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Madras High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 2444 (MAD)

C. Shanmuganathan v. A. Murugesan

2015-07-09

S.NAGAMUTHU

body2015
ORDER : The petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 are the accused in C.C.No.4 of 2008 on the file of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai. The respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 is the petitioner in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.12405 of 2015 and he is the complainant in the case. On the private complaint filed by the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, had taken cognizance of offences punishable under Sections 120(B), 167, 177, 196, 199, 211, 323, 342, 469 and 500 IPC. Seeking to quash the said proceedings, the petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 are before this Court with this Criminal Original Petition. 2. The petitioner in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.12405 of 2015, who is the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 has come up with this petition seeking compensation to the tune of Rs.25 lakhs for the loss sustained by him on account of his illegal detention in C.C.No.206 of 1994 and the consequential mental agony suffered by him. 3. Common facts in both the petitions are as follows: A case in Crime No.30 of 1994 was registered on the file of the Oomachikulam Police Station in Madurai District on 28.01.1994 as against five accused by name, Murugesan, S/o.Krishnan, Somu, Shanthi, Sasi and Latha. All the accused were arrested and remanded to judicial custody and later on, as per the orders of the learned Judicial Magistrate, No.II, Madurai, they were released on bail on 03.02.1994. On completing the investigation, a final report was filed, upon which, cognizance was taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate, No.II, Madurai, in C.C.No.206 of 1994. 3.1. On service of summons, the accused Somu, Shanthi, Sasi and Latha appeared before the learned Magistrate, admitted the offences under Sections 3(1), 4(1), 6(1) and 7(1) of Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 and accordingly, they were punished. But the first accused in the case Mr.Murugesan, S/o.Krishnan, a resident of 5/68 Vellalar Street, Thirupplai, did not appear before the Court. Therefore, the learned Judicial Magistrate issued a non bailable warrant on 04.07.1995, for the arrest of Mr.Murugesan, S/o.Krishnan. 3.2. On 30.04.2001, the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008, Mr.A.Murugesan, S/o.S.Arunachalam, residing at No.18, Lourdhu Nagar, 7th Street, 10th Cross street, K.Pudur, Madurai, was arrested by one Mr.Padmanabhan, the then Sub Inspector of Police, attached to Oomachikulam Police Station in execution of the said non bailable warrant. 3.2. On 30.04.2001, the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008, Mr.A.Murugesan, S/o.S.Arunachalam, residing at No.18, Lourdhu Nagar, 7th Street, 10th Cross street, K.Pudur, Madurai, was arrested by one Mr.Padmanabhan, the then Sub Inspector of Police, attached to Oomachikulam Police Station in execution of the said non bailable warrant. According to the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 , there was some motive between him and the 2nd petitioner Mr.Veluchamy in Crl.O.P. (MD) No.5608 of 2008, who was working as a Police Constable Grade I, attached to Oomachikulam Police Station. He was the Driver under the first petitioner in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008, who was the then Inspector of Police of Oomachikulam Police Station. The petitioners 3 and 4 in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 were working as Constables in the very same police station. According to the complainant, due to the said motive, the 2nd petitioner had instigated the rest of the accused and the Sub Inspector of Police to arrest the respondent in execution of the non bailable warrant in connection with the case in C.C.No.206 of 1994 and then to produce him before the learned Magistrate. When the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 was produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate, as the first accused in C.C.No.206 of 1994, the respondent filed a protest petition stating that he was not the one concerned in the said case. The learned Magistrate granted him interim bail based on the said submission. Then, the learned Magistrate proceeded to hold a summary enquiry. During the said enquiry, the learned Magistrate examined the Sub Inspector of Police, Mr.Padmanabhan and the Inspector of Police. Mr.Padmanabhan asserted before the learned Magistrate that the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 was the real accused in C.C.No.206 of 1994. The learned Magistrate believed the said statement of Mr.Padmanabhan and held that the respondent was the accused concerned in the case in C.C.No.206 of 1994 and accordingly remanded him to judicial custody. Thus, came to an end to the interim bail granted to him. Thereafter, it appears that he was granted bail in the regular course. 3.3. As against the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate declaring that the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 was the accused concerned in the case in C.C.No.206 of 1994, the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 filed a Criminal Revision Petition before the Principal Bench of this Court in Crl.R.C.No.1109 of 2001. 3.3. As against the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate declaring that the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 was the accused concerned in the case in C.C.No.206 of 1994, the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 filed a Criminal Revision Petition before the Principal Bench of this Court in Crl.R.C.No.1109 of 2001. By order dated 14.09.2001, the learned single Judge of this Court dismissed the Revision holding that the dispute as to whether the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No. 5608 of 2008 was the real accused connected to C.C.No.206 of 1994 could be decided only during the trial of the case, when the witnesses would be in a position to identify him. Thus, according to this Court, it was too premature to decide the said issue. Accordingly, this Court dismissed the said revision. 3.4. As against the said order of this Court, the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 filed Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) Nos. 553 and 554 of 2002 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. By order dated 18.11.2002, the Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate, which was confirmed by this Court and directed the learned Magistrate to hold a detailed enquiry to ascertain whether the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 is the real accused concerned in C.C.No.206 of 1994 or not and then to proceed further. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, considering the fact that there was allegation of wrong person being in prison, directed the learned Judicial Magistrate to complete the enquiry within one month and to dispose of the same in accordance with law. 3.5. As per the said direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the learned Judicial Magistrate, No.II, Madurai, took up the matter for enquiry. During which, the learned Judicial Magistrate examined as many as four witnesses, namely, the Inspector of Police (first petitioner in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008), Mr.Padmanabhan, the Sub Inspector of Police, (who is reported to be now dead), one Mr.Subramanian, the Probation Officer and one Thamarai Selvan and as many as 15 documents were exhibited, which include the Family Card, School Certificate, Tahsildar Certificate etc. On the side of the respondent, he was examined. Having considered all the above materials, the learned Judicial Magistrate, by order dated 03.01.2003 held that the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 was not the real accused concerned in C.C.No.206 of 1994. On the side of the respondent, he was examined. Having considered all the above materials, the learned Judicial Magistrate, by order dated 03.01.2003 held that the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 was not the real accused concerned in C.C.No.206 of 1994. In other words, according to the learned Magistrate, Murugesan, S/o.Krishnan, a resident of 5/68 Vellalar Street, Thiruppalai, who was the first accused in C.C.No. 206 of 1994 is a different person and not the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008. The fathers name of the respondent is Arunachalam and he is a resident of No.18, Lourdhu Nagar 7th Street, 10th Cross Street, K.Pudur, Madurai. With the above conclusion, the learned Magistrate relieved the respondent from the case. That order has become final, as there has been no challenge made to the same either by the petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 or by the State. 3.6. Thereafter, the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 started working out his other remedies. He filed a complaint before the Human Rights Commission against as many as 7 persons including the petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 claiming various reliefs under the Protection of Human Rights Act. That was entertained by the Tamil Nadu Human Rights Commission in SHRC No.9192 of 2003. The Commission, after holding enquiry, passed an order on 20.05.2005 directing the first petitioner in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 to pay compensation of Rs.50,000/-to the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 and the other petitioners herein to pay a sum of Rs.25,000/-each to the respondent herein as compensation for having violated the Human Rights of the respondent herein. 3.7. As against the said award of the Human Rights Commission, the petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 filed four writ petitions in W.P.Nos.5288 to 5291 of 2005. When these writ petitions came up for hearing, on 18.09.2007, before this Court, it was contended that the petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008, who were the respondents before the Human Rights Commission were not afforded any opportunity at all to defend themselves. In other words, the contention before this Court was that the Human Rights Commission did not follow the principles of natural justice before issuing directions against the petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 to pay compensation. This Court, on perusal of the records found that there was justification in the contentions of the petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008. In other words, the contention before this Court was that the Human Rights Commission did not follow the principles of natural justice before issuing directions against the petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 to pay compensation. This Court, on perusal of the records found that there was justification in the contentions of the petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008. This Court found that the Human Rights Commission had passed the order without affording sufficient opportunity and in gross violation of principles of natural justice. On that ground, by a common order dated 18.09.2007, when I was sitting single on the writ jurisdiction, I allowed all the four writ petitions and remanded the Human Rights Case to the file of the State Human Rights Commission for passing fresh order, after affording sufficient opportunity to the petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008. 3.8. Challenging the said order, the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 filed writ appeals in W.A.Nos.522 to 525 of 2007 before the Division Bench of this Court. By order dated 13.11.2008, the Division Bench dismissed all the writ appeals thereby confirming the order of the single Judge. 3.9. Thereafter, the Human Rights Commission took up the Human Rights case again, for trial. This time, the Human Rights Commission afforded opportunity to all the parties. During the course of the said proceedings, the petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 took up a new plea of limitation. According to the petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008, any complaint into the violation of Human Rights shall be enquired into by the Human Rights Commission, provided, the same is filed within one year from the date of commission of the Human Rights Violation. That plea was accepted by the Human Rights Commission and accordingly, the Human Rights Commission dismissed the Human Rights case by order dated 07.11.2012. It is reported to this Court that the said order of the Human Rights Commission has been challenged by the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 and the same is pending before this Court. 4. When things stood thus, during the interregnum period, the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 filed a private complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Madurai, against the petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 alleging that the petitioners were responsible for arrest illegally in connection with the case in C.C.No.206 of 1994 and for his remand in judicial custody. 4. When things stood thus, during the interregnum period, the respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 filed a private complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Madurai, against the petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 alleging that the petitioners were responsible for arrest illegally in connection with the case in C.C.No.206 of 1994 and for his remand in judicial custody. It is on this private complaint, the learned Judicial Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offences as narrated herein above. Seeking to quash the said private complaint, which is now pending on the file of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai, the petitioners have come up with this petition in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008. 5. During the pendency of Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008, the respondent has come up with Crl.O.P.No.12045 of 2015 under Section 482 Cr.P.C. claiming compensation from the State to the tune of Rs.25 lakhs for the loss sustained by him due to the gross Human Rights Violation committed on his life and personal liberty on the action of the officials of the State in illegally arresting and causing his production before the Court for remand. 6. Crl.O.P.No.12405 of 2015 and Crl.O.P.No.5608 of 2008 were heard together and as a matter of fact, common arguments were advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners in Crl.O.P.No.5608 of 2008. The respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 is the petitioner in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.12405 of 2015 and the learned Additional Advocate General assisted by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr.C.Mayilvahana Rajendran, on behalf of the respondents 1 to 7 in Crl.O.P.No.12405 of 2015 were heard. Since the issues involved are almost same, these petitions are disposed of by this common order. Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008 7. As I have already pointed out, this petition has been filed seeking to quash the entire proceedings in C.C.No.4 of 2008 pending on the file of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai. In this case, the learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the learned Judicial Magistrate, No.II, who held enquiry as directed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in his order has very categorically stated that the arrest of the respondent in connection with C.C.No.206 of 1994 in execution of the non bailable warrant cannot be stated to be a wanton act. According to the learned Judicial Magistrate, out of mistaken identity, the respondent was arrested as though he was Mr.Murugesan, S/o.Krishnan involved in the case in C.C.No.206 of 1994. He would further submit that the arrest of the respondent was made by the then Sub Inspector of Police Padmanabhan and he only caused his production before the learned Magistrate for remand. He would further submit that the request for remand was only made by Mr.Padmanabhan and by none of these petitioners. He would further submit that when a summary enquiry was held regarding identity of the respondent, a dispute was raised. It was Mr.Padmanabhan, who again, identified the respondent as the real accused in C.C.No.206 of 1994. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the petitioners have got nothing to do with either the arrest of the respondent in execution of the non bailable warrant or his remand to judicial custody. Therefore, there is no offence committed by these petitioners, the learned counsel contended. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that assuming that the petitioners had some act to perform in the arrest of the respondent and in the judicial remand, their act would clearly fall under Section 76 of the Indian Penal Code. He would lastly submit that these offences, for which, cognizance has been taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate are barred by the provisions contained in Section 195(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the entire case is liable to be quashed. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent would oppose the same. According to him, the question as to whether the petitioners have acted in good faith or not is a matter to be decided only on evidence and it is too premature, according to the learned counsel, to plead now that they acted by reason of a mistake of fact and out of good faith. The learned counsel, Mr.Anand, appearing for the respondent would further submit that though the offences fall within the scope of Section 195(1) and Section 468 Cr.P.C., going by the fact that the respondent was making a legal fight all these years, the delay needs to be condoned and the bar contained in Section 195(1) needs to be ignored. The learned counsel, Mr.Anand, appearing for the respondent would further submit that though the offences fall within the scope of Section 195(1) and Section 468 Cr.P.C., going by the fact that the respondent was making a legal fight all these years, the delay needs to be condoned and the bar contained in Section 195(1) needs to be ignored. The learned counsel would further submit that though on fact, it is true that Mr.Padmanabhan, the then Sub Inspector of Police, had arrested the respondent illegally, the petitioners had a role to play in the same, which has been clearly averred in the complaint. Therefore, according to him, the case need not be quashed. 10. I have considered the rival submissions. 11. Before proceeding further, let us have a quick look into the list of circumstances (not exhaustive) enumerated in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in any one or more of the circumstances, this Court should quash the proceedings pending before a criminal Court. Keeping in mind, the above principles stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, let us go into the facts of this case. 12. Admittedly, the respondent was not arrested on 28.01.1994 along with the other accused in Crime No.30 of 1994. The person arrested as a first accused in the said case was one Murugesan, S/o.Krishnan, a resident of 5/68, Vallalar Street, Thiruppalai, in Madurai District. Admittedly, after the filing of final report, the other accused appeared before the trial Court and admitted the offences, whereas Mr.Murugesan, S/o.Krishnan, did not appear in response to the summons, which forced the learned Judicial Magistrate to issue non bailable warrant for his arrest on 04.07.1995. 13. From 04.07.1995 onwards, the non-bailable warrant issued against Mr.Murugesan, S/o.Krishnan was pending on the file of the Oomachikulam Police Station. It is common knowledge that several officers would have been there working as Officer in-charge of the police station from 1995 onwards and no useful effort appears to have been taken for six years to execute the non-bailable warrant from 04.07.1995 onwards so as to apprehend Mr.Murugesan, S/o.Krishnan, the accused No. 1 in C.C.No.206 of 1994. Finally, on 30.04.2001, the respondent was arrested. Admittedly, his father's name is Mr.Arunachalam. Finally, on 30.04.2001, the respondent was arrested. Admittedly, his father's name is Mr.Arunachalam. But, while producing the accused for judicial remand, Mr.Padmanabhan, the then Sub Inspector of Police, had conveniently mentioned his name as Murugesan, S/o.Krishnan alias Arunachalam. Probably Mr.Padmanabhan would have believed that if he had mentioned the name of the respondent as Murugesan, S/o.Arunachalam, the learned Judicial Magistrate would not have accepted to remand him to judicial custody. Probably, in order to avoid that situation, Mr.Padmanabhan had mentioned his name as Murugesan, S/o.Krishnan alias Arunachalam, whereas the fact absolutely remains that the respondent's father had no such alias name as Krishnan. 14. Admittedly, when he was produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate for judicial remand, the respondent raised objection and said that he was not the accused concerned. What followed thereafter is not important for the decision in this petition. Now, the question is whether these allegations in the complaint reflecting the above facts would make out any offences against these petitioners. In my considered opinion, it is not so. As I have already narrated, not at all these petitioners arrested the respondent. The arrest was made only by Mr.Padmanabhan, the then Sub Inspector of Police, who is now no more. Absolutely, there is no material even to infer that the petitioners had knowledge that Mr.Padmanabhan had arrested the respondent illegally with the knowledge that the respondent is not the real accused connected in the case. At any rate, in my considered view, going thoroughly through the complaint and the other records, I find that absolutely, there is no material against these petitioners to allow the prosecution to proceed further. 15. So far as the contention of the petitioners relying on Section 76 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, I find some force. Section 76 of the Indian Penal Code reads as follows: “76.Act done by a person bound, or by mistake of fact believing himself bound, by law – Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes himself to be, bound by law to do it.” 16. Section 76 of the Indian Penal Code is one of the general exceptions, which declares an act of an accused an no offence, provided, it satisfies the requirements of the said provisions. Section 76 of the Indian Penal Code is one of the general exceptions, which declares an act of an accused an no offence, provided, it satisfies the requirements of the said provisions. A reading of the said provision would go to show that if a person has done an act by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of mistake of law and in good faith, then, it is not an offence. Here, in this case, it is pleaded that the respondent was mistaken for the real accused in the case out of good faith and therefore, he was arrested by Mr.Padmanabhan. If Mr.Padmanabhan is before me, whether his act in arresting the respondent was out of good faith and by mistake of fact or not could have been dealt with by me. Since he is not before me and it is not known as to under what circumstances, he acted to arrest the respondent, I do not want to go into that question. 17. Now, turning to the last leg of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners, the offences under Sections 177 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code fall under Sub Section (1)(a)(i) of Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The said provision mandates that no Court shall take cognizance of any offences under these penal provisions, except on the complaint in writing of a public servant concerned or some other public servant to whom, he is administratively subordinate. Similarly, the offences under Sections 196, 199 and 211 IPC could be taken cognizance of only on the complaint of that Court before which, the said offences were committed. In this case, neither a public servant has made the complaint nor the learned Judicial Magistrate No.II has made the complaint. Thus, taking cognizance of these offences by the learned Judicial Magistrate is illegal. The other offences viz, the offences under Sections 167, 323 and 342 IPC are barred by limitation, as provided under Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, in respect of these offences, they are hit by the limitation. So far as Section 120(B) is concerned, corresponding offence is the offences, which are either barred by limitation or barred by Section 195(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, in my considered view, the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate, taking cognizance itself, is not sustainable. 18. Therefore, in respect of these offences, they are hit by the limitation. So far as Section 120(B) is concerned, corresponding offence is the offences, which are either barred by limitation or barred by Section 195(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, in my considered view, the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate, taking cognizance itself, is not sustainable. 18. For these reasons, I hold that the private complaint now pending on the file of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai, in C.C.No.4 of 2008 is liable to be quashed. In the result, Crl.O.P.(MD) No. 5608 of 2008 is allowed and the case in C.C.No.4 of 2008 is hereby quashed. Consequently connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. Crl.O.P.(MD) No.12405 of 2015 This Criminal Original Petition (MD) No.12405 of 2015 has been filed by the petitioner (respondent in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5608 of 2008), claiming compensation. As I have already narrated, it has been judicially once for all declared that he is not the accused Murugesan, S/o.Krishnan, who is the first accused in C.C.No.206 of 1994, but the petitioner was arrested in execution of the non bailable warrant issued by the learned Judicial Magistrate, as though, he were Mr.Murugesan, S/o.Krishnan, the first accused in C.C.No.206 of 1994. He was in jail for few days and thereafter, he was released on bail. 2. The fact remains that in order to prove the fact that he is not the real accused concerned in C.C.No.206 of 1994, the petitioner had to fight a legal battle before one forum or the other. The first response came from him by filing a petition before the learned Judicial Magistrate, at the time when he was produced for remand, when he disputed the identity. The learned Judicial Magistrate, on hearing the said protest made by the petitioner, granted him interim bail for two days. During enquiry again, Mr.Padmanabhan, the Sub-Inspector of Police asserted by giving evidence that the petitioner herein was the real accused concerned in C.C.No.206 of 1994. The Inspector of Police also gave evidence. But he did not assert so. The learned Judicial Magistrate, on accepting the identification made by the Sub Inspector of Police, Mr.Padmanabhan, remanded him to judicial custody. That is how, he was in judicial remand. The Inspector of Police also gave evidence. But he did not assert so. The learned Judicial Magistrate, on accepting the identification made by the Sub Inspector of Police, Mr.Padmanabhan, remanded him to judicial custody. That is how, he was in judicial remand. This act of Mr.Padmanabhan, the then Sub Inspector of Police to inform the Court assertively that the petitioner was the real accused in connection with C.C.No.206 of 1994 was obviously made without making proper enquiry and without ascertaining the truth of the allegations. I can say that Mr.Padmanabhan had made an irresponsible statement before the Court identifying the petitioner as the one, who was involved in C.C.No.206 of 1994. 3. The second legal fight, the petitioner was to make, was before this Court by filing Crl.R.C.No.1109 of 2001. That went on for about an year. Thereafter, this Court also dismissed the petition. At this juncture, I have to state that had he not taken up the matter to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, he would have been facing the ordeal of trial for few more years. But he did not stop with the lost legal fight before this Court and he took up the matter to the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing SLP (Crl) Nos.553 and 554 of 2002. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, on considering the plea of the petitioner that he was detained illegally by mistaken identity, directed the enquiry to be held by the learned Judicial Magistrate, No.II, Madurai. 4. Ultimately, before the learned Judicial Magistrate, the petitioner had to undergo the ordeal of producing witnesses, documents and to dispute the oral evidence let in by the police officers in order to establish himself to be Mr.Murugesan, S/o.Arunachalam and not Mr.Murugesan, S/o.Krishnan. The learned Judicial Magistrate, ultimately, passed an order on 03.01.2003. Thus, between 30.04.2001 and 03.01.2003, he was making his legal batttle only to establish that he is only Murugesan, S/o.Arunachalam, and not Murugesan, S/o.Krishnan, who is the accused in C.C.No.206 of 1994. 5. The complaint made before the Human Rights Commission was dismissed on a technical ground of limitation. Of course, the challenge made by the petitioner is pending before this Court. It is in those circumstances, the petitioner has come up with this petition claiming compensation. 6. 5. The complaint made before the Human Rights Commission was dismissed on a technical ground of limitation. Of course, the challenge made by the petitioner is pending before this Court. It is in those circumstances, the petitioner has come up with this petition claiming compensation. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that because the petitioner was implicated in a case involving Sections 3(1), 4(1) and 6(1) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, he has been put to lot of humiliation in the eye of public. This Court is able to perceive the amount of mental agony, shame and sufferings, which the petitioner would have undergone on account of his false implication in such a case. It is really immeasurable. It is not only for the illegal detention of the petitioner for few days and it is not only for the sufferings of the petitioner in making the legal fight all these years, it is for the mental agonies of the petitioner and other sufferings on account of the false implication and his remand in a case involving immoral trafficking, the petitioner deserves to be compensated. 7. In the counter filed by the Superintendent of Police, Madurai District, on his behalf and on behalf of the Chief Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu, Home Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu and the other respondents, the above facts have not been disputed. But the only objection raised in the counter is that the liability to pay compensation rest with the individual officers concerned and the Government Tax Payers money cannot be expended for this purpose. It is further stated that the individual officers against whom allegations have been made have not been impleaded in their personal capacity. It is also alleged that no malafide or ill motive have been established against the police officers and for these reasons, compensation should be denied to the petitioner, it is stated in the counter. 8. The learned Additional Advocate General, reiterating the stand of the Government in the counter, would submit that for the illegalities committed by the police officers, the State cannot be held liable to pay compensation. 8. The learned Additional Advocate General, reiterating the stand of the Government in the counter, would submit that for the illegalities committed by the police officers, the State cannot be held liable to pay compensation. The learned Additional Advocate General would further submit that when the petitioner was produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate on the first occasion for judicial remand, the Court was also satisfied with the identity of the petitioner and that is why, the Court itself remanded him to judicial custody. Therefore, according to the learned Additional Advocate General, the police officers cannot be blamed, who acted out of good faith and by mistake of fact. 9. The above argument, in my considered view, is so strange. The reasons are many. It is needless to point that the State is the guardian of the fundamental rights of its citizens, which have been guaranteed as fundamental rights in Chapter III of the Constitution of India. It is the obligation of the State that the personal liberty of an individual and his right to personal liberty and life, as guaranteed under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India are ensured, protected and they are enjoyed by the citizens without there being any infringement, even slightly at the hands of its officials or State instrumentalities. If it is found by the State that such fundamental right of a citizen of this Country has been violated by any officer of the State, either wantonly or by mistake, the State should volunteer to repair the damage caused to the citizen by offering to pay monetary compensation, which would, to some extent, reduce the agonies of the citizen. For the sake of litigation, the State is expected not to agitate even after having come to know that on account of the act of their officials, a serious human rights violation has been committed. 10. But in this case, it is argued by the State that the petitioner can work out his remedy before the civil Court or any other forum under the Private law. This argument, in my considered opinion, deserves to be rejected at its threshold. 10. But in this case, it is argued by the State that the petitioner can work out his remedy before the civil Court or any other forum under the Private law. This argument, in my considered opinion, deserves to be rejected at its threshold. It has been too well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the right to claim compensation or damages for any loss sustained by any individual on account of the tortfeasor act committed by the State instrumentalities, by way of private law remedy will not deter the constitutional Court to grant such relief in exercise of its constitutional power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or its inherent power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in very many number of cases, has also held that the compensation granted by way of constitutional remedy will not deter the claimant from working out his remedy under the private law independently. 11. In this regard, I may refer to some of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In Bhagalpur Blinding case, [Khatri (II) v. State of Bihar – 1981 (1) SCC 627 ], the Hon'ble Justice Bhagavati, (as he then was), speaking for the Bench, posed the following question while considering the relief that could be given by a court for violation of constitutional rights guaranteed in Article 21 of the Constitution:- “... but, if life or personal liberty is violated otherwise than in accordance with such procedure, is the Court helpless to grant relief to the person who has suffered such deprivation? Why should the Court not be prepared to forge new tools and device new remedies for the purpose of vindicating the most precious of the precious fundamental right to life and personal liberty” 12. The same was expanded in a subsequent order in Bhagalpur Blinding case [Khatri (IV) v. State of Bihar – 1981 (2) SCC 493 ], thus:- “If an officer of the State acting in his official capacity threatens to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty without authority of law, can such person not approach the Court for injuncting the State from acting through such officer in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21? Can the State urge in defence in such a case that it is not infringing the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 21, because the officer who is threatening to do so is acting outside the law and therefore beyond the scope of his authority and hence, the State is not responsible for his action ? Would this not make a mockery of Article 21 and reduce it to nullity, a mere rope of sand, for, on this view, if the officer is acting according to law there would ex concessionis be no breach of Article 21 and if he is acting without the authority of law, the State would be able to contend that it is not responsible for his action and therefore there is no violation of Article 21. So also if there is any threatened invasion by the State of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21, the petitioner who is aggrieved can move the Court under Article 32 for a writ injunction such threatened invasion and if there is any continuing action of the State which is violative of the fundamental right under Article 21, the petitioner can approach the Court under Article 32 and ask for a writ striking down the continuance of such action, but where the action taken by the State has already resulted in breach of the fundamental right under Article 21 by deprivation of some limb of the petitioner, would the petitioner have no remedy under Article 32 for breach of the fundamental right guaranteed to him? Would the court permit itself to become helpless spectator of the violation of the fundamental right of the petitioner by the State and tell the petitioner that though the Constitution has guaranteed the fundamental right to him and has also given him the fundamental right of moving the Court for enforcement of his fundamental right, the Court cannot give him any relief.” 13. This declaration of law made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhagalpur Blinding case was subsequently elaborated and followed in Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar [ 1983 (4) SCC 141 ], wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “Article 21 which guarantees the right to life and liberty will be denuded of its significant content if the power of this Court were limited to passing orders of release from illegal detention. One of the telling ways in which the violation of that right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance with the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violators in the payment of monetary compensation. Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements of fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any other method open to the judiciary to adopt. The right to compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest and which present for their protection the powers of the State as a shield. If civilisation is not to perish in this Country as it has perished in some others too well-known to suffer mention, it is necessary to educate ourselves into accepting that, respect for the rights of individuals is the true basion of democracy. herefore, the State must repair the damage done by its officers to the petitioners' rights. It may have recourse against those officers.” 14. Similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa [ 1993 (2) SCC 746 ], wherein Hon'ble Justice J.S.Verma, (as he then was), has held as follows: “Award of compensation in a proceeding under Article 32 by this Court or by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law, based on strict liability for contravention of fundamental rights to which the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply, even though it may be available as a defence in private law in an action based on tort. Enforcement of the constitutional right and grant of redress embraces award of compensation as part of the legal consequences of its contravention.” 15. Following these judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sube Singh vs. State of Haryana [ AIR 2006 SC 1117 ], has held as follows: “a claim in public law for compensation for contravention of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy for enforcement and protection of such rights, and such a claim based on strict liability made by resorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the enforcement of a fundamental rights is 'distinct from, and in addition to, the remedy in private law for damages for the tort' resulting from the contravention of the fundamental right. The defence of sovereign immunity being inapplicable, and alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights, there can be no question of such a defence being available in the constitutional remedy. 16. In view of the law so declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is crystal clear that the defence taken by the State in this case that the officers, who are responsible for the illegal detention of the petitioner alone can be mulcted with the liability to pay compensation, is only to be rejected. The State is, therefore, liable to pay compensation to the petitioner as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The plea of sovereign immunity is not available for the State, as it is not applicable to constitutional remedy and the same is only applicable to private law remedy when asked for. In view of the settled position of law, the objections raised by the learned Additional Advocate General to resist the claim of the petitioner for compensation are rejected. 17. Though no plea of limitation has been raised in the counter, since it was argued before me, I have to answer that also. In this case, it is true that the petitioner was freed on 03.01.2003. But, he has been continuously making the legal battle before one forum or the other. It shows his anxiety to get redressal and to repair the damages caused to him. Though for claiming compensation by way of constitutional remedy, there is no prescribed period of limitation, it is well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that such a claim should be made within a reasonable time. In this case, I hold that though the claim is made only now, going by the peculiar facts and circumstances, more particularly, the fact that the petitioner has been making the legal fight, continuously, for a long time before one forum or the other, I hold that the claim for compensation made in this petition is well within the reasonable time. 18. Now, turning to the quantum, as I have already pointed out, the mental agony, shame, horror and humiliation suffered by the petitioner on account of the human rights violation and violation of his fundamental rights is immeasurable and beyond repairs. In my view, any amount of compensation would not be a substitute for the loss sustained by him on account of these agonies. In my view, any amount of compensation would not be a substitute for the loss sustained by him on account of these agonies. At any rate, with a view to alleviate the sufferings of the petitioner to some extent, I deem it appropriate to direct the State, namely, the Secretary, Home (Police) Department to pay compensation of Rs.2 lakhs as compensation. The Home Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu shall pay compensation amount, within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 19. The Registry to list this case 'For Reporting Compliance' on 24.08.2015.