JUDGMENT : The challenge in the present writ petition is to the adjudication of standard rent in proceedings initiated under section 8 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (for short 'the said Act'). 2. The respondent herein is the owner and landlord of house admeasuring 1056 sq.ft., which is occupied by the petitioner as a tenant. The tenancy was created in the year 1961 on monthly rent of Rs. 20/-. According to the respondent, as the rent was inadequate, he sought determination of standard rent and accordingly on 28-9-2000 initiated proceedings under section 8 of the said Act. The proceedings were opposed by the petitioner by filing reply. The proceedings were titled as Regular Civil Suit No. 98/2000 and after the parties led evidence, the trial Court fixed the standard rent at Rs. 1,200/- per month from the date of filing of the proceedings. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed an appeal under section 34 of the said Act and the appellate Court confirmed the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Hence, this writ petition. 3. Shri R. S. Parsodkar, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that there was no evidence whatsoever on record to fix the standard rent at Rs. 1,200/- per month. According to him, the construction was of the year 1950 and the standard rent fixed was on a much higher side. He submitted that considering the age of the construction, some reasonable enhancement in the amount of rent could have been granted, but not Rs. 1,200/- per month. He referred to the interim order dated 25-11-2009 and submitted that the interim rent fixed at Rs. 700/- per month was reasonable. 4. Shri B. N. Mohta, the learned Counsel for the respondent raised objection to the maintainability of the writ petition on a ground that the order passed by the trial Court had been accepted by the petitioner and the subsequent suits filed by the landlord on the basis of standard rent being fixed at Rs. 1,200/- per month had been decreed. It was then submitted that the proceedings had been initiated by filing an application under section 8 of the said Act and, therefore, no appeal could have been filed under section 34 of the said Act and the appellate Court was not justified in entertaining the same on merits. 1,200/- per month had been decreed. It was then submitted that the proceedings had been initiated by filing an application under section 8 of the said Act and, therefore, no appeal could have been filed under section 34 of the said Act and the appellate Court was not justified in entertaining the same on merits. It was submitted that an application for dismissal of the appeal as not maintainable had been filed before the appellate Court, but said application was not decided and instead the appeal itself was entertained on merit. He, therefore, submitted that the petitioner having accepted fixation of standard rent at Rs. 1,200/- per month by complying with the decrees passed in favour of the landlord, he was estopped from questioning the amount of standard rent. In that regard, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the judgment in Pundalik s/o Haribhau Chandekar vs. Jagdish s/o Dadaji Bind, 2010(3) Mh.L.J. 292 as well as the judgment of the Supreme Court in Prabir Banerjee vs. Union of India and others, (2007) 8 SC 793. He also referred to order of the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 365/2008, dated 13-2-2009, Madanmohan Tolaramji Daga vs. Deputy Charity Commissioner, Nagpur and others. 5. Without prejudice, it was submitted that the amount of standard rent as fixed was reasonable and was on the basis of the evidence available on record. The witness examined on behalf of the respondent had referred to rent being paid with respect to adjoining premises on the main road and on that basis considering the area of the suit premises, the amount fixed was reasonable. He submitted that same was a finding of fact not required to be interfered with. 6. In reply to the aforesaid submissions, Shri Parsodkar, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that as the writ petition was admitted, same could not be dismissed at this stage on technical ground. In that regard, he referred to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in A. P. Ramtekkar and others vs. Union of India and others, 2013(2) Mh.L.J. 419 . 7. I have heard the respective counsel at length. It is first necessary to consider the objection raised by the respondent to the maintainability of the writ petition. The application moved by the respondent was under section 8 of the said Act. 7. I have heard the respective counsel at length. It is first necessary to consider the objection raised by the respondent to the maintainability of the writ petition. The application moved by the respondent was under section 8 of the said Act. As per provisions of section 8 of the said Act, on an application made for said purpose, or in any suit or proceedings, the Court can fix the standard rent after considering the provisions of the said Act. Under sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 8, the Court can issue interim directions and against those orders, no appeal is maintainable. Under section 34(1)(c) of the said Act, an order made on the application fixing the standard rent cannot be challenged in an appeal. It is on this basis that it is submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the appeal filed by the petitioner was not maintainable. 8. The record indicates that the application filed by the respondent was treated as a plaint and same was registered as Regular Civil Suit No. 98/2000. Issues were duly framed and on 12-7-2002, while dealing with the claim as made and fixing the standard rent, the trial Court passed a decree in that regard. Against said adjudication, appeal under section 34 of the said Act was preferred and the appellate Court while dismissing the same, directed a decree to be drawn accordingly. The aforesaid, therefore, indicates that the trial Court entertained the proceedings as a civil suit and the appellate Court entertained the appeal treating the same under section 34(1) of the said Act. 9. The provisions of the said Act do not bar filing of civil suit for determining standard rent. Under section 8(1) of the said Act, the Court has jurisdiction to fix standard rent either upon an application made for said purpose or in any suit or proceedings. When said provision is considered along with provisions of section 8(3) and 8(4) of the said Act, the distinction between the same is clear. The trial Court having decided the proceedings by way of suit and having passed a decree which was confirmed by the appellate Court, the same cannot be said to be an order on an application for fixing standard rent. In effect, the same was a decree passed by the trial Court. The trial Court having decided the proceedings by way of suit and having passed a decree which was confirmed by the appellate Court, the same cannot be said to be an order on an application for fixing standard rent. In effect, the same was a decree passed by the trial Court. In that context, therefore, it cannot be said that the appellate Court erred in entertaining the appeal on merits. Said submission made on behalf of the respondent regarding non-maintainability of the writ petition on said count, therefore, cannot be accepted. As observed in A. P. Ramtekkar (supra), the writ petition is not being dismissed on the ground of tenability. 10. In Pundalik Haribhau Chandekar (supra), it has been held that an appeal under section 34 of the said Act cannot be filed challenging an order passed on an application fixing standard rent. As observed hereinabove, the adjudication was in a suit against which appeal under section 34(1)(b) of the said Aadjudication was in a suit against which appeal under section 34(1)(b) of the said Act was maintainable. Said decision, therefore, does not support the case of the respondent. 11. Insofar as the facts that have transpired after the decree was passed by the trial Court on 12-7-2002 are concerned, the same are found relevant. After the standard rent was fixed at Rs. 1,200/- per month, the respondent filed R.C.S. No. 10/2003 claiming rent for the period from 13-1-2000 to 31-12-2002 by treating standard rent at Rs. 1,200/- per month. The said suit was decreed on 14-7-2003 and this decree was executed. Thereafter the respondent filed R.C.S. No. 123/2004 seeking arrears of rent for the period from 1-1-2003 to 31-5-2004. This suit was decreed on 29-8-2005 and said decree was also executed. Thereafter, the respondent has filed R.C.S. No. 81/2007 claiming rent from 1-6-2004 onwards. The said suit is still pending. It is also to be noted that after the standard rent was fixed on 12-7-2002, said decree was not stayed and it operated during pendency of the appeal. The first interim order passed by this Court is on 25-11-2009. Thus, from 12-7-2002 till 25-11-2009, the petitioner did not take any steps to have the judgment of the trial Court stayed. It is also to be noted that after the standard rent was fixed on 12-7-2002, said decree was not stayed and it operated during pendency of the appeal. The first interim order passed by this Court is on 25-11-2009. Thus, from 12-7-2002 till 25-11-2009, the petitioner did not take any steps to have the judgment of the trial Court stayed. It is on aforesaid basis that the landlord initiated subsequent proceedings for recovery of rent along with 4% interest per annum as per provisions of section 11(1) of the said Act. As per provisions of section 11 of the said Act, an increase of 4% per annum is permissible in the standard rent. It is on this basis that the three suits came to be filed. The conduct of the petitioner, therefore, indicates that he has acquiesced to the adjudication in the two civil suits and has remained content by paying the arrears as per the standard rent determined in said suits. The observations of the Supreme Court in Prabir Banerjee (supra) and of the Division Bench in Madanmohan Daga (supra) to that extent support the stand of the respondent. 12. Insofar as the challenge on merits is concerned, the same is based on the aspect that the evidence on record did not justify fixation of standard rent at Rs. 1,200/- per month. In effect, the attempt of the petitioner is to seek reconsideration of the evidence on record for the purpose of setting aside the impugned order. Considering the facts referred to above, it is clear that the petitioner has acquiesced to the fixation of standard rent and has permitted the same to operate for the period from 12-7-2002 till 25-11-2009. Further, the two decrees passed in favour of the respondent on the basis of the standard rent as adjudicated have also been executed. In such situation, I do not find that this is a fit case in which extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India deserves to be exercised. It is well settled that the jurisdiction in this regard cannot be claimed as of right and the same is discretionary in nature and has to be exercised in the facts of the case. It is well settled that the jurisdiction in this regard cannot be claimed as of right and the same is discretionary in nature and has to be exercised in the facts of the case. Reference in that regard can be made to the observation of the Supreme Court in paragraphs 22 and 25 of its decision in B. K. Muniraju vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2008) 4 SCC 451 , which reads thus : "22. It is settled law that a writ of certiorari can only be issued in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or tribunals or authorities in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice......... 25....... To put it clear though the power is there but the exercise is discretionary which will be governed solely by the dictates of judicial conscience enriched by judicial experience and practical wisdom of the Judge." 13. There is, therefore, no case to interfere in the writ jurisdiction. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs. 14. The petitioner is granted time of three months to pay the arrears to the respondent as the interim order permitted the petitioner to pay rent at Rs. 700/- per month. There shall be no orders as to costs.