JUDGMENT Anil Kumar, J. Heard Shri Ajay Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for the opposite party no.1, Shri Manu Shreshta, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 and perused the record. 2. Facts in brief of the present case are that in the city of Hardoi, there is an institution known as Santosh Kumar Inter College, Behdar Kalan, Hardoi governed by the provisions as provided under U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as Act). 3. In the said institution, opposite party no.2/Samarjeet Singh who was working on Class-IV post, his services have been terminated vide order dated 01.10.2013 passed by the Principal of the Institution. 4. Aggrieved by the said order, he filed an appeal and the same was dismissed by order dated 10.11.2013 passed by the Manager of the Committee of Management. 5. Order dated 01.10.2013 and 10.11.2013 passed by the Principal and Manager of the Committee of Management respectively were challenged by the petitioner before the District Inspector of Schools, Hardoi, allowed by order dated 19.03.2014 and set aside the order dated 10.11.2013 passed by the Manager of the Committee of Management and directed that services of the opposite party no.2/Samarjeet Singh shall be allowed to work in the institution on Class-IV post. 6. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and going through the records, the position which emerges out is that the sole basis of passing of the order dated 19.03.2014 passed by District Inspector of Schools, Hardoi is to the effect that neither any opportunity was given to the opposite party no.2 nor enquiry has been conducted as per rules prior to passing of the order dated 01.10.2013 passed by Principal of the Institution by which his services have been terminated. 7. Accordingly, the sole question arises for consideration in the instant matter that if an order has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice without conducting a proper enquiry as per rule and the same is liable to be set aside on the said ground, then whether it will open to the authority to set aside the same and direct that employee be allowed to work or the authority to set aside the order and direct the competent authority to proceed/conduct de novo enquiry from the stage where the principles of natural justice has been violated. 8. 8. Answer to above said question finds place in the case of Canara Bank and others Vs. Debasis Ds and others (2003)4 Supreme Court Cases, 557, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that whenever an order is struck down as invalid being in violation of principles of natural justice, there is no final decision of the case and fresh proceedings are left open that is done is to vacate the order assailed by virtue of its inherent defect, but the proceedings are not terminated. 9. Further, Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of NTC (WBAB&O) Ltd. Vs. Anjan K. Saha, (2004) 7 SCC 581 after taking into consideration the Constitutional Bench in the case of Managing Director, ECIL Vs. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727 has held as under: - "The language of clause 14(4)(c) of the Model Standing Orders is not mandatory. In any case , non compliance therewith cannot be held to be more vitiating factor than non supply of enquiry report . If the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in cases of non supply of enquiry report directs the procedure to be adopted by allowing the employers to restart the enquiry from the stage of supply of enquiry report without reinstating the employee , why such a course should not be directed to be adopted where the other grievance of the employee is denial of opportunity to show cause against proposed penalty? When the court can direct a fresh enquiry from the stage of supply of enquiry report the next step in the enquiry of giving opportunity against the proposed penalty can also be directed to be taken. After the fresh enquiry is over from the stage of supply of enquiry report, the employee can be granted opportunity against proposed penalty in terms of clause 14(4)(c) of the Model Standing Orders. Consequential order, if any passed , shall abide the final result of the proceedings . As held in the case of B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 if the employee is cleared of the charges and is reinstated , the disciplinary authority would be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the period of reinstatement and the consequential benefits." 10. As held in the case of B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 if the employee is cleared of the charges and is reinstated , the disciplinary authority would be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the period of reinstatement and the consequential benefits." 10. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and others vs. A. Masilamani (2013) 6 SCC 530 has held as under : "It is a settled legal proposition, that once the Court sets aside an order of punishment, on the ground that the enquiry was not properly conducted, the Court cannot reinstate the employee. It must remit the concerned case to the disciplinary authority, for it to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated, and conclude the same. (Vide: Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad etc.etc. v. B. Karunakar etc.etc. AIR 1994 SC 1074 ; Hiran Mayee Bhattacharyya v. Secretary, S.M. School for Girls & Ors., (2002) 10 SCC 293 ; U.P. State Spinning C. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey & Anr., (2005) 8 SCC 264 ; and Union of India v. Y.S. Sandhu, Ex- Inspector AIR 2009 SC 161 ). The second question involved herein, is also no longer res integra. Whether or not the disciplinary authority should be given an opportunity, to complete the enquiry afresh from the point that it stood vitiated, depends upon the gravity of delinquency involved. Thus, the court must examine, the magnitude of misconduct alleged against the delinquent employee. It is in view of this, that courts/tribunals, are not competent to quash the charge-sheet and related disciplinary proceedings, before the same are concluded, on the aforementioned grounds." 11. In view of the above said facts, the impugned order dated 19.03.2014 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Hardoi is liable to be set aside. 12. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 19.03.2014 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Hardoi is set aside with a direction to the Principal of the institution to hold a de-novo enquiry in the matter from the stage of issuing a charge sheet to the petitioner and thereafter complete the disciplinary proceeding and pass the final order in accordance with law. The said exercise shall be done expeditiously.