JUDGMENT Sanjay Karol, J. 1. Assailing the judgment dated 26.09.2007, passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. in S.C. No. 13-D/VII/07/S.T. No.17/2007, titled as The State of Himachal Pradesh Versus Avinash Katoch, State has filed the present appeal under the provisions of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 2. It is the case of prosecution that on 27.12.2006, police party comprising of Constable Sanjeev Kumar (PW.5), Santosh Patial (PW.6) and Inspector R.P. Jaswal (PW.10) had laid a Naka at Tapoban Chowk, Dhramshala, District Kangra, H.P. At about 10.35 PM, accused came on a motorcycle which was stopped. On suspicion, accused was checked and from the bag carried by him, contraband substance, which appeared to be charas, was recovered. Prior thereto, independent witnesses Bishan Giri (PW.1) and Sarwan (PW.2) were associated by the police. Upon weighment, charas was found to be 3 kilograms. Two samples of 25 grams each were drawn and sealed with seal having impression ‘A’. Rukka (Ex.PW.10/C) was sent to the Police Station, on the basis of which FIR No.303/2006, dated 27.12.2006 was registered at Police Station, Dharamshala, under the provisions of Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as NDPS Act), against the accused. Necessary formalities were completed on the spot, including filling up of the forms; arrest of the accused and preparation of record. Thereafter contraband substance was deposited with MHC Anil Kumar (PW.7), who kept it in the Malkhana. Sealed sample was taken by Joginder Singh (PW.8) to be deposited with the Central Forensic Science Laboratory, Chandigarh and after chemical analysis, report (Ex.PA) was taken on record. With the completion of investigation, which prima facie revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, Challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. The accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 20 of the NDPS Act, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to establish its case, in all, prosecution examined as many as ten witnesses. Statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was also recorded, in which he took plea of innocence and false implication. No evidence in defence was led. 5. Trial Court, after appreciating the testimony of prosecution witnesses acquitted the accused. Hence the present appeal. 6. Statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was also recorded, in which he took plea of innocence and false implication. No evidence in defence was led. 5. Trial Court, after appreciating the testimony of prosecution witnesses acquitted the accused. Hence the present appeal. 6. We have heard M/s Ashok Chaudhary, V.S. Chauhan, learned Addl. AGs., assisted by Mr. J.S. Guleria, learned Asstt. AG., on behalf of the State as also Mr. Vikas Rathore, Advocate, on behalf of the accused. We have also minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. Having done so, we are of the considered view that no case for interference is made out at all. We find that the judgment rendered by the trial Court is based on complete, correct and proper appreciation of evidence (documentary and ocular) so placed on record. There is neither any illegality/infirmity nor any perversity with the same, resulting into miscarriage of justice. 7. It is a settled principle of law that acquittal leads to presumption of innocence in favour of an accused. To dislodge the same, onus heavily lies upon the prosecution. Having considered the material on record, we are of the considered view that prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredients so required to constitute the charged offence. 8. In Prandas vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 36 , Constitution Bench of the apex Court, has held as under: “(6) It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot support the view which has been expressed in several cases that the High Court has no power under S. 417, Criminal P.C., to reverse a judgment of acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the subordinate Court has in some way or other misdirected itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice. In our opinion, the true position in regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 417, Criminal P.C. in an appeal from an order of acquittal has been stated in – Sheo Swarup vs. Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227 (2) at pp.229, 230 (A), in these words: “Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognized in the administration of justice.” 9. In the instant case, we find that independent witnesses Bishan Giri (PW.1) and Sarwan (PW.2) have not supported the prosecution case at all. They were declared hostile and extensively cross-examined by the Public Prosecutor, yet nothing fruitful could be elicited from their testimony. On the contrary a different version has emerged on record. 10. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashok alias Dangra Jaiswal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2011) 5 SCC 123 have held that seizure witnesses turning hostile may not be very significant by itself, as it is not an uncommon phenomenon in criminal trials, particularly in cases relating to NDPS Act. 11. 10. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashok alias Dangra Jaiswal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2011) 5 SCC 123 have held that seizure witnesses turning hostile may not be very significant by itself, as it is not an uncommon phenomenon in criminal trials, particularly in cases relating to NDPS Act. 11. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt vs. State of Gujarat, (2011) 6 SCC 312 have held that evidence of hostile witness may contain elements of truth and should not be entirely discarded. Their Lordships have held as under: “22. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted the doctor had not given his written opinion that the deceased was fit enough to give her statement. Though orally, the doctor said so. Relying on this part of the evidence especially the evidence of the husband of the deceased, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that even though the husband may have been declared hostile, the law relating to appreciation of evidence of hostile witnesses is not to completely discard the evidence given by them. This Court has held that even the evidence given by hostile witness may contain elements of truth. 23. This Court has held in State of U.P. vs. Chetram and Others, AIR 1989 SC 1543 , that merely because the witnesses have been declared hostile the entire evidence should not be brushed aside. [See para 13 at page 1548]. Similar view has been expressed by three-judge Bench of this Court in Khujji alias Surendra Tiwari vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1853 . At para 6, page 1857 of the report this Court speaking through Justice Ahmadi, as His Lordship then was, after referring to various judgments of this Court laid down that just because the witness turned hostile his entire evidence should not be washed out.” 12. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhajju alias Karan Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 4 SCC 327 have held that evidence of hostile witnesses can also be relied upon by the prosecution to the extent to which it supports the prosecution version of the incident. Their Lordships have held as under: “36. It is settled law that the evidence of hostile witnesses can also be relied upon by the prosecution to the extent to which it supports the prosecution version of the incident. Their Lordships have held as under: “36. It is settled law that the evidence of hostile witnesses can also be relied upon by the prosecution to the extent to which it supports the prosecution version of the incident. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as washed off the records, it remains admissible in trial and there is no legal bar to base the conviction of the accused upon such testimony, if corroborated by other reliable evidence. Section 154 of the Act enables the Court, in its discretion, to permit the person, who calls a witness, to put any question to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. 37. The view that the evidence of the witness who has been called and cross-examined by the party with the leave of the court, cannot be believed or disbelieved in part and has to be excluded altogether, is not the correct exposition of law. The Courts may rely upon so much of the testimony which supports the case of the prosecution and is corroborated by other evidence. It is also now a settled cannon of criminal jurisprudence that the part which has been allowed to be cross-examined can also be relied upon by the prosecution. These principles have been encompassed in the judgments of this Court in the cases: (a) Koli Lakhmanbhai Chanabhai vs. State of Gujarat, (1999) 8 SCC 624 (b) Prithi vs. State of Haryana, (2010) 8 SCC 536 (c) Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2010 (6) SCC 1 (d) Ramkrushna vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 13 SCC 525 13. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Harijan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2012) 5 SCC 777 have again reiterated that any portion of evidence consistent with case of prosecution or defence can be relied upon. Their Lordships have further held that seizure/recovery witnesses though turning hostile, but admitting their signatures/ thumb impressions on recovery memo, they could be relied on by prosecution. Their Lordships have held as under: “23. It is a settled legal proposition that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross examine him. Their Lordships have held as under: “23. It is a settled legal proposition that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross examine him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent that their version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. (Vide: Bhagwan Singh vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1976 SC 202 ; Rabindra Kumar Dey vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1977 SC 170 ; Syad Akbar vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848 ; Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1853 ). 24. In State of U.P. vs. Ramesh Prasad Misra & Another, AIR 1996 SC 2766 , this Court held that evidence of a hostile witness would not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution or the accused but required to be subjected to close scrutiny and that portion of the evidence which is consistent with the case of the prosecution or defence can be relied upon. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Balu Sonba Shinde vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 7 SCC 543 ; Gagan Kanojia & Another vs. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 516; Radha Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb & Others vs. State of U.P. AIR 2006 SC 951 ; Sarvesh Narain Shukla vs. Daroga Singh & Others, AIR 2008 SC 320 and Subbu Singh vs. State by Public Prosecutor, (2009) 6 SCC 462 . Thus, the law can be summarised to the effect that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a whole, and relevant parts thereof which are admissible in law, can be used by the prosecution or the defence. (See also C. Muniappan & Others vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2010 SC 3718 and Himanshu @ Chintu vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2011 (2) SCC 36 )” 14. Both the independent witnesses have disputed any recovery having been effected, from the custody of the accused, in their presence. Sarwan (PW.2) on the asking of Suresh Kumar, Pradhan, went to his shop where he found the SHO sitting, informed him that a bag containing charas was recovered from the accused. Both the independent witnesses have disputed any recovery having been effected, from the custody of the accused, in their presence. Sarwan (PW.2) on the asking of Suresh Kumar, Pradhan, went to his shop where he found the SHO sitting, informed him that a bag containing charas was recovered from the accused. In fact, witnesses deny being present on the spot or any recovery having been effected, in the manner, prosecution wants us to believe, in their presence. Significantly police officials do not state who called these witnesses. Also witnesses are not residing in the neighbourhood or have their place of work close by. Thus, version of prosecution of having associated these witnesses, for carrying out search and seizure operations, in the dark hours of night, is uninspiring in confidence. Notice can be taken of the fact that on a cold wintery night, in the month of December, generally local residents are not found on the streets. 15. Thus, in our considered view, two views with regard to the manner in which search and seizure operations were carried out by the police, have emerged on record. In fact we disbelieve the prosecution story of having conducted the search and seizure operations in the manner they want the Court to believe. 16. It is a settled proposition of law that sole testimony of police official, which if otherwise is reliable, trustworthy, cogent and duly corroborated by other witnesses or admissible evidence, cannot be discarded only on the ground that he is a police official and may be interested in the success of the case. It cannot be stated as a rule that a police officer can or cannot be a sole eye-witness in a criminal case. It will always depend upon the facts of a given case. If the testimony of such a witness is reliable, trustworthy, cogent and if required duly corroborated by other witnesses or admissible evidences, then the statement of such witness cannot be discarded only on the ground that he is a police officer and may have some interest in success of the case. It is only when his interest in the success of the case is motivated by overzealousness to an extent of his involving innocent people; in that event, no credibility can be attached to the statement of such witness. 17. It is only when his interest in the success of the case is motivated by overzealousness to an extent of his involving innocent people; in that event, no credibility can be attached to the statement of such witness. 17. It is not the law that Police witnesses should not be relied upon and their evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other independent evidence. The presumption applies as much in favour of a police officer as any other person. There is also no rule of law which lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of a police officer even if such evidence is otherwise reliable and trustworthy. Rule of prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence. If such a presumption is raised against the police officers without exception, it will be an attitude which could neither do credit to the magistracy nor good to the public, it can only bring down the prestige of police administration. 18. Wherever, evidence of a police officer, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form basis of conviction and absence of some independent witness of the locality does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case. No infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officers merely because they belong to the police force and there is no rule of law or evidence which lays down that conviction cannot be recorded on the evidence of the police officials, if found reliable, unless corroborated by some independent evidence. Such reliable and trustworthy statement can form the basis of conviction. [See : Govindaraju alias Govinda vs. State by Srirampuram Police Station and Another, (2012) 4 SCC 722 ; Tika Ram vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 15 SCC 760; Girja Prasad vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 7 SCC 625 and Aher Raja Khima vs. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1956]. 19. Apex Court in Tahir vs. State (Delhi), (1996) 3 SCC 338 , dealing with a similar question, held as under:- "6. 19. Apex Court in Tahir vs. State (Delhi), (1996) 3 SCC 338 , dealing with a similar question, held as under:- "6. In our opinion no infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officials, merely because they belong to the police force and there is no rule of law or evidence which lays down that conviction cannot be recorded on the evidence of the police officials, if found reliable, unless corroborated by some independent evidence. The Rule of Prudence, however, only requires a more careful scrutiny of their evidence, since they can be said to be interested in the result of the case projected by them. Where the evidence of the police officials, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form basis of conviction and the absence of some independent witness of the locality to lend corroboration to their evidence, does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case." 20. It is also well established principle of law that (i) the appellate Court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be more probable; (ii) while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court must consider entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether views of the trial court are perverse or otherwise unsustainable; (iii) the appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, trial Court failed to take into consideration any admissible fact and (iv) the trial Court failed to take into consideration any admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration evidence brought on record contrary to law. (See : Balak Ram & Another vs. State of U.P. AIR 1974 SC 2165 ; Allarakha K. Mansuri vs. State of Gujarat, (2002) 3 SCC 57 ; Raghunath vs. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 398 ; State of U.P. vs. Ram Veer Singh & Others, (2007) 13 SCC 102 ; S. Rama Krishna vs. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Others, AIR 2008 SC 2066 ; Sambhaji Hindurao Deshmukh & Others vs. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 186 ; Arulvelu & Another vs. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 ; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2009) 16 SCC 98 ; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 445 ). 21. In Sheo Swaroop and Others vs. King Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227 , the Privy Council held that: "The High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." 22. In Chandrappa and Others vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , the apex Court observed as under: "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 23. In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Banne @ Baijnath & Others, (2009) 4 SCC 271 , the apex Court gave illustrations of certain circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court, which principle, in our considered view, would squarely apply to the judgment under review by us. The circumstances include; (i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) Apex Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; and (vi) the apex Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal. The apex Court further held that “Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference with the decision of the trial court in a routine manner, where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for such interference.” (Emphasis supplied). The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference with the decision of the trial court in a routine manner, where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for such interference.” (Emphasis supplied). 24. From the conjoint reading of testimonies of Sanjeev Kumar (PW.5), Santosh Patial (PW.6) and Inspector R.P. Jaswal (PW.10), we find prosecution story of having apprehended the accused while he was driving the motorcycle to be doubtful. Police officials state that the driving licence of the accused was recovered by them. But where is this licence, it has not been placed on record. Also on record, there is no registration certificate or insurance of the said vehicle. 25. Contradictions, embellishments and exaggerations in the testimonies of police officials further render the prosecution case to be doubtful. Inspector R.P. Jaswal (PW.10) states that before Rukka was sent to the Police Station for registration of FIR, NCB form was not filled up, in complete. But then, there is no reference therein, as to whether contraband substance stood weighed or not. This only renders testimonies of prosecution witnesses to be doubtful, in the backdrop of contrary version which has emerged on record. PW.10 further admits that source of contraband substance was not enquired from the accused. Why so? has not been clarified on record. After all large contraband was recovered by the police, yet no endeavour was made to further trace the source from which it was procured. 26. Santosh Patial (PW.6) who happens to be present on the spot, nowhere records presence of independent witnesses, in whose presence alleged recovery was effected. Version of R.P. Jaswal (PW.10) that he filled up the NCB forms, in triplicate, on the spot and also filled up number of FIR after receipt of the file from the Police Station, does not appear to be true. Significantly, in the malkhana register, there is no mention of any NCB forms. Now where these NCB forms were kept has not been established, beyond reasonable doubt, by the prosecution. 27. Even by way of link evidence, we find prosecution has not been able to establish its case, beyond reasonable doubt. 28. According to Anil Kumar (PW.7), on 29.12.2006, sample was handed over to Joginder Singh (PW.8) to be taken to CFSL, Chandigarh. Now where these NCB forms were kept has not been established, beyond reasonable doubt, by the prosecution. 27. Even by way of link evidence, we find prosecution has not been able to establish its case, beyond reasonable doubt. 28. According to Anil Kumar (PW.7), on 29.12.2006, sample was handed over to Joginder Singh (PW.8) to be taken to CFSL, Chandigarh. It has come on record that on account of holidays, sample could only be deposited on 02.01.2007. Delay is sought to be explained on the ground that initially NCB forms were not sent with the sample as a result of which Constable returned and only thereafter, after collecting the same, sample was deposited. But then, prosecution witnesses Anil Kumar (PW.7), Joginder Singh (PW.7) and SHO Gulzari Lal (PW.9) admits that no record pertaining to delay stands prepared by the police. Also there is no record that NCB forms were collected from Dharamshala, whereafter only same were deposited in the Laboratory. Thus delay remains unexplained. The possibility of tampering cannot be ruled out in the instant case, more so when the sample seal has not been produced in Court. Trial Court found the prosecution case to be doubtful and we see no reason to interfere with the findings, so returned vide impugned judgment dated 26.09.2007, in S.C. No.13-D/VII/07/S.T. No. 17 of 2007, titled as The State of Himachal Pradesh Versus Avinash Katoch. 29. We do not find prosecution to have proved its case, beyond reasonable doubt, by leading clear, cogent, convincing piece of evidence with regard to recovery of contraband substance from the conscious possession of the accused. Contradictions in the statements of police officials are glaring, material and relevant, totally shaking the edifice of prosecution story. Witnesses are unreliable and their testimonies not free from embellishments/contradictions/variations. 30. The Court below, in our considered view, has correctly and completely appreciated the evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. It cannot be said that judgment of trial Court is perverse, illegal, erroneous or based on incorrect and incomplete appreciation of material on record resulting into miscarriage of justice. 31. The accused person has had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. It cannot be said that judgment of trial Court is perverse, illegal, erroneous or based on incorrect and incomplete appreciation of material on record resulting into miscarriage of justice. 31. The accused person has had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohammed Ankoos and Others vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad (2010) 1 SCC 94 , since it cannot be said that trial Court has not correctly appreciated the evidence on record or that acquittal of the accused has resulted into travesty of justice, no interference is warranted in the instant case. For all the aforesaid reasons, present appeal, being devoid of merit, is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. Bail bonds furnished by the accused are discharged. Record of the trial Court be immediately sent back.