JUDGMENT : The unsuccessful defendant in the trial Court having also been unsuccessful in the lower appellate Court has challenged the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Balasore in R.F.A. No.45 of 2013 confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Balasore in C.S. NO.25 of 2012. 2. For the sake of convenience, clarity and to avoid confusion, the parties hereinafter have been referred to as they have been arrayed in the trial Court. 3. The respondent no.1 as the plaintiff has filed the suit for realization of sum of Rs.97,546/- with interest @ 13% w.e.f, 24.04.2009 till actual realization of his arrear 60% wage board salary, compensation to the tune of Rs.80,000/- with interest @ 13% per annum from 15.03.2012 till its realization and other reliefs. Plaintiff's case is that he was a meter reader/clerk-B in Orissa State Electricity Board on 26.05.1973 as it was then. After that he served under GRIDCO and NESCO till his retirement on 31.08.2008 without any break. On an application filed by the plaintiff the defendant no.1 sanctioned commuted value of his pension to the tune of Rs.2,47,149/- which was duly communicated. Pay revision thereafter took place when the pay of the plaintiff was revised w.e.f. 01.04.2005. Accordingly, the commuted value of his pension was revised at RS.1,47,361/- Then the defendant no.1 without any rhyme and reason by letter dated 03.05.2010 asked the plaintiff to refund the said revised amount as to have been paid in excess while simultaneously intimating to recover the same from his dues in the event of non-refund. The plaintiff, therefore, approached this Court in W.P. (C) NO.9028 of 2010 questioning the action of the defendants. This Court by order dated 20.05.2010 as an interim measure kept the order of recovery in abeyance. Thereafter, while finally disposing of the said writ application, this Court quashed the order passed by the respective employers against the petitioner cancelling the revision of commuted value of pension to the employees and to treat the differential amount as excess payment. The defendants were also restrained from recovering the differential amount of commuted pension from the plaintiff's dues. Thus, the plaintiff claims that as per the pay revision of the wage board; he is entitled to Rs. The defendants were also restrained from recovering the differential amount of commuted pension from the plaintiff's dues. Thus, the plaintiff claims that as per the pay revision of the wage board; he is entitled to Rs. 1,62,577/from 01.04.2005 to 31.08.2008 and from out of that Rs.65,031/- (40% of the entitled amount) to be paid by the defendant no.2 by depositing the said amount in the bank account on 25.09.2009. The balance due, i.e., 60% amount of RS.97,546/- remained unpaid till the suit. The plaintiff served notice i.e upon the defendants for release the legitimate arrear amounting to Rs. 97,546/-and claimed compensation and damages as well as interest. The defendants though received notice did not respond, so the suit was finally heard and decreed ex parte. This was challenged in the Court of the District Judge, Balasore. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the suit in the Court of the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Balasore was not maintainable since it falls within the ambit of "Industrial Dispute" covered under the provision of Industrial Dispute Act. So, it is said that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction in entertaining the suit and granting the reliefs as have been decreed. He further submits that the relief concerning recovery of arrear wages as per the wage revision made by the concerned wage board as per Section 7 of the Minimum Wages Act and the said claim due being also included under Section 20 of the Act stands for recovery in the manner as provided therein and there stands the total .bar under Section 24 of the said Act as well as Section 22 of the Payment of Wages Act. According to him, in view of the alternative dispute redressal forum as provided under Section 33 (c)(2) of the 1.0. Act instead of invoking said jurisdiction in the manner provided therein, the suit is incompetent. 5. The appeal has been admitted on the following substantial question of law: "(a) Whether the civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the present suit in view of the provision of Section 33(c)(2) of the 1.0. Act; Section 24 of the Minimum Wages Act and Section 22 of the Payment of Wages Act?" 6. 5. The appeal has been admitted on the following substantial question of law: "(a) Whether the civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the present suit in view of the provision of Section 33(c)(2) of the 1.0. Act; Section 24 of the Minimum Wages Act and Section 22 of the Payment of Wages Act?" 6. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the present dispute is neither falling within the definition of industrial dispute as provided in Section 2(k) of the I.D. Act and so also the subject matter is riot falling within the definition of wages as provided in Section 2 (r)(r) of the said Act nor such definition given in the Payment of Wage Act. He further submits that the plaintiff cannot be said to be a workman as defined in I.D. Act. Therefore, he urges that the appeal is devoid of merit and the finding of the Jower appellate Court in that regard is based upon sound interpretation of legal provision when he negated the contention with regard to the lack of jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the present suit. 7. Section 2(k) of the I.D. Act defines the industrial dispute as under: "2(k) industrial dispute means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is concerned with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, any person" The definition of workman as contained in Section 2(s) of the said Act which runs as follows: ""Workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for him or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person" (i) Who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) Who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or . (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature." Admittedly, the plaintiff has retired. At this moment .it is felt apposite to further reproduce the provision of Section 33-C (2) of the Act which reads as under: "Section 33-C(2)- Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules• that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government (within a period not exceeding three months). Therefore, it is clear that benefit of Section 33-C(2) of the said Act would be available only for those who were considered as workmen. In other words, it would not be available to both who are ex-employees and had availed of the benefits and full payments under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme." The above provision makes it clear that the benefit under the provision as available only for those who are considered as workman. Thus, it is clear that it would not be available to ex-ex-employees. In case of Premier Automobiles Ltd. Vs. PAL VRS Employees Welfare Association and Anr., (2002) ILLJ 527 Born, the High Court of Bombay has held that the benefit of Section 33-C(2) is not available to ex-employees who have even availed the benefit under the voluntary retirement scheme and, therefore, it has been held that the members of the VRS Employees Welfare Association are not entitled to invoke Section 33-C(2) of the Act as they had opted for voluntary retirement. In another decision in case of "Everestee Vs. In another decision in case of "Everestee Vs. District labour Officer', (1999) IILLJ 85 Ker, it has been held that a person having voluntarily tendered his resignation pursuant to a scheme for voluntary retirement and that having been accepted by the management and all the benefits arising out of such resignation having been paid by the management and received by the employee, he cannot be treated as a 'workman' coming under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Dispute Act. It has been categorically held that the definition only includes persons who are presently employed or who have been dismissed, discharged or retrenched from the service of the employer. The High Court Calcutta in case' of "Hindustan lever Ltd. Vs. IVth Industrial Tribunal and Ors.", 2007 (113) FLR 1090 have also held that according to the definition of term 'workman', it would appear that the said definition contemplates any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do' any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory works for hire or reward, whether the terms of the employment are express or impfied. This shows that the person concerned has to be "employed in any industry" that is to say such person must be in employment. In the second part of the definition of the term "workman", persons who have been dismissed, discharged or retrenched have been included. The third part of the definition deals with the exclusion part. The respondent Nos. 3 to 54 are neither in employment at present nor were they in employment when the dispute was raised and the reference was made it is also not the case of the respondent Nos. 3 to 54 that they were dismissed, discharged or retrenched from their service. There is no ambiguity in the said definition. If the words "any person" in the said definition was intended to include a person who was employed at any point of time and had subsequently retired then the latter part of the definition, which contemplates a discharged, dismissed or retrenched employee, would have become redundant and useless. In that view of the matter, it has be en said that a plain reading of Section 2(s) would indicate that a retired person was not intended to be included in the said definition. 7. The decision in case of Jitendra Nath Vrs. M/s.Empire of India & Ceylone Tea Co. In that view of the matter, it has be en said that a plain reading of Section 2(s) would indicate that a retired person was not intended to be included in the said definition. 7. The decision in case of Jitendra Nath Vrs. M/s.Empire of India & Ceylone Tea Co. and another, AIR 1990 S.C. 255 cited on behalf of the appellant, concerns with the relief of reinstatement and back wages and so far as grant of those reliefs, the Hon'ble Apex Court held the jurisdiction of Civil Court who have been impliedly barred in view of the provisions of Industrial Dispute Act. In the given case, the reliefs are claimed by a retired employee and that too in relation to cause of action arising after retirement. The other cited decision in case of 'The Managing Director, Aska Cooperative Sugar Industry Ltd., Aska Vrs. Bhagaban Muni; 2006 (Supp-II) O.L.R: 200 is again concerning the relief for a direction to the employer to accept the particular date as the date of birth and thus to extend the date of, superannuation. The said decision holding the lack of jurisdiction of Civil Court has no applicability to the instant case. So also the other decision in case of O.R.T.C. Vrs. Sachinanda Kanungo; 1984 (1) O.L.R. 978 concerning with the dispute relating to legality of the retrenchment cannot come to the aid of the appellant. 8. Present is a suit where the plaintiff has sought for the back pensions when admittedly he is no more the employee and as such as already discussed is not coming as a 'workman' on the date of the institution of the suit and thus his dispute cannot be termed to be' an industrial dispute. Here also looking to the subject matter of the dispute and the basis of the claim, the provision of Payment of Wages Act or Minimum Wages Act do not come into play. In fact the cause of action for levying such claims has also arisen after retirement. 9. For the aforesaid discussion and reason the submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff as regards lack of jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit and decide fails. The substantial question of law as framed is accordingly answered 10. In the result the appeal stands dismissed. No order as to cost.