ORDER M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J. 1. A.S.M.P. No. 1986 of 2014 is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay of 536 days in seeking review of the judgment and decree dt.12-02-2013 in A.S. No. 2401 of 1998 passed by this Court. 2. A.S.M.P. No. 2062 is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay of 542 days in seeking review of the judgment and decree dt.12-02-2013 in A.S. No. 138 of 1999 passed by this Court. The brief facts leading to the filing of these review petitions are as under: 3. The petitioner in both these applications is 1st defendant in O.S. No. 235 of 1989 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Tirupathi and plaintiff in O.S. No. 15 of 1993 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Tirupathi. 4. The 1st respondent herein filed the suit O.S. No. 235 of 1989 for partition of the plaint A & B schedule properties into six equal shares and for allotting one such share to 1st respondent, for determining the mesne profits from out of the suit schedule properties and direct the defendants therein to pay her 1/6th share from the date of suit till the date of delivery of her share and for costs of the suit. The said suit was transferred to the Court of III Additional District Judge, Tirupathi and renumbered as O.S. No. 5 of 1996. 5. The petitioner herein along with others filed O.S. No. 15 of 1993 for perpetual injunction against 1st respondent and others to restrain them in any way from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property therein. This was transferred to the Court of III Additional District Judge, Tirupathi and renumbered as O.S. No. 16 of 1997. 6. While the petitioner is seeking relief of perpetual injunction on the basis of a Will dt.11-08-1985, 1st respondent sought for partition contending that the said Will executed by her father Siddaiah Chetti in favour of the petitioner is a concocted one. 7. Both O.S. Nos. 5 of 1996 and 16 of 1997 were heard together and by common judgment dt.31-08-1998, O.S. No. 5 of 1996 was dismissed and O.S. No. 16 of 1997 was decreed. 8. 7. Both O.S. Nos. 5 of 1996 and 16 of 1997 were heard together and by common judgment dt.31-08-1998, O.S. No. 5 of 1996 was dismissed and O.S. No. 16 of 1997 was decreed. 8. Challenging the judgment dt.31-08-1998 in O.S. No. 5 of 1996, 1st respondent filed A.S. No. 2401 of 1998 before this Court, and challenging the said judgment in O.S. No. 16 of 1997, she filed A.S. No. 138 of 1999 before this Court. 9. By common judgment dt.12-02-2013 A.S. No. 2401 of 1998 was allowed and O.S. No. 5 of 1996 was decreed as prayed for. A.S. No. 138 of 1999 was partly allowed by the same judgment and it was directed that the decree of injunction shall continue only till passing of final decree in O.S. No. 5 of 1996. 10. The petitioner was represented in both these appeals by Sri Mummaneni Srinivasa Rao an Sri M. Sudheer Kumar. 11. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner had approached the Supreme Court and filed Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) Nos. 19127 and 19128 of 2013 questioning the common judgment dt.12-02-2013 in A.S. No. 2401 of 1998 and A.S. No. 138 of 1999 and both S.L. Ps were dismissed on 15-07-2013 by a non speaking order. 12. On 26-07-2013, the petitioner had filed Review A.S.M.P. S.R. No. 10756 of 2013 seeking review of the judgment dt.12-02-2013 in A.S. No. 2401 of 1998 and Review A.S.M.P.S.R. No. 10754 of 2013 seeking review of the judgment dt.12-02-2013 in A.S. No. 138 of 1999. 13. The petitioner filed A.S.M.P. No. 2094 of 2013 under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay of 119 days in filing the Review A.S.M.P.S.R. No. 10756 of 2013 seeking review of the judgment and decree dt.12-02-2013 in A.S. No. 2401 of 1998. He also filed A.S.M.P. No. 2136 of 2012 under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay of 121 days in filing the Review A.S.M.P.S.R. No. 10754 of 2013 seeking review of the judgment dt.12-02-2013 in A.S. No. 138 of 1999. 14. After hearing the learned counsel for 1st respondent, A.S.M.P. No. 2094 of 2013 was allowed by this Court and the delay of 119 days in filing Review A.S.M.P.S.R. No. 10756 of 2013 seeking review of the judgment dt.12-02-2013 in A.S. No. 2401 of 1998 was condoned. 14. After hearing the learned counsel for 1st respondent, A.S.M.P. No. 2094 of 2013 was allowed by this Court and the delay of 119 days in filing Review A.S.M.P.S.R. No. 10756 of 2013 seeking review of the judgment dt.12-02-2013 in A.S. No. 2401 of 1998 was condoned. Likewise, Review A.S.M.P. No. 2136 of 2012 was allowed and the delay of 121 days in filing Review A.S.M.P.S.R. No. 10754 of 2013 seeking review of the judgment dt.12-02-2013 in A.S. No. 138 of 1998 was condoned on 07-04-2013 on payment of costs of Rs. 200/-. The costs were paid. 15. Thereafter, Review A.S.M.P.S.R. No. 10756 of 2013 was numbered as Review A.S.M.P. No. 2518 of 2013 and Review A.S.M.P.S.R. No. 10754 of 2013 was numbered as Review A.S.M.P. No. 2780 of 2013. 16. In these review petitions, the petitioner was represented by the counsel on record Sri K. Lakshmana Sastri and Sri S. Subrahmanyam, advocates. On the petitioner's behalf, Senior Counsel Sri Koka Raghava Rao appeared and argued these review petitions. 17. By common judgment dt.02-06-2014, Review A.S.M.P. No. 2518 of 2013 in A.S. No. 2401 of 1998 and Review A.S.M.P. No. 2780 of 2013 in A.S. No. 138 of 1999 were both dismissed. 18. On 08-09-2014, the petitioner has filed present Review A.S.M.P.S.R. No. 7468 of 2014 seeking review of the judgment dt.12-02-2013 in A.S. No. 2401 of 1998 along with A.S.M.P. No. 1986 of 2014 to condone the delay of 536 days in filing the above said Review A.S.M.P. under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 19. On 08-09-2014, the petitioner also filed present Review A.S.M.P.S.R. No. 7469 of 2014 seeking review of the judgment dt.12-02-2013 in A.S. No. 138 of 1999 along with A.S.M.P. No. 2062 of 2014 to condone the delay of 542 days in filing the above said Review A.S.M.P. under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 20. The period of delay was computed from the date the certified copy of the judgments and decrees dt. 12.2.2013 in A.S. 2401 of 1998 and A.S. No. 138 of 1999 were made available to the petitioner's counsel. 21. These review petitions and applications for condonation of delay are filed through a different advocate by name Reddy Venkata Ramana on whose behalf, Sri K.V. Satyanarayana, advocate appeared. 22. 12.2.2013 in A.S. 2401 of 1998 and A.S. No. 138 of 1999 were made available to the petitioner's counsel. 21. These review petitions and applications for condonation of delay are filed through a different advocate by name Reddy Venkata Ramana on whose behalf, Sri K.V. Satyanarayana, advocate appeared. 22. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in both these applications for condonation of delay i.e. A.S.M.P. No. 1986 of 2014 as well as A.S.M.P. No. 2062 of 2014 that petitioner is filing these review petition on grounds other than those which were urged in the earlier review petition and that the present review petitions are filed within 30 days from the date of dismissal of earlier review petitions on 02-06-2014 by this Court. It is further alleged that there is no negligence on the part of the petitioner in pressing the legal remedies and that in the earlier review petitions, the petitioner could not take the grounds raised herein because of lack of appropriate legal advice. 23. The points sought to be raised in the review petitions filed now are that late Siddaiah Chetti had eight children and 1st respondent had claimed 1/6th share which was granted to her by the judgment dt.12-02-2013 in A.S. No. 2401 of 1998; that she would be entitled to only to 1/8th share out of her father's share since her father died on 10-09-1995; and that the learned Single Judge had failed to apply both Sections 6 and 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 prior to the amendment thereto in 2005. It is further contended that the petitioner would be entitled to half share of the property left behind by his father Siddaiah Chetti. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that this point was not argued in the earlier review petitions by the earlier counsel Sri Koka Raghava Rao on account of probably inadvertence. It is further contended that the petitioner would be entitled to half share of the property left behind by his father Siddaiah Chetti. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that this point was not argued in the earlier review petitions by the earlier counsel Sri Koka Raghava Rao on account of probably inadvertence. Learned counsel further contended that on account of lack of appropriate legal advise immediately after A.S. No. 2401 of 1998 and A.S. No. 138 of 1999 were allowed, the petitioner had approached Sri K. Lakshmana Sastry to seek his legal advice; that he did not represent the petitioner in the appeal; Sri K. Lakshmana Sastry, advocate took him to Sri Koka Raghava Rao, designated Senior Counsel; the petitioner was advised to file a review petition; and therefore he filed Review A.S.M.P. No. 2518 of 2013 in A.S. No. 2401 of 1998 and Review A.S.M.P. No. 2780 of 2013 in A.S. No. 138 of 1999; that they were dismissed on 02-06-2014; then the petitioner took the bundle to Sri Reddy Venkata Ramana, advocate and the said advocate took the petitioner to Sri K.V. Satyanarayana, learned counsel, who advised him to file the present review petitions on a ground which was not taken in the earlier review petitions. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon judgments of the Supreme Court in The Punjabi University etc., v. Acharya Swami Ganesh and another AIR 1972 S.C. 1973 and M/s. Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Smt. Nirmala Devi and others AIR 1979 S.C. 1666 , wherein the Supreme Court had held that if a bona fide mistake had been committed by counsel in computing the period of limitation for filing an appeal, it would amount to sufficient cause and the delay is liable to be condoned. 24. Per contra, learned counsel for 1st respondent Sri P.V. Vidya Sagar opposed the condonation of delay and contended that the delay is inordinate delay and sufficient cause has not been shown for it's condonation. He also contended that valuable rights have accrued to 1st respondent on account of the failure to file the Review petitions within the prescribed period of limitation raising these points and if delay is condoned, it would cause grave and irreparable loss to 1st respondent. 25. I have noted the submissions of both sides. 26. He also contended that valuable rights have accrued to 1st respondent on account of the failure to file the Review petitions within the prescribed period of limitation raising these points and if delay is condoned, it would cause grave and irreparable loss to 1st respondent. 25. I have noted the submissions of both sides. 26. The principles governing exercise of power under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are well settled. 27. In Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (2013) 12 SCC 649 , the Supreme Court held: "21.1 (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters. 23. Presently to the assertions made in the application for condonation of delay and the asseverations in oppugnation of the same. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters. 23. Presently to the assertions made in the application for condonation of delay and the asseverations in oppugnation of the same. It may be stated here that the Division Bench while dealing with the application for condonation of delay has also adverted to the legal tenability of the interim order in a matter of appointment and approval of a teacher, and condoned the delay. It does not require Solomon's wisdom to perceive that the delay was colossal." 28. Recently in Brijesh Kumar v. State of Haryana (2014) 11 SCC 351, the Supreme Court considered the issue and held: "7. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures, 1932 wherein it has been said that: (IA p. 426) A law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognised by law. 8. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held as under: (SCC p. 558, para 6) "6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds." 9. While considering a similar issue, this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy laid down various principles inter alia: (SCC pp. 658-59, paras 21-22) * * * "21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. * * * 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. * * * 21.9. 658-59, paras 21-22) * * * "21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. * * * 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. * * * 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach. * * * 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters." (See also Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer.)" 29. Keeping these principles in mind, I will now decide whether the Review petitioner in both the Review applications had shown sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing these Review petitions. 30. The facts noted above indicate that after the judgment dt.12-02-2013 allowing A.S. No. 2401 of 1998 and partly allowing A.S. No. 138 of 1999, the petitioner herein had filed S.L. Ps. (Civil) Nos. 19127 and 19128 of 2013 in the Supreme Court of India which were dismissed on 15-07-2013. Thereafter, the petitioner filed Review A.S.M.P. No. 2518 of 2013 and Review A.S.M.P. No. 2780 of 2013 on 26-07-2013 to review the judgment dt.12-02-2013 in A.S. No. 2401 of 1998 and A.S. No. 138 of 1999 by engaging a different advocate. These Review Petitions were also filed with a delay of 119 days and 121 days respectively which was condoned by separate orders dt.09-10-2013 in A.S.M.P. No. 2094 of 2013 and 07-11-2013 in A.S.M.P. No. 2136 of 2012 respectively. On 02-06-2014, Review A.S.M.P. No. 2518 of 2013 in A.S. No. 2401 of 1998 and Review A.S.M.P. No. 2780 of 2013 in A.S. No. 138 of 1999 were dismissed by a common judgment. 31. Thereafter Review A.S.M.P.S.R. No. 7468 of 2014 and Review A.S.M.P.S.R. No. 7469 of 2014 were filed to review the common judgment dt.12-02-2013 in A.S. No. 2401 of 1998 and A.S. No. 138 of 1999 respectively along with the A.S.M.P. Nos. 31. Thereafter Review A.S.M.P.S.R. No. 7468 of 2014 and Review A.S.M.P.S.R. No. 7469 of 2014 were filed to review the common judgment dt.12-02-2013 in A.S. No. 2401 of 1998 and A.S. No. 138 of 1999 respectively along with the A.S.M.P. Nos. 1986 of 2014 and A.S.M.P. No. 2062 of 2014 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,1963 to condone the delay of 536 and 542 days respectively by again engaging a different advocate. 32. The reason given for seeking condonation of delay is that the grounds raised in the present Review petitions could not be taken in the earlier Review petitions because of lack of appropriate legal advice and that the present Review petitions were filed within 30 days of the dismissal of the earlier Review petitions. 33. It is not the case of the Review Petitioner that the point now raised in the Review petitions was not available to him when the appeal or the earlier Review Petitions were filed. Yet it was not raised even though at the time of hearing of the appeal as well as the earlier Review petitions, the petitioner was represented by a lawyer of considerable standing and also a designated Senior Counsel. 34. The plea that the present Review Petitions are filed within 30 days from date of disposal of the earlier Review Petitions cannot be countenanced for the reason that petitioner is seeking a review of the judgment in the appeals delivered on 12.2.2013and not the judgments in the earlier Review Petitions delivered on 2.6.2014. 35. As observed in Esha Bhattachajee (2013) 12 SCC 649 , there is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days. To the former, doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 36. In my opinion, the explanation offered by petitioner for condonation of such a long period of delay is no explanation in the eye of law much less a reasonable explanation. It is not acceptable. If such inordinate long delay of 536 and 542 days in filing the present Review petitions is condoned, it would cause grave prejudice to the respondent No. 1. It is not acceptable. If such inordinate long delay of 536 and 542 days in filing the present Review petitions is condoned, it would cause grave prejudice to the respondent No. 1. Law of limitation may harshly affect the Review Petitioner but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and this court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. 37. The decisions in Punjabi University AIR 1972 S.C. 1973 and M/s. Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. AIR 1979 S.C. 1666 cited by counsel for the Review Petitioners have no application as in those cases the Counsel for the party had committed an error in calculating the period of limitation for filing appeals under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 and under the Motor Vehicles Act,1938 and the Court had accepted that such error in calculation of period of limitation for filing appeals under these statutes can be taken as "sufficient cause' for condonation of delay in filing the appeals. In the present cases, the delay is not on account of counsel's mistake in calculating time for filing the present Review petitions. 38. In fact in the latter judgment, the Court specifically held that there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is a sufficient ground for condoning delay. It observed that if there is gross delay too patent even for lawman or if there is incomprehensible indifference, the shield of legal opinion may still be vulnerable. It held that it is always a question of fact whether the mistake is bonafide or as merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose such as laches on the part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation in an underhand way. 39. Moreover, the Supreme Court of India in Tamilnadu Electricity Board and another v. N. Raju Reddiar (1997) 9 S.C.C. 736 , has strongly deprecated the practice of filing repeated Review petitions by changing the advocates. It observed that when an appeal/Special Leave Petition is dismissed, except in rare cases where error of law or fact is apparent on record, no review can be filed; that too by the Advocate on Record who neither appeared nor was party in the main case. It held that a Review Petition is not, and should not be, an attempt for hearing the matter again on merits. It held that a Review Petition is not, and should not be, an attempt for hearing the matter again on merits. It noted that in recent times it had become a practice to file such Review Petitions as a routine; that too, with change of counsel, without obtaining consent of the Advocate on Record at earlier stage. It observed that it is not conducive to healthy practice of the Bar which has the responsibility to maintain the salutary practice of profession. It held: "Once the petition for review is dismissed, no application for clarification should be filed, much less with the change of the Advocate-on-Record. This practice of changing the advocates and filing repeated petitions should be deprecated with a heavy hand for purity of administration of law and salutary and healthy practice." 40. In the present case, although consent of the earlier counsel on record was obtained, the very practice of changing counsel and filing repeated Review petitions having been deprecated, I feel that entertaining this review petitions, notwithstanding the abnormal delay of 536 days and 542 days in filing them, would not be proper. 41. Also it is settled law that an entirely new ground which was not raised earlier at the time of hearing of the appeal at the High Court would not be considered for the first time at Review stage. 42. In Collector of 24 Parganas v. Lalith Mohan Mullick 1988 Supp SCC 578, the Supreme Court held: "This review petition has been instituted on the plea that original Respondent 2 Smt. Sibadasi Mullick, widow of Shri Krishna Mohan Mullick had died during the pendency of the appeal in this Court and that original Respondent 5 Smt. Kamalini Mullick, widow of Shri Khirode Mohan Mullick had also died during the pendency of the appeal in this Court which was disposed of on merits by a judgment and order dated 13-2-19861 after hearing the parties. So far as Smt. Sibadasi Mullick, widow of Shri Krishna Mohan Mullick is concerned, her two sons viz. Lakshmi Kanto Mullick and Nilkanto Mullick were already on record as Respondents 3 and 4. Therefore, the estate of the deceased was sufficiently represented before this Court. So far as Respondent 5 Smt. Kamalini Mullick, widow of Shri Khirode Mohan Mullick is concerned, her son Ramendra Mullick was already on record as Respondent 6. In her case also the estate was sufficiently represented. Therefore, the estate of the deceased was sufficiently represented before this Court. So far as Respondent 5 Smt. Kamalini Mullick, widow of Shri Khirode Mohan Mullick is concerned, her son Ramendra Mullick was already on record as Respondent 6. In her case also the estate was sufficiently represented. Under the circumstances it is not possible to uphold the plea that the appeal had abated and the judgment on merits rendered by this Court on 13-2-1986 requires to be set aside on this ground. 2. Learned counsel for the applicant has also raised the contention embodied in ground No. D reading as under: This Honourable Court was allowed to be misled by documents alleged to be the petition of appeal presented before this Honourable Court and not bringing to the notice of this Honourable Court the facts that the Society of Experimental Science, India for whom the land in dispute was sought to be acquired was not in existence and in fact the land was not at all needed by the appellants herein for public purpose for constructing a hospital for the crippled children as claimed by the appellants herein; So far as this ground is concerned, it was not raised before this Court when the appeal was heard on merits. It does not appear to have been raised even before the High Court. The new ground cannot be taken into consideration for the purposes of the review application, apart from the fact that it would also involve investigation of new facts which were not on record till the point of time when the appeal was disposed of by this Court on 13-2-1986. We see no reason to entertain this review petition which accordingly fails and is dismissed." 43. Again in Nehali Panjiyara v. Shyama Devi (2002) 10 SCC 578 , at page 578, the Supreme Court observed: "We have carefully gone through the review petition and the connected papers. 2. The review petition raises entirely a new point about the extinction of the legal heirs in the line of descendants of the estate represented by Gurudayal Panjiara and Kunjlal Panjiara prior to the institution of the suit and that the said estate stood inherited in amongst the descendants of only Matuki Panjiara and Ashrafi Panjiara. Such a contention was never canvassed before any of the courts below. Such a contention was never canvassed before any of the courts below. Not only that, there was no issue sought for on this point even before the trial court. In second appeal the only dispute raised was regarding suit properties Items 2 to 8. The High Court confirmed the decision about their partibility in the light of the findings reached by the lower appellate court which has noted in para 49 of its judgment that defendant 2nd party admitted the plaintiffs claim for Items 2 to 8 of the schedule. 3. Consequently, no case is made out for our interference in the review proceedings on the aforesaid new contention. 4. The review petition is, therefore, dismissed on merits." 44. Admittedly, the point now sought to be canvassed in the present review petitions was not canvassed in the earlier Review petitions or at the time when the appeals were heard. Therefore even on this ground, it is not permissible to entertain the present review petitions. 45. For all these reasons I hold that no sufficient cause was shown by the Review petitioner for condoning the inordinately long delay of 536 days and 542 days respectively in filing Review Petitions ASMP SR. No. 7468 of 2014 in A.S. 2401 of 1998 and ASMPSR No. 7469 of 2014 in A.S. No. 138 of 1999. 46. Consequently ASMP No. 1986 of 2014 in ASMP SR. No. 7468 of 2014 and ASMP No. 2062 of 2014 in ASMP SR. No. 7468 of 2014 are dismissed. Consequently ASMP SR. No. 7468 of 2014 in A.S. No. 2401 of 1998 and ASMP SR. No. 7468 of 2014 in A.S. 138 of 1999 are dismissed. No costs.