JUDGMENT : Rule. Heard finally with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties. 2. The question that arises for consideration is whether the Divisional Joint Registrar entertaining an appeal under section 152 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (for short, the said Act) having dismissed the appeal in default has the jurisdiction and power to restore the same. 3. On the basis of an enquiry report submitted under section 83 of the said Act, the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies passed further orders under section 88 of the said Act. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 21-11-2011. Being aggrieved by aforesaid enquiry report, the petitioners filed an appeal under section 152 of the said Act before the Divisional Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies. It appears that on a few occasions, the appellants and their Counsel were not present before the Appellate Authority and hence on 17-4-2014 the Divisional Joint Registrar dismissed said appeal in default. The petitioners moved an application for restoration of the said appeal along with an application for condonation of delay. However, on 12-3-2015 the Divisional Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies held that as there was no provision for restoration of the proceedings, the same could not be restored. This order is under challenge in the present writ petition. 4. Shri D.V. Siras, learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Divisional Joint Registrar had necessary jurisdiction and the power to restore the appeal that was dismissed in default. It was submitted that the Divisional Joint Registrar having been conferred statutory power to entertain an appeal under section 152 of the said Act, said Authority by necessary implication had the power to make the grant of such statutory power effective. In absence of any bar in the said Act prohibiting the appellate Authority from restoring proceedings dismissed in default, it could not be said that there was no power to do so. The learned Counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Income Tax Officer, Cannanore vs. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi AIR 1969 SC 430 and judgment of learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in the case of Divisional Personnel Officer vs. Unnamalai decided on 19-2-2003. It was, therefore, submitted that the respondent No. 1 ought to be directed to reconsider the application for restoration. 5. Shri S.B. Ahirkar, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent Nos. It was, therefore, submitted that the respondent No. 1 ought to be directed to reconsider the application for restoration. 5. Shri S.B. Ahirkar, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 supported the impugned order. It was submitted that due to absence of the petitioners and their Counsel before the appellate Authority, the order dismissing the appeal for want of prosecution was justified. Shri A.R. Patil, learned Counsel for respondent No. 4, however, fairly stated that by applying general principles under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the appellate Authority would have the jurisdiction to entertain an application for restoration of the appeal. It was, however, submitted that the order dismissing the proceedings for want of prosecution was justified. He brought to the notice of the Court the judgment of the Supreme Court in Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi vs. L. H. Patel and another, 2009(3) Mh.L.J. (S.C.) 767, (2009) 2 SCC 81 wherein it was held that the power to proceed ex parte under Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957 carried with it the power to recall an ex parte order. He also referred to the judgment of the learned Single judge in Lokmanya Nagar Priyadarshini and ors. vs. State of Maharashtra and ors., 2007 MhLJ Online 1, 2007(1) BCR 929 and Savitri Chandrakesh Pal vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 2009(4) Mh.L.J. 406 in that regard. 6. I have given due consideration to the respective submissions and I have gone through the documents filed on record. Section 152 of the said Act confers jurisdiction on the Divisional Joint Registrar to entertain an appeal against an order or decision under sections stated therein. Section 152(3-A) of the said Act empowers the Appellate Authority to pass such interim orders as it deems fit to prevent the ends of justice being defeated. Rule 106 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961 prescribe the procedure for presentation and disposal of appeals under section 152 of the said Act. The manner in which an appeal has to be entertained and decided has been specified. 7. It is a settled principle that where a Tribunal or statutory appellate Authority that has been conferred with jurisdiction to decide proceedings under a statute, it is also clothed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purposes of doing justice between the parties. 7. It is a settled principle that where a Tribunal or statutory appellate Authority that has been conferred with jurisdiction to decide proceedings under a statute, it is also clothed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purposes of doing justice between the parties. The reliance placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners on the decision of the Supreme Court in Income Tax Officer (supra) in that regard is apposite. In para 4 thereof, it has been observed by the Supreme Court as under : "4..................................................................... It is a firmly established rule that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication to authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective (Sutherland Statutory Construction, Third Edition, Articles 5401 and 5402). The powers which have been conferred by section 254 on the Appellate Tribunal with widest possible amplitude must carry with them by necessary implication all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make the exercise of those powers fully effective. In Domat's Civil Law, Cushing's Edition, Vol. I at page 88, it has been stated : "It is the duty of the judges to apply the laws, not only to what appears to be regulated by their express dispositions but to all the cases where a just application of them may be made, and which appear to be comprehended either within the consequences that may be gathered from it." Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Eleventh Edition contains a statement at p. 350 that "where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution. Cui jurisdiction data est, ea quoqe concessa esse vindenture, since guibus jurisdiction explicari non potuit." An instance is given based on Ex Parte, Martin, (1879) 4 QBD 212 at p. 491 that "where an inferior Court is empowered to grant an injunction, the power of punishing disobedience to it by commitment is impliedy conveyed by the enactment, for the power would be useless if it could not be enforced." The judgment of the Supreme Court in Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi (supra) proceeds on aforesaid principle. 8. 8. Learned Single judge of the Madras High Court while considering the question as to whether the appellate Authority constituted under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 had the power to restore an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution held that the appellate Authority had necessary incidental powers to restore an appeal that had been dismissed for non-prosecution. The decision in Lokmanya Nagar Priyadarshani and others (supra) lays down certain parameters that are required to be followed by an Authority while considering a stay application in an appeal or revision. In Savitri Chandrakesh Pal (supra) similar procedural guidelines to be followed by quasi judicial authority have been laid down. 9. Thus, from the aforesaid it can be safely held that the appellate Authority entertaining an appeal under section 152 of the said Act has the necessary jurisdiction and power to restore an appeal that is dismissed for want of prosecution. Mere absence of any such statutory provision would not have the effect of preventing the appellate Authority from exercising such incidental powers with which it is inherently clothed. The impugned order, therefore, passed by respondent No. 1 refusing to restore the appeal that was dismissed in default is liable to be set aside. 10. In view of aforesaid discussion, the following order is passed: ORDER (a) Order dated 12-3-2015 passed by respondent No. 1 refusing to entertain the application for restoring the appeal that was dismissed in default is set aside. (b) The respondent No. 1 shall consider the application for restoration of the appeal along with the prayer for condonation of delay in accordance with law after giving due opportunity to all the parties. (c) Rule is made absolute in aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.