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2015 DIGILAW 247 (GUJ)

PREMJIBHAI RANCHHODBHAI SENJALIYA v. KHAMBHA TALUKA PANCHAYAT, KHAMBHA THRO TALUKA

2015-03-02

ABHILASHA KUMARI

body2015
JUDGMENT : ABHILASHA KUMARI, J. This petition has been preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the impugned Resolution No. 48 and the proceedings dated 22.04.2013, whereby a No Confidence Motion has been passed against the petitioner. 2. The brief facts of the case are as follows: 2.1. The petitioner was elected as a Member of the Khambha Taluka Panchayat in the election held in the month of October, 2010. On 12.11.2010, the petitioner was elected, uncontested, to the post of President of the said Taluka Panchayat. The petitioner also happens to be the Chairman of Rabarika Pradesh Kelavani Mandal Sanchalit Gandhi Vidyalaya, and the President of Gujarat State Agriculture and Rural Development Bank Limited, Khambha, Branch since the last many years. According to the petitioner, he has worked with all sincerity and diligence as the President of the Taluka Panchayat. However, some members owing allegiance to the ruling party had moved a No Confidence Motion against him as he belongs to the opposition party. The No Confidence Motion was passed on 07.03.2013. The petitioner challenged the impugned Resolution No. 46 dated 07.03.2013 by filing a petition, being Special Civil Application No. 2936 of 2013. The petition was partly-allowed by order dated 26.03.2013 and the No Confidence Motion dated 07.03.2013 was quashed and set aside, with liberty to the contesting respondents to move a motion of No Confidence afresh, if deemed fit. 2.2. It is further the case of the petitioner that on account of some personal engagements, he was required to go to Hyderabad. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted a leave report to respondent No. 1-Taluka Development Officer, Khambha, on 28.03.2013, and sought leave for two months. According to the petitioner, out of sheer vengeance, a No Confidence Motion was submitted against the petitioner on 28.03.2013. Respondent no. 1-Taluka Development Officer, issued an agenda on 08.04.2013, calling a meeting of the Khambha Taluka Panchayat on 25.04.2013, to discuss and decide on the No Confidence Motion. The said date was later changed to 22.04.2013, pursuant to an order passed by the District Development Officer. It is further the case of the petitioner that he left for Hyderabad on 28.03.2013. The agenda dated 12.04.2013 was sent to the petitioner by Registered Post A.D. on 17.04.2013, which was received by the petitioner upon his return, after the No Confidence Motion had already been passed. It is further the case of the petitioner that he left for Hyderabad on 28.03.2013. The agenda dated 12.04.2013 was sent to the petitioner by Registered Post A.D. on 17.04.2013, which was received by the petitioner upon his return, after the No Confidence Motion had already been passed. Aggrieved by the passing of the No Confidence Motion against him in his absence, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present petition. 3. Mr. P.J. Kanabar, learned advocate for the petitioner, has submitted that the petitioner was not served with the notice of the No Confidence Motion. The meeting was held on 22.04.2013, and the Resolution and motion of No Confidence was passed against him in his absence. It is submitted that as per the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 70 of the Act, the petitioner has a mandatory right to address the members present in the meeting before the No Confidence Motion is passed against him. By passing the No Confidence Motion behind the back of the petitioner, this mandatory right has been violated and the petitioner has been gravely prejudiced. 4. On the other hand, Mr. H.S. Munshaw, learned advocate for respondents Nos. 1 and 2, has submitted that on 28.03.2013, the petitioner proceeded on leave, therefore, the charge of the post was handed over to the Vice-President. A No Confidence Motion was moved against the petitioner and the Vice-President by ten members of the Taluka Panchayat, in the prescribed form. That the Circle Inspector, Khambha Taluka Panchayat, reported on 30.03.2013, that the petitioner could not be served with the notice as he was not available at his residence. Thereafter, the notice was sent by Registered Post A.D., which was returned by the Postal Department with an endorsement that it could not be served due to the non-availability of the petitioner at his residence. 4.1. It is further submitted that respondent No. 1 issued an agenda on 12.04.2013, intimating that a meeting was fixed at 12:00 noon, on 22.04.2013, to consider the No Confidence Motions moved against the petitioner and the Vice-President. A copy of this agenda was sent to the petitioner at his residential address through Registered Post A.D. but was returned, with seven endorsements by the Postal Department bearing different dates, that the petitioner was not available. A copy of this agenda was sent to the petitioner at his residential address through Registered Post A.D. but was returned, with seven endorsements by the Postal Department bearing different dates, that the petitioner was not available. Ultimately, the agenda was served by affixing it on the residence of the petitioner on 20.04.2013, and a Panch Rojkam, duly signed by the Circle Inspector, Khambha, and the Talati-cum-Mantri of Village Rabarika, was prepared. 4.2 It is submitted that the respondents have tried their level best to serve the petitioner but since he could not be served, the agenda was affixed at his residence, therefore, it cannot be said that he was not served. 5. This Court has heard learned counsel for the respective parties, perused the averments made in the petition, contents of the impugned Resolution and proceedings dated 22.04.2013 and other documents on record. 6. It may be noted that sub-section (3) of Section 70 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993, pertains to a No Confidence Motion against the President or Vice-President of the Taluka Panchayat. The petitioner is a President of the Khambha Taluka Panchayat. Sub-section (3) of Section 70 is relevant and is reproduced herein below: “70. Motion of no-confidence.- (1) *** *** *** (2) *** *** *** (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder a President or Vice-President shall not preside over a meeting in which a motion of no confidence is discussed against him; but he shall have a right to speak or otherwise to take part in the proceedings of such a meeting (including the right to vote).” 7. An identical provision has been enacted in respect of a No Confidence Motion against the Sarpanch and Upa-sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat as the case may be, which is sub-section (3) of Section 56. It reads as below: “56. Motion of no-confidence.- (1) *** *** *** (2) *** *** *** (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder a Sarpanch or, as the case maybe, an Upa-Sarpanch, shall not preside over a meeting in which a motion of no confidence is discussed against him, but he shall have a right to speak or otherwise to take part in the proceedings of such a meeting (including the right to vote).” 8. From the above, it can be seen that sub-section (3) of Section 56 and sub-section (3) of Section 70 are couched in identical language and are pari materia. This Court had an occasion to deal with the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 56 of the Act in the judgment of Geetaben Bharatbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2006 (1) GLH 91 , in the following terms: “14. Based on the above judicial pronouncements, it is necessary to examine whether the provisions of section 56(3) of the said Act which provide that a Sarpanch, or as the case may be, an Upa-Sarpanch though shall not preside over a meeting in which a motion of no confidence is discussed against him, shall have a right to speak or otherwise to take part in the proceedings of the no confidence motion including right to vote; is a mandatory requirement of law or is merely directory so that the proceedings of no confidence motion would not vitiate even if the requirement is not strictly fulfilled. 15. From the above recording of the relevant provisions of the said Act and the said Rules and in particular rules 29 to 35, it can be seen that even in the capacity of a member of the Panchayat, Sarpanch against whom no confidence motion is being conducted would have a right to participate and to speak subject, of course, to the provisions contained in rules 29 to 35 of the said Rules. Section 56(3) of the said Act not only preserves this right, but highlights the aspect that a Sarpanch, or as the case may be, an Up-Sarpanch who is facing no confidence motion though shall not preside over such a meeting, but he shall have a right to speak or otherwise to take part in the proceedings of such a meeting as also shall have a right to vote. The words shall have a right to speak or otherwise to take part in the proceedings of such a meeting have been used by the Legislature advisedly and unless it is found from the attending provisions of the statute that the Legislature intended that such provision should not be mandatory, it is not possible to hold that the requirement is merely directory in nature. A right to address a meeting or otherwise to take part in the proceedings including to vote are statutory rights vested in the Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch who is facing a no confidence motion. A no confidence motion has to be tabled and debated before the same can be put to vote. A Sarpanch whose position and reputation are at stake definitely has a right to speak at such a meeting and when denied such a right, prejudice would be caused to him or her, as the case may be. In a democracy when an elected Sarpanch or, as the case may be, an Up-Sarpanch is being sought to be removed through a motion of no confidence and when the provisions of section 56(3) of the said Act specifically provide that a Sarpanch or, as the case may be, Up-Sarpanch who is facing such a no confidence motion shall have a right to speak, it is not possible to hold that such a requirement is merely directory in nature. The Sarpanch or, as the case may be, Up-Sarpanch, through his persuasive power or logical arguments may be able to prevail upon some of the members present at the meeting to change their mind and persuade them to oppose the no confidence motion. By denying the Sarpanch or, as the case may be, Up-Sarpanch an audience altogether, this statutory right is being violated. It is not possible to judge the prejudice that may be caused in an individual case by the denial of such a right. It is also not possible to interpret the provisions of section 56(3) of the said Act keeping in mind an individual fact situation in a given case. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention of the learned advocate Shri Raval for respondent No. 6 that in the present case when as many as 14 out of 17 members voted in favour of no-confidence motion, no prejudice was caused to the petitioner even if she was denied the right to speak at the meeting and that eventually what matters is the opinion of two-third members of the Panchayat that no confidence motion should be adopted. What would have been the position if the petitioner was permitted to speak and participate in the said meeting is not possible to predict. What would have been the position if the petitioner was permitted to speak and participate in the said meeting is not possible to predict. Before a no confidence motion could be put to vote, the petitioner had a statutory right to address the meeting. When such a mandatory requirement of law was not followed, all consequential steps of putting the motion to vote and counting of votes and adoption of resolution would automatically] fail having no effect or validity. 16. In view of the conclusion that I have reached, namely, that the requirement of section 56(3) of the said Act is mandatory in nature and not merely directory, all consequential steps from the stage of voting of no confidence motion and its adoption by the meeting would be rendered non est and ineffective, since it is factually concluded in the earlier portion of the judgment that the petitioner was not given an opportunity to speak at the meeting or in any other manner to participate except to vote.” (emphasis supplied) 9. As is clear from the above-quoted judgment, sub-section (3) of Section 56 has been held to be mandatory in nature. Sub-section (3) of Section 70 is identically worded and its provisions are also couched in mandatory language, therefore, are mandatory in nature. If follows that the petitioner was required to be afforded an opportunity of addressing the members before the No Confidence Motion against him was put to vote. Obviously, this has not been done, as the petitioner was not present at the meeting held on 22.04.2013, as he had gone to Hyderabad after taking leave. 10. It is the case of the respondents herein that several attempts were made to serve the agenda upon the petitioner, but all attempts failed. A letter was then sent by Registered Post A.D. but been returned with as many as seven endorsements by the Postal Department. Ultimately, the agenda was affixed on the house of petitioner which, according to the respondents, is sufficient compliance of its service and the petitioner is deemed to have been served. 11. Be that as it may, the issue involved in the present petition is not whether the petitioner has been duly served with the agenda notice or not, but is whether the petitioner has been heard as per the mandatory provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 70 of the Act. 11. Be that as it may, the issue involved in the present petition is not whether the petitioner has been duly served with the agenda notice or not, but is whether the petitioner has been heard as per the mandatory provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 70 of the Act. The answer is, obviously, that he has not been afforded an opportunity of speaking, for the simple reason that the impugned proceedings have been conducted in his absence. 12. Learned advocate for the Respondents has laid emphasis on the aspect that the petitioner was on leave, therefore, he could not attend the meeting. However, the said assertion may not have any bearing in terms of the mandatory provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 70 of the Act which states that the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, shall have a right to speak at the meeting in which the No Confidence Motion against him is being discussed. 13. It cannot be understood by this Court what was the tearing hurry on the part of the respondents in moving the No Confidence Motion against petitioner in his absence, and passing it behind his back. The respondents, being responsible authorities, are well conversant with the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 70 and ought to understand that the petitioner would have to be granted an opportunity of speaking at the said meeting. Even though the petitioner was on leave, the meeting in respect of the petitioner could have been convened after his return. However, this was not done. 14. In the view of this Court, not only have the mandatory provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 70 been violated in the case of the petitioner, but the principles of natural justice have also been contravened. It is a settled position of law that no order ought to be passed against the petitioner without affording him an opportunity of hearing, and definitely not behind his back. By the impugned action, the petitioner, who is a democratically elected representative, has been gravely prejudiced and adversely affected. 15. This Court is unable to uphold contentions advanced by the learned advocate for the Respondents in view of the clear and specific provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 56. 16. In view of the above discussion, the following order is passed: The petition is allowed. 15. This Court is unable to uphold contentions advanced by the learned advocate for the Respondents in view of the clear and specific provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 56. 16. In view of the above discussion, the following order is passed: The petition is allowed. The impugned Resolution No. 48 and the proceedings dated 22.04.2013 of the Khambha Taluka Panchayat are hereby quashed and set aside. As a consequence thereof, it is directed that the petitioner be reinstated as the President of the Khambha Taluka Panchayat, forthwith. 17. Rule is made absolute, accordingly. There shall be no orders as to costs. Direct Service of this order is permitted.