JUDGMENT Hon’ble Harsh Kumar, J.—Supplementary-affidavit filed by applicant with averment that she has not filed any other petition/application containing same prayer either in the Allahabad High Court or in its Bench at Lucknow prior to filing of instant petition/application, be taken on record. 2. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and CBI and perused the record. 3. This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed with the prayer that “an order to the effect that the applicant be treated on bail throughout the conclusion of trial in Special Case No. 16 of 2012 CBI v. Dr. A.K. Shukla and others, pending in the Court of Special Judge (Anti Corruption), Ghaziabad, may be passed as she has been enlarged on bail by this Hon’ble Court at Allahabad vide order dated 12.2.2013 in Bail Application No. 3905 of 2013, Dr. Sumedha Yadav v. State of U.P. and another”. 4. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant was not named in the F.I.R. filed as Case Crime No. 115 of 2011, under Sections 409, 419, 420, 467, 471, 474 and 120-B IPC at P.S. Wazirganj, District Lucknow of which investigation was transferred to CBI vide order dated 27.7.2011 of this Court in Writ Petition No. 3659 (MB) of 2011 and was registered as RC No. 2172011A0010 by P.S. CBI/ACU-VI, New Delhi under Section 120-B read with Sections 409, 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC and Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act; that upon investigation, charge-sheet, Annexure-2 was filed by CBI on 7.9.2012 against several persons, including the applicant, as accused No. 8, stating that the applicant has committed offences punishable under Section 120-B read with 420 IPC and Section 13 (2) read with 13(1) (d) of P.C. Act by verifying 11 bills worth Rs. 2,20,435/-; that subsequently vide notification dated 28.8.2012 of State Government, charge-sheet was transferred for trial to Special Judge (Anti Corruption), CBI, Ghaziabad and registered as Special Case No. 16 of 2012, CBI v. Dr. A.K. Shukla and others; that the applicant was granted bail by this Court vide order dated 12.2.2013, Annexure-6; that co-accused Dr. Chandrajeet Yadav was also granted bail by this Court, but after framing charges he was taken in custody by Special Judge (Anti Corruption), CBI, Lucknow vide order dated 17.3.2015, Annexure-8; that at the time of taking Dr. A.K. Shukla and others; that the applicant was granted bail by this Court vide order dated 12.2.2013, Annexure-6; that co-accused Dr. Chandrajeet Yadav was also granted bail by this Court, but after framing charges he was taken in custody by Special Judge (Anti Corruption), CBI, Lucknow vide order dated 17.3.2015, Annexure-8; that at the time of taking Dr. Chandrajeet Yadav into custody, the Special Judge, CBI, Ghaziabad found that he was not on bail under several specific Sections in which charges were framed against him; that Dr. Chandrajeet Yadav moved an application for bail which was rejected by Special Judge, CBI, Ghaziabad vide order dated 2.4.2015; that since Dr. Chandrajeet Yadav was on bail vide order of this Court despite framing of charges in some additional or specific sections if any, in which he was not found on bail, he ought to have been treated on bail or should have been granted bail; that since Dr. Chandrajeet Yadav was taken into custody on account of framing of charges in some additional or specific sections, apprehension has arisen in the minds of co-accused persons that they may also be taken into custody despite having been granted bail by this Court; that due to above apprehension Dr. A.K. Shukla and A.K. Yadav approached this Court by moving application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and obtained interim orders of protection dated 13.4.2015 and 14.5.2015 Annexure Nos. A.K. Shukla and A.K. Yadav approached this Court by moving application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and obtained interim orders of protection dated 13.4.2015 and 14.5.2015 Annexure Nos. 10 and 11 respectively to the effect that they shall not be taken into custody by the Court concerned till next date of listing; that Shri Atul Gupta the then Presiding Officer of the Special Judge, CBI, Ghaziabad had no jurisdiction to try the matter at Ghaziabad and the order dated 1.5.2015 upholding his jurisdiction, passed by this Court in Case No. 6623 of 2015, M/s.HCL Info System Ltd. v. CBI, 2015 (4) ALJ 1, has been stayed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No. 4338 of 2015, copy filed as annexure-13; that in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Paritosh Kumar v. Union of India through CBI, 2014 (1) JIC 1 All (FB), the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court has jurisdiction to try the petition despite the trial is pending before Special Judge, CBI, Ghaziabad, beyond the local limits of the jurisdiction of Lucknow Bench; that vide order dated 21.7.2015, A-15 passed by Hon’ble the Apex Court in SLP (Criminal) No. 833 of 2015 in the case of Sanjay Awasthi v. State of U.P., certain directions have been issued for grant of bail in NRHM Scam cases, upon deposit of proportionate amount of loss caused by accused to public exchequer; that the applicant has deposited the amount of Rs. 2,20,435/- in compliance with the bail order of the Court and is entitled to remain on bail treated on bail till disposal of trial; that the applicant is entitled to the same protection as has been granted to co-accused Dr. A.K. Shukla and A.K.Yadav vide orders dated 13.4.2015 and 14.4.2015, mentioned above; that in absence of similar order, the applicant may also be taken into custody and suffer irreparable injury; that in order to avoid abuse of process of Court, similar interim order as passed in the matters of Dr. A.K. Shukla and A.K. Yadav on 13.4.2015 and 14.5.2015, is required to be passed in respect of applicant also. 5. A.K. Shukla and A.K. Yadav on 13.4.2015 and 14.5.2015, is required to be passed in respect of applicant also. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for CBI contended that the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is misconceived and mala fide and has been filed with absolutely wrong and baseless allegations; that there is no necessity for exercise of inherent powers by this Court to prevent any abuse of process of Court or to secure the ends of justice; that the apprehension of applicant of being taken into custody is purely hypothetical and baseless; that as per the provisions of law in each and every case after lodging of F.I.R., in certain sections, upon investigation the charge-sheet may be submitted in some different or additional sections, than mentioned in F.I.R. and upon submission of charge-sheet, the Court may take cognizance in some different or additional sections, than in which charge-sheet has been submitted, if the Court finds that offence is made out under those sections; that similarly, at the time of framing charges if the Court after hearing parties finds sufficient reason, may drop certain sections from the charges framed against the accused persons and may also frame charges in same or in some additional or different sections, which may differ from case to case; that it is settled principle that if upon hearing on charge, Court finds that no case is made out against accused under some sections, it shall refuse to frame charges under those sections and similarly if certain different or new sections are added at the time of submission of charge-sheet, or at the time of taking of cognizance by Court, or at the time of framing of charges, due to change in circumstances or otherwise the accused even if on bail, in existing sections, will be required to obtain bail under such additional or different sections, which may relate to more serious offences, as the case may be; that the trial of a case is to proceed in accordance with law and there is no space for any hypothetical apprehension to either party; that in this matter there are several accused persons who have been assigned with different roles and as far as the case of co-accused Dr. Chandrajeet Yadav is concerned, he was rightly taken into custody by the Special Judge, CBI and the correctness of order passed in the case of Dr. Chandrajeet Yadav is concerned, he was rightly taken into custody by the Special Judge, CBI and the correctness of order passed in the case of Dr. Chandrajeet Yadav may not be questioned by the applicant; that the applicant has obtained bail order, annexure-6 from principal seat of High Court at Allahabad and the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has wrongly been moved before the Lucknow Bench; that though the jurisdiction of Lucknow Bench is not disputed in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Paritosh Kumar (supra), but in view of the facts and circumstances of obtaining bail from principal seat, moving of the application at Luknow Bench is abuse of process of Court and amounts to a case a Bench hunting or Bench hopping; that since the applicant claims herself to be on bail, there is no requirement of any protection order as prayed; that order and more particularly the interim orders of co-ordinate Bench passed in the cases of Dr. A.K. Shukla and A.K.Yadav have no binding effect on the final order to be passed on application under Section 482 Cr.P.C; that to grant or not to grant bail is prerogative and jurisdiction of trial Court which power may not be exercised by this Court within writ jurisdiction or in exercise of inherent powers, conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 6. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusal of record, I find that the facts of (i) applicant having been granted bail vide order dated 12.2.1013, annexure-6, (ii) co-accused Dr. Chandrajeet Yadav, having been taken into custody after framing of charges, (iii) grant of interim protection orders in matters of Dr. A.K. Shukla and A.K. Yadav, and (iv) jurisdiction of this bench to entertain present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not disputed. 7. Chandrajeet Yadav, having been taken into custody after framing of charges, (iii) grant of interim protection orders in matters of Dr. A.K. Shukla and A.K. Yadav, and (iv) jurisdiction of this bench to entertain present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not disputed. 7. The argument advanced on behalf of applicant that the then presiding officer Shri Atul Kumar Gupta had no jurisdiction to try the case and the order passed by the Allahabad High Court upholding his jurisdiction as well the validity of orders passed by him, in the case of M/s.HCL Info System Ltd. v. CBI, 2015 (4) ALJ 1, A-12 is under challenge before the Apex Court which has stayed the same vide order dated 6.7.2015 at annexure-13 has no force and no relevance because firstly, the then presiding officer has been transferred in the month of April, 2015, much before moving of application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and secondly, no order passed by him is sought to be quashed in this application, so apprehension which is alleged to have arisen from the then presiding officer who passed the order dated 17.3.2015 ceases to exist. Otherwise also the law Courts are there to pass orders in accordance with law with reference to the role assigned to accused concerned, and there may be no space for such baseless and hypothetical apprehensions as has been raised by the applicant. 8. As far as parity sought by learned counsel for applicant with the orders dated 13.4.2015 and 14.4.2015 in cases of Dr. A.K. Shukla and A.K. Yadav, filed at Annexures No. 10 and 11, undisputedly the above orders are interim orders and final order is yet to be passed in those cases. In State of Assam v. Barak Upatyaka D.U. Karmachari Sanstha, 2009(5) SCC 694, it has been held by Hon’ble the Apex Court that “A precedent is a judicial decision containing a principle, which forms an authoritative element termed as ratio decidendi. An interim order which does not finally and conclusively decide an issue cannot be a precedent. Any reasons assigned in support of such non-final interim order containing prima facie findings, are only tentative”. Since the above orders are interim orders and the matters are still to be decided finally and conclusively, the arguments of learned counsel for the applicant for passing similar order has no force. 9. Any reasons assigned in support of such non-final interim order containing prima facie findings, are only tentative”. Since the above orders are interim orders and the matters are still to be decided finally and conclusively, the arguments of learned counsel for the applicant for passing similar order has no force. 9. As far as the jurisdiction of this Bench is concerned, after the full bench decision in the case of Paritosh Kumar (supra), since the FIR of the case was lodged at Lucknow, so despite trial being pending before Special Judge, Ghaziabad beyond the local limits of the jurisdiction of this Bench of High Court, the jurisdiction of this Bench of High Court to entertain the application is not taken away. The arguments advanced on behalf of the CBI that since the bail order was obtained by applicant from principal seat at Allahabad High Court, Allahabad, the present application may be filed only at the principal seat at Allahabad and thus it becomes a case of bench hunting or bench hopping, has no force. 10. It is settled principle of law that if the Court finds that charge is required to be amended or the offence made against the accused is more serious, the Court can amend the charge at any stage and in case the cognizance is taken or charge is framed in some different or additional sections of more serious offences or otherwise due to change in circumstances or otherwise, the accused may seek and may be enlarged on bail in such different or additional sections also. In such cases the Courts are required to have a liberal approach considering the earlier grant of bail, in existing sections and otherwise also in granting or refusing to grant bail, the Court must not have hyper-technical approach. The apprehension raised by the applicant is purely hypothetical and non-existent. It is also pertinent to mention that if such protection as prayed by applicant are granted the bail orders will have to be considered under any and every section covering all offences in a particular case crime number and the order granting bail under certain sections shall become meaningless and the accused will become immune of custody under any other section, in the same case. 11. 11. As far as the grant of bail is concerned, this power vests only with the trial Court and is not required to be exercised by this Court under the inherent powers conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under writ jurisdiction. In the case of Nazma v. Javed alias Anjum, (2013) 1 SCC 376 , Hon’ble the Apex Court has held that “Grant of bail or not to grant, is within the powers of the regular criminal Courts and the High Court, in its inherent jurisdiction is not justified in usurping their powers and the jurisdiction vested in High Court under Articles 226/227 of Constitution of India or Section 482 Cr.P.C. by way of interference in functions of ordinary criminal Courts is exceptional and should be exercised sparingly in most exceptional cases.” 12. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh and others, (2003) 8 SCC 50 , Hon’ble the Apex Court at the time of allowing the appeal, setting aside order passed by the High Court granting bail to respondents held that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice. But this power cannot be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party”. 13. In the case of Dr. Monika Kumar v. State of U.P. and others, (2008) 8 SCC 781 , Hon’ble the Apex Court has held that “inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified, by the tests specifically laid in the Section itself”. 14. In view of the discussions made above, I have come to the conclusion that the learned counsel for the applicant has failed to show existence of any apprehension. The application is frivolous and vexatious and there is no sufficient ground for exercising inherent powers by this Court to grant the prayer mentioned in the application for preventing the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 15. The application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has no force and is liable to be dismissed. 16. The application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is dismissed accordingly.