JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dinesh Maheshwari, J.—After having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and having perused the material placed on record, we are satisfied that this writ petition not only remains entirely baseless, but is of rather an over adventurous attempt on the part of the petitioner. 2. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner, who was not a party to the principal litigation, seeks issuance of writ in the nature of mandamus to the effect that the concerned Secretary to the State Government should grant permission for filing Special Appeal against an order passed by the learned Single Judge on 3.12.2014. 3. The petitioner has prayed for the reliefs in the following terms : “It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to : (a) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing to concerned Secretary of State Government to grant permission for filing the Special Appeal by State Officers against the judgment and order dated 3.12.2014 passed by learned Single Judge. (b) Issue a writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. (c) Award the cost of writ petition in favour of the petitioner.” 4. Looking to the nature of relief claimed, when we expressed reservations in entertaining this petition and queried on the locus of the petitioner to seek such kind of a relief, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the basic order dated 4.10.1993 in Writ Petition No. 20320 of 1991 was obtained by the concerned persons while playing fraud; and the said order essentially operates to benefit certain persons, said to be working as teacher, at the cost of Public Exchequer when they are not even qualified to hold such a post and even the vacancies are not available with the institution concerned. 5. The record shows that the order dated 4.10.1993 as passed in Writ Petition No. 20320 of 1991 was initially sought to be questioned before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 582 of 1992 but then, the said S.L.P. was withdrawn on 21.4.1994 alongwith another S.L.P. of similar nature; and the S.L.P.s were dismissed as withdrawn by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is also borne out that the said order dated 4.10.1993 has already been implemented long back. 6. It is also borne out that the said order dated 4.10.1993 has already been implemented long back. 6. However, in the year 2007, litigation was taken up by the present petitioner against the beneficiaries of the said order dated 4.10.1993 by filing a writ petition (No. 25407 of 2007); and for the order passed therein, an inquiry was conducted by the Secretary, Secondary Education and report was submitted before the Court. The said writ petition was, however, ultimately dismissed by this Court on 29.3.2010 when it was placed for consideration alongwith another petition filed as Public Interest Litigation concerning the same subject-matter. While dismissing the present petitioner’s writ petition (No. 25407 of 2007), the Court observed that no independent cause of action was available to the petitioner. Counsel for the petitioner, however, informs that an application seeking recall of the order dated 29.3.2010 remains pending. 7. Be that as it may and without elaborating on various other litigations and orders passed by the Court, suffice it to notice for the present purpose that Public Interest Litigation (PIL) Petition No. 55475 of 2010 concerning the teachers/employees of the respondent-institution was ultimately dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 23.5.2011 while observing, inter alia, that when the order dated 4.10.1993 in Writ Petition No. 20320 of 1991 had become final after dismissal of S.L.P., the report, prepared by the Secretary was itself questionable as he could not prepare the report contrary to the directions issued by this Court in the writ petitions filed by the Committee of Management in the years 1991, 1992 and 1993. The said P.I.L. petition was dismissed by this Court with exemplary costs of Rs. 50,000/-. The said order dated 23.5.2011 was also taken to the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 24152 of 2011 but therein, the only prayer before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was for waiver of the amount of the cost which was granted. Thus, on merits, the order dated 23.5.2011 also attained finality and in the result, another attempt to have the matter reopened by way of P.I.L. also failed. 8. It appears, however, that in the year 2012, a review application bearing No. 62050 of 2012 with delay condonation application No. 62047 of 2012 was filed in this Court by the State, seeking review of the order dated 4.10.1993 passed in writ petition No. 20320 of 1991. 8. It appears, however, that in the year 2012, a review application bearing No. 62050 of 2012 with delay condonation application No. 62047 of 2012 was filed in this Court by the State, seeking review of the order dated 4.10.1993 passed in writ petition No. 20320 of 1991. It was suggested before the Court that in view of the other litigation, when old records were examined, several factual aspects, different than those placed earlier before the Court, came to the fore and hence, when the matter related to fraud, the order passed by this Court was required to be reviewed. A learned Single Judge of this Court, in his detailed order dated 3.12.2014, inter alia noticed the facts, as indicated hereinabove, and found no reason to condone the inordinate delay (of about 18 years) in filing the review application. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay was rejected and consequently, the review application was also rejected. 9. It appears that the petitioner, who had been privy to the initiation of different nature litigations in the year 2007 or so also, keenly came forward and attempted to join the litigation again and hence, filed a separate review application No. 238991 of 2011 with an application for leave to file review application bearing No. 238983 of 2011. The propositions, as suggested on behalf of the petitioner, were rejected by the learned Single Judge after consideration of all the relevant aspects of the record and after finding that no case for condonation of delay or maintaining of review application by the petitioner was made out. The learned Judge dismissed the said applications as being “absolutely misconceived” by a separate order dated 3.12.2014. 10. One would have expected that when the Court has pronounced on the attempt on his part as being misconceived and refused to entertain the matter at his instance, the petitioner would be discreet enough to desist from attempting such litigation which would be either of misconception or of unnecessary adventure. However, the petitioner appears to be carrying the ideas and propositions different and has, therefore, chosen to file the present writ petition. 11. However, the petitioner appears to be carrying the ideas and propositions different and has, therefore, chosen to file the present writ petition. 11. During the course of submissions, when we queried if the petitioner has filed any appeal against the order dated 3.12.2014, as passed in his review application No. 238991 of 2011, the learned counsel for the petitioner answered in the negative and submitted that therein, the Court has found that the review application was not maintainable at the instance of the petitioner and, therefore, he has not filed any appeal. However, the learned counsel has strenuously argued at length that the matter being of fraud on public exchequer, necessary orders deserve to be passed by this Court on his so called innocuous prayer for direction to the Secretary concerned for sanctioning filing of appeal as per the advice/opinion already given by its counsel. 12. We are afraid, the submissions do not even remotely make out a case for issuance of the writ as prayed for. 13. On the fundamental and first principles, it remains trite that as regards to any particular litigation, either the litigant therein or at the most an aggrieved person is to take a decision whether to question a particular order passed by a Court before the higher Forum, if available. In other words, the question as to whether an appeal be filed or not is to be considered only by a person who could be construed to be a person aggrieved and not by a third party. 14. The suggestions in the present writ petition are that the State Government must be directed to grant permission for filing a special appeal against the order passed in review application No. 62050 of 2012, meaning thereby that the Court should, at the instance of the petitioner, direct the State Government that it should consider itself to be aggrieved of the order passed by the learned Single Judge. In our view, the petitioner cannot be considered having any right or legal grievances in this regard and is not entitled to seek any such direction. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner also suggested before us that the said review petition was filed by the State by engaging Special Counsel, when the questionable position was noticed, which has bearing on Public Exchequer. In our view, this submission does not carry any meaning. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner also suggested before us that the said review petition was filed by the State by engaging Special Counsel, when the questionable position was noticed, which has bearing on Public Exchequer. In our view, this submission does not carry any meaning. Though we are not commenting on the merits of the order dated 3.12.2014 passed in review application No. 62050 of 2012 in this order, as the same is not the subject-matter in this writ petition, however, as to whether an appeal thereagainst is to be filed or not would absolutely be a matter for consideration of the State, a party to the litigation, who may or may not consider itself aggrieved. It is entirely explicable that it is sought to be suggested by way of this writ petition that the State Government must be directed to consider itself being aggrieved of the said order dated 3.12.2014. Such a proposition remains baseless and can only be rejected. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner during the course of submission even attempted to suggest that the earlier order dated 21.4.1994 came to be passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 582 of 1994 without the State putting forward its case on merits. We are afraid, this kind of suggestions by the petitioner before this Court appear to be beyond his permissible limits. The said order dated 21.4.1994 was passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court while recording the statements made on behalf of the parties and the special leave petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The petitioner is not even remotely entitled to suggest anything beyond what has been considered and pronounced upon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 17. In the totality of circumstances, we are satisfied that this is only an attempt on the part of the petitioner at persecution; and the petitioner appears to be interested in taking up the litigation without regard to the limits of his locus. 18. For what has been observed hereinabove and in the totality of circumstances, we are satisfied that the present one is an entirely frivolous, unnecessary and rather over-adventurous petition that deserves to be dismissed and the petitioner deserves to be saddled with exemplary costs. 18. For what has been observed hereinabove and in the totality of circumstances, we are satisfied that the present one is an entirely frivolous, unnecessary and rather over-adventurous petition that deserves to be dismissed and the petitioner deserves to be saddled with exemplary costs. We, therefore, put to the learned counsel for the petitioner that the exemplary costs are proposed to be imposed to which, the learned counsel submitted that the petitioner has taken up this litigation bona fide and is otherwise a poor person, who may not be saddled with costs. 19. For the facts, which we have noticed hereinabove, we are not satisfied with the submissions made in this regard by the counsel for the petitioner because it appears that the petitioner has taken up this litigation to somehow continue with his attempts at persecution despite orders to the other effect by the Courts. 20. In view of the above, we consider it appropriate to saddle the petitioner with costs quantified at Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand), to be deposited by the petitioner in the account of State Legal Authority at Allahabad within 30 days from the date of this order. If the petitioner fails to deposit this amount within 30 days, the District Magistrate, Allahabad shall take appropriate steps to recover this amount from the petitioner and to deposit it in the account of State Legal Authority at Allahabad. 21. The petition stands dismissed with costs and the requirements foregoing. ——————