JUDGMENT P.R. SHIVAKUMAR, J. 1. The unsuccessful plaintiff, who failed in his suit filed before the trial Court for the relief of specific performance and also suffered a dismissal of the appeal filed against the decree of the trial Court, has come forward with the present Second Appeal. 2. The Plaintiff in the original suit is the appellant in the Second Appeal. The first defendant is the respondent in the Second Appeal. Though the second defendant has also been shown as the respondent in the Second Appeal, the appeal memorandum as against the second respondent has been rejected by order dated 15.07.2015. In view of the same, for achieving clarity, the parties are referred to in accordance with their ranks in the suit. 3. The facts leading to the filing of the Second Appeal can be briefly summarised as follows:- The first respondent Rehmathunnisa Begum is the owner of the suit property. One Syed Mohammed was the power of attorney holder of the first respondent. The first respondent through her power of attorney holder, namely Syed Mohammed entered into an agreement with the appellant/plaintiff on 20.06.2007 for the sale of the suit property for sale consideration of Rs. 5 lakhs. A sum of Rs. 75,000/- was paid by the appellant/ plaintiff and the same was received by Syed Mohammed on behalf of the owner Rehmathunnisa Begum, as advance. It was agreed that the sale transaction should be completed within three months from the date of agreement for sale. The sale was not completed within three months. Hence the respondent, through her power of attorney holder caused issuance of a notice dated 24.09.2007 informing the appellant/plaintiff that the agreement stood cancelled due to the failure on the part of the appellant to perform the obligations under the agreement within the time stipulated in the suit sale agreement. It was also informed that the property was sought to be sold for the repayment of the loan availed from third parties by the respondent/first defendant to defray the expenses of the marriage of her daughter with a promise to repay the loan amount within four months and that hence, the parties to the agreement had agreed that the time stipulated in the agreement should be the essential condition of the contract. After the issuance of the said notice, the appellant/plaintiff chose to issue a notice dated 25.09.2007 calling upon the defendants to execute the sale deed in terms of the agreement, after receiving the balance sale consideration. In the said notice, the appellant/Plaintiff also contended that on 19.09.2007, he met the first defendant with the balance sale consideration and demanded the execution of sale deed, but the first defendant informed him that the second defendant had gone to Thiruvarur and on his return, she would cause the sale deed to be executed. Refuting the above said contentions made in the notice of the appellant/plaintiff, the first defendant sent a reply notice dated 30.09.2009. After the receipt of said reply notice dated 30.09.2009, the appellant herein/plaintiff filed the suit in O.S. No. 466 of 2007 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Tiruchirappalli. In the plaint, the appellant/Plaintiff has also contended that though a fixed amount was mentioned in the agreement for sale as sale consideration; it had been agreed that the sale consideration would be at the rate of Rs. 2,50,000/- per acre and that even then, the appellant/plaintiff was prepared to go ahead with the sale transaction without insisting upon the technicality of ascertaining the actual extent available. It was also contended that the defendants were bound to obtain patta pass-book and have the suit property measured so as to enable the execution of the sale deed within the time stipulated in the agreement, but they failed to do so. 4. The plaint averments regarding the ready-ness and willingness on the part of the appellant/plaintiff and the alleged reluctance on the part of the defendants have been refuted. On the other hand, it was contended by the defendants that since the property was agreed to be sold for repaying the loan obtained by the first defendant from third parties for the marriage expenses of her daughter, which was solemnized on 17.6.2007 and she had promised to repay the said loan amount within four months; that hence parties agreed that the time of three months stipulated in the agreement should be the essence of the contract and that since the appellant/plaintiff was not ready to complete the transaction within three months, the agreement was lawfully cancelled by the defendants. It was also contended therein that the plaint allegations as if the appellant/Plaintiff met the first defendant on 19.9.2007 with the balance sale consideration and the first defendant avoided execution of the sale deed citing the absence of the second defendant was an utter false one. Based on the said averments, they prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 5. The learned trial Judge after framing necessary issues regarding the ready-ness and willingness on the part of the appellant/Plaintiff and his entitlement to seek the relief of specific performance, conducted the trial, in which the appellant/Plaintiff figured as the sole witness (P.W.1) on his part and produced nine documents as Ex.A1 to Ex.A9. On the side of the defendants, the second defendant figured as the sole witness (D.W.1) and eight documents were marked as Ex.B1 to Ex.B8. The learned trial Judge, on appreciation of evidence came to the conclusion that the time stipulated in the agreement was the essence of the contract; that the appellant/plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract under the suit agreement for sale within the time stipulated in the agreement for sale and that hence, he was not entitled to the relief of specific performance. Based on the said findings, the learned trial Judge non-suited the appellant herein/plaintiff to the relief sought for in the plaint. Accordingly, by judgment and decree dated 2.1.2013, the learned trial Judge dismissed the suit with costs. As against the said decree of the trial Court dated 2.1.2013, the appellant herein/plaintiff filed an appeal before the District Court, Tiruchirappalli in A.S. No. 28 of 2013. The learned Principal District Judge, Tiruchirappalli after hearing, concurred with all the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal without costs by a judgment and decree dated 28.1.2014. It is as against the said decree of the lower appellate Court, the present Second Appeal has been filed. 6. The appeal stands listed today for admission. When the High Court is seized of the Second Appeal, namely an appeal from the appellate decree of the Courts subordinate to it, it shall take a decision as to whether the appeal involves a substantial question of law. In case, the High Court comes to the conclusion that no substantial question of law is involved, the appeal has to be dismissed at the threshold. In case, the High Court comes to the conclusion that no substantial question of law is involved, the appeal has to be dismissed at the threshold. On the other hand, if the High Court feels that any substantial question of law is involved in the Second Appeal, the Second Appeal shall be admitted and the exact substantial question of law on which the appeal is admitted shall be formulated by the High Court. The mere fact that the Second Appeal has been admitted the substantial question of law thus formulated, does not mean that the opposite party shall not have the right to contend that the said question thus formulated is not in fact a substantial question of law involved in the Second Appeal. 7. The arguments advanced by Mrs. A.L. Ganthimathi, learned counsel for the appellant regarding the admission of the Second Appeal are heard. Copies of the judgments of the Courts below and copies of the other documents produced in the form of typed-set of papers were also perused. 8. Upon such hearing and after such perusal, this Court comes to the conclusion that the Second Appeal is not fit for admission and the same deserves to be dismissed at the threshold. The reasons are as follows:- 9. Admittedly, the appellant/Plaintiff entered into an agreement with the first defendant through her power of attorney holder, namely the second defendant under Ex.A1-agreement for sale, dated 20.6.2007. It is also not in dispute that the first defendant conducted the marriage of her daughter on 17.06.2007. Clear evidence had been adduced on the side of the defendants to the effect that for the said marriage, she had made borrowals promising to repay the amount thus borrowed within four months. It is the contention of the defendants that the sale agreement itself was entered into for discharging the debts incurred by the first defendant for the marriage of her daughter and that the same was the reason why they insisted upon the completion of the transaction within three months, taking the time stipulated in the agreement as an essential condition of the contract. In this regard, the appellant/plaintiff has not taken a concrete stand as to whether the time stipulated in the agreement was the essence of the contract or not. In this regard, the appellant/plaintiff has not taken a concrete stand as to whether the time stipulated in the agreement was the essence of the contract or not. On the other hand, the very nature of the pleading made by the appellant/Plaintiff and the evidence adduced on his side will make it clear that he was also of the view that the transactions should be completed within the period of three months stipulated in the agreement for sale. The same is the reason why the appellant/plaintiff had taken a stand that just a day prior to the expiry of the time stipulated in the agreement for sale, he approached the first defendant and demanded execution of the sale deed, whereupon, the fist defendant replied that she would cause the sale deed executed and registered on the return of the second defendant, who had gone to Thiruvarur. The same will make it clear that the appellant/plaintiff was very much aware of the condition, which according to the defendants, was an essential condition of the contract for sale. Hence the finding of the Courts below that the time was the essence of contract cannot be said to be either infirm or defective, much less perverse. 10. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the finding of the Courts below that the appellant herein/plaintiff had not proved his ready-ness and willingness to perform his part of the contract under Ex.A1-agreement for sale within the time stipulated in the agreement can be sustained. The plea made by the appellant/Plaintiff and also the evidence adduced by him as ascertained from the judgments of the Courts below and also from the copy of the plaint produced in the form of typed-set would show that the appellant/plaintiff wanted to take advantage of the fact that the first defendant had not obtained patta in her name for the suit property. That is the reason why the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, during her arguments before this Court, has contended that the first defendant got patta only on 10.09.2007 and thereafter, he expressed his ready-ness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, giving up his right to have the property measured to fix the actual sale consideration at the rate of Rs. 2,50,000/- per acre. 2,50,000/- per acre. The same will make it clear that though the defendants were obliged under the agreement to show patta transferred in the name of the vendor namely the first defendant and in fact, the first defendant had got patta on 10.09.2007 itself under Ex.B4. The appellant/plaintiff was not able to prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract within the time stipulated in the agreement. 11. For the contention of the appellant/plaintiff that he met the first defendant on 19.09.2007 and requested her to receive the balance amount of sale consideration and execute the sale deed and the first defendant replied that the same would be done on the return of the second defendant, who had gone to Thiruvarur, there is no other evidence excepting the interested testimony of P.W.1.Though the same has been stated in the noticed dated 25.09.2007, marked as Ex.B1 (a copy of which has also been marked as Ex.A2), it is pertinent to note that immediately after the expiry of the time stipulated in the agreement i.e., on 21.09.2007 itself, the defendants obtained two demand drafts for a total sum of Rs. 75,000/- and made arrangements to send a notice. In fact, a notice was sent on 24.09.2007 enclosing xerox copies of the said demand drafts showing that the defendants were prepared to refund the advance amount even though the agreement contained a clause for the forfeiture of the same. Only after coming to know that such a notice had been sent, the appellant/Plaintiff chose to issue a notice with the date 25.09.2007. For the said notice also, the first defendant issued a reply under Ex.A8. 12. Section 16-C of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 mandates that the plaintiff filing the suit for specific performance should plead and prove the ready-ness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract. Though a plea has been made, the same has not been proved by placing reliable evidence. Though P.W.1 would have stated that on 19.09.2007, he met the first defendant with the balance amount of sale consideration, he has not chosen to produce any document to show that he was having the amount with him on that day. The source from which he arranged the funds on 19.09.2007 has not been clearly spelt out. Though P.W.1 would have stated that on 19.09.2007, he met the first defendant with the balance amount of sale consideration, he has not chosen to produce any document to show that he was having the amount with him on that day. The source from which he arranged the funds on 19.09.2007 has not been clearly spelt out. The appellant/plaintiff has also failed to produce his bank pass-book or other documents to show that he had drawn the balance amount of sale consideration from the bank to be paid to the defendants on 19.09.2007. Failure to produce the bank pass-book or statement to show that he was having sufficient funds, coupled with the fact that the plaintiff has not chosen to deposit the balance amount of sale consideration when the suit was filed and the further fact that there is not even an averment in the plaint that the plaintiff was ready to deposit the balance amount of sale consideration as and when the Court would direct to do so, will make it clear that the appellant/Plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the obligations under the agreement for sale. 13. On the other hand, though the defendants could have taken a stand that they were entitled to avail the forfeiture clause, they had acted fairly in coming forward to offer refund of the advance amount by sending Ex.A5-notice. Ready-ness and willingness, as the terms appearing under Section 16-C of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, has got two components; the first one, the intention to perform and the other, the capacity to perform. Though it cannot be said that the appellant/Plaintiff had got the intention to perform, he has not proved his capacity to perform his obligations under the agreement, namely capacity to pay the balance amount of sale consideration within the time stipulated in the agreement for sale. If all these aspects are taken into consideration, this Court cannot come to any other conclusion than the one that the Courts below have not committed any error in holding that the appellant/plaintiff was not able to prove his ready-ness and willingness to perform his part of the obligations under the suit agreement for sale and that hence he was not entitled to the relief of specific performance as sought for in the plaint. It is pertinent to note that the appellant/plaintiff has not even chosen to seek the alternative relief of refund of the advance amount. Without such prayer, a decree for such a relief cannot be granted and the Courts below have not committed any mistake or error in not directing the refund of advance amount. No substantial question arises for consideration. There is no merit in the Second appeal and the same deserves to be dismissed at threshold. 14. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is dismissed.