JUDGMENT S.B. SHUKRE, J. 1. Heard. 2. Rule, made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of the parties. 3. By this petition, the petitioner has challenged the legality and correctness of the order dated 07/6/2014 passed by Judge, Family Court, Nagpur, thereby allowing an application (Exh.28) filed by the respondent for grant of permission to amend his composite reply to the application filed by the petitioner under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, claiming maintenance from the respondent. 4. It so happened that in the proceedings initiated under Section 125 Cr. P. C. at the instance of the petitioner, on 20/3/2014, the respondent filed an application seeking grant of permission of the Court to amend the composite reply and written statement. That was the stage when evidence had already commenced and an affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief had been filed on record on that very date by the petitioner and her statement of oath, in support of her averements in the affidavit had also been recorded and the matter was fixed for further examination-in-chief to enable the petitioner to prove some documents. The application was strongly opposed by the petitioner. However, learned Judge of the Family Court was of the view that out of two paragraphs sought to be amended by the amendment, one paragraph could be allowed to be added as contentions were necessary for effective adjudication of the petition. Therefore, the learned Judge partly allowed the application by imposing costs of Rs.500/-. Not being satisfied with this order, the petitioner is before this Court in the present petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 5. According to learned Counsel for the petitioner, the amendment allowed to be made to the reply would change the nature of defence of the respondent as, initially in his reply, respondent had stated that the petitioner had left his company without any cause or reason and now that by this amendment, the respondent is coming out with the case that the petitioner has been living in adultery so as to deny her original claim of maintenance. She further submits that the amendment is being made by the respondent only with mala fide intention and, therefore, it should not have been allowed. She further submits that the amendment is being made by the respondent only with mala fide intention and, therefore, it should not have been allowed. She also submits that after evidence had commenced, in view of the proviso to Rule 17 Order VI of the Civil Procedure Code, the amendment should not have been allowed. 6. According to learned Counsel for the respondent, rules of the Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to the criminal proceedings and in any case the amendment was necessary for deciding the controversy between the parties and, therefore, no illegality or arbitrariness can be seen in the impugned order. He also submits that the amendment does not change the nature of controversy and it is only by way of an additional and alternate defence taken by the respondent. He also submits that for the inconvenience caused to the petitioner, compensation of Rs.500/- has been granted. 7. Upon going through the impugned order and also the amendment allowed to be carried out, I find that there is great substance in the argument advanced by learned Counsel for the petitioner and no merits in the argument canvassed by the learned Counsel for the respondent. 8. It is true that provisions of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be applied to the proceedings initiated under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. At the same time, it is well settled law that these proceedings have trappings and characteristics of civil proceedings, though the Section is embedded in a Code regulating criminal proceedings and the remedy is a summary one (See Madhavi Vs. Thupran, 1987 (3) Crimes 183, 185 (Ker.) and Mst. Jagir Kaur Vs. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1963 SC 1521 : 1963 (2) Cri. L.J. 413. Therefore, while adjudicating upon such an issue as an amendment of pleadings or contentions of parties, guidance, in suitable cases, can be sought from the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, that is to say those contained in Order VI Rule 17 and the law applicable to them. It would, therefore, be useful to refer to the parameters set by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various judgments on which Courts are required to consider grant or refusal of the application for amendment of pleadings. In this regard, learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred to me the case of Rameshkumar Agarwal Vs. Rajmala Exports Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. In this regard, learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred to me the case of Rameshkumar Agarwal Vs. Rajmala Exports Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. AIR 2012 SC 1887 , wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has made a reference to the case of Revajeetu Builders & Developers Vs. Narayanaswamy & Sons & Ors. (2009) 10 SCC 84 , laying down the factors that should be taken into consideration while dealing with the application for amendment while clarifying that they are stated only illustratively and not exhaustively. These factors are as under : (1) Whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case; (2) Whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide; (3) Whether the amendment causes any such prejudice to the other side as cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money; (4) Whether refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multiple litigation; (5) Whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case; (6) As a general rule, the court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application. After referring to the above referred six factors, the Hon'ble Apex Court further held that while deciding the application for amendment ordinarily the Court must not refuse bona fide, legitimate, honest and necessary amendments. It also held that the Court should never permit mala fide and dishonest amendments although liberal approach should be the general rule particularly in cases where the other side can be compensated with costs. 9. The above referred factors, having regard to the nature of proceedings filed under Section 125 Cr.P.C. as stated above, can be taken as guiding principles while dealing with the amendment application. In addition to these factors, after the amendment of provisions of Order VI Rule 17. C.P.C., one more additional factor may also weigh with the mind of the Court. It is that the amendment cannot be granted if the application for amendment is made after the trial has commenced, unless the party seeking amendment satisfies the Court that the amendment could not have been made earlier in spite of due diligence on his part. 10. In the instant case, the amendment which has been allowed by the impugned order appears to be in the nature of additional defence of the respondent. 10. In the instant case, the amendment which has been allowed by the impugned order appears to be in the nature of additional defence of the respondent. This additional defence is that the petitioner is not entitled to claim any maintenance as she is the wife who is living in adultery. This defence was available to the respondent even at the time when he filed his reply to the application. In the amendment application, the respondent has nowhere stated that he learnt about the alleged adultery only after filing of his reply. On the contrary, his case is that in the year 1989, there was an agreement for dissolution of marriage between himself and the respondent and thereafter the respondent started residing with one Babu, who died a homicidal death and thereafter, she started residing with one Shamrao Thumke, who also died in the year 2009. This shows that the alleged fact of adultery was well within the knowledge of the respondent and yet, he did not include it in his reply as an alternate or additional defence. It is an admitted fact that the evidence in the matter has already been commenced and since the facts, which were to be brought on record by way of amendment of reply, were within the knowledge of the respondent, learned Judge could not have allowed the said amendment. On this ground alone the impugned order seems to be illegal and arbitrary. 11. The matter does not rest here. The impugned order also appears to be passed in ignorance of a material consideration as to whether or not the amendment application was bona fide or mala fide. The amendment application appears to be filed with mala fide intention, just to protract the proceedings some how or the other. In the reply, it is the case of the respondent that the petitioner had left his company without any reason or cause. Now, the petitioner is suggesting that there was some reason for the petitioner to leave his company which is - she wanted to lead an adulterous life. In the reply, it is the case of the respondent that the petitioner had left his company without any reason or cause. Now, the petitioner is suggesting that there was some reason for the petitioner to leave his company which is - she wanted to lead an adulterous life. It is also his case as put forward in the amendment application that there was dissolution of marriage in presence of the panchas, which would indicate that now the respondent is trying to suggest that reason for living separate by the petitioner was the dissolution of marriage by an agreement and not the desire to live in adultery. As if this is not enough, the respondent has taken yet another stand. In his reply to the application filed by the petitioner for interim maintenance (Exh. 20), the respondent contended that he was ready to cohabit with the petitioner. If the petitioner was leading adulterous life, respondent would never have said that he was ready to cohabit with her. The fact that he did say so, would only mean his levelling of allegation of adultery subsequently is not bona fide. The respondent has also not given the dates since when the petitioner, according to him, had started residing as wife of one Babu or another person Shamrao Thumke. This would only further strengthen the inference of mala fides of the respondent in the matter. Then, both the said persons are already dead and the respondent would be hard put to prove the said allegation even if allowed to be incorporated in his reply. Allowing of the amendment in all probability, is going to be an exercise in futility and the respondent is well aware of it and still wants to take a chance, just to tarnish the image of petitioner. This would further add up to mala-fides on the part of the respondent. I am thus of the view that the only intention with which the amendment application has been filed by the respondent is to delay the proceedings and cause damage to reputation of petitioner in whatever way it is possible. The application smacks of mala fides on the face of it. These aspects, however, have not been appropriately considered by the learned Judge of the Family Court and the result is an illegal and arbitrary order passed in ignorance of the well settled provisions of law. The application smacks of mala fides on the face of it. These aspects, however, have not been appropriately considered by the learned Judge of the Family Court and the result is an illegal and arbitrary order passed in ignorance of the well settled provisions of law. If such an order is allowed to be sustained, it would only delay the proceedings. It would also cause such harassment to the petitioner as cannot be compensated in terms of money for the reason that the allegations of adultery are per se defamatory and may injure permanently the image of a woman, if are not proved. The party making such allegations, therefore, must show that there is some reasonable basis for them. But, as seen earlier, that is not the case here. 12. The petition, for the reasons stated above, deserves to be allowed and is allowed accordingly. The impugned order dated 07/6/2014 below Exh.28 is hereby quashed and set aside. Family Court, Nagpur shall proceed with the matter in accordance with law. Parties to appear before the Family Court on 06/02/2015. Rule is made absolute in these terms.