JUDGMENT : The question that arises for determination in this appeal filed under Section 30 of the Employees Compensation Act, 1923 (for short, the said Act) is whether a legal representative of a deceased employee can be permitted to continue proceedings initiated by said employee during his life time for seeking compensation under Section 10 of the said Act. The facts lie in a narrow compass. One Madhu was employed with the respondent No.2 and during the course of employment, he met with an accident on 11/02/2011. On 07/05/2012 said Madhu filed proceedings under Section 10 of the said Act seeking compensation on the ground that the accident in question had arisen out of and in the course of employment. During pendency of said proceedings, the claimant Madhu expired on 23/07/2013 and his elder brother in the capacity as his legal heir applied for being brought on record. Said application was opposed by the appellant on the ground that the elder brother of the deceased was not a dependent in terms of provisions of Section 2(1)(d) of the said Act. Said application was allowed and by the impugned judgment dated 30/06/2014, the learned Commissioner under the said Act granted compensation of an amount of Rs.4,78,560/- with interest @ 12% p.a. Being aggrieved, the Insurance Company has filed the present appeal. 2. Shri A. J. Pophaly, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that as the respondent No.1 who was the elder brother of the employee concerned was not a “dependent” as per the provisions of Section 2(1)(d) of the said Act, no amount of compensation could have been awarded in aforesaid proceedings. It was submitted that the provisions of the said Act recognise the entitlement only of a dependent to claim compensation. As the respondent No.2 was not a dependent as per provisions of Section 2(1)(d) of the said Act, he could not have been awarded any compensation. Relying upon provisions of Section 8 of the said Act, it was then submitted that in case of death of an employee, the amount of compensation has to be distributed amongst the dependents and the elder brother of the deceased employee not being covered under definition of the expression “dependent” as per Section- 2(1)(d) of the said Act, the claim could not have been allowed. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance on the following decisions : (i) B. M. Habeebullah Marciar v. Periaswami & ors., 1977 A.C.J. 517 (ii) National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mst. Param Pal Singh, (2008) ACC 515 (iii) Mayfield Estate Nallakottah, Nilgiris v. Krishnan, 1984 A.C.J. 295 (iv) National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rana Dev Sutradhar & ors. III (2007) ACC 313 (DB) (v) Gopal Synthetics v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, Kota and ors., 1994 LAB. I.C. 1968 (vi) Sureshkumar and ors. v. Smt. Urmila and ors., 1999 LAB. I. C. 2872 (vii) Divisional Manager, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Rourkela v. Shyam Bahadur Singh and ors., 2003 LAB I. C. 598 (viii) National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sharanappa and anr., 2007 ACJ 2466 3. Per contra Shri A.J. Pathak, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 supported the impugned judgment. According to him the respondent No.1 had been brought on record in the capacity of legal representative of the deceased employee and not as a dependent. According to learned counsel, if the employee had died in the accident, only then a dependent as defined by Section 2 (1)(d) of the said Act could claim the compensation. The present was a case where an injured employee had himself filed proceedings for compensation and he had expired more than a year after filing said proceedings. Referring to provisions of Section 8(6) of the said Act, it was urged that compensation could also be paid to a person not being a dependent who was otherwise entitled to the same. The learned counsel therefore submitted that the amount as awarded by the learned Commissioner was by treating the respondent No.1 as legal representative of the deceased employee and hence there was no reason to interfere in the impugned judgment. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance on the following decisions : (i) Margarida Gomes and anr v. Messrs Mackinnon Mackennon Mackenzie and Co. Pvt. Ltd. Bombay AIR 1968 Bombay 328 (ii) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Thr. Its Divisional Manager, Nagpur v. Sheikh Rizwan Sheikh Rashid & ors., 2012 (6) Mh.L.J. 652 (iii) Proprietor, Radhkrishna Estate v. Mary 1994 II CLR 1145 (iv) Commissioner For Workmen's v. P. V. Mohanan and ors. II (1989) ACC 158 (v) Judgment of Kerala High Court in Krishnakumar G. v. Union of India dated 10/06/2010 in MFA No.192 of 2010. 4. Its Divisional Manager, Nagpur v. Sheikh Rizwan Sheikh Rashid & ors., 2012 (6) Mh.L.J. 652 (iii) Proprietor, Radhkrishna Estate v. Mary 1994 II CLR 1145 (iv) Commissioner For Workmen's v. P. V. Mohanan and ors. II (1989) ACC 158 (v) Judgment of Kerala High Court in Krishnakumar G. v. Union of India dated 10/06/2010 in MFA No.192 of 2010. 4. The following substantial question of law arises for consideration : “ Whether a legal representative of an employee who had initiated proceedings under Section 10 of the said Act seeking compensation for injuries suffered during course of employment would be entitled to continue said proceedings after the death of said employee ? ” I have heard the respective counsel for the parties at length and I have given due consideration to their submissions. In so far as the factual aspects are concerned, the same are not in dispute. The claim for compensation under Section 10 of the said Act was filed by the injured employee during his life time. He expired during pendency of the proceedings. For answering the question as framed it would be necessary to refer to certain provisions of the said Act which are found relevant. Under Section 4A of the said Act, compensation under Section 4 of the said Act is payable as soon as it falls due. In case of injuries sustained in an accident, it is obvious that the date of the accident would be the date when compensation under Section 4 of the said Act would become payable. The provisions of Section 8 of the said Act deal with distribution of compensation when injury to an employee has resulted in his death. Under Section 8 (4) of the said Act where the amount of compensation is deposited by the employer, same has to be distributed amongst the dependents. The term “dependent” has been defined by Section 2(1) (d) of the sad Act. Section 10 of the said Act contemplates a claim for compensation being made to the Commissioner. In the present case such claim was filed by the injured employee under Section 10(1) of the said Act. During pendency of said proceedings, the respondent No.1 was brought on record as his legal representative. 5. The scheme of the said Act therefore indicates that in case of death of an employee during the course of employment, it is for his/her dependents to seek compensation. During pendency of said proceedings, the respondent No.1 was brought on record as his legal representative. 5. The scheme of the said Act therefore indicates that in case of death of an employee during the course of employment, it is for his/her dependents to seek compensation. In case of injuries suffered, the employee himself/herself can claim compensation. The term “dependent” would have to be considered in the context of compensation being sought on behalf of a deceased employee. In that context therefore, if the deceased employee is survived by any dependent as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the said Act, compensation can be claimed by such dependent under provisions of the said Act. However, if claim for compensation is made by an injured employee then there is no requirement under the said Act that it is only a dependent as defined by Section 2 (1)(d) of the said Act who can be impleaded as a legal heir on the death of the injured employee. If the right to sue survives after the death of an injured employee who has made a claim for compensation then there is no bar under the said Act for his/her legal representative to continue said proceedings. 6. A somewhat similar question was considered by learned Single Judge in Margarida Gomes (supra) and it was held that as the right of the concerned employee to sue survived, the proceedings can be continued by his legal representatives. This decision has been followed by another learned Single Judge in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra) In Proprietor Radhakrishna (supra) identical facts were considered by learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court and by following the judgment of learned Single Judge in Margarida Gomes (supra) the proceedings were adjudicated on merits. The decisions in Commissioner for Workmen's and Krishnakumar (supra) support the stand of respondent No.1. 7. In the judgment of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in B. M. Habebullah (supra) on which heavy reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant, the judgment of learned Single Judge in Manubhai & Co. v. Babajee AIR 1968 Bom. 328 was referred to but the view taken therein was not followed. The Full Bench held that as benefit under the said Act could be granted only to the employee and his dependents, a legal representative was not entitled to claim compensation. v. Babajee AIR 1968 Bom. 328 was referred to but the view taken therein was not followed. The Full Bench held that as benefit under the said Act could be granted only to the employee and his dependents, a legal representative was not entitled to claim compensation. Considering the decision of learned Single Judge in Margarida Gomes and Manubhai and Co. (supra) it is not possible to agree with the view taken by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) the claim for compensation was filed by an adopted son of the deceased employee. In that context it was held that said adopted son was not entitled to claim compensation. In Mayfield Estate (supra) the claim was again filed for compensation by a person who was not a dependent. Similar is the case in National Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra). In Gopal Synthetics (supra) it was held that a brother of deceased employee was not a dependent under Section 2(1)(d) of the said Act. There is no dispute with the said proposition as in the present case the brother is brought on record as legal representative of the injured employee who had expired after filing the proceedings. For the same reason, the decisions in Suresh Kumar and others, Divisional Manager, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and National Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) cannot be made applicable. 8. The matter can be viewed from another angle in the context of provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by referring to the judgment of the Division Bench in Kumar Mohamed Rafique Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, 1986 ACJ 55. On account of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, the injured filed a claim petition seeking compensation. The Claims Tribunal dismissed the claim petition on the ground that negligence on the part of the driver of the concerned vehicle was not proved. The injured claimant therefore filed an appeal. He however expired during pendency of the appeal. On behalf of the respondents, an objection was raised that as the cause of action for compensation was for the pain and suffering of the injured, after his death his parents could not claim compensation. Turning down said objection, it was held that the parents as legal representatives of the deceased could prosecute the claim especially when the death had resulted on account of the accident. Turning down said objection, it was held that the parents as legal representatives of the deceased could prosecute the claim especially when the death had resulted on account of the accident. In paragraph 9 of the judgment, it was observed thus : “ 9. …. We are fortified in this view by two authorities. In Piriska Rozario v. Ford Foundation, repelling the very same contention, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has observed that the maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona" although an ancient English maxim and a part of the English common law, is no part of our law except to the extent that it has been recognised by statutes in this country. In the absence of any statutory provision or any established law or usage in this country recognising the sams, the courts here are entitled to invoke and apply the underlying principles of any part of the English common law, only when they are in consonance with justice, equity and good conscience. The maxim in question has been criticised, even in England, as harsh, unconscionable and unjust. In these circumstances, it cannot be applied as part of the Indian law on principles of justice, equity and good conscience. The maxim has been recognised only to a limited extent as found in Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act. We have adverted to the provisions of the said Section 306 and have pointed out the limited extent to which it has been statutorily applied. Admittedly the present case is not covered by the said limitation. ...” It is also necessary to note that the Division Bench in Jashoda Factories Pvt. Ltd. Bombay v. Judge, Labour Court, Nagpur & Ors. 1980 Mh.L.J. 453 has held that the provisions of Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 would operate only upon Courts and not upon Tribunals like the Labour Court. 9. Thus in the light of aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the respondent no.1 has been brought on record in the capacity of legal representative of a injured employee who had himself filed the proceedings for seeking compensation. The question as framed is therefore answered by holding that it would be permissible for a legal representative of an injured employee who has himself filed proceedings for compensation but has expired subsequently to continue the proceedings and receive the amount of compensation. 10. The question as framed is therefore answered by holding that it would be permissible for a legal representative of an injured employee who has himself filed proceedings for compensation but has expired subsequently to continue the proceedings and receive the amount of compensation. 10. In view of aforesaid discussion, there is no case made out to interfere with the judgment of the learned Commissioner under Section 30 of the said Act. The judgment dated 30/06/2014 in ECA No.C-42/2012 stands confirmed. The appeal is therefore dismissed with no order as to costs.