JUDGMENT : Ali Mohd. Magrey, J. 1. This writ petition challenges the order dated 15.12.2008 passed by respondent No. 3, the Assessing Authority, Commercial Taxes Officer, Circle (1), Srinagar, under Section 4 clause (2) of Jammu and Kashmir Entry Tax on Goods Act, 2000, and the seizure memo dated 17.11.2008 of the goods seized. The petitioners set up a diagnostic centre at Karan Nagar, Srinagar, and installed connected equipments therein. They also purchased Acuson S. 2000 Doppler System worth Rs. 65,00,000 from Seimens Ltd., Mumbai. Respondent No. 4, Deputy Commissioner Taxes, Check Post, Lakhanpur, demanded entry tax thereon under the provisions of Section 4(2) of J&K Entry Tax on Goods Act, 2000 (for short, Entry Tax Act) @ 12.5%. Since the petitioner refused to pay entry tax, the goods were seized. Relying on an earlier decision dated 29.05.2008, passed by the J&K Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Appellate Tribunal) in an appeal, titled M/s. Medicare Diagnostic Imaging Centre v. Dy. Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, filed by the petitioners in relation to their earlier consignment, they filed an application before the Appellate Tribunal seeking a direction to the concerned respondent not to charge any entry tax from them. The Appellate Tribunal referred the application with a copy of the aforesaid decision to respondent No. 4. 2. Simultaneously, it appears, the petitioners made an application before the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, respondent No. 2 who, vide his order dated 08.12.2008, withdrew seizure case from respondent No. 4 and referred it to the Commercial Taxes Officer, Circle (I), Srinagar, respondent No. 3 herein, for disposal in accordance with law. Respondent No. 3, holding that diagnostic centres and hospitals cannot be treated as manufacturing units, vide the impugned order dated 15.12.2008, levied entry tax @ 12.5% on the cost of the goods of the petitioners. The petitioners have challenged the aforesaid order together with the seizure memo in this petition on various grounds taken in the writ petition. 3. The respondents have filed their objections. Apart from objecting to the maintainability of this writ petition, the respondents have, inter alia, stated that the petitioner-dealer is registered with the Industries Department as a Small Scale Services and Business Enterprise and there is no manufacturing activity. The petitioners' unit is purely a diagnostic centre rendering service to his customers. 3. The respondents have filed their objections. Apart from objecting to the maintainability of this writ petition, the respondents have, inter alia, stated that the petitioner-dealer is registered with the Industries Department as a Small Scale Services and Business Enterprise and there is no manufacturing activity. The petitioners' unit is purely a diagnostic centre rendering service to his customers. In the objections, it is also stated that perusal of the records revealed that the petitioner dealer has not shown any kind of sales, nor is there any remission claim whatsoever. It is stated that Small Scale Industrial Units are governed by SRO 91 of March, 2006 and that the principal characteristics of SRO 91 are: (i) the price adjustment scheme; and (ii) the tax remission claim. It is averred that both these relevant characteristics are absent in the instant case. Therefore, the claim of the petitioners of being an Industrial Unit is refuted. It is also stated that SRO 428 is not applicable to the petitioner. As regards the order dated 29.05.2008 passed by the Appellate Tribunal, the respondents have stated that an application under Section 75 of the J&K VAT Act stands already filed before the Tribunal seeking reference of the case to the High Court on several questions mentioned in paragraph 2 of the objections under the heading 'parawise reply'. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties on the admission of this petition and considered the matter. 5. The crucial question that falls for determination is whether in view of the provisions of the Entry Tax Act and the facts and circumstances of the case, this petition would be maintainable before this Court at this stage? Let the relevant provisions of the Entry Tax Act be noticed. 6. The Entry Tax Act has been enacted by the State Legislature to provide for levy of entry tax on goods in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Section 2(b) thereof defines the term 'goods' as meaning all kinds of moveable property, materials, articles and commodities brought into the State of Jammu and Kashmir for use or consumption. Section 3 thereof provides for incidence and levy of tax on entry of scheduled goods into the State. Section 4 provides for seizure of goods and levy of penalty. Section 2(b) thereof defines the term 'goods' as meaning all kinds of moveable property, materials, articles and commodities brought into the State of Jammu and Kashmir for use or consumption. Section 3 thereof provides for incidence and levy of tax on entry of scheduled goods into the State. Section 4 provides for seizure of goods and levy of penalty. Section 5 lays down that in case any person claims that he is not liable to pay entry tax under the Act, the burden of proof shall be on that person. Section 6 provides for application of certain provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir General Sales Tax Act, 1962. For determination of the aforesaid question, this is the most relevant provision of the Act. It reads as under: "6. Application of certain provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir General Sales Tax Act, 1962 The provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir General Sales Tax Act, 1962 relating to appeal, revisions, appellate tribunal, power to withdraw and transfer cases, recovery of fines, taxes or penalties, refund of taxes and penalties, power to take evidence on oath, powers by authorised person, powers to give instructions and determination of issues shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to all such proceedings under this Act." It is seen that Section 6 of the Entry Tax Act, thus, envisages that, as regards appeals and revisions, the appellate tribunal etc., the provisions of the J&K General Sales Tax Act, 1962 (for short, GST Act) shall apply mutatis mutandis. It is not in dispute that Section 11 and 11-A of the GST Act provide for appeals. This means that the petitioners had an alternative remedy of filing an appeal against the order passed by the Assessing Officer. 7. Mr. A. Haqani, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that an alternative remedy does not operate as a bar to the maintenance of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution or against issuance of prerogative writs by the High Court. The learned counsel in this connection relied upon and cited two decisions of the Supreme Court in Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. State of MP, 1954 STPL (LE) 477 SC : AIR 1954 SC 403 : 1954 SCR 1122 , and M/s. Paradip Port Trust v. Sales Tax Officer, (1998) 4 SCC 90 . On the other hand, Mr. The learned counsel in this connection relied upon and cited two decisions of the Supreme Court in Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. State of MP, 1954 STPL (LE) 477 SC : AIR 1954 SC 403 : 1954 SCR 1122 , and M/s. Paradip Port Trust v. Sales Tax Officer, (1998) 4 SCC 90 . On the other hand, Mr. Khawja, learned counsel for the respondents, cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Sales Tax Officer Jodhpur v. shiv Ratan G. Mohatta, 1965 Legal Eagle (SC) 35 : 1966 AIR (SC) 142, and particularly relied upon paragraph 11 thereof. 8. In Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. State of MP (supra), the question was whether Explanation II to Section 2(g) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act (Act XXI of 1947), as amended by Act XVI of 1949, was ultra vires the Constitution and whether threat to use coercive machinery of the Act for realising tax was infringement of fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. A contention was raised that the petitioners had a remedy available under the impugned Act and, therefore, it was disentitled to the relief under Article 226. The Supreme Court repelled the contention by observing and holding that the contention stands negative by the decision of the Court in State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd., AIR 1953 SC 252 (B). What had been held in that case was reproduced by the Supreme Court in its aforesaid judgment in the following words: "There it was held that the principle that a Court will not issue a prerogative writ when an adequate alternative remedy was available could not apply where a party came to the Court with an allegation that his fundamental right had been infringed and sought relief under Art. 226. Moreover, the remedy provided by the Act is of an onerous and burdensome character. Before the appellant can avail of it, he has to deposit the whole amount of the tax. Such a provision can hardly be described as an adequate alternative remedy." 9. In M/s. Paradip Port Trust v. Sales Tax Officer (supra), the writ petitioners had raised questions involving interpretation of the words 'transfer or the right to use any goods' in Sub-Clause (d) of Clause 29-A of Article 366 of the Constitution. Such a provision can hardly be described as an adequate alternative remedy." 9. In M/s. Paradip Port Trust v. Sales Tax Officer (supra), the writ petitioners had raised questions involving interpretation of the words 'transfer or the right to use any goods' in Sub-Clause (d) of Clause 29-A of Article 366 of the Constitution. The High Court had dismissed the writ petitions filed by the appellant on the view that alternative remedy of an appeal against the order of assessment was available under the Sales Tax law and since the said remedy was available, the writ petitions could not be entertained. The Supreme Court held that, having regard to the question that was involved, the High Court should have entertained the writ petitions and should have considered the said question instead of requiring the appellant to avail the remedy of appeal under the Sales Tax Act. 10. In Sales Tax Officer Jodhpur v. Shiv Ratan G. Mohatta (supra), the respondents had challenged the order of assessment of the Sales Tax Officer on the ground that they were not liable to be assessed to sales tax. The High Court of Rajasthan allowed the writ petition. In appeal before the Supreme Court, the learned Advocate General took two points, the first being that on the facts of the case the High Court should have refused to entertain the petition. On this point, the Supreme Court in paragraph 11 laid down as under: "11. We are of the opinion that the High Court should have declined to entertain the petition. No exceptional circumstances exist in this case to warrant the exercise of the extra ordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226. It was not the object of Art. 226 to convert High Courts into original or appellate assessing authorities whenever an assessee chose to attack an assessment order on the ground that a sale was made in the course of import and, therefore, exempt from tax. It was urged on behalf of the assessee that they would have had to deposit sales tax while filing an appeal. Even if this is so, does this mean that in every case in which the assessee had to deposit sales tax, he can bypass the remedies provided by the Sales Tax Act? Surely not. It was urged on behalf of the assessee that they would have had to deposit sales tax while filing an appeal. Even if this is so, does this mean that in every case in which the assessee had to deposit sales tax, he can bypass the remedies provided by the Sales Tax Act? Surely not. There must be something more in a case to warrant the entertainment of a petition under Art. 226, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer, something to show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the assessee to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the Act. But as the High Court chose to entertain the petition, we are not inclined to dismiss the petition on this ground at this stage." 11. The point at issue was considered by the Supreme in somewhat detail in Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 . In that case, it was held by the Supreme Court that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions, one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction, but the alternative remedy has been consistently held not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or where the vires of an Act is challenged. Therein, the Supreme Court referred to some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law, as they held the field. 12. The issue again came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 . That was a case emanating from the provisions of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. The respondent No. 1 before the Supreme Court in that case had filed writ petition challenging the notice issued to him under Section 13(4) of the aforesaid Act. That was a case emanating from the provisions of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. The respondent No. 1 before the Supreme Court in that case had filed writ petition challenging the notice issued to him under Section 13(4) of the aforesaid Act. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Financial Institution it was pleaded that action initiated against respondent No. 1 therein was consistent with the provisions of the Act and that the writ petitioner was bound to discharge her obligations to pay the outstanding dues etc. It was further pleaded that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed because an alternative remedy was available to the petitioner under Section 17 of the Act. However, without adverting to the said plea, the High Court passed an order restraining the appellant before the Supreme Court from taking action in furtherance of the notice issued under Section 13(4) of the Act. The Supreme Court referred to its various judgments on the point and observed and laid down as under: "42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent No. 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression 'any person' used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. 43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. 46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Mahesh-wari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, AIR 1969 SC 556 , Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 and Harbanslal Sahnia and another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others, (2003) 2 SCC 107 and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass appropriate interim order." 13. It may be apt to mention here that in that case the Supreme Court showed a serious concern that despite repeated pronouncements by it, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of the banks and other financial institutions to recover their duties. 14. In Raj Kumar Shivhare v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2010) 4 SCC 772 , which was followed by the Supreme Court in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon (supra), dealing with the issue whether the alternative statutory remedy available under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 can be bypassed and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution could be invoked. After examining the scheme of the Act, the Court observed: "31. When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievance and that too in a fiscal statute, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. In this case the High Court is a statutory forum of appeal on a question of law. That should not be abdicated and given a go-by by a litigant for invoking the forum of judicial review of the High Court under writ jurisdiction. The High Court, with great respect, fell into a manifest error by not appreciating this aspect of the matter. It has however dismissed the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. 32. The High Court, with great respect, fell into a manifest error by not appreciating this aspect of the matter. It has however dismissed the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. 32. No reason could be assigned by the appellant's counsel to demonstrate why the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 35 of FEMA does not provide an efficacious remedy. In fact there could hardly be any reason since the High Court itself is the appellate forum." 15. In the instant case, the principal grievance of the petitioners is that the respondents 2 to 4 have not considered the fact that in the petitioners' earlier case, the Appellate Tribunal, vide its judgment dated 29.05.2008, had held that the equipment imported by the petitioners was covered by SRO 428. It is thus, rather, admitted by none other than the petitioners that they have an effective alternative remedy available to them inasmuch as the Tribunal had allowed their appeal in respect of a different consignment earlier. 16. In light of the above, I am of the considered view that no exceptional circumstances exist in this case to warrant the exercise of the extra ordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226. The petitioners have an effective alternative remedy available to them against the impugned order passed by respondent No. 3 under Section 11 of the GST Act which in terms of Section 6 of the Entry Tax Act is applicable mutatis mutandis to the appeals under Entry Tax Act. 17. It may also be observed here that under Section 12-D of the GST Act, a person is otherwise entitled to seek reference of any question of law emanating from an order which affects the liability of such person to pay tax to the High Court for its determination. 18. Curiously, the petitioners have not disclosed any reason in the petition for bypassing the alternative remedy available to them. 19. This petition, is therefore, held to be not maintainable. It is dismissed as such alongwith the connected CMP. Interim direction of stay, if any, subsisting shall stand vacated. Dismissal of the petition shall not come in the way of petitioners to challenge the impugned order before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority shall entertain the appeal, if filed, within a period of two weeks, henceforth by treating the delay as having been condoned. Interim direction of stay, if any, subsisting shall stand vacated. Dismissal of the petition shall not come in the way of petitioners to challenge the impugned order before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority shall entertain the appeal, if filed, within a period of two weeks, henceforth by treating the delay as having been condoned. Till two weeks the impugned order shall not be given effect.