original Petition stands dismissed with the above direction. Consequently, connected M.P. (MD) No. 1 of 2015 is also dismissed.