JUDGMENT R.K. DESHPANDE, J. 1. Regular Civil Suit No. 51 of 1993 for eviction and possession of the suit premises was dismissed by the trial court on 30.11.1994. In Regular Civil Appeal No. 278 of 1994, the learned 2nd Additional District Judge at Akola has reversed the decision of the trial court on 31.03.1999 and the suit has been allowed passing a decree for eviction and possession against the defendant. The original defendant is before this court in this second appeal. 2. Regular Civil Suit filed by the respondents – plaintiffs proceeds on the footings that they are the owners of the suit property and their predecessor-in-title Mohd. Ishaque had let out the suit property to the appellant – defendant. After the death of Mohd. Ishaque, the plaintiff issued a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to the appellant – defendant terminating the tenancy w.e.f. 31.05.1993. It was received by the appellant – defendant on 14.05.1993, but in spite of it the appellant – defendant did not vacate the suit premises, and therefore, he has become a trespasser. 3. The trial court recorded the finding that the plaintiffs have failed to prove — (i) their title over the suit property and also (ii) that the suit property was let out by Mohd. Ishaque the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiffs to the defendants on monthly rent of Rs.30/. In view of these, findings the trial court held that the question of deciding the other aspects of the matter does not at all arise. The lower Appellate Court recorded the finding in paragraph 15 that it has been established that after the death of Mohd. Ishaque the plaintiffs became the owners of the suit premises and the landlords in respect of the suit premises. The appellant – tenant admitted relationship and also payment of monthly rent of Rs.30/. In para 32 of the judgment, the lower Appellate Court has held that no sooner the tenant deny the tile of the landlord over the suit property, the landlord would be entitled to the possession and there is no need to obtain permission of the Rent Controller under the C.P. and Berar Letting of Premises And Rent Control Order, 1949. The lower Appellate Court further recorded the finding that mere notice of forfeiture of tenancy for ejectment of the tenant is sufficient to maintain the suit. The lower Appellate Court further recorded the finding that mere notice of forfeiture of tenancy for ejectment of the tenant is sufficient to maintain the suit. The reliance is placed upon the Division Bench of this Court in Ashvinikumar vs. Gangadhar, 1990 Mh. L.J. 18. 4. On 10.06.2003 this Court admitted the matter and passed an order as under:- “Heard Shri Dey, learned Advocate for the appellant and Shri Haq, Adv. for the Respondents. Admit on the question : whether taking into consideration the facts of the case, notice under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, was required to be given, particularly when the present appellant-tenant has specifically denied the title claimed by the respondents on the sole ground of adverse possession. Interim relief continued on the condition that the appellant pays to the respondents the occupation charges, as were earlier paid by way of rent along with arrears till date, within three months from today.” 5. A decree for eviction has been passed on the ground of forfeiture of tenancy under Section 111 (g) and (h) of the Transfer of Property Act, which is reproduced below:- 111. Determination of lease:— A lease of immovable property determines:— (a) To (f)……………… (g) By forfeiture; that is to say, (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that, on breach thereof, the lessor may reenter or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; [or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may reenter on the happening of such event]; and in [any of these cases. the lessor or his transferee [gives notice in writing to the lessee of. his intention to determine the lease. the lessor or his transferee [gives notice in writing to the lessee of. his intention to determine the lease. (h) On the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of intention to quit, the property lease, duly given by one party to the other.” In case the lessee renounces his character as a tenant by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; as provided in part (2) of clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, a lease of immovable property determines at the option of the lessor, provided the lessor or his transferee issues notices in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease. This provision therefore, requires a notice of forfeiture to be given by lessor to the lessee for determination of tenancy on the ground of forfeiture. 6. With the assistance of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, I have gone through the notice issued by the plaintiff to the defendant on 03.05.1993 at Exh.19. The said notice does not speak about the forfeiture of tenancy, as contemplated under Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act. It is simply a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the absence of notice of forfeiture of tenancy the protection under Clause 13 of the C.P. & Berar Letting of Premises and Rent Control Order, 1949 was attracted. 7. Clause 13 of the C.P. & Berar Letting of Premises and Rent Control Order, 1949, which provides protection to the tenant from eviction at the instance of landlord being relevant is reproduced below: Claus 13(1) (a) and (b):- 13.(1) No landlord shall, except with the previous written permission of the Controller — (a) Given notice to a tenant determining the lease or determining the lease if the lease is expressed to be determinable as his option. (b) Where the lease is determinable by efflux of the time limited thereby, require the tenant to vacate the [premises. by process of law or otherwise if the tenant is willing to continue the lease on the same terms and conditions. (b) Where the lease is determinable by efflux of the time limited thereby, require the tenant to vacate the [premises. by process of law or otherwise if the tenant is willing to continue the lease on the same terms and conditions. I have already held that the notice at Exh.19 issued by the appellant – defendant was one issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and it was not a notice determining the lease on the ground of forfeiture of tenancy. Such a notice is, therefore, covered by Clause 13(1)(a) reproduced above, and in the absence of previous written permission from the controller the suit for eviction and possession was not maintainable. Undisputedly, in the present case, no such permission was obtained, the suit was therefore, liable to be dismissed on that ground. 8. The lower Appellate Court has committed an error of law in treating the notice at Exh.19 to be one under Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act. There is not even a whisper in the notice that the appellant – tenant has renounced his character by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. I have also gone through the pleadings in the plaint, which lacks all the material facts to claim eviction and possession on the ground that the appellant – tenant has renounced his character as a tenant by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. In the absence of notice of forfeiture and the claim in the suit for forfeiture of tenancy, the trial court could not have recorded the finding that the appellants – plaintiffs have failed to establish their title over the suit property. Though, the Appellate Court recorded the finding that the title has been proved, there is no finding recorded that the appellant – tenant has renounced his character as a tenant by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. The judgment and order impugned passed by the lower Appellate Court cannot therefore, be sustained. It will have to be set aside by restoring the decision of the trial court. 9. The second appeal is allowed. The judgment and order impugned passed by the lower Appellate Court cannot therefore, be sustained. It will have to be set aside by restoring the decision of the trial court. 9. The second appeal is allowed. The judgment and order dated 31.03.1999 passed by the lower Appellate Court in Regular Civil Appeal No. 278 of 1994, is hereby quashed and set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court on 30.11.1994 in Regular Civil Suit No. 51 of 1993 be restored. No order as to costs. Needless to say that it shall always be open for the plaintiffs either to institute fresh suit for recovery of provision on the basis of a valid notice of forfeiture of tenancy or notice determining tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and none of the observations made by the trial court or the Appellate Court shall come in the way of parties.