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2015 DIGILAW 2390 (ALL)

Bhagwat Prasad Upadhyay v. State of U. P.

2015-08-13

ANIL KUMAR

body2015
JUDGMENT Anil Kumar, J. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record. 2. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 07.05.2014 (Annexure No. 4) passed by Joint Commissioner (Administration), Gramya Vikas, U.P., Lucknow/O.P. No. 3. 3. I have heard learned counsel for parties and gone through the record. 4. By order dated 07.05.2014 while considering the case of the petitioner in respect to assigning his seniority, the finding which is given are as under: - ---Hindi--- 5. After hearing learned counsel for petitioner and going through the record as well as consideration the reasoning given by O.P.No. 3 while passing the 07.05.2014 that the petitioner is entitled for seniority in the cadre in question from the date of his appointment, not prior to said date is perfectly valid rather in accordance with law, so taking into consideration the said fact and the fact that while exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is not intended to take away from administrative authorities the powers and discretion properly vested in them by law and to substitute courts as the bodies making the decisions. Judicial review is a protection and not a weapon. 6. In the case of Council of Civil Service Unions (CCSU) V. Minister 11 for the Civil Service (1984) 3 ALL ER 935, Lord Diplock has observed the scope of judicial review in the following words: - "Judicial Review as I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call 'illegality' the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety". 7. Moreover, judicial review has certain inherent limitation. It is suited more for adjudication of disputes than for performing administrative functions. It is for the executive to administer the law and the function of the judiciary is to ensure that the Government carries out its duty in accordance with the provisions of the rules and statute. 8. 7. Moreover, judicial review has certain inherent limitation. It is suited more for adjudication of disputes than for performing administrative functions. It is for the executive to administer the law and the function of the judiciary is to ensure that the Government carries out its duty in accordance with the provisions of the rules and statute. 8. In the case of Chief Constable of the North Wales Police V. Evans, (1982) 3 ALL ER 141, it was observed by Lord Hailsham as under: - "Purpose of judicial review is to ensure that individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment reaches on a matter which it is authorized by law to decide with its conclusion which is corrected in the eyes of the Court." 9. In the same case, Lord Brightman observed that: - "Judicial review as the words imply is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which a decision was made," and held, that "it would be an error to think that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself." 10. The aforesaid observations made by the Lord Hailsham and Lord Brightman were quoted with approval by their Lordships of Supreme Court in State of U.P. V. Dharmendar Prasad Singh, AIR 1989 SC 997 , and while upholding that the judicial review is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision making process, it was held by the Supreme Court as under: - "When the issue raised in judicial review is whether a 12 decision is vitiated by taking into account irrelevant, or neglecting to take into account, relevant factors or is so manifestly unreasonable that no reasonable authority entrusted with the power in question could reasonable have made such a decision, the judicial review of the decision making process includes examination, as a matter of law, of the relevance of the factors." 11. In the case of Tata Cellular V. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 the Supreme Court stated that: - "Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made but the decision making process itself," and enumerated some broad grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review and classified them under the heading of 'illegality', 'irrationality' and 'procedural impropriety.' In their supervisory jurisdiction as distinguished form the appellate one, the Courts do not themselves embark upon rehearing of the matter but nevertheless courts will, if called upon, act in a supervisory capacity and see that the decision making-body acts fairly. If the decision making body is influenced by considerations which ought not to influence or fails to take into account the matters which ought to have been taken into account the Courts will interfere. If the decision making body comes to its decision on no evidence or comes to a finding so unreasonable that a reasonable man could not have come to it then again the Courts will interfere. Further if the decision making body goes outside its power or misconstrues the extent of its power, then the Courts can only interfere, if the decision making body acts in a bad faith or with ulterior object which it is not authorized by law, its decision will be set aside in supervisory jurisdiction. A decision of a public authority will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by appropriate order in judicial review proceedings, where the Courts concludes that the decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and fact acting reasonably could have reached it." 12. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order under challenge in the present writ petition, thus, the writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed accordingly