JUDGMENT S.G. SHAH, J. 1. The petitioner herein is original complainant, whereas the respondent no. 1 is prosecuting agency and the respondent no. 2 is original accused. They are referred to in the same capacity herein also. 2. The complainant is aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order dated 18/9/2014 rendered by the Ld. Addl. Sessions Judge, Court No. 3, City Sessions Court at Ahmedabad in Criminal Revision Application No. 237/2014, whereby Ld. Sessions Judge has allowed the revision preferred by the respondent accused and order dated 23/6/2014 below exh. 2 in Criminal Case No. 34/2012 rendered by the Ld. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate was set aside. Thereby the Sessions Court has accepted the report submitted by the Investigating Officer [IO] so far as respondent accused is concerned and thereby not only deleted the name of the accused from the charge-sheet which was already filed, but factual disclosure about such respondent as an absconder is also deleted from the charge- sheet of Criminal Case No. 588/2010. The impugned order thereby allows the report of the IO in two different cases by one single order. 3. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate has rejected the report dated 12/9/2011 submitted by the IO, whereby IO has requested to delete several sections from the first charge-sheet No. 207/2010 submitted by him on 20/5/2010 against two accused and to delete the name of several accused who are shown as absconder in such charge-sheet while filing supplementary charge- sheet No. 251/2011 on 12/9/2011. The basic facts relating to the complaint and dispute between the parties are well described in the impugned judgment by the Sessions Court, more particularly in paras 2 to 5. Therefore, to avoid explanation of the same story in different words, those paragraphs are reproduced hereunder as it is. “2 The complainant Jayesh Khodidas Patel has filed FIR in Naranpura Police Station on date 3/9/2006 against 11 accused – [1] Bhavesh Govindbhai Patel [2] BhikhabhaiSomabhai Patel, [3]Hasmukh Govindbhai Patel, [4] Nitin Govindbhai Patel, [5]Govindbhai M. Patel, [6] Ranchhodbhai Senghidas Patel, [7]Ganpatbhai Senghidas Patel, [8] Dashrathbhai Prahladbhai Patel, [9] Jayantibhai Prahladbhai Patel, [10] Laxmanbhai Jivrambhai Patel and [11] Jashwantbhai Dahyabhai Patel for committing offence punishable under sections 406, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 474, 114, 506[2] and 120B of the IPC. It has been stated by the complainant that he has purchased plot Nos. 26, 27, 28 and 31 of Survey Nos. It has been stated by the complainant that he has purchased plot Nos. 26, 27, 28 and 31 of Survey Nos. 446, 448, 449/1 and 449/2 of Savita Govind Agricultural Cooperative Housing Society situated at Gota, Ahmedabad and possession of these plots are given to him along with possession letters, allotment letters, maps, certificate of registration of the society along with the affidavit of the Chairman of the society dated 11/11/2002. He has further stated in the FIR that as he wanted to sell these plots, in the year 2005, he issued a public notice through his advocate for title clearance on date 5/10/2005 and he received a reply on date 8/10/2005 by the society that no such plots were sold to him by the society, nor such documents or possession of the plots are given to him by the society. He has inquired and come to know that the persons named in the FIR have committed cheating with him. Hence, he has filed FIR against the above named persons and also filed Lavad Suit No. 1318/2005 before the Board of Nominees. This FIR has been registered in Naranpura Police Station vide I. C.R. No. 561/2006 dated 13/9/2006. The Investigating Officer has started investigation. He has recorded the statements of the complainant and the witnesses. During the course of investigation, he came to know that in favour of the present revisioner, the Chairman of the Society has executed a development agreement. The Investigating Officer, Naranpura Police Station has arrested initially Govindbhai Mafatlal Patel and Nitin G. Patel in this offence and has submitted chargesheet before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad for conducting trial against the accused. The Police Inspector, Mr. R.T. Gohil, Naranpura Police Station, Ahmedabad has shown [1] Bhavesh Govindbhai Patel [2] Bhikhabhai Somabhai Patel, [3] Hasmukh Govindbhai Patel, [4] Ranchhodbhai Senghidas Patel, [5] Ganpatbhai Senghidas Patel, [6] Dashrathbhai Prahladbhai Patel, [7] Jayantibhai Prahladbhai Patel, [8] Laxmanbhai Jivrambhai Patel, [9] Jashwantbhai Dahyabhai Patel, [10] Naranbhai Keshavlal Patel and [11] Baldevbhai Nagjibhai Desai as ‘absconding accused’ in the chargesheet. This chargesheet has been registered as Criminal Case No. 588/2010 in the Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad. 3. The aggrieved complainant Mr. Jayesh Khodidas Patel has preferred Special Criminal Application No. 2441/2010 before the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat stating therein that the investigation carried out by Naranpura Police Station is not fair in I. C.R. No. 561/2006. This chargesheet has been registered as Criminal Case No. 588/2010 in the Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad. 3. The aggrieved complainant Mr. Jayesh Khodidas Patel has preferred Special Criminal Application No. 2441/2010 before the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat stating therein that the investigation carried out by Naranpura Police Station is not fair in I. C.R. No. 561/2006. The Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat on date 30/12/2010 has entrusted investigation to C.I.D. Crime, Ahmedabad with a direction to submit appropriate report - chargesheet – supplementary chargesheet before the concerned Magistrate within three months of the order. 4. The Police Inspector, C.I.D. Crime, Ahmedabad Zone, Ahmedabad has started investigation. He has arrested Bhavesh Govindbhai Patel in this crime and submitted chargehseet for conducting trial against him before the Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Ahmedabad which has been registered as Criminal Case No. 2058/11. 5. The Police Inspector, Mr. G.S. Baria, C.I.D. Crime, Ahmedabad Zone, has submitted report dated 12/9/2011 Exh. 1 stating therein that the Chairman of the Society has executed allotment letters and affidavit and handed over to the complainant. Thereafter, without consulting the complainant, he has executed development agreement. Hence, the accused have committed offence punishable under Sections 406, 420 of the IPC. But none of the accused are public servants, hence, section 409 of the IPC will not be applicable. Moreover, no forged documents are created, nor signed, nor used as genuine. Hence, Sections 467, 468, 471, 474 of the IPC will not be applicable. There is no evidence that the criminal conspiracy has been hatched by the accused. Therefore, he has requested to delete Sections 409, 467, 468, 471, 474, 120B of the IPC from the FIR. He has also requested to delete Section 465 from the FIR. He has stated that he has obtained permission of the Head Office to delete the sections as no evidence has been found for the above referred sections. He has requested to delete Sections 409, 467, 468, 471, 474, 465, 120B of the IPC from the FIR as well as the previous chargesheet No. 588/10.” It appears from the above story as well as record before this Court that the complainant has lodged an FIR with Naranpura Police Station in-all against 11 persons on 13/9/2006, which is registered as C.R. No. I-561/2006. After investigation of such complaint, IO has filed charge-sheet No. 207/2010 on 20/5/2010. After investigation of such complaint, IO has filed charge-sheet No. 207/2010 on 20/5/2010. The record shows that thereafter, on very next day, IO has applied before the trial Court to add section 476 of the Indian Penal Code [IPC] in the same charge-sheet. Meanwhile, being dissatisfied by the investigation, the complainant has preferred Special Criminal Application No. 2441/2010 before this High Court wherein by order dated 30/12/2010 investigation was transferred to CID [Crime]. After further investigation, second charge-sheet was filed on 2/11/2011, now only against one additional accused though as many as 11 accused were shown as absconder in the first charge-sheet. Surprisingly, with such charge- sheet, IO has given two applications which are registered as exhs. 1 and 2 before the trial Court. By application at exh. 1, IO has prayed the Court to delete several sections from the charge-sheet and FIR from which Criminal Case No. 588/2010 is registered based upon first charge- sheet. Whereas by application at exh. 2 the same IO has requested the Court to delete the name of accused from such charge-sheet No. 207/2010, whose name is disclosed as absconder in column no. 2. 6. Therefore, so far as application at exh. 1 is concerned, it is a report or application by the IO wherein though charge-sheet was filed on 20/5/2010, after four months IO has come forward to delete several sections from the FIR and thereby from the charge-sheet also. Irrespective of all other aspects touching the matter, a simple observation is necessary that after filing a charge-sheet with supporting documentary evidence and disclosing crux of the charges in the 5th column of the charge-sheet, titled “charge or information, name of offence and circumstances connected with it in concise details and under what section of law charged”, the IO has come forward with a story that no offence has been made out in some of the sections disclosed in such charge-sheet. It is more surprising to note that though there may be deletion of some sections from the charge-sheet, the IO has requested the Court to delete some sections from the FIR itself which is lodged by the complainant in writing and after scrutiny of the complaint, the concerned SHO has lodged the complaint as per the sections disclosed by the complainant regarding commission of offence by the accused. Therefore, in any case, the application at exh. Therefore, in any case, the application at exh. 1 by the IO for deletion of section from the FIR is certainly unwarranted, improper and illegal. Similarly, so far as deletion of charge is concerned, it is settled legal position that framing of charge is the function and duty of the Court. For the purpose, ample and suitable provisions are made under Chapter VII of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Cr. P.C.], where IO has no role except to help the Court to find out certain facts from the bulky record; that too only with a view that in case of bulky record of investigation, it would be difficult for any one to scrutinize everything immediately and, therefore, APP may get the help of the IO to find out certain evidence. But in any case, IO’s presence or hearing of IO for such an application would certainly result into irregularity in the judicial process. Such irregularity may certainly lead to some injustice if it is touching to the root of the dispute and evidence between the parties. 7. At such stage, it would be appropriate to recollect the sections under which FIR and charge-sheet were lodged and which sections, which were requested to be deleted by the IO. The FIR disclosed that the respondents have committed offences under sections 406, 409, 467, 468, 471 474, 120-B, 114 and 506[2] of the IPC. Whereas by application exh. 1 IO has submitted to delete sections 409, 467, 468, 471, 474 and 120-B of the IPC leaving sections 406, 114 and 506 [2] of the IPC. For such request, it is contended by the IO that since accused is not a Government servant, section 409 does not get attracted. So far as deletion of other sections is concerned, it is contended by the IO before both the lower Courts that the accused has not forged the documents and has not used the documents, which are not genuine. Therefore, to understand the charges with reference to the allegations in the FIR, basic details of such sections need to be recollected herein by recording details of heading of the sections. ‘406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust. 409. Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent 467. Forgery of valuable security, will, etc. 468. Forgery for purpose of cheating. 471. Using as genuine a forged document or electronic record. 474. ‘406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust. 409. Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent 467. Forgery of valuable security, will, etc. 468. Forgery for purpose of cheating. 471. Using as genuine a forged document or electronic record. 474. Having possession of document described in section 466 or 467, knowing it to be forged and intending to use it as genuine 506 Punishment for criminal intimidation 114 Abettor present when offence is committed 120-B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.’ 7. Thereby, if we peruse the allegations made in the complaint, then prima-facie, it cannot be said that section 409 is not applicable inasmuch as it is not limited to the misdeed committed by the public servant only, but it extends to several persons viz., a person in whose favour any property has been entrusted or where he is in domination of such property or in the way of his business as a banker, merchant, broker, attorney or agent. After such wide coverage, the sections provide that for commission of criminal breach of trust in respect of the property, such person shall be punished maximum by imprisonment for life. 8. So far as forged documents are concerned, it is submitted by the respondent accused that none of the accused has ever forged any document, that there is no allegation regarding forged signature and any such document and, therefore, section 467 is not attracted. However, here also IO has put forward a misconception which was not approved by the trial Court but approved by the appellate Court inasmuch as section 467 deals with forgery of valuable security, will, etc. Bare reading of the section makes it clear that whoever forges a document which purports to be a valuable security or a will or which purports to give authority to any person to make or transfer any valuable security or to receive principal or interest or dividend thereon or any document purporting to be an acquittance or receipt acknowledging for the delivery of any movable property. In such case, again prescribed punishment is maximum imprisonment for life. Section 468 relates to section 467 as discussed hereinabove inasmuch as committing forgery with intention that the forged document shall be used for the purpose of cheating. In such case, again prescribed punishment is maximum imprisonment for life. Section 468 relates to section 467 as discussed hereinabove inasmuch as committing forgery with intention that the forged document shall be used for the purpose of cheating. Whereas section 471 is quite clear that using as genuine a forged document and section 474 confirms the possession of documents prescribed hereinabove and intending to use them as genuine. Therefore, the basic allegation in the complaint is regarding forgery and cheating. So far as charge under section 420 is concerned, it is not requested to be omitted. We have to verify that whether there is any forgery or not. Unfortunately, the appellate Court has failed to consider the domination of forgery provided under section 463 of the IPC, which makes it clear that whoever makes any false document with intent to cause damage or injury to the public or to any person or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed. Whereas false document is explained in section 464 of the IPC with a title ‘Making a false document’ that even a document prepared with dishonesty is to be considered as a false document in addition to the documents prepared fraudulently. To be precise, the relevant outcome of the section would be as under:- “A person is said to make a false document, to dishonestly or fraudulently makes and signs such document with intention to causing it to be believed that such document or part of document was made, signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority though he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed by such authority.” Such disclosure is there in first part of section 464. Whereas unfortunately what is submitted by the respondent herein and what is considered by the IO and the Sessions Court is to the effect that a document can be considered as a forged only if there is alteration or forged signature in the document. However, it is not so, as explained hereinabove. Therefore, so far as exh. 1 is concerned, there is no substance in such application and same needs to be dismissed as done by the trial Court, as well as Sessions Court. 9. Whereas by application exh. However, it is not so, as explained hereinabove. Therefore, so far as exh. 1 is concerned, there is no substance in such application and same needs to be dismissed as done by the trial Court, as well as Sessions Court. 9. Whereas by application exh. 2, IO has prayed for deletion of certain names from the charge-sheet, who were otherwise disclosed as absconder while filing the charge-sheet. To substantiate the application made by the IO, it is submitted by the respondent accused relying upon the contents of the application itself that pursuant to opinion of the District Registrar of Cooperative Society, Ahmedabad, members of the cooperative society cannot be held responsible and liable for the act of their Chairman if such act is resulting into some offence. For such observation, the IO has recorded that opinion of the District Registrar was called for pursuant to the direction by this High Court. The respondent no. 1 State was, therefore, called upon to disclose that by which order the High Court has directed the investigating agency to call for the report from the District Registrar. However, the State could not confirm any such order. Surprisingly it is further contended and pleaded by the IO in such application exh. 2 that the complainant is not cooperating with the IO and has not provided evidence against all the accused and, therefore, summary report was submitted for want of evidence. However, IO has no option but to file an additional charge-sheet against one Bhavesh Govindbhai Patel, who seems to be son of the accused no. 1 – Govindbhai and brother of accused no. 2 Nitinbhai, as he was absconding since first charge-sheet is filed, contending that sufficient evidence was available against him. Even for the sake of repetition, it is to be recollected here that while filing first charge- sheet against father and son, said Bhavesh and other 10 accused were disclosed as absconder; amongst them, only one accused i.e., present petitioner has challenged the impugned order. Therefore, the Ld. Sessions Judge has wisely allowed the application at exh. 2 qua present respondent namely Naranbhai Keshavbhai Patel only. Thereby criminal case is to be initiated against remaining accused whose names are otherwise prayed to be deleted from the charge- sheet by the IO. It seems that those other accused have not come forward to challenge the order of the Ld. Sessions Judge has wisely allowed the application at exh. 2 qua present respondent namely Naranbhai Keshavbhai Patel only. Thereby criminal case is to be initiated against remaining accused whose names are otherwise prayed to be deleted from the charge- sheet by the IO. It seems that those other accused have not come forward to challenge the order of the Ld. Magistrate refusing the request to delete their names from the charge-sheet. 10. So far as factual merits are concerned, it is the case of the petitioner that he is not member of the society and thereby not concerned with the misdeeds, if any, committed by office bearers of the society or even their members, but he has entered into one agreement for development of the plot under dispute and he has done nothing on the disputed land, which is otherwise in possession of the complainant and, therefore, when there is no activity by him with reference to the transaction of the property in dispute or otherwise, the report of the IO is proper and rightly accepted by the Sessions Court. Though factual details of the complaint is reproduced hereinabove in nut-shell as referred by the Sessions Court, at present I do not intend to disclose, discuss and determine the validity and propriety either of the FIR, first charge-sheet or the second charge-sheet and prayer in exh. 2 by the IO, since it would unnecessarily prejudice the final trial which is yet to be commenced, more particularly because of the fact that whether particular person has committed any offence or not is yet to be examined by the trial Court after full-fledged trial and on appreciation of evidence that may ultimately be produced before it. 11. Thereby at this stage, when there are two opposite decisions in the same application, one by the Ld. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate dismissing the application at exh. 2 made by the IO and second by the Sessions Court in allowing the same applications,what is required to be examined and scrutinized and thereby to determine the limited issue that whether name of the accused can be allowed to be deleted as prayed for by the IO or not. 12. It is unfortunate that in so many such cases, Courts have to intervene even at such preliminary stage of trial. It is settled legal position, based upon the provisions of Cr. 12. It is unfortunate that in so many such cases, Courts have to intervene even at such preliminary stage of trial. It is settled legal position, based upon the provisions of Cr. P C that the duty of the investigating agency is to investigate and to file a report before the Court of law and thereafter, it would be the duty and function of the Court to appreciate and ascertain that whether trial should be proceeded i.e., whether accused should be charged or discharged. Though IO has liberty to disclose to the Court that there is no evidence or that accused could not be traceable or that no offence has been made out as alleged, but in that case also discretion is with the Court either to accept such report or to reject the same with direction for further investigation. But in any case, once IO has filed a charge-sheet or report disclosing that particular persons have committed particular offences and out of which when few persons are shown as accused with a report that remaining persons are absconding and when criminal case has been initiated based upon such charge-sheet, it is clear and obvious that relevant papers of investigation have been submitted with the charge-sheet and thereby there is a conclusive report and submission by the IO that the persons whose names are shown in the charge-sheet have committed offences as alleged in the charge- sheet. In the present case, by filing such report, IO has disclosed name of as many as 11 persons as absconder and in last column, he has explained that what type of crime is committed and how. 13. Therefore, now IO has no reason or authority to say that now there is no evidence against 10 such persons whose names are disclosed as absconder and most surprisingly to say that offence is not committed as alleged in the FIR and thereby to pray for deletion of certain sections from the FIR and the charge-sheet, which is already filed before four months. 14. The Criminal Procedure Code provides for every contingency either during investigation or during trial and, therefore, IO has no option but to submit his report in accordance with provisions of Cr. 14. The Criminal Procedure Code provides for every contingency either during investigation or during trial and, therefore, IO has no option but to submit his report in accordance with provisions of Cr. P C. At the most, he can file a report submitting appropriate summary disclosing that no offence is made out or that there is no evidence against the accused or that accused is not traceable. When such report that the accused are not traceable was already filed on 20/5/2010, thereafter IO has no authority to change such report. Such powers are vested only with the Court while framing the charge under Chapter VIII of the Cr. P C, wherein it is provided that the Court can omit the charge under particular section at the time of framing the charge or can discharge the accused or can also add the charge. For doing any such activity, the Cr. P C provides all the steps that is to be taken care of and permits the Court even to alter the charge or add any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced. Therefore, remedy lies with the proposed accused either to apply for omission of charge or for discharge before the trial Court frames the charge against them, if they are certain that there is no evidence against them. Once IO has disclosed the commission of offence by all the accused with manner and details of offence, it is not permissible for him to change his own decision and to submit that either charge be dropped under particular sections or to drop prosecution against particular accused. 15. It is made clear that at present this Court has not entered into the factual details so as to ascertain that whether evidence available before the trial Court in the form of police papers with charge-sheet are sufficient enough for framing the charge or not since that stage is not arrived. However, unfortunately the Sessions Court has considered the matter as if the accused can be discharged and even respondent herein has also argued in similar manner by submitting that when there is no sufficient evidence on record to prove the commission of offence by them, the report of the IO should be accepted. 16. It is also argued by Ld. Advocate Mr. Premal Nanavati for respondent no. 16. It is also argued by Ld. Advocate Mr. Premal Nanavati for respondent no. 2 that this is second revision and therefore, there is no scope of re-appreciation of evidence. It is settled legal position and, therefore, I have not entered into appreciation of evidence at this stage except to scrutinize the legal position and legality of the impugned order. However, it cannot be ignored that though this is second revision, considering the fact that revisional Court has set aside the decision of the Ld. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, practically this is first challenge of the impugned judgment. 17. Ld. Advocate Mr. Nanavati has submitted that present respondent has never received any benefit or he has never disturbed either possession or ownership of the complainant. However, for the reasons recorded hereinabove, all such facts are not relevant at this stage, inasmuch as, ultimately all such issues are to be decided after full-fledged evidence is adduced before the trial Court to ascertain that whether accused nos. 1, 2 and 3 have used or tried to use all such subsequent act or transaction or agreement with the help or through members of the society or contractors like present respondent, if at all there is an evidence that to get rid of the sale transaction in favour of the complainant, whether these accused have helped the accused nos. 1, 2 and 3 in any manner whatsoever or not. Thereby only because of non- disclosure of name of all such accused in the FIR at initial stage would not entitle the accused to get rid of such trial only at the hands of the IO and that too in the form of application submitted at exh. 1 and 2 before the trial Court. If at all the accused are innocent and there is no evidence against them, they may certainly take steps in accordance with law, but report at exhs. 1 and 2 by the IO are certainly against the settled provisions of law and, therefore, cannot be allowed. It cannot be ignored that the land in question was dealt with by the accused somewhere in the year 2002 and entered into transaction with the complainant and handed over possession. 1 and 2 by the IO are certainly against the settled provisions of law and, therefore, cannot be allowed. It cannot be ignored that the land in question was dealt with by the accused somewhere in the year 2002 and entered into transaction with the complainant and handed over possession. But thereafter since it was an open land, original accused entered into a development agreement in favour of present respondent and other proposed accused and if the complainant fails to safeguard his interest by initiating proceedings, such persons would have certainly disturbed the possession of the complainant. 18. Ld. Advocate Mr. Nanavati is relying upon a decision rendered in the case of Laxmipat Choraria v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1968 S.C. 938 , more particularly para 13 of the judgment. However, para 13 of the judgment deals with some previous citations and it seems that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not dealt with the question discussed in para 13. But if we peruse the entire judgment, by and large, it is pertaining to admission of statement before the Custom Officers and, therefore, Hon’ble Supreme Court has disapproved such statement while deciding in favour of the accused. However, there is no such case before us and, therefore, though it is argued that by such judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that person not included in the FIR should not be charge-sheeted, cannot help the respondent accused. 19. If we peruse the judgment rendered by the Ld. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, he has rightly relied upon the decision rendered in the case of Jagdish Nathabhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat reported in 2008 [5] G.L.R. 4220, wherein legal position in case like present is well explained and, therefore, there is no reason to deviate from such judgment. 20. As against that, if we peruse the impugned judgment rendered by the Sessions Court, it transpires that the appellate Court has failed to appreciate the record properly though it is stated that it has gone through the entire record, inasmuch as there is a reference of scrutiny of cross-examination in one previous Lavad Case No. 1318/2005. It is pertinent to note that statement in such deposition before the Civil Court is to be read in the context of that case and for the relevant prayer in that case. It is pertinent to note that statement in such deposition before the Civil Court is to be read in the context of that case and for the relevant prayer in that case. Suffice it to say that even if some-one admits that his prayer for recovery is only against members and thereby he restricts his claim for the members and office bearers of the society only, he does not admit that he has let gone the offenders of crime committed for such purpose. It is also to be recollected here that pending investigation, complainant has to file Special Criminal Application alleging against previous investigating agency and it has been recorded by the lower Courts that there was some highhandedness by one of the higher Police Officer in favour of the accused with a pressure to drop the complaint and prosecution. 21. So far as submission that the complainant was aware about the transaction of the society and the present respondent and thereby not disclosed the name of such accused in the FIR goes against the complainant is concerned, suffice it to say that, as deposed in Lavad proceedings, the complainant has restricted himself to allege against original accused only and name of present respondent and other accused have been cropped up during investigation by the IO only and, therefore, the complainant is not at fault. It is also pertinent to note that some of the accused have approached this Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court for anticipatory bail. However, such requests were refused by all the Courts. Whereas in an application by the complainant, this High Court has to order to investigate the crime by the different agency with a direction to file their report before the Court. It is pertinent to note that even though Sessions Court has to report that the IO has not submitted reports independently, the Sessions Court has proceeded further to advise the trial Court regarding its power to call for the report from the investigating agency. 23. Reference of following decisions would be relevant at this stage. 23.1 In Union Public Service Commission v. S. Papaiah reported in AIR 1997 SC 3876 the Hon’ble Apex Court has scrutinized the powers of the Magistrate under section 173 of the Cr. 23. Reference of following decisions would be relevant at this stage. 23.1 In Union Public Service Commission v. S. Papaiah reported in AIR 1997 SC 3876 the Hon’ble Apex Court has scrutinized the powers of the Magistrate under section 173 of the Cr. P.C., which simply emphasize that before accepting the final report by the investigating agency for dropping of the proceedings, as per the law laid down in the case of Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police AIR 1985 SC 1285 , the issuance of notice by the Magistrate to the informant is “must” and issuance of notice by the investigating agency to the complainant is not a substitute for the notice required to be given by the Magistrate in terms of the judgment in Bhagwant Singh [supra]. It is further emphasized, after considering the provisions of section 173, more particularly sub-section [8] that the Magistrate could, in exercise of the powers under section 173 [8], direct the investigating agency to further investigate the case and collect further evidence keeping in view the objections raised by the complainant to the investigation and the new report to be submitted by the IO would be governed by sub-sections [2] to [6] of section 173 of the Cr. P.C. Therefore, if the Magistrate failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him, then his order cannot sustain. 23.2 In Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2004 SC 4753 and Sanjay Bansal v. Jawajarla Vats reported in AIR 2008 SC 207 the Hon’ble Apex Court has considered the provisions of sections 190 and 173 of the Cr. P.C., reconfirming the decision in the case of Bhagwant Singh [supra], observed that Magistrate cannot compel police to change their opinion. Though all such judgments are with reference to the powers of the Magistrate, the basic principle of criminal jurisprudence remains that investigating agency cannot change its opinion once report is filed, but it is for the Magistrate to apply his mind either to accept such report or to reject it. For such conclusion, reproduction of paras 7 to 9 of such judgment would be material, which read as under: “7. For such conclusion, reproduction of paras 7 to 9 of such judgment would be material, which read as under: “7. In Abhinandan Jha and Another v. Dinesh Mishra ( AIR 1968 SC 117 ), this Court while considering the provisions of Sections 156(3), 169, 178 and 190 of the Code held that there is no power, expressly or impliedly conferred, under the Code, on a Magistrate to call upon the police to submit a charge sheet, when they have sent a report under Section 169 of the Code, that there is no case made out for sending up an accused for trial. The functions of the Magistrate and the police are entirely different, and the Magistrate cannot impinge upon the jurisdiction of the police, by compelling them to change their opinion so as to accord with his view. However, he is not deprived of the power to proceed with the matter. There is no obligation on the Magistrate to accept the report if he does not agree with the opinion formed by the police. The power to take cognizance notwithstanding formation of the opinion by the police which is the final stage in the investigation has been provided for in Section 190(1)(c). 8. When a report forwarded by the police to the Magistrate under Section 173(2)(i) is placed before him several situations arise. The report may conclude that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons and in such a case, the Magistrate may either (1) accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process, or (2) may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding, or (3) may direct further investigation under Section 156(3) and require the police to make a further report. The report may on the other hand state that according to the police, no offence appears to have been committed. When such a report is placed before the Magistrate he has again option of adopting one of the three courses open i.e., (1) he may accept the report and drop the proceeding; or (2) he may disagree with the report and take the view that there is sufficient ground for further proceeding, take cognizance of the offence and issue process; or (3) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under Section 156(3). The position is, therefore, now well-settled that upon receipt of a police report under Section 173(2) a Magistrate is entitled to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) b) of the Code even if the police report is to the effect that no case is made out against the accused. The Magistrate can take into account the statements of the witnesses examined by the police during the investigation and take cognizance of the offence complained of and order the issue of process to the accused. Section 190(1)(b) does not lay down that a Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if the Investigating Officer gives an opinion that the investigation has made out a case against the accused. The Magistrate can ignore the conclusion arrived at by the Investigating Officer and independently apply his mind to the facts emerging from the investigation and take cognizance of the case, if he thinks fit, exercise of his powers under Section 190(1)(b) and direct the issue of process to the accused. The Magistrate is not bound in such a situation to follow the procedure laid down in Sections 200 and 202 of the Code for taking cognizance of a case under Section 190(1)(a) though it is open to him to act under Section 200 or Section 202 also. [See M/s. India Sarat Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and another ( AIR 1989 SC 885 )]. The informant is not prejudicially affected when the Magistrate decides to take cognizance and to proceed with the case. 9. We may add here that the expressions charge-sheet or final report are not used in the Code, but it is understood in Police Manuals of several States containing the Rules and the Regulations to be a report by the police filed under Section 170 of the Code, described as a charge-sheet. In case of reports sent under Section 169, i.e., where there is no sufficiency of evidence to justify forwarding of a case to a Magistrate, it is termed variously i.e., referred charge, final report or summary. Section 173 in terms does not refer to any notice to be given to raise any protest to the report submitted by the police. In case of reports sent under Section 169, i.e., where there is no sufficiency of evidence to justify forwarding of a case to a Magistrate, it is termed variously i.e., referred charge, final report or summary. Section 173 in terms does not refer to any notice to be given to raise any protest to the report submitted by the police. Though the notice issued under some of the Police Manuals states it to be a notice under Section 173 of the Code, though there is nothing in Section 173 specifically providing for such a notice.” 24. Therefore, though all above judgments are with reference to section 173, the fact remains that once IO has submitted one report, thereafter it would be duty of the Court to examine the report and either to accept it or to reject it. In case it is disclosed in the police report that no offence has been committed, even then, though the Court cannot ask to file charge-sheet, the Court can certainly order further investigation. Whereas in the present case, in absence of such specific order by the Court and though first charge-sheet was disclosing the nature and commission of offence as well as number of accused, who are involved in such offence, by second report the investigating agency has taken ‘u’ turn by submitting to drop the charges under certain sections against some of the accused and dropping the proceedings against as many as nine accused including the present petitioner. Therefore, paras from Sanjay Bansal [supra] reproduced hereinabove, makes it clear that the Magistrate is not supposed to accept the report as it is and can pass order for further investigation. Though it is stated that the IO is free to file appropriate report as per his investigation, it is certainly not permissible to the IO to take ‘u’ turn after filing one charge- sheet saying that offence under particular sections is not committed by the accused and that some of the accused are not involved in the offence at all though in the first charge-sheet it is categorically stated that offence has been committed by all of them and under all the sections referred therein. 25. In such situation, in fact the power of the Magistrate comes in picture with reference to Chapter VII regarding framing of the charge. 25. In such situation, in fact the power of the Magistrate comes in picture with reference to Chapter VII regarding framing of the charge. At this stage, accused may submit that no charge can be framed under particular section or in toto against them and Magistrate has to take decision in accordance with law. For framing of charge, the law is well discussed in the Bhopal Tragedy case in both the judgments, one by which the Hon’ble Apex Court has dropped certain charges and another judgment of reviewing the same judgment, are relevant to refer here. The first judgment is reported in [1996] 6 SCC 129 between Keshub Mahindra v. State of M.P being Criminal Appeal Nos. 1672-75 of 1996 decided on 13/9/1996, against which Curative Petition [Criminal] Nos. 39-42 of 2010 were decided on 11/5/2011, reported in AIR 2011 SC 2037 between CBI v. Keshub Mahindra. Both such judgments make it clear that once report is filed by the investigating agency, it is for the Court to scrutinize the prima-facie evidence available against accused for framing the charge and what would be remedy available to the accused in case they feel that there is no evidence against them to frame charge under particular sections or against particular accused. I do not find any instance in any reported decision wherein IO has filed an additional report dropping the charges or for dropping the accused, stating that they have not committed any offence though final charge-sheet was filed against all accused alleging commission of offence under all the sections under reference. 26 In view of above facts and circumstances, there is substance in the revision application filed by the original complainant when he is challenging the order of the Sessions Court in revision by which Sessions Court has set aside the order of the trial Court rejecting the prayer of the IO to drop the sections and to drop the prosecution against as many as 10 accused who are originally shown as absconders. Since the decision by the Sessions Court suffers from several irregularity as well as illegality, which result into injustice to the complainant. 27. The Revision Application deserves to be allowed and it is hereby allowed. Since the decision by the Sessions Court suffers from several irregularity as well as illegality, which result into injustice to the complainant. 27. The Revision Application deserves to be allowed and it is hereby allowed. Therefore, the judgment and order dated 18/9/2014 by City Sessions Court No. 3, Ahmedabad, in Criminal Revision Application No. 237/2014 is quashed and set aside resulting into restoration of the judgment and order dated 23/6/2014 below exhs. 1 and 2 in Criminal Case No. 34/2012 by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad. 28. Needless to say that the discussion and opinion, if any, with reference to the factual details of the present case is for limited purpose of deciding this revision application and thereby trial Court is free to proceed further in accordance with law, as discussed hereinabove. It is also made clear that if at all any of the accused apply for discharge or altering the charge, then in that case also the trial Court shall decide such application on its own merits and in accordance with law without being influenced either by the discussion or decision in this judgment. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Further Order : After pronouncement of the judgment, Ld. Advocate Mr. Premal Nanavati appearing with Mr. BS Khatana for respondent no. 2 has requested to stay the operation of this judgment for four weeks. Whereas Ld. Advocate Mr. BK Dave for the petitioner has opposed to grant any such stay. However, considering the fact that issue of law is involved in the matter inasmuch as to ascertain whether IO has power to modify the charge-sheet once filed before the Court, it would be appropriate to stay the operation of this judgment for four weeks from today so as to enable the respondent no. 2 to take necessary steps in accordance with law. Thereby the operation of this judgment is stayed for four weeks from today.