JUDGMENT Sudhir Agarwal, J. 1. Heard learned Standing Counsel for revisionists and perused the record. 2. This revision has been preferred under Section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1887") aggrieved by judgment and decree dated 9.4.2001 passed by Additional District Judge/Judge, Small Causes Court, Mathura decreeing S.C.C. Suit No. 1 of 1998 instituted by respondent for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits etc. 3. Counsel for revisionists contended that entire rent was deposited on the first date of hearing before the Court below in order to claim benefit under Section 20 (4) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1972") except the water tax. However, he could not dispute that "water tax" form part of rent and once it is admitted that the amount of water tax was not deposited, it cannot be said that entire rent was deposited on the first date of hearing. 4. However, that would make no difference in the case in hand inasmuch here the Court below has recorded a finding that the Act, 1972 is not at all applicable to the disputed premises and when the tenancy has been terminated by issuing notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1882"), and, since there is no termination of tenancy by invoking any provision under Section 111 of Act, 1882, the defendant would not be entitled for benefit under Section 114 of Act, 1882. 5. I am in agreement with the view taken by Court below. In order to attract Section 114 of Act, 1882, an agreement containing stipulation empowering landlord to re-enter in demised premises in case of breach of condition regarding payment of rent is essential. In Ram Bali Pandey (Since deceased) through his Lrs' Vs. II Additional District Judge, Kanpur and other, 1998 (2) ARC 362 , in para 23, this Court observed: "The tenancy was terminated under Section 106 of the T.P. Act simpliciter. For the applicability of Section 114, existence of an agreement containing a stipulation empowering the landlord to re-enter in the demised premises in case of breach of a condition regarding payment of rent is essential. For the applicability of Section 114, existence of an agreement containing a stipulation empowering the landlord to re-enter in the demised premises in case of breach of a condition regarding payment of rent is essential. In the present case there was no such agreement and as U.P. Act No. 3/47 was not applicable to the premises, there was simpliciter termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the T.P. Act serving a notice thereunder. The mere fact that the notice stated about non-payment of rent also besides termination of monthly tenancy and demand of vacant possession it would not be a case of forfeiture under Clause (g) but one of determination of tenancy by exercising power under Clause (h) of Section 111 of the T.P. Act. No authority is required for the proposition that where there is simpliciter termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the T.P. Act and not under Section 111 (g) of the T.P. Act then provisions of Section 114 of the T.P. Act cannot be attracted. This argument of respondent's counsel also does not appeal to the Court and has to be rejected." (emphasis added) 6. In Mohammad Nasir Vs. District Judge, Nainital and others, 1999 (1) AWC 550 , this Court said: "Section 114 of the Act confers a power on the Court to grant an equitable relief to the defaulting lessee. In order to claim benefit under this section, it has to be shown by the tenant that one of the terms of the lease was that the landlord will have a right of re-entry if the rent for any specified period remained unpaid and he has to show further that forfeiture has been incurred as provided under Section 111 (g). Section 114, of the Act thus postulates existence of determination of lease by forfeiture as a condition precedent and provisions contained in this section will have no application where the lease has been determined by serving a notice to quit under Section 106, of the Act. The relief under Section 114 of the Act is confined to those cases only which are strictly covered under Section 111 (g) and not to those cases which fall under Section 106 of the Act. The relief under Section 114 of the Act is confined to those cases only which are strictly covered under Section 111 (g) and not to those cases which fall under Section 106 of the Act. A monthly tenancy is determinable by one month's notice by either party and if the tenancy is terminated by serving one month's notice under Section 106 of the Act, there is no forfeiture of tenancy and in that event, Section 114 cannot be applied. Thus, a notice under Section 106, of the Act by no means could be treated as one under Section 111(g). Section 114 applies to those cases where the landlord invokes his rights under what is known as forfeiture clause and determines the lease by forfeiture and sues for the ejectment of the tenant. I may illustrate it by an example which will make the picture more clear. Suppose there is a lease for a fixed term of five years containing a clause that the landlord will be entitled to determine the lease and to re-enter upon the demised premises even during the period of five years if the tenant does not pay rent for more than three months. But for this clause, the lease must run for the entire period of five years and the landlord during the said period will have no right to eject the tenant before the expiry of the fixed period of five years. If the tenant fails to pay rent for more than three months, forfeiture clause enables the landlord to determine the lease before its expiration. In such a case, the subsisting tenancy cannot be determined by serving a notice simpliciter under Section 106 of the Act and it can only be determined where the landlord forfeits the tenancy by serving a notice under Section 111 (g). In such an event, Section 114 can be pressed into service but where the tenancy runs from month to month and the same has been determined by a valid notice under Section 106 of the Act, Section 114 of the Act shall have no application." (emphasis added) 7. The aforesaid judgments have been referred to and followed by this Court in Smt. Noorul Subah & Anr. Vs. Addl. District Judge-I, Bijnor & Others, 2013 (2) ADJ 454 . 8. In Arun Khiamal Makhijani Vs. The aforesaid judgments have been referred to and followed by this Court in Smt. Noorul Subah & Anr. Vs. Addl. District Judge-I, Bijnor & Others, 2013 (2) ADJ 454 . 8. In Arun Khiamal Makhijani Vs. Jamnadas C. Tuliani and Ors., (1989) 4 SCC 612 , at page 624, Apex Court observed: "In a case where forfeiture of lease is claimed for non-payment of rent, it would, therefore, have to be established that one of the express conditions of the lease provided that on breach of that condition namely on non-payment of rent the lessor was entitled to re-enter. It is only in those cases where such an express condition is contained in the lease and the lessee breaks the said condition and the lessor on his part gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease that a lease of immovable property determines by forfeiture for non-payment of rent." 9. Referring to the above authorities, this Court also in Devi Prasad Sachan Vs. Spl. Judge (S.C. & S.T. Act) Kanpur Dehat & Ors., 2013 (3) ADJ 683 has held in paras 12 and 14 as under: "12. From the aforesaid authorities and also bare perusal of Section 114 of Act, 1882 makes it very clear that genesis of Section 114 of Act, 1882 is a written agreement between the parties containing expressed terms and conditions and in breach whereof, when a right of re-entry is exercised under Section 111(g) of Act, 1882, Section 114 of Act, 1882 may be attracted and not otherwise." "14. In absence of any written agreement, the courts below have rightly declined to extend benefit of Section 114 of Act, 1882 to the petitioner." 10. The above view has been reiterated in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.19601 of 2013 (Mohd. Mustafa Vs. Ram Niwas Gupta & Ors.) decided on 16.4.2013 and Nizamuddin Vs. Smt. Bushara Khatoon & Ors., 2013(5) ADJ 590 . 11. In the case in hand, the question of benefit under Section 20 (4) of Act, 1972 does not arise when the Act, 1972 itself has no application to the case in hand. 12. No other point has been argued in order to show that the Court below has committed any illegality, material illegality or jurisdictional error in passing the impugned order. No interference, therefore, is called for. 13. Dismissed. 14. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 15. 12. No other point has been argued in order to show that the Court below has committed any illegality, material illegality or jurisdictional error in passing the impugned order. No interference, therefore, is called for. 13. Dismissed. 14. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 15. Certify this order to the lower Court immediately.