JUDGMENT A.S. CHANDURKAR, J. 1. This appeal has been filed under Section 30 of the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 (for short the said Act) challenging the judgment dated 2011-2001 passed by the learned Commissioner under the said Act. By said judgment, an amount of Rs.67,776/has been granted as compensation to the respondent nos. 1 & 2. The respondent No. 3 has filed cross objections challenging the direction issued by the learned Commissioner at Sr. No. 7 in its operative order with regard to reimbursement of the amount of compensation. 2. On 1751990, a truck carrying cement bags met with an accident. One Bandu who was working as a coolie was injured in said accident and he later succumbed to his injuries. He was aged about 45 years when the accident took place and according to the claimants, he was getting Rs.40/per day as wages. The respondent Nos. 1 & 2 herein filed application under provisions of Section 10 of the said Act seeking compensation of an amount of Rs.42,776/. In the said application, it was mentioned that the claimants had received an amount of Rs.25,000/on account of 'no fault' under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, the Act of 1988). The claim for compensation was initially filed against the appellant and the respondent No. 4. 3. The appellant filed its reply vide Exhibit12 and took the stand that the respondent No. 3 herein was the contractor who had undertaken the work of construction at the instance of the appellant. It was denied that the appellant was the principal employer. It was then pleaded that there was an agreement entered into between the appellant and the respondent No. 3 herein and as per clause 37 thereof, it was the contractor who was responsible for paying the amount of compensation under provisions of the said Act. 4. During pendency of the proceedings, the respondent No. 3 herein was joined as party in view of orders passed below Exhibit32. In the claim application, it was pleaded that the respondent No. 4 herein was the agent of the respondent No. 3 – Contractor. Though the respondent No. 3 herein was duly served, he did not contest the proceedings. 5. On behalf of the claimants, the respondent No. 1 was examined vide Exhibit47. In the claim application, it was pleaded that the respondent No. 4 herein was the agent of the respondent No. 3 – Contractor. Though the respondent No. 3 herein was duly served, he did not contest the proceedings. 5. On behalf of the claimants, the respondent No. 1 was examined vide Exhibit47. In her deposition, she referred to various documents such as spot panchanama and postmortem report related to said accident. It was further stated that amount of Rs.25,000/was received towards no fault liability under Section 140 of the Act of 1988. In the cross-examination, it was stated that the deceased was doing the work of loading and unloading of cement bags under directions of the Engineer. Another witness examined was a colabourer at Exhibit53. On behalf of the appellant its Executive Engineer was examined vide Exhibit55. He referred to the agreement dated 15121989 at Exhibit56 and clause 37 thereof. In his cross-examination, he admitted that the appellant was the principal employer of the deceased. 6. On consideration of aforesaid evidence on record, the learned Commissioner found that said Bandu had expired during the course of employment and hence, the claimants were entitled for compensation. It was further held that the deceased was getting Rs.40/per day and on that basis, it was held that the claimants were entitled for total compensation of Rs.67,776/. An amount of Rs.25,000/which was already received towards 'no fault' liability was deducted and the balance amount of Rs.42,776/was directed to be paid as compensation. Being aggrieved, the principal employer has filed First Appeal No. 413 of 2002 while the contractor has filed cross-objections challenging the direction as regards reimbursement of the amount of compensation. 7. Shri P.B. Patil, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Commissioner was not justified in holding that the appellant was the principal employer. It was submitted that the respondent Nos. 3 & 4 were the contractor and subcontractor respectively. In terms of clause 37 of the agreement with the contractor vide Exhibit56, the liability was that of the contractor and, therefore, the appellant was not liable to pay amount of compensation. It was further submitted that as the claimants had invoked jurisdiction under the Act of 1988, the present proceedings were not maintainable. 8. In terms of clause 37 of the agreement with the contractor vide Exhibit56, the liability was that of the contractor and, therefore, the appellant was not liable to pay amount of compensation. It was further submitted that as the claimants had invoked jurisdiction under the Act of 1988, the present proceedings were not maintainable. 8. Shri V.P. Panpalia, learned Counsel for the cross-objector/respondent No. 3 submitted that as the appellant was the principal employer it alone was liable to satisfy the claim for compensation. There was no relationship of employer and employee between the deceased and the respondent No. 3. Referring to the evidence on record, it was submitted that the witness examined on behalf of the appellant had clearly admitted that the appellant itself was the principal employer. In this regard, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the judgment in Triveedhi Peerayya vs. Executive Engineer Dam Division N. S. Dam Vijayapuri North and Another, 1988 (2) ACC 443. It was then submitted that the accident occurred as the vehicle in question was driven by the cleaner who was not authorized to drive the same. It was also submitted that having approached the Claims Tribunal under the Act of 1988 and having received the amount of no fault liability, the jurisdiction of the Commissioner under the said Act could not have been invoked. Referring to the doctrine of election, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs Mastan and another, (2006) 2 Supreme Court Cases 641 and Safiyabi wd/o Jamilkhan Pathan and Others vs. Wamanrao Anandraoji Surkar and Others, 1997 (1) Mh. L.J. 834. It was, therefore, submitted that the claim itself was not maintainable and in any event direction No. 7 was liable to be set aside. 9. Shri D.G. Patil, learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 supported the impugned judgment. According to him, the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 were entitled to receive amount of compensation as the accident had occurred during the course of the employment. In so far as the question of liability was concerned, the same was a matter between the appellant and the respondent Nos. 3 & 4. 1 & 2 supported the impugned judgment. According to him, the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 were entitled to receive amount of compensation as the accident had occurred during the course of the employment. In so far as the question of liability was concerned, the same was a matter between the appellant and the respondent Nos. 3 & 4. It was then submitted that merely because the amount of no fault liability had been received by the claimants, the claim for compensation under the said Act could not be defeated in view of provisions of Section 167 of the Act of 1988. In that regard, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Dyamavva and Others, (2013) 9 SCC 406 . It was then submitted that the respondent No. 3 had not contested the proceedings before the learned Commissioner and, therefore, the cross objections filed by the respondent No. 3 were not maintainable. In that regard, he placed reliance on the judgment in Assistant Executive Engineer vs. Shantavva and Others, 2001 (90) FLR 584 . 10. The following questions of law arise for consideration:- (1) Whether the appellant is liable to satisfy the claim for compensation in the light of the finding that it was the principal employer? (2) Whether the respondent No. 3 can be absolved of the liability to satisfy the claim? (3) Whether present proceedings for seeking compensation are tenable in view of acceptance of amount of no fault liability by the claimants? 11. With the assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties, I have perused the records of the case. I have also given due consideration to the respective submissions. 12. As to Point No. 1 – The evidence on record indicates that the work of construction on behalf of the appellant was handed over to the respondent No. 3 in view of the agreement at Exhibit56. As per clause 37 of said agreement, it was the contractor who was responsible to pay compensation to his workmen in case of any claim under provisions of said Act. It was further stipulated that if compensation was paid by the appellant as principal employment under Section 12(1) of the said Act, same would be recoverable from the contractor under Section 12(2) of the said Act. The aforesaid agreement between the parties is not in dispute. 13. It was further stipulated that if compensation was paid by the appellant as principal employment under Section 12(1) of the said Act, same would be recoverable from the contractor under Section 12(2) of the said Act. The aforesaid agreement between the parties is not in dispute. 13. In the deposition of the witness examined on behalf of the appellant, it was admitted that the appellant was the principal employer of deceased Bandu. In view of aforesaid admission, the liability of the principal employer to answer the claim for compensation in proceedings under said Act stands duly established. The finding in that regard recorded by the learned Commissioner is, therefore, based on the evidence available on record and said finding does not deserve to be disturbed. In so far as the amount of compensation is concerned, the same has been granted in terms of Schedule IV to the said Act and on that count also no interference is called for. No substnatial question of law in that regard arises. Point No. 1 is answered accordingly. 14. As to Point No. 2 – In so far as the aspect of indemnifying the principal employer is concerned, provisions of Section 12(2) of the said Act entitle the principal employer who is liable to pay compensation to be indemnified by the contractor from whom the employee could have recovered compensation. As per said provisions, questions as to the right to and the amount of indemnity in default of agreement are required to be settled by the Commissioner. At this stage, it would be necessary to refer to Rule 39 of the Employees Compensation Rules, 1924 (for short, the said Rules). As per said provisions, questions as to the right to and the amount of indemnity in default of agreement are required to be settled by the Commissioner. At this stage, it would be necessary to refer to Rule 39 of the Employees Compensation Rules, 1924 (for short, the said Rules). Rule 39(1) of the said Rules reads thus:- “39(1): Where the opposite party claims that if compensation is recovered against him he will be entitled under sub-section (2) of Section 12, to be indemnified by a person not being a party to the case, he shall, when first called upon to answer the application, present a notice of such claim to the Commissioner accompanied by the prescribed fee, and the Commissioner shall thereupon issue notice to such person in Form J.” Aforesaid provision indicates that where an opposite party claims that it would be entitled to be indemnified by a person who is not a party to the case then he is required to present a notice of such claim to the Commissioner along with prescribed fee after which the Commissioner is required to issue notice under Form-J appended to the Rules to such party. In the present case when the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 filed aforesaid proceedings, only the appellant and the respondent No. 4 were arrayed as parties. The appellant on being served with the notice of claim did not take necessary steps under Rule 39(1) of the said Rules though it was the stand of the appellant that the contractor was liable to indemnify the appellant if any compensation was paid. As the respondent No. 3 was not a party to the proceedings when the claim application was filed, it was necessary for the appellant to have followed the procedure prescribed by Rule 39(1) of the said Rules. If such course would have been followed, a notice could have been served on the contractor – respondent No. 3 and thereafter the aspect of entitlement to indemnification under Section 12(2) of the said Act could have been decided. In the absence of said procedure being followed, the adjudication by the learned Commissioner on the aspect of indemnification was uncalled for. In the absence of said procedure being followed, the adjudication by the learned Commissioner on the aspect of indemnification was uncalled for. Though it was submitted on behalf of the appellant that in view of agreement vide Exhibit56, it was entitled to be indemnified, clause 37 itself prescribes that such indemnification would be as contemplated by Section 12(2) of the said Act. Thus, in absence of such application for being indemnified being made by the appellant under Rule 39(1) of the said Rules, the direction issued by the learned Commissioner holding the appellant entitled to reimbursement has been issued without following the prescribed procedure. By holding that aforesaid raises a substantial question of law, direction No. 7 issued by the learned Commissioner is liable to be set aside. Point No. 2 is answered accordingly. 15. As to Point No. 3 – As regards the question of tenability of the proceedings at the instance of the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 on the ground that jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal had been invoked under Section 140 of the Act of 1988, it is to be noted that under Section 167 of the Act of 1988, a person is entitled to claim compensation also under provisions of the said Act without prejudice to provisions of Chapter X of the said Act of 1988. Section 140 of the Act of 1988 falls in Chapter X of the Act of 1988. A similar question was considered by the Supreme Court in the National Insurance Company Limited (supra) wherein it was observed that under Section 140 of the Act of 1988, the liability to pay compensation arises even if 'no fault' is established against the driver or owner of the vehicle. In para 34 of the said judgment, it has been held thus:- “34. Section 167 of the Act gives a claimant even under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the right to invoke the provisions of Chapter X of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Chapter X of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals with what is known as “no fault” liability in case of an accident. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 imposes a liability on the owner of the vehicle to pay the compensation fixed therein, even if no fault is established against the driver or owner of the vehicle. Chapter X of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals with what is known as “no fault” liability in case of an accident. Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 imposes a liability on the owner of the vehicle to pay the compensation fixed therein, even if no fault is established against the driver or owner of the vehicle. Sections 141 and 142 deal with particular claims on the basis of no fault liability and Section 143 reemphasises what is emphasised by Section 167 of the Act that the provisions of Chapter X of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, would apply even if the claim is made under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Section 144 of the Act gives the provisions of Chapter X of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 an overriding effect.” From the aforesaid, it is clear that provisions of Chapter X of the Act of 1988 would apply even if the claim for compensation is made under provisions of the said Act. Thus, merely because the amount of 'no fault' had been received by the respondent Nos. 1 & 2, the claim for compensation under Section 10 of the said Act cannot be defeated. The learned Commissioner was justified in relying upon the decision in Neelabai Mahadeo Salunke and Others vs. Shamrao Tatoba Pawar and Others, 1994 (2) Mh. L.J. 1656. Similar view has been taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Rajani Agrawal vs. Ramswaroop and Others, 2010 ACJ 1276 . Considering the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Limited (supra), the reliance placed on the decision in Safiyabi Pathan (supra) is misplaced. The Supreme Court in clear terms has held that provisions of Chapter X of the said Act would apply even if the claim for compensation is made under provisions of the said Act. The present proceedings are, therefore, tenable. Moreover, in the present case, while determining the amount of compensation, the amount received by the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 under “no fault” has been deducted. In view of foregoing discussion, Point No. 3 is answered accordingly. 16. Hence, for aforesaid reasons, the following order is passed:- (1) The judgment dated 2011-2001 passed by the learned Commissioner is partly modified and Direction No. 7 of the operative order is set aside. 1 & 2 under “no fault” has been deducted. In view of foregoing discussion, Point No. 3 is answered accordingly. 16. Hence, for aforesaid reasons, the following order is passed:- (1) The judgment dated 2011-2001 passed by the learned Commissioner is partly modified and Direction No. 7 of the operative order is set aside. (2) The First Appeal stands dismissed with no order as to costs while the cross objections are allowed in aforesaid terms with no order as to costs. (3) The respondent Nos. 1 & 2 are entitled to receive the balance amount of compensation from the appellant.