JUDGMENT : The petitioner, being aggrieved with the order dated 3.4.2006(Annexure-5) by which petitioner has been disengaged from duties with effect from 31.3.2006 in obedience to the order passed by the Hon’ble High Court in W.P.(C) No.11784 of 2003 and W.P.(C) No.14947 of 2004, has approached this Court. Brief facts of the case that the petitioner was engaged as Swechhasevi Sikhaya Sahayak by virtue of notice published in this regard having all eligibility conditions and accordingly joined the post on 24.4.2004 and has started working. The petitioner all of a sudden was disengaged from service vide order dated 3.4.2006 which was passed in pursuance of the order passed by this Hon’ble High Court in W.P.(C) No.11784 of 2003 and W.P.(C) No.14947 of 2004 and the petitioner immediately thereafter has approached this Court challenging the said order mainly the ground that before passing the order no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner. From the pleadings of the writ petition it appears that the petitioner was appointed as Swechhasevi Sikhya Sahayak on the basis of the advertisement issued by the competent authority in the year 2003 and started discharging her duties. The petitioner wad disengaged from service vide order dated 3.4.2006. The sole point which has been raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that before passing the order dated 3.4.2006 the petitioner has not been provided opportunity of hearing. Perused the order dated 3.4.2006 and from its perusal it is evident that the authority had not issued any show-cause regarding her engagement, rather an order of disengagement was passed on the basis of judgment rendered by this Court in the above writ petitions. Since the petitioner was appointed by virtue of an advertisement by following principles of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and following the procedure as laid down in the guideline of the scheme, she has started discharging her duty. Authority has got power to disengage after it came to notice that the petitioner’s engagement has been made contrary to the provisions of the rule/guideline but at least the petitioner is entitled to give opportunity of hearing which is the principle of natural justice but on perusal of the order dated 3.4.2006 no opportunity of being heard has been given to the petitioner. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the post of Swechhasevi Sikhya Sahayak is initially for a period of three years and thereafter after three years she was automatically engaged as Junior Teacher, but if she fulfils further six years service, she will be regularised as Primary Teacher. Considering the nature of appointment which is permanent in nature if she fulfils other eligibility conditions the service rendered along with other candidates, they will be adjusted in regular establishment but the moment a candidate is appointed as Swechhasevi Sikhya Sahayak civil right accrues to the concerned employee and main requirement of principle of natural justice is mandatory requirement. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Maneka Gandhi –vs-Union of India and another, reported in AIR 1978 S.C. 597 wherein it has been held at paragraphs 57,58 and 61 as follows: “57. The question immediately arises: does the procedure prescribed by the Passports Act, 1967 for impounding a Passport meet the test of this requirement? Is it 'right or fair or just'? The argument of the petitioner was that it is not, because it provides for impounding of a passport without affording reasonable opportunity to the holder of the passport to be heard in defence. To impound the passport of a person, said the petitioner, is a serious matter, since it prevents him from exercising his constitutional right to go abroad and such a drastic consequence cannot in fairness be visited without observing the principle of audi alteram partem. Any procedure which permits impairment of the constitutional right to go abroad without giving reasonable opportunity to show cause cannot but be condemned as unfair and unjust and hence, there is in the present case clear infringement of the requirement of Article 21, Now, it is true that there is no express provision in the Passports Act, 1967 which requires that the audi alteram parten rule should be followed before impounding a passport, but that is not conclusive of the question, if the statute makes itself clear on this point, then no more question arises. But even when the statute is silent, the law may in a given case make an implication and apply the principle stated by Byles, J., in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works. (1863) 14 C. B. N. S. 180: "A long course of decisions, beginning with Dr. But even when the statute is silent, the law may in a given case make an implication and apply the principle stated by Byles, J., in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works. (1863) 14 C. B. N. S. 180: "A long course of decisions, beginning with Dr. Bentley's case (1723) 1 Str 557 and ending with some very recent cases, establish that although there are no positive words in the statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature". The principle of audi alteram partem which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard, is part of the rules of natural justice. In fact, there are two main principles in which the rules of natural justice are manifested, namely, Nemo Judex in Sua Causa and audi alteram partem. We are not concerned here with the former since there is no case of bias urged here. The question is only in regard to the right of hearing, which involves the audi alteram partem rule. Can it be imported in the procedure for impounding a passport? 58. We may commence the discussion of this question with a few general observations to emphasis the increasing importance of natural justice in the field of administrative law. Natural justice is a great humanising principle intended to invest law with fairness and to secure justice and over the years it has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large areas of administrative action Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest spoke of this rule in eloquent terms in his address before the Bentham Club: "We can, I think, take pride in what has been done in recent periods and particularly in the field of administrative law by invoking and by applying these principles which we broadly classify under the designation of natural justice. Many testing problems as to their application yet remain to be solved. But I affirm that the area of administrative action is but one area in which the principles are to be deployed. Nor are they to be invoked only when procedural failures are shown. Does natural justice qualify to be described as a "majestic" conception? I believe it does. Is it just a rhetorical but vague phrase, which can be employed, when needed, to give a gloss of assurance? I believe that it is very much more. Nor are they to be invoked only when procedural failures are shown. Does natural justice qualify to be described as a "majestic" conception? I believe it does. Is it just a rhetorical but vague phrase, which can be employed, when needed, to give a gloss of assurance? I believe that it is very much more. If it can be summarised as being fair play in action -who could wish that it would ever be out of action? It denotes that the law is not only to be guided by reason and by logic but that its purpose will not be fulfilled: it lacks more exalted inspiration." (Current Legal Problems, 1973, Vol. 26, p. 16). And then again, in his speech in the House of Lords in Wiseman v. Borneman 1971 AC 297 the learned Law Lord said in words of inspired felicity: "that the conception of natural justice should at all stages guide those who discharge judicial functions is not merely an acceptable but is an essential part of the philosophy of the law. We often speak of the rules of natural justice. But there is nothing rigid or mechanical about them. What they comprehend has been analysed and described in many authorities. But any analysis must bring into relief rather their spirit and their inspiration than any precision of definition or precision as to application. We do not search for prescriptions which will lay down exactly what must, in various divergent situations, be done. The principles and procedures are to be applied which, in any particular situation or set of circumstances, are right and just and fair. Natural justice, it has been said, is only "fair play in action." Nor do we wait for directions from Parliament. The common law has abundant riches: there may we find what Byles, J., called "the justice of the common law."' Thus, the soul of natural justice is 'fair play in action' and that is why it has received the widest recognition throughout the democratic world. In the United States, the right to an administrative hearing is regarded as essential requirement of fundamental fairness. And in England too it has been held that 'fair play in action' demands that before any prejudicial or adverse action is taken against a person, he must be given an opportunity to be heard. In the United States, the right to an administrative hearing is regarded as essential requirement of fundamental fairness. And in England too it has been held that 'fair play in action' demands that before any prejudicial or adverse action is taken against a person, he must be given an opportunity to be heard. The rule was stated by Lord Denning, M. R. in these terms in Schmidt v. Secy. of State for Home Affairs:-(1969) 2 Ch. D. 149 "Where a public officer has power to deprive a Person of his liberty or his property, the general principle is that it has not to be done without his being given an opportunity of being heard and of making representations on his own behalf." The same rule also prevails in other Commonwealth countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It has even gained access to the United Nations. Vide American Journal of International Law, Vol. 67, page 479, Magarry, J., describes natural justice "as a distillate of due process of law." Vide Fontaine v. Chastarton (1968) 112 Sol Gen 690. It is the quintessence of the process of justice inspire and guided by 'fair play in action.' If we look at the speeches of the various Law Lords in Wiseman's case, it will be seen that each one of them asked the question "whether in the particular circumstances of the case, the Tribunal acted unfairly so that it could be said that their procedure did not match with what justice demanded.," or, was the procedure adopted by the Tribunal 'in all the circumstances unfair'? The test adopted by every Law Lord was whether the procedure followed was "fair in all the circumstances" and 'fair play in action' required that an opportunity should be given to the tax payer "to see and reply to the counter-statement of the Commissioners" before reaching the conclusion that "there is a prima facie case against him. “The inquiry must, therefore, always be: does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person affected? 61. “The inquiry must, therefore, always be: does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person affected? 61. This Court speaking through Hedge, J., in A. K. Kraipak's case ( AIR 1970 SC 150 ), quoted with approval the above passage from the judgment of Lord Parker, C. J., and proceeded to add: (at p. 156 of AIR) "The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it........... Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Oftentimes it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries, which were considered administrative at one time, are now being considered as quasi-judicial in Character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. The University of Kerala (1969) 1 SCR 317 : ( AIR 1969 SC 198 ) the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of the case." This view was reiterated and re-affirmed in a subsequent decision of this Court in D. F. O. South Kheri v. Ram Sanehi Singh: (1971) 3 SCC 864 : ( AIR 1973 SC 205 ). The law must, therefore, now be taken to be well settled that even in an administrative proceeding, which involves civil consequences, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable.” In the case of Biecco Lawrie Limited and another –vs- State of West Bengal and another, reported in (2009)10 SCC 32 at 18 it has been held as follows: “Principle of natural justice is attracted whenever a person suffers a civil consequence or a prejudice is caused to him by an administrative action. In other words principle of natural justice is attracted where there is some right which is likely to be affected by any act of the administration including a legitimate expectation. (See : Ashoka Smokeless Coal India (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., [ (2007) 2 SCC 640 ] The procedure to be followed is not a matter of secondary importance and in the broadest sense natural justice simply indicates the sense of what is right and wrong (Voinet v. Barrett (1885) 55 LJQB 39) and even in its technical sense it is now often equated with fairness. As a well-defined concept, it comprises of two fundamental rules of fair procedure that-a man may not be a judge in his own cause (nemo judex in re sua) and that a man's defence must always be fairly heard. On perusal of the ratio laid down in the case referred to above, the requirement of natural justice is mandatory requirement. As a well-defined concept, it comprises of two fundamental rules of fair procedure that-a man may not be a judge in his own cause (nemo judex in re sua) and that a man's defence must always be fairly heard. On perusal of the ratio laid down in the case referred to above, the requirement of natural justice is mandatory requirement. From perusal of the order impugned dated 3.4.2006 the petitioner has not been given opportunity of being heard, hence the order dated 3.4.2006 is not sustainable in the eye of law and the same is hereby quashed. The matter is remitted before the authority to take a decision after providing opportunity of hearing to the petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of presentation of certified copy of this order. It is made clear that this Court has not exercised its mind regarding merit of claim of the petitioner. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of.