JUDGMENT : 1. This is a revision petition under section 115 CPC filed by the defendants against order dated 31.08.2013, whereby in a suit filed against them by one Som Dutt Sharma the trial Court after the death of the plaintiff has allowed substitution of the respondents as legal representatives of the deceased. Facts briefly are these: Plaintiff filed a suit against petitioners(defendants) for possession of land measuring 2 kanals and 04 marlas comprised in Khasra No. 2713 situate at village, Kote, Tehsil and District Jammu and mandatory injunction directing the petitioners to dismantle the construction of two rooms and one shop raised constructed by the defendants on the suit land. He alleged that defendants have trespassed upon and taken illegal possession of his land and cause of action accrued to him when defendants declined to restore the possession to him and asserted their own right in the suit land. Plaintiff died during the pendency of the suit on 23.03.2010. The respondents moved an application for their substitution as legal representatives of the deceased-plaintiff. They contended that the deceased had snapped his relationship with his wife, son and daughters by virtue of a deed of disinheritance dated 22.03.2010 ousting them from his life and estate and that the respondents had been and even now are in possession of and handling the landed property of the deceased and used to attend litigation in the suit on behalf of the deceased-plaintiff and, therefore, they are intermeddlers vis-a-vis the estate of the deceased and entitled to represent him as his legal representatives in the suit. 3. Learned trial Court allowed the application vide impugned order dated 31.08.2013 bringing on record the respondents as legal representatives of the deceased-plaintiff. As per the impugned order and record of the trial Court, the petitioners (defendants) opposed the respondents' application contending that the legal heirs of the deceased-plaintiff having not come forward for impleadment the respondents have no locus standi. Petitioners also denied respondents' plea that the deceased has disinherited his legal heirs and alleged that the respondents with ulterior motive want to grab the property of the deceased and to dislodge his legal heirs. Petitioners also denied respondents' plea that the deceased has disinherited his legal heirs and alleged that the respondents with ulterior motive want to grab the property of the deceased and to dislodge his legal heirs. Learned trial Court, however, while referring to definition of the term 'legal heir' as given in section 2(11) CPC took the view that the respondents, applicants therein, are the legal representatives of the deceased-plaintiff, however, observing further that finding in the application shall have no effect on right of the legal heirs of the deceased. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and I have perused the record. 5. Mr. Kalbhushan Salgotra, learned counsel for the petitioners (defendants), submitted briefly that the learned trial Court has fallen into error by impleading strangers as legal representatives of the deceased-plaintiff. Mr. Ved Raj Wazir, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents, however, supported the impugned order contending that not only a legal heir but a person who manages the property of deceased is entitled to be substituted in a suit in his capacity as intermeddlers qua the property of the deceased. Mr. Wazir submitted further that respondents have been substituted in their capacity as intermeddlers as they had been taking care of the deceased/plaintiff and had been and are managing his entire estate. Mr. Wazir relied upon a judgment of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Baldev Raj v. J&K Special Tribunal' 2010(4) JKJ 732 . Mr. Wazir also questioned maintainability of this revision petition contending that the impugned order does not amount to a case decided and is not open to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. In support of his submission, Mr. Wazir relied upon a judgment of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Ghulam Mohammad Bhat v. Abdul Rahim Sheik', 2012 (2) SLJ 487. 6. In relation to objections to the maintainability of the revision petition notice is taken of the proviso to section 115 CPC which reads, thus: “Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision would have finally disposed of the suit.” 7. Interpreting similar proviso in Central CPC, the Supreme Court in Shiv Shakti Co-op. Interpreting similar proviso in Central CPC, the Supreme Court in Shiv Shakti Co-op. Housing Society v. M/s Swaraj Developers, AIR 2003 SC 2434 , has held in para-32 of the reporting: “A plain reading of Section 115 as it stands makes it clear that the stress is on the question whether the order in favour of the party applying for revision would have given finality to suit or other proceeding. If the answer is 'yes' then the revision is maintainable. But on the contrary, if the answer is 'no' then the revision is not maintainable. Therefore, if the impugned order is of interim in nature or does not finally decide the lis, the revision will not be maintainable. The legislative intent is crystal clear. Those orders, which are interim in nature, cannot be the subject matter of revision under Section 115. There is marked distinction in language of Section 97(3) of the Old Amendment Act and Section 32(2)(i) of the Amendment Act. While in the former, there was clear legislative intent to save applications admitted or pending before the amendment came into force. Such an intent is significantly absent in Section 32(2)(i). The amendment relates to procedures. No person has a vested right in a course of procedure. He has only the right of proceeding in the manner prescribed. If by a statutory change the mode of procedure is altered the parties are to proceed according to the altered mode, without exception, unless there is a different stipulation.” 8. Applying the ratio of aforementioned case, this revision is maintainable because had the application for impleadment not been allowed, proceedings in the suit might have come to an end because legal representatives of the sole plaintiff have not come forward for impleadment as legal representatives after his death. 9. The important question, thus, arising for determination is whether the respondents should have been impleaded as legal representatives of the deceased-plaintiff in terms of Order 22, Rule 3 CPC, which provides for impleadment in a case where the sole plaintiff dies during pendency of the suit, read with section 2(11), which defines the term 'legal representative'. Under Order 22, Rule 3, in” a case where the sole plaintiff or sole surviving plaintiff dies, court shall cause his 'legal representatives' to be made party on an application made by them. Under Order 22, Rule 3, in” a case where the sole plaintiff or sole surviving plaintiff dies, court shall cause his 'legal representatives' to be made party on an application made by them. Section 2 (11) defines the term 'legal representative' for the purpose of the CPC as under: “legal representative” means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued'. (underlining by me) 10. On its plain reading, Section 2(11) would show that a legal representative for the purpose of impleadment under Order-22 CPC may either be a person who represents estate of the deceased in law or a person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased. A person representing estate of the deceased in law includes a legal heir, executor, administrator and the like whereas intermeddler would be a person other than that depending upon the claim put forth by him. A legal representative for the purpose of impleadment, therefore, should not necessarily be a legal heir of the deceased entitled to inherent his estate after his death. It can be said that every legal heir may claim to be a legal representative for the purpose of impleadment but every person claiming impleadment need not be a legal heir. 11. The Supreme Court in Custodian, Branches of BANCO National Ultramarino v. Nalini Bai Naique, AIR 1989 SC 1589 , while incorporating the term 'legal representative' as it appears in CPC has held in para-4 of the reporting as under; “....”Legal representative” as defined in Civil Procedure Code which was admittedly applicable to the proceedings in the suit, means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. The definition is inclusive in character and its scope is wide, it is not confined to legal heirs only instead it stipulates a person who may or may not be heir, competent to inherit the property of the deceased but he should represent the estate of the deceased person. It includes heirs as well as persons who represent the estate even without title either as executors or administrators in possession of the estate of the deceased. All such persons would be covered by the expression “legal representative”. If there are many heirs, those in possession bona fide, without there being any fraud or collusion, are also entitled to represent the estate of the deceased....” 12. I, may also usefully refer to a judgment of Rajasthan High Court in Kalu Ram v. Charan Singh, AIR 1994 Rajasthan 31, where it has been held in para-6 of the reporting as under; “.......It is true that all legal heirs are, ordinarily, also legal representatives, but the converse is not true. All legal representatives are not necessarily legal heirs as well. The decision as to who is the legal representative for the purpose of proceedings is necessarily limited for the purpose of carrying on the proceedings and cannot have the effect of conferring of any right of heirship to the estate of the deceased. The decision on this issue also does not operate res judicata on the question of heir-ship in the subsequent proceedings. In view of this settled position of law, it must be held that the enquiry into right to heirship is not the determining factor in deciding whether a person is or is not a legal representative for the purpose of proceedings before the court. What is required to be considered is whether the person claiming to represent the estate of the deceased for the purpose of lis has sufficient interest in carrying on litigation and is not any imposter. In case of rival claimants, it may also be necessary to decide that out of the rival claimants, who really is the person entitled to represent the estate for the purpose of particular proceedings. Even that determination does not result in determination of inter se right to succeed to property to the deceased and that right has to be established in independent proceedings in accordance with law. 13. Even that determination does not result in determination of inter se right to succeed to property to the deceased and that right has to be established in independent proceedings in accordance with law. 13. The respondents in this case sought impleadment neither as legal heirs of the deceased nor as persons representing estate of the deceased in law, say as executors or administers. They, however, claim to be intermeddlers because of the deceased having disinherited his legal heirs in the life time and living with and being looked after by the respondents. They claim also that they are in possession of the land of the deceased and had been representing him in the suit in his lifetime. 14. It would not be possible for a person to claim impleadment in his capacity as intermeddler without any reason. In order to claim impleadment as an intermeddler, one will have to show that he has sufficient interest in continuing the suit filed by deceased-plaintiff or to defend a suit filed against the deceased and its outcome. 15. Respondents, however, neither have stated in the application nor it is discernible as to what interest in the subject matter of the suit they have acquired merely for the reason that they had been looking after the deceased or his property during his lifetime and what interest they have in prosecuting the suit filed by the deceased. It is not the respondents' case that they have any interest in the subject matter of the suit, which as per the plaintiffs suit, is in possession, though unauthorized, of the petitioners(defendants). 16. For what has been said and discussed above, respondents cannot be treated as intermeddlers qua the estate of the deceased giving them a legal right to be impleaded as legal representatives of deceased plaintiff. The learned trial Court has, therefore, fallen into error by impleading the respondents as legal representatives of the deceased-plaintiff. 17. Viewed, thus, this revision has merit and is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. 18. Record of the trial Court be remitted back forthwith alongwith a copy of this order.