JUDGMENT : B.R. Gavai, J. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed on 18/19th of August, 2006 by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 85 of 1996, thereby dismissing the writ petition filed by the present appellants, upholding the order passed by the learned Member of the Industrial Court, dated 13th of December, 1995 in Complaint (ULPN) No. 1045 of 1991, the appellants have approached this Court. 2. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present Letters Patent Appeal are as under : Respondent No. 1 - Union herein filed a complaint alleging indulgence into unfair labour practice as contemplated under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1971'). The said complaint was purported to be filed by complainant respondent No. 1/Union for the benefits of alleged employees of the appellants, who were alleged to be the members of the said complainant-Union. It was the contention of complainant that the establishment of the appellants was an engineering industry and therefore its employees were entitled to receive minimum wages as fixed for engineering industry under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. It was contention of the respondent No. 1 complainant that the appellants were manufacturing steel bushes in the establishment, which are required for construction of the bridges, and that the members of respondent No. 1 were engaged in the said work. The complainant also prayed for issuance of attendance-cum-wage Card. 3. The claim of the complainant was resisted by the appellants by filing written statement. The appellants specifically denied that the members of the respondent No. 1 were its employees. It was the case of the appellants that the appellant No. 2 at Bombay undertook the job of bridge construction, etc. wherever the services are requisitioned. It was the specific case of the appellants that the plot at Nagpur is only a stock yard and no industrial activity of any sort was taking place there and only the work of loading and unloading was undertaken. The very existence of relationship of employer - employee between the parties was disputed. 4. wherever the services are requisitioned. It was the specific case of the appellants that the plot at Nagpur is only a stock yard and no industrial activity of any sort was taking place there and only the work of loading and unloading was undertaken. The very existence of relationship of employer - employee between the parties was disputed. 4. It is also pertinent to note that prior to filing the complaint, employees in their individual capacity had jointly filed an application under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vide IDA No. 338 of 1990. In the said proceedings, they had prayed for difference of wages, as mentioned by them in the schedule, along with interest at the rate of 18%. The said application was resisted by the present appellants by filing written statement. A specific stand was taken by them that they were having a stock yard at Nagpur and no manufacturing or commercial activity was taking place there. A specific stand was also taken that only work of loading and unloading was being done at the stock yard and that too through a contractor. They specifically denied that the said employees were their employees and prayed for dismissal of the proceedings. However, it appears that during the pendency of the said application, a complaint, which is subject-matter of the present appeal, came to be filed by respondent No. 1 and as such the employees did not press that application. 5. It further appears that during the pendency of main complaint, respondent No. 1 had also filed an application under section 30(2) of the Act of 1971. It further appears that in the said application the learned Industrial Court had appointed an Investigating Officer to investigate in the matter. The Investigating Officer investigated the establishment of the appellants on 23rd of April, 1992 and submitted his report. In his report he specifically mentioned that the work of loading and unloading, stacking, work of correspondence and implementation of orders received from the Head Officer is carried out at Nagpur. The Investigating Officer further observed in the report that the work of loading and unloading or stacking or maintaining the records is got done through Contractor's labourers. He further reported that seven workers, for whose benefit complaint was filed, were reported to be the employees of one Ashadeep Udyogh Agency. 6. The Investigating Officer further observed in the report that the work of loading and unloading or stacking or maintaining the records is got done through Contractor's labourers. He further reported that seven workers, for whose benefit complaint was filed, were reported to be the employees of one Ashadeep Udyogh Agency. 6. In view of rival pleadings, the learned Tribunal framed four issues, including the following issue as Issue No. 3. "3. Does the complainant prove that the workers on whose behalf the complaint is filed are the workers of respondents ?" The complainant - Union examined on its behalf witness No. 1 Shri Rajendra Gangotri, who claims to be the Vice President of the complainant - Union and witness No. 2 Shri Manoj Jambhulkar, one of the workers on whose behalf the complaint was filed. The appellants examined on their behalf witness No. 1 Vilas Bakhale, Works Manager and witness No. 2 Dilip Sachdeo, Labour Contractor. At the conclusion of the trial, the learned Industrial Court came to a finding that the work of manufacturing steel bushes was going on in the establishment of the appellants. The learned Tribunal also came to a finding that the work of manufacturing was going on in the establishment of the appellants and that the workers on whose behalf the complaint is filed are the workers of the respondent No. 1. The learned Industrial Court therefore allowed the complaint and directed to pay the wages as per Minimum Wages Act to the workers who were represented by the complainant. The learned Industrial Court also directed the appellants to issue the attendance-cum-wage cards to the said workers. 7. Being aggrieved thereby, a Writ Petition came to be filed by the appellants before this Court. The learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 18/19th of August, 2006 dismissed the said petition. Being aggrieved thereby, the present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed. 8. We have heard Shri S.P. Dharmadhikari, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants and Shri R.S. Charpe, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 - Union. 9. Shri Dharmadhikari, the learned Senior Counsel, submits that the learned Tribunal while exercising jurisdiction under section 30 of the Act of 1971 exercises a very limited jurisdiction. 8. We have heard Shri S.P. Dharmadhikari, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants and Shri R.S. Charpe, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 - Union. 9. Shri Dharmadhikari, the learned Senior Counsel, submits that the learned Tribunal while exercising jurisdiction under section 30 of the Act of 1971 exercises a very limited jurisdiction. He submits that once a issue as to whether there exists an employer - employee relationship arose, the learned Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain a complaint under section 30 of the Act of 1971. He submits that only in the event of relationship being admitted, the learned Tribunal could not have entertained the complaint under section 30 of the Act of 1971. The learned Senior Counsel further submits that in any case when an elaborate consideration on the basis of the evidence recorded is required to be undergone to establish whether an employer - employee relationship exists or not, such an exercise would not be permissible while exercising jurisdiction under section 30 of the Act of 1971. The learned Senior Counsel further submits that the perusal of the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Industrial Court reveals that both, learned Single Judge as well as learned Industrial Court, had done an elaborate exercise of scrutinizing the evidence to come to a conclusion that there exists employer - employee relationship between the appellants and the members of respondent No. 1. Shri Dharmadhikari, learned Senior Counsel, relies on the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Cipla Ltd. vs. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union, reported in (2001)2 SCC 381 and Sarva Shramik Sangh vs. Indian Smelting and Refining Co. Ltd. and ors., reported in 2003 AIR SCW 5989. 10. Per contra, Shri Charpe, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, in support of his case, has relied upon the following case laws. 1. AIR 2001 SC 1534 , Vividh Kamgar vs. Kalyani Steels. 2. General Labour Union (Reg flat), Bombay vs. Ahmadbad Mfg. and Calico Printing Co. Ltd., reported in (1995)2 Lab IC 765. 3. Krantikari Suraksha Rakshak Sangathana vs. S.V. Naik, reported in 19931 CLR 1003. 4. AIR 2001 SC 1165 , Cipla Ltd. vs. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union. 5. 2006 II CLR 815, ICICI Bank Ltd. vs. Narendra Parmar 6. 2005 (1) Bom C.R. 759 Quadricon Pvt. Ltd. and ors. and Calico Printing Co. Ltd., reported in (1995)2 Lab IC 765. 3. Krantikari Suraksha Rakshak Sangathana vs. S.V. Naik, reported in 19931 CLR 1003. 4. AIR 2001 SC 1165 , Cipla Ltd. vs. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union. 5. 2006 II CLR 815, ICICI Bank Ltd. vs. Narendra Parmar 6. 2005 (1) Bom C.R. 759 Quadricon Pvt. Ltd. and ors. vs. Maxi D'Souza and others Bom H.C. 7. 2002(1) Mh.L.J. 559 , Hindustan Coca Cola Bottling Pvt. Ltd. vs. Bhartiya Kamgar Sena. 8. 2003(4) Mh.L.J. 619 , Nagraj Gowda vs. Tata Hydro. 9. 2004(3) Mh.L.J. 142 = 2004EQ (Bom)-0453, Akhil Bhartiya Shramik Kamgar Union vs. Buildtech Construction 10. 2007(4) Mh.L.J. 97, Janprabha Offset Works vs. Sarva Shramik Sangha. 11. Writ Petition No. 112 of 2008 (Late Yeshodabai Gudadhe Shikshan Sanstha vs. Sau. Prabhabai Milmile, decided on 11-2-2008. 12. 2011(2) Mh.L.J. 167, Indo European Breweries vs. Dnyaneshwar. The learned counsel submits that if only in order to deprive the employees, the employer takes a vague stand that the employees are not his employees, then that cannot be a sole ground to not sue the employees in the complaint under section 30 of the Act of 1971. The learned counsel submits that, the learned Industrial Court as well as the learned Single Judge have rightly found that the employees of the complainant - Union were in fact the employees of the appellants and as such the learned Industrial Court has rightly allowed the complaint and the learned Single Judge has dismissed the petition. The learned counsel submits that in any case in view of concurrent findings of fact as recorded by the learned Industrial Court and the learned Single Judge, no interference is warranted in the present appeal. 11. For appreciating the rival controversies, it will be appropriate to refer to the following observations of Their Lordships of the Apex Court in the case of Sarva Shramik Sangh vs. M/s Indian Smelting and Refining Co. Ltd. and ors. (supra), wherein the Lordships have considered all earlier pronouncements while considering the scope of section 30 of the Act of 1971. It will be relevant to refer the following observations of the Apex Court, which read thus : "12. In view of the rival submissions it would be appropriate to take note of the conclusions arrived at by this Court earlier. First at point of time is the General Labour Union's case (supra). It will be relevant to refer the following observations of the Apex Court, which read thus : "12. In view of the rival submissions it would be appropriate to take note of the conclusions arrived at by this Court earlier. First at point of time is the General Labour Union's case (supra). This Court, inter alia, observed as follows – "The workmen have first to establish that they are the workmen of the respondent - company before they can file any complaint under the Act. Admittedly, this has not been done. It is open for the workmen to raise an appropriate industrial dispute in that behalf if they are entitled to do so before they resort to the provisions of the present Act." 13. In V. Kamgar's case (supra) it was, inter alia, observed as follows : "At this stage it must be mentioned that this court has also in the case of General Labour Union (Red Flag) Bombay vs. Ahmedabad Mfg. and Calico Printing Co. Ltd. held that where the workmen have not been accepted by the company to be its employees then no complaint would lie under the MRTU and PULP Act. We are in full agreement wit the above mentioned view." The provisions of the MRTU and PULP Act can only be enforced by persons who admittedly are workmen. If there is dispute as to whether the employees are employees of the company, then that dispute must first be got resolved by raising a dispute before the appropriate forum. It is only after the status as a workmen is established in an appropriate forum that a complaint could be made under the provisions of the MRTU and PULP Act. 14. Then comes the last of the cases i.e. CIPLA's case (supra) where detailed analysis have been made of the legal position. In paras 8, 9 and 10, it was observed as under : "8. But one thing is clear - If the employees are working under a contract covered by the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act then it is clear that the Labour Court or the Industrial Adjudicating Authorities cannot have any jurisdiction to deal with the matter as it falls within the province of an appropriate Government to abolish the same. But one thing is clear - If the employees are working under a contract covered by the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act then it is clear that the Labour Court or the Industrial Adjudicating Authorities cannot have any jurisdiction to deal with the matter as it falls within the province of an appropriate Government to abolish the same. If the case put forth by the workmen is that they have been directly employed by the appellant company but the contract itself is a camouflage and, therefore, needs to be adjudicated is a matter which can be gone into by appropriate Industrial or Labour Court. Such question cannot be examined by the Labour Court or the Industrial Court constituted under the Act. The object of the enactment is, amongst other aspects, enforcing provisions relating to unfair labour practices. If that is so, unless it is undisputed or indisputable that there is employer-employee relationship between the parties, the question of unfair practice cannot be inquired into at all. The respondent-union came to the Labour Court with a complaint that the workmen are engaged by the appellant through the contractor and though that is ostensible relationship the true relationship is one of the master and servant between the appellant and the workmen in question. By this process, workmen repudiated their relationship with the contractor under whom they are employed but claimed relationship of an employee under the appellant. That exercise of repudiation of the contract with one and establishment of a legal relationship with another can be done only in a regular Industrial Tribunal/Court under the I.D. Act. 9. Shri K.K. Singhvi, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent, submitted that under section 32 of the Act the Labour Court has the power to "decide all matters arising out of any application or complaint referred to it for decision under any of the provisions of the Act." Section 32 would not enlarge the jurisdiction of the Court beyond what is conferred upon it by other provisions of the Act. If under other provisions of the Act the Industrial or the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to deal with a particular aspect of the matter, section 32 does not give such power to it. If under other provisions of the Act the Industrial or the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to deal with a particular aspect of the matter, section 32 does not give such power to it. In the cases at hand before us, whether the workman can be stated to be the workman of the appellant establishment or not, it must be held that the contract between the appellant and the second respondent is a camouflage or bogus and upon such a decision it can be held that the workman in question is an employee of the appellant establishment. That exercise, we are afraid, would not fall within the scope of either section 28 or section 7 of the Act. In cases of this nature whether the provisions of the Act are summary in nature and give drastic remedies to the parties concerned elaborate consideration of the question as to relationship of employer-employee cannot be gone into. If at any time the employee concerned was indisputably an employee of the establishment and subsequently it is so disputed, such a question is an incidental question arising under section 32 of the Act. Even the case pleaded by the respondent-Union itself is that the appellant establishment had never recognized the workmen mentioned in Exhibit 'A' as its employee and throughout treated these persons as the employees of the second respondent. If that dispute existed throughout, we think, the Labour Court or the Industrial Court under the Act is not the appropriate Court to decide such question, as held by this Court in General Labour Union (Red Flag) vs. Ahmedabad Mfg. and Calico Printing Co. Ltd., 1995 Supp(1) SCC 175, which view was reiterated by us in Vividh Kamgar Sabha vs. Kalyani Steels Ltd., 2001(2) SCC 381 . 10. and Calico Printing Co. Ltd., 1995 Supp(1) SCC 175, which view was reiterated by us in Vividh Kamgar Sabha vs. Kalyani Steels Ltd., 2001(2) SCC 381 . 10. However, Shri Singhvi very strenuously contended, by adverting to the scope of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and the scope of section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, that these questions can be gone into by the Courts and, in this context, he relied upon the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Vishwanath Tukaram vs. G. M. Central Rly., V.T. In determining whether the wages had been appropriately paid or not, the authority under the Payment of Wages Act was held to have jurisdiction to decide the incidental question of whether the applicant was in the employment of the railway administration during the relevant period. It means that at one time or the other the employee concerned was indisputably in employment and later on he was found to be not so employed and in those circumstances, the Court stated that it was an incidental question to be considered." 12. It could thus be seen that the Apex Court in clear terms has held that the provisions of the Act of 1971 can only be enforced by persons who admittedly are workmen. It has further been held that when there is a dispute as to whether the employees are employees of the employer or not, that dispute must first be got resolved by raising a dispute before the appropriate forum. It has further been held that, it is only after the status as a workmen is established in an appropriate forum that a complaint could be made under the provisions of the Act of 1971. It could further be seen that the Apex Court has clearly held that if the case put forth by the workmen is that they have been directly employed by the appellant company but the contract itself is a camouflage and needs to be adjudicated, then such a matter can be gone into only by appropriate Industrial or Labour Court. Such question cannot be examined by the Labour Court or the Industrial Court constituted under the Act of 1971. The Apex Court goes on to hold that, unless it is undisputed or indisputable that there is employer-employee relationship between the parties, the question of unfair practice cannot be inquired into at all. Such question cannot be examined by the Labour Court or the Industrial Court constituted under the Act of 1971. The Apex Court goes on to hold that, unless it is undisputed or indisputable that there is employer-employee relationship between the parties, the question of unfair practice cannot be inquired into at all. It could further be seen that in the case of Cipla Ltd. (cited supra), a contention was sought to be raised that under section 32 of the Act of 1971, the Labour Court has the power to decide all the matters arising out of any application or complaint referred to it for decision under any of the provisions of the Act and as such the question with regard to employer-employee relationship can also be gone into by the Court while exercising the jurisdiction under the Act of 1971. However, said contention has been specifically rejected by the Lordships of the Apex Court. 13. It will also be relevant to refer to the following observations made by Their Lordship in paragraph No. 15 of the said judgment, which reads thus- "For getting protection under the Maharashtra Act, it has first to be established that the complainant is an employee of a person under whom he claims to be an employee, and against whom he files a complaint. In other words, the determinative question is can anybody who is not an 'employee' of or under a person against whom a grievance is sought to be made file a complaint under the Act and the answer is inevitably 'No'. The fundamental issue therefore is whether the complainant is an employee of the person against whom a complaint is made under the Maharashtra Act and if there is a dispute, he has to establish it, first before the appropriate forum designated for adjudication of such industrial disputes. Section 32 does not aid the appellant in the sense that it is not a matter arising out of the application, when the preexisting relationship of employer-employee is a must and an essential prerequisite. It is the core issue on which only the very locus to make a complaint can at all be claimed. A person who does not answer the description has no legal locus to file a complaint. It is the core issue on which only the very locus to make a complaint can at all be claimed. A person who does not answer the description has no legal locus to file a complaint. A jurisdictional fact is one on the existence or otherwise of which depends assumption or refusal to assume jurisdiction by a Court, tribunal or the authority. Said fact has to be established and its existence proved before a Court under the Maharashtra Act can assume jurisdiction of a particular case." 14. It will also be relevant to refer the following observations made by Their Lordships in paragraph No. 20 of the said judgment, which reads thus : "We have carefully gone through the construction placed upon the statutory provisions noticed and conclusions drawn as to the class or category of matters which only would fall within the purview of the Maharashtra Act and the necessity for any complainant to answer the description, as a condition precedent, to be or having been treated by the employer as his 'employee' and the relationship of employee and employer with the employer against whom any such complaint of unfair labour practice is made and relief therefore is sought is beyond controversy and common case or accepted position and we are in respectful agreement with the same. The interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Maharashtra Act appears to be in tune with the legal sense of the words construed in the context of the statue and the jurisdiction of the authorities constituted thereunder. Such a construction paves way for avoiding uncertainty as well as possible inconsistency or expression of contradictory view when more than one group chose to avail different forums for similar kind of relief and therefore could not be said to have resulted in serious injustice, hardship or anomaly to warrant the countenance of a different view. A careful, critical and analytical scrutiny of the various provisions which consciously and conspicuously use the words 'employee' and 'employer' in all the relevant provisions would postulate the preexisting relationship of such employee and employer being an accepted/acceptable fact. Consequently, the question of outing the jurisdiction of an assumed and unfound jurisdiction to be otherwise existing, does not at all arise." 15. Consequently, the question of outing the jurisdiction of an assumed and unfound jurisdiction to be otherwise existing, does not at all arise." 15. It could thus be seen that the Apex Court in the case of Sarva Shramik Sangh (supra) goes on to hold that an existence of employer-employee relationship is a jurisdictional fact upon which the question regarding tenability or otherwise of the complaint under section 30 of the Act of 1971 would depend. The Apex Court held that a careful, critical and analytical scrutiny of the various provisions which consciously and conspicuously use the words 'employee' and 'employer' in all the relevant provisions would postulate the preexisting relationship of such employee and employer being an accepted/acceptable fact. 16. In the light of this clear pronouncement of law by Their Lordships of the Apex Court, we will have to examine as to whether the present complaint filed by the complainant was tenable or not. It could be seen that though in the complaint it was alleged by the complainant that the employees on whose behalf the complaint was filed were the employees of the appellants, the said fact is specifically denied by the appellants in the written statement. In paragraph 4, the appellant has specifically denied that it was carrying out any manufacturing activities in Nagpur. It is specifically averred that only activity carried out in Nagpur was work of loading and unloading. The appellants have specifically stated thus – "There exists no relationship of master and servant in between the parties giving rise to an industrial dispute and on this count also the present application is liable to be rejected." 17. It could thus be seen that in view of these rival pleadings, the learned Labour Court has specifically framed the issue with regard to complainant's proving as to whether the workers on whose behalf the complaint was filed, were the workers of respondents or not. It could thus be seen that the learned Industrial Court itself was oblivious of the fact that there existed a serious dispute as to whether there is an employer - employee relationship or not and as such framed the said issue. 18. It could thus be seen that the learned Industrial Court itself was oblivious of the fact that there existed a serious dispute as to whether there is an employer - employee relationship or not and as such framed the said issue. 18. By elaborately discussing the evidence led on behalf of both the parties in paragraph No. 32 of the judgment, the learned Industrial Court observed thus : "This also lead me to draw an inference that these workers on whose behalf the complaint is filed are the workers of respondents and they cannot in any case, but the workers of respondents and they cannot in any case, be the workers of contractor. This inference drawn by me is supported by the payment and attendance registers produced by the contractor Shri Sachdeo as per Exh.238 to 240." 19. The learned Industrial Court thereafter further considering the evidence on record and disbelieving the evidence on behalf of the witness of the appellants that the employees were not the employees of the appellants or the contractors, goes on to hold as under- "I, therefore, find that though these registers are submitted by the contractor Shri Sachdeo claiming to be his registers in respect of his labourers who are employed for loading and unloading, these registers are of the respondents and the workers noted therein are also of the respondents and not of the contractor Shri Sachdeo. I accordingly believe the claim of the complainant union and held that these workers 7 in number as noted in the list Exh.15 are the workers of respondents." 20. It could thus clearly be seen that the learned Industrial Court has gone into the exercise of considering the entire evidence to come to a finding as to whether there existed an employers-employee relationship between the appellants and the members of the complainant - Union. With due respect, the said exercise is not permissible while entertaining the complaint under section 30 of the Act of 1971, as has been held by Their Lordships of the Apex Court. 21. The perusal of the judgment of the learned Single Judge would reveal that the learned Single Judge has examined from the aspect, as to whether the findings as recorded by the learned Single Judge on the basis of evidence recorded before it were perverse or not. 21. The perusal of the judgment of the learned Single Judge would reveal that the learned Single Judge has examined from the aspect, as to whether the findings as recorded by the learned Single Judge on the basis of evidence recorded before it were perverse or not. It will be relevant to refer to paragraph No. 12 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, as follow – "12. These findings reached by the learned Member, Industrial Court are on the basis of evidence, which is available on record. I perused the entire evidence with the assistance of both the learned counsel and I find that the findings are not in any way perverse. The stand of the petitioners - employer that employees are engaged in loading and unloading work is therefore, apparently incorrect and the conclusion drawn by the Industrial Court in this respect, is therefore, justified. 22. It could thus be seen that the learned Single Judge finds that the findings as recorded by the learned Industrial Court was on the basis of evidence available on record and there was no perversity in it. The learned Single Judge goes on to observe that stand of the present appellants that the employees were engaged for loading and unloading work was therefore incorrect and the conclusion drawn by the Industrial Court justified. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of the learned Single Judge in paragraph No. 14. "Had the petitioners proved that the employees were performing the work of loading and unloading, the question whether the Industrial Court possessed the jurisdiction in adjudicate upon disputed question of employer and employee relationship; would have arise. However, as it apparent the petitioners-employer have failed to prove that the employees were doing the work, which was allotted by them to a Contractor, such question does not fall for consideration at all." 23. It could thus be seen that the learned Single Judge held that the onus was on the appellants to establish that the employees were performing the work of loading and unloading and then only the question as to whether the Industrial Court possesses the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon disputed question of employer and employee relationship would have arisen. It could thus be seen that the learned Single Judge held that the onus was on the appellants to establish that the employees were performing the work of loading and unloading and then only the question as to whether the Industrial Court possesses the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon disputed question of employer and employee relationship would have arisen. The learned Single Judge held that since the appellants have failed to prove that the employees were doing the work which is allotted to them by the Contractor, such a question did not fall for consideration. The learned Single Judge, therefore, held that the findings of the learned Industrial Court are not perverse. The learned Single Judge further observed that the judgments which are cited by the petitioner in that respect are, therefore, not relevant. With great respect, we find that the learned Single Judge has, therefore, also re-appreciated the evidence to decide the question as to whether there existed an employer - employee relationship or not. In our respectful view, such an enquiry could not have been embarked upon in the proceeding under section 30 of the Act of 1971. 24. That leaves us with the question with regard to various judgments cited at the bar by Shri Charpe, learned counsel for respondent No. 1. Insofar as the judgment in the case of Vividh Kamgar Sabha vs. Kalyani Steels Ltd., reported in AIR 2001 SC 1534 . The said judgment instead of supporting the case of respondent No. 1/complainant would rather support the case of the appellants. Same is a case with the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of General Labour Union (red flag) Bombay vs. Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co. Ltd. (Calico Mills), Ahmedabad, reported in 1995 SCC Supp. (1) 175. Even the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Krantikari Suraksha Rakshak Sanghatana vs. S.V. Naik, reported in 1993 (2) LLJ 1145 would be of no assistance to the case of the complainant. 25. The Judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Quadricon Pvt. Ltd. vs. Maxi D'Souza, reported in BCR 2005 (1) 759, relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Cipla Ltd. (supra), also holds that if there is any dispute with regard to employer - employee relationship, the complaint under section 30 of the Act of 1971 would not be tenable. We fail to understand as to how the said judgment would take further the case of complainant. 26. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the learned Industrial Court as well as the learned Single Judge have erred in going into the question as to whether the employees, who were represented by the complainant, were in fact the employees of the appellants or not. At the costs of repetition we find that such an enquiry was not permissible in a complaint under section 30 of the Act of 1971. 27. In that view of the matter, we allow the appeal and pass the following order. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the learned Industrial Court in Complaint (ULPA) No. 1045 of 1991, dated 12/13th of December, 1995 and the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 85 of 1996 dated 18/19th of August, 2006 are quashed and set aside. The complaint of respondents herein is dismissed. However, though the members of the respondent/Association were workers of contractors, since they had, even in that capacity, worked on the establishment of the appellants for a considerable period, we had requested Mr. S.P. Dharmadhikari, learned Senior Counsel to seek instructions as to whether on humanitarian grounds, some amount should be paid to the said workmen. Mr. S.P. Dharmadhikari, learned Senior Counsel, on instructions from Mr. Mohd. Jabir, Factory Manager of the appellants states that the appellants undertake to pay an amount of Rs. 3.5 lakhs to each of the six workmen and that the said amount would be paid within a period of two weeks from today.