JUDGMENT : R.K. Deshpande, J. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard the matter finally by consent of the learned counsels appearing for the parties. 2. The challenge in this petition is to the judgment and order dated 29.10.2014 passed by the Industrial Court in Complaint ULP No. 238 of 2005. The complaint filed by the respondent-complainant invoking Item 5, 6 and 9 of Schedule IV of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act has been allowed directing the petitioner-employer to make the respondent-complainant permanent in service with effect from the date of her appointment and pay all monetary benefits applicable to the permanent employee of the petitioner Bank. 3. The Industrial Court has held that the provisions of Model Standing Orders are applicable to the establishment by virtue of subsection (5) of section 35 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and there is no provision under the Model Standing Orders to make any clerical or supervisory appointment on contract basis. The finding is also recorded that the appointment of the respondent-complainant to the post of clerk should have been on probation for a period of three months as per Standing Orders, at the end of which either she is to be confirmed as permanent employee or to be discontinued on account of unsatisfactory performance in the work or for some other related reason making her unfit to be continued beyond the period of 3 months. The Industrial Court has also recorded the finding that the appointment of the respondent was after following the due process of law and she was not being provided with the monetary benefits which were provided to the permanent clerks working in the Bank in spite of the fact that she was continued in service beyond the period of probation. 4. The contention of Shri Jaiswal, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by the learned counsel Shri Shantanu Ghate, is that by virtue of Clause 29 of the Model Standing Orders framed under the B.I.R Act, the employment of clerk on contract basis is permissible. He has further relied upon the provision of Section 2(e) of the Bombay Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, to urge that the petitioner is not an industrial establishment as defined therein. 5. Section 35(5) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act being relevant is reproduced below. "35. Settlement of Standing Orders by Commissioner of Labour ..... ..... ..... He has further relied upon the provision of Section 2(e) of the Bombay Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, to urge that the petitioner is not an industrial establishment as defined therein. 5. Section 35(5) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act being relevant is reproduced below. "35. Settlement of Standing Orders by Commissioner of Labour ..... ..... ..... (5) Until standing orders in respect of an undertaking came into operation under the provisions of subsection (4), model standing orders, if any, notified in the Official Gazette by the State Government in respect of the industry shall apply to such undertaking. It is not in dispute that the Standing Orders in terms of provisions of subsection (4) of Section 35 have not been brought into operation and therefore, by virtue of subsection (5) reproduced above, the provision of Model Standing Orders become applicable to the establishment of the petitioner. In view of this, it was not necessary for the Court to decide whether the establishment of the petitioner is an industrial establishment as defined under Section 2(e) of the Bombay Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. 6. So far as the contention raised on the basis of Clause 29 of the Model Standing Orders is concerned, it states that nothing contained in the Standing Orders shall operate in derogation of any law for the time being in force or any prejudice to the rights under the contract of service, custom or usage or an agreement, settlement and award applicable to the industry. 7. There is also no challenge to the findings recorded by the Industrial Court that the Model Standing Orders do not envisage any clerical or supervisory appointment to be made on contract basis. Once it is held that the Model Standing Orders do not envisage any clerical or supervisory appointment to be made on contract basis, it attracts Item 9 of Schedule IV of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P Act. Apart from this, the averments in para 7 of the complaint are as under; "7. After discontinuation on 10.09.2002 as a clerk on contract basis, the complainant applied for the post of permanent clerk. As per the directive of the Government of Maharashtra, the Bank was about to recruit clerks from S.C., S.T., O.B.C. and N.T. categories to clear the backlog. The complainant belongs to O.B.C. category and she was called for written test on 16.02.2003. As per the directive of the Government of Maharashtra, the Bank was about to recruit clerks from S.C., S.T., O.B.C. and N.T. categories to clear the backlog. The complainant belongs to O.B.C. category and she was called for written test on 16.02.2003. She successfully passed the written test and was also cleared in the interview. Thereafter by letter of appointment dated 26.08.2003, she was appointed as Trainee Clerk on the terms and conditions set out in the said letter. During the trainee period, she was to be paid stipend of Rs. 1000/per month. Perusal of the terms and condition would make it apparent that under the guise of appointment as Trainee Clerk, the complainant was in fact appointed as a Clerk. It is pertinent to mention that the so called training was for a period of one year and the appointment letter was valid upto 05.09.2004. As a matter of fact, the complainant has also performed regular clerical work and duties on contract basis in the year 2000 as mentioned above. During this entire period of one year, no further training was given and she performed regular duties of clerk in second respondent Chhatrapati Nagar Branch...." The complainant himself does not claim the employment on contract basis. Hence, Clause 29 of the Model Standing Orders is not of any help to him. The contention is rejected. In view of this, no fault can be found with the view taken by the Industrial Court. 8. Shri Jaiswal, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Reserve Bank of India has cancelled the license of the petitioner Bank on 30.08.2009 and the Liquidator has been appointed on 09.11.2009. He, therefore, submits that the respondent would not be entitled to any monetary benefit beyond the date from which the other employees in the establishment and the respondent were terminated as a result of closure of the establishment. This aspect has not been dealt with by the Industrial Court in the judgment and order impugned. 9. He, therefore, submits that the respondent would not be entitled to any monetary benefit beyond the date from which the other employees in the establishment and the respondent were terminated as a result of closure of the establishment. This aspect has not been dealt with by the Industrial Court in the judgment and order impugned. 9. Shri Thakur, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-employee submits that nothing prevented the petitioner Bank from following the procedure of law in terminating the services of the respondent on account of closure of an undertaking and till such procedure is followed, the employee would be entitled to all monetary benefits including the arrears of salary payable till the order of termination is passed by the management. This aspect is required to be gone into by the Industrial Court and for that purpose, the matter will have to be remanded back. 10. In view of above, the writ petition is partly allowed. The order passed by the Industrial Court to the extent it direct the petitioner-employer to pay all monetary benefits to the respondent-employee as are applicable to the permanent employee beyond 2010 is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Industrial Court to decide the question of entitlement of respondent-employee to the monetary benefits from the year 2010, more particularly from the date of termination of similarly situated employees. The parties to appear before the Industrial Court on 30th November, 2015. The Industrial Court shall permit the parties to place on record the additional material and pleadings and the aspect shall be decided in accordance with law within a period of six months thereafter, if required by giving the parties an opportunity to lead evidence. Rest of the order passed by the Industrial Court does not call for any interference. Needless to say that it shall be open to the respondent to institute the proceedings for execution of the order in accordance with law. Rule is made absolute in above terms. No order as to cost.