JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashwani Kumar Mishra, J.—This second appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure arises out of a decree for specific performance of contract passed by the lower Appellate Court dated 25.8.1982, whereby the judgment and decree of the Trial Court has been reversed. Facts in brief giving rise to filing of the appeal are that plaintiff-respondents filed Original Suit No. 4 of 1970 with the allegation that the defendant had executed an agreement to sale in his favour on 23.9.1969 for sale of a shop alongwith staircase and a godown, bearing municipal No. 6, Anaaj Mandi, Meerut, for a consideration of Rs. 18,000/- and a sum of Rs. 2,500/- was paid as advance. It was provided in the agreement that the sale-deed would be got executed by 31.10.1966. Plaintiff alleged that despite execution of agreement to sale and readiness and willingness on his part the sale-deed has not been executed. It was also stated in para 4 of the plaint that a notice was also served upon the defendant on 25.10.1969 to execute the sale-deed on 27.10.1969, and thereafter subsequent intimations were also given, but the defendants failed to get the sale-deed executed although the plaintiff remain present with the balance sale consideration before the Sub-Registrar on 27.10.1969, 29.10.1969 and 31.10.1969. Consequently prayer for specific performance of the contract was made by filing Suit. 2. A written statement was filed by the defendant-appellant in which it was stated that the shop is not exclusively owned by the defendant, rather it was owned by him alongwith his brother Sri Raghuraj Narain his nephews, niece, son and sister-in-law who also haver right/share in the property. Defendant also denied execution of the agreement and it was stated that his share in the shop is only 1/4th and in the absence of other family members having been impleaded to the suit, no relief of specific performance is liable to be granted. 3. Before the Trial Court, oral and documentary evidence was led by the parties. On the basis of respective pleadings advanced before the Trial Court, issues were framed. Issue No. 5 framed by the Court was to the following effect-”Whether the defendant alone is the owner of the shop in suit? If so, its effect?” 4. Subsequently an application was moved by the plaintiff for deleting this issue which was rejected. On the basis of respective pleadings advanced before the Trial Court, issues were framed. Issue No. 5 framed by the Court was to the following effect-”Whether the defendant alone is the owner of the shop in suit? If so, its effect?” 4. Subsequently an application was moved by the plaintiff for deleting this issue which was rejected. A revision filed against such order was allowed and it was held that in a suit for specific performance the question of ownership of defendant was not material and the defendant’s interest would not suffer if the suit proceeds without such an issue. Aggrieved by the order of the Revisional Court, a revision was filed by the defendant-appellant before this Court, which was dismissed with costs on 26.7.1978 vide following orders : “In a suit for specific performance one of the pleas taken in defence was that the defendant was not the exclusive owner of the property. On this issue No. 5 was framed as under: “Whether defendant alone is the owner of the shop in a suit? If so, its effect?” Subsequently, the plaintiff moved an application for deleting this issue. The Trial Court dismissed this application. On revision, a different view was taken. It was held that in a suit for specific performance the question of the ownership of the defendant was not material. The defendant’s interest will not suffer by the suit proceeding without such an issue. Issue No. 5 was directed to be struck off. The defendant has come up in revision. I have heard learned counsel and I am not satisfied that there is any jurisdiction. I defect or even factum of justice in the case. The revision is accordingly dismissed with costs.” 5. On the basis of evidence lead by the parties, Trial Court proceeded to examine the plaintiff’s case for specific performance of contract on the following issues : “1- Whether the defendant entered into an agreement to sell dated 23.9.1969 in consideration of Rs. 18000/- and received Rs. 2500/- as advance? 2. Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract? 3. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?” 6. On the first two issues, a finding was returned by the Trial Court that the agreement to sale dated 23.9.1969 has been executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff and a sum of Rs. Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract? 3. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?” 6. On the first two issues, a finding was returned by the Trial Court that the agreement to sale dated 23.9.1969 has been executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff and a sum of Rs. 2,500/- was received as advance whereas the total consideration for the sale of the property was fixed at Rs. 18,000/-. A further finding was returned that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. However, on issue No. 3, the Trial Court upon examining the evidence on record came to a conclusion that the suit property was actually an ancestral property. Trial Court, however, noticed that an application was moved by defendant before the Municipal Board for exclusively recording his name over the shop pursuant to a private settlement dated 24.9.1969. This private settlement is alleged to have taken place on 24.9.1969 wherein the two brothers i.e. the defendant and his brother Sri Raghuraj Narain had partitioned their respective shares and the suit property had fallen exclusively in the share of defendant. Trial Court, however, was of the opinion that even if the suit property came in the share of the defendant, still share of his son over such property was in existence, as the property itself was ancestral, and the son was not a party. It was also stated that no legal necessity had been proved and therefore, the defendant had no right to execute the ancestral property on his own volition. Consequently the plaintiff suit was decreed for return of earnest money alongwith interest of 12% per annum, but relief of specific performance was denied. 7. It would be worthwhile to note that after the suit was filed in the year 1970, an order of injunction was passed and continued during pendency of suit which came to be violated. It appears that the son of the defendant transferred the suit property by means of a sale-deed dated 24.8.1976. A copy of the said sale-deed has been produced before this Court which mentions that pursuant to a family settlement dated 28.2.1970, the suit property has fallen exclusively in the share of the son. It appears that the son of the defendant transferred the suit property by means of a sale-deed dated 24.8.1976. A copy of the said sale-deed has been produced before this Court which mentions that pursuant to a family settlement dated 28.2.1970, the suit property has fallen exclusively in the share of the son. Interestingly, the defendant had filed written statement in the suit on 12.2.1972, but neither reference was made to the alleged family settlement dated 28.2.1970 nor it was mentioned that the suit property has fallen exclusively in the share of defendant’s son. Plaintiff during his cross-examination was confronted with these developments and he pleaded ignorance about factum of execution of sale-deed by his son and stated that he had no knowledge as to when the shop was transferred by him in favour of his son. The relevant portion of statement of the defendant before the Trial Court is reproduced : ^^;g dguk xyr gS fd esjh fu;r esa QdZ vk x;k gSA vc eSaus tcjnLrh okyh ckr dgus yxk gWwA eq>s irk ugha fd tk;nkn ck c;ukek esjs yMds us dj fn;k gS] gks ldrk gS fd dj fn;k gksA eq>s irk ughs eSus fookfnr nwdku vius yMds ds gd esa dc dj nh FkhA ;g Hkh ?;ku ugha fd eSaus viuh nqdku dkSu ls yMds ds gd esa dc dhA ;g Hkh ?;ku ugha nwdkus eqdnek ds nkSjku dh ;k igys dhA yMds ds gd esa ;kuh cVokjsa esa nqdku djus dh rgjhj gS ;k ughA irk ugha fd cVokjsa vkilh dks dksbZ rgjhj gS ;k ughaA nqdku fdjk;s ig FkhA vc nqdku fdjk;s ij ugha gSA** 8. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court refusing to grant prayer for specific performance of contract, the plaintiff preferred Civil Appeal No. 414 of 1980, which has been allowed. Appellate Court was of the view that as against the defendant the contract dated 23.9.1969 was binding and operative against him and it was not open for the defendant to have pleaded any defect in his title. It was also observed that the area of conflict raised in the suit ought not to have been enlarged as has been done by the Trial Court and the observations made by the Trial Court discussing the nature of right held by the defendant in the property so as to deny the relief of specific performance was wholly uncalled for. It was also observed that the area of conflict raised in the suit ought not to have been enlarged as has been done by the Trial Court and the observations made by the Trial Court discussing the nature of right held by the defendant in the property so as to deny the relief of specific performance was wholly uncalled for. Para 19 and 20 of the judgment of the lower Appellate Court which deals with this aspect of the matter is reproduced: “19. As far as the defendant was concerned the contract dated 23.9.1969 was binding and operate against him and it did not lie in his mouth to blow hot and cold in the same breath. The learned trial judge should not have enlarged the area of the conflict of the controversy before him to questions dealing with may be of law is a process concerned with the immediate and is not geared to answer future and possible grievances. Legal apparatus is a device to evaluate grievances. The apparatus does not contemplate any policy planning over a large range of time. The decisions naturally are adhocastic and piecemeal and within the contraints that we have no other decision is possible except to hold that the finding of the learned trial Court on issue No. 3 as recorded by him, were uncalled for and he went astray in overemphasizing the trivia. 20. The appeal must succeed and the finding on issue No. 3 must be disturbed as a consequence. Even if whatever the learned trial Court has said on issue No. 3 is accepted, there was no reason for him to dismiss the suit completely and he should have on his own reasoning decreed the specific performance to the extent to the defendant’s share. As it is, in the compectus of the circumstances, as spread out in the preceding paragraphs, the suit succeeds in its entirety.” 9. Appeal was allowed and suit for specific performance was decreed. 10. Aggrieved by the decree of the lower Appellate Court passed in appeal the defendant has preferred the present second appeal. Sri. As it is, in the compectus of the circumstances, as spread out in the preceding paragraphs, the suit succeeds in its entirety.” 9. Appeal was allowed and suit for specific performance was decreed. 10. Aggrieved by the decree of the lower Appellate Court passed in appeal the defendant has preferred the present second appeal. Sri. B.D. Mandhayan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Om Prakash, Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant have made following submissions : (I) The finding returned by the Trial Court to the effect that the suit property was ancestral and do not belong exclusively to the defendant has not been specifically set aside and reversed in appeal and, therefore, decree passed by the lower Appellate Court is liable to be set aside in view of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is also submitted that no issues were framed by the lower Appellate Court either. (II) It is then stated that the Trial Court had exercised its jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act for return of earnest money which was based upon materials available on record and the same was therefore not liable to be interfered with in appeal. It is further stated that once the property had been transferred during the pendency of the suit and the transferees were not impleaded as a party, the lower Appellate Court could not have decreed the suit for specific performance of contract. It is also stated that the lower Appellate Court had observed that in the event the right of defendant is found not to be absolute then the decree in respect of the share of the defendant was liable to have been granted, but while decreeing the suit, the entire premises has been directed to be sold which reasoning is self-contradictory. (III) Last and not the least, learned counsel submits that after a gap of about 45 years it would be inequitable for the Court to allow specific performance of contract. 11. (III) Last and not the least, learned counsel submits that after a gap of about 45 years it would be inequitable for the Court to allow specific performance of contract. 11. The submissions aforesaid are refuted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent who contends that admittedly in all revenue records the property was recorded exclusively in the name of defendant and the family partition between him and his brother dated 24.9.1969 clearly resulted in the suit property falling exclusively in the share of the defendant and the plea to the contrary taken by the defendant was only to non suit the plaintiff’s right. Learned counsel submits that the issue with regard to ownership of the defendant was struck off, which order has attained finality with dismissal of revision before this Court and therefore, any discussion with regard to defect in title of respondent was beyond the scope of proceedings and the Trial Court has erroneously dealt with such aspect which has rightly been interfered by the lower Appellate Court. It is further stated that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the defendant had acted with dishonest intention inasmuch as after the property had fallen in his share in the partition with his brother, a further plea of partition dated 28.2.1970 was set up between him and his son so as to transfer the property exclusively in favour of his son during the pendency of suit but no such plea was taken in the written statement filed much after it on 12.2.1972 and the entire plea of the property having fallen in the share of the son was an calculated design engineered only with a intent to defeat the rights of the plaintiff. 12. Learned counsel further submits that the transfer of property by the son was clearly in teeth of the injunction operating against the defendant and even otherwise in view of the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, such a transfer would have to abide by the out come of the suit proceedings, and no equity in favour of the defendants can be set up on such count. Learned counsel submits that once the findings on issue No. 1 and 2 had been returned against the defendant, it was not open for the defendant to set up a defect in his title over the property just to defeat the rights of the plaintiff. 13. Perusal of the records shows that the appeal was admitted by this Court on following three substantial questions which are enumerated hereinafter : “1. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case when it is established on record that the property was ancestral and the appellant was not absolute owner of the shop in dispute, could he execute the agreement to sell in respect of the entire shop and was the lower appellate Court justified in decreeing the suit in toto even on holding that he would be entitled to 1/4th share only? 2. Whether in the facts and circumstances even if it is held that the appellant was entitled to 1/4th share, could the property which was indivisible, be allowed to be sold by way of specific performance? 3. Whether in the facts and circumstances Sections 12 and 14 of the Specific Relief Act provide adequate compensation and the relief of specific performance being discretionary, was the lower appellate justified in decreeing the suit for specific performance instead of directing the return of the money alongwith interest?” 14. Learned counsel for the parties have advanced their submissions as noted above and it is submitted by the appellants that on the substantial questions so framed, the appeal is liable to succeed. However, before adverting to the substantial questions noted above, it would be appropriate to analyse some of the facts which are relevant for adjudication in the present appeal. 15. The finding of the Courts below on issue No. 1 and 2 that the agreement dated 23.9.1969 had been executed by the defendant and that plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract is a finding returned by both the Courts below, upon consideration of oral and documentary evidence, and the learned counsel for the appellant has not seriously challenged such finding returned by the Courts below. The finding of the Courts below on the first two questions is not required to be further gone into. The finding of the Courts below on the first two questions is not required to be further gone into. The entire thrust of submissions by both the counsels and the substantial questions requiring adjudication is on the aspect of issue No. 3, which pertains to grant of relief to the plaintiff. In this context, it would be relevant to note that though the property was initially shown to be ancestral but factum of family settlement with his brother on 24.9.1969 and suit property falling exclusively in the share of the defendant is admitted to him. It is also not disputed to the defendant that upon an application filed by him he was exclusively recorded over the suit property. In the written statement which has been filed by the defendant, however, the only defence which had been taken with regard to defect in title was that the share of his brother, his wife and his children and defendant’s son were also in the suit property and without their being impleaded, the relief claimed in the suit could not be granted. This plea was not liable to be sustained for the simple reason that the share of the brother of the defendant with his respective family had already been segregated in the family partition dated 24.9.1969, which aspect had not been disputed by the defendant. 16. Only plea on the aspect of title which has been relied upon by the Trial Court is with regard to lack of partition between the defendant and his son, on the ground that suit property is ancestral. The written statement, however, is contrary to the evidence produced by the defendant. There is no reference in the written statement filed in February, 1972 that any partition between the defendant and his son had taken place in the year 1970 in which the suit property had fallen exclusively in the share of the defendant. 17. Even in the oral statement of the defendant he has pleaded absolute ignorance of the family partition or manner in which the property has been transferred by him to his son. He further pleads ignorance of the transfer of the property during the pendency of the suit. 17. Even in the oral statement of the defendant he has pleaded absolute ignorance of the family partition or manner in which the property has been transferred by him to his son. He further pleads ignorance of the transfer of the property during the pendency of the suit. From the aforesaid stand of the defendant, this Court finds that the defendant was not acting in a fair manner and the stand taken by him before the Courts below was taken so as to deliberately and with a mala fide intent frustrate the right of the plaintiff in the suit property. This Court finds that in case the plea of partition between the defendant and his son of the year 1970 was in existence then such a plea ought to have been taken either in the written statement filed in 1972 or at least was required to have been elaborated during his oral testimony. It is in this context that this Court is required to consider the scope of proceedings before the Trial Court, when a specific plea regarding exclusive right of defendant over the suit property had been struck off and affirmed up to this Court vide order dated 26.7.1978, already reproduced above. In the opinion of the Court in the factual background of the present case when the issue No. 5 was struck off, and the defendant had failed to elaborate as to how the interest of his son in the property had evolved, it was not necessary for the Trial Court to have gone into all such issues as had been done by it. The lower Appellate Court, therefore, was justified in coming to a finding that the Trial Court had unnecessarily enlarged the scope of enquiry in the trial, by examining the right of other persons in the property which had not been substantiated and in respect of which no issue had been framed. This Court finds substance in the reasoning assigned by the lower Appellate Court that once the defendant had executed the agreement to sell, it was not open for the defendant to have set up any plea of defect in his own title, which has been engineered by him only to frustrate the right of the plaintiff. This Court finds substance in the reasoning assigned by the lower Appellate Court that once the defendant had executed the agreement to sell, it was not open for the defendant to have set up any plea of defect in his own title, which has been engineered by him only to frustrate the right of the plaintiff. In view of the discussions aforesaid, this Court finds that the lower Appellate Court was justified on facts in reversing the judgment and decree of the Trial Court dated 11.8.1979 and decree the plaintiff suit for specific performance. 18. So far as submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant on the first substantial question framed that the nature of property was rightly gone into by the Trial Court is concerned, this Court finds that in view of the discussions made above such a consideration on facts of the present case was not warranted. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kunju Kesavan v. M.M. Philip, AIR 1964 SC 164 wherein it was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court where the party clearly understood their case as set up by them, the non framing of issues would not result in the trial being vitiated on that count. Reliance has been placed upon para 17 of the said decision. This Court finds that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kunju Kesavan (Supra) was particular to the facts of the case itself, as would be apparent from para 17 of the said judgment which reads as under : “We do not think that the plaintiff in the case was taken by surprise. The notification must have been filed with the written statement, because there is nothing to show that it was tendered subsequently after obtaining the orders of the Court. The plaintiff was also cross-examined with respect to the address of Bhagavathi Valli, and the only witness examined on the side of the defendant deposed about the notification and was not cross-examined on this point. The plaintiff did not seek the permission of the Court to lead evidence on this point. Nor did he object to the reception of this evidence. The plaintiff did not seek the permission of the Court to lead evidence on this point. Nor did he object to the reception of this evidence. Even before the District judge, the contention was not that the evidence was wrongly received without a proper plea and issue but that the notification was not clear and there was doubt whether this Bhagavathi Valli was exempted or not. The parties went to trial fully understanding the central fact whether the succession as laid down in the Ezhava Act applied to Bhagavathi Valli or not. The absence of an issue, therefore, did not lead to a mistrial sufficient to vitiate the decision. The plea was hardly needed in view of the fact that the plaintiff made the following plea in the replication: “The suit property was obtained as makkathayam property, by Bhagavathi Valli, under the Ezhava Act. And as per the provisions in the said Act, the said property was obtained exclusively by Vasudevan, subsequent to the death of the said Bhagavathi Valli and Sivaraman.” and the notification was filed to controvert his allegation. In our opinion, the subject of exemption was properly raised between the parties and considered in the High Court and the Courts below. The High 649 Court differed from the District Court with regard to the notification and held that Bhagavathi Valli was exempted from the operation of part IV of the Ezhava Act. We shall now consider whether the finding on this part of the case given by the District judge or that given by the High Court is correct.” 19. Learned counsel has then relied upon another decision of the Apex Court in Nedunuri Kameshwaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao, AIR 1963 SC 884 , wherein a similar view was expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it was held where the parties were clearly aware of the nature of dispute involved non-framing of issued would not be fatal. The preposition laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as mentioned above is too well-settled. However, in the facts of the case, this Court finds that in the written statement as well as in the oral testimony of the defendant no such plea had been raised with regard to any partition having taken place between him and his son or that suit property had fallen exclusively in the share of the defendant’s son. However, in the facts of the case, this Court finds that in the written statement as well as in the oral testimony of the defendant no such plea had been raised with regard to any partition having taken place between him and his son or that suit property had fallen exclusively in the share of the defendant’s son. The only plea taken in the written statement was that the right of the defendants’ brother and his family was also involved which plea was not liable to be sustained in view of the material available on record which clearly established that partition between the defendant and his brother had taken place and the suit property had fallen exclusively in the share of the defendant. The only reference of the right of the son is made in written statement while referring to the right of his two nephews and his three nieces and sister-in-law. No independent claim of ownership of son was pleaded in the written statement. Even otherwise, this Court is of the opinion that the defendant cannot be permitted to set up defect in his own title as has been done here. The written statement is absolutely silent about the alleged family partition between him and his son. In the opinion of the Court all such plea appears to have been engineered by the defendant only for the purpose of denying right created in favour of plaintiff on the strength of agreement to sell. The conduct of defendant is material and is clearly lacking in bona fide. 20. Coming to the submission of the Counsel that the judgment of the lower Appellate Court is self-contradictory and that the right of defendant was admitted to be only 1/4th in the property and second substantial question framed is concerned, this Court finds that the arguments of the learned counsel in this regard is wholly misconceived. The lower Appellate Court had merely taken note of the stand of the defendant in the written statement that his right is only to the extent of 1/4th in the property and there was no finding returned by the lower Appellate Court that the share of defendant was only 1/4th. The lower Appellate Court had merely taken note of the stand of the defendant in the written statement that his right is only to the extent of 1/4th in the property and there was no finding returned by the lower Appellate Court that the share of defendant was only 1/4th. The plea of 1/4th share has been set up by the defendant relying upon the averments made in the written statement according to which his brother and his family members also had right in the suit property, whereas their right has seized to exist as per the family settlement dated 24.9.1969 entered into between the defendant and his brother. Law is otherwise settled that suit for specific performance can always be decreed in respect of respective share held by the parties. However, in the facts of the present case, the defendant had not been able to demonstrate that he was not owner of the suit property and the alleged defect in his title and the right of his son over it, clearly was deployed as a defence engineered against the plaintiff’s right and the same cannot be allowed. 21. This Court finds substance in the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent wherein it had been held that the defendant cannot be permitted to plead defect in his own title. Reliance has been placed upon a Division Bench judgment of Patna High Court in Diwali Lal and others v. Sardar Baldev Singh and another, AIR 1985 Patna 344, in order to contend that question of title in a suit for specific performance is not required to be gone into. It is to be noticed that this Court, in Civil Revision No. 602 of 1978, arising out of orders passed in the instant suit had clearly observed that question of title of defendant is not required to be gone into in the facts of the present case. 22. Reliance has also been placed by the respondents upon the decision of the Apex Court in Jehal Tanti v. Nageshwar Singh, 2013 AIR (SCW) 2854, wherein it has been held that any execution of sale-deed in teeth of the injunction would render it unlawful and is void. 22. Reliance has also been placed by the respondents upon the decision of the Apex Court in Jehal Tanti v. Nageshwar Singh, 2013 AIR (SCW) 2854, wherein it has been held that any execution of sale-deed in teeth of the injunction would render it unlawful and is void. Para 9 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jehal Tanti (Supra) is reproduced : “We may also notice Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which lays down that the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless it is forbidden by law; or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or is fraudulent; or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is unlawful and every agreement executed with such an object or consideration which is unlawful is void. Since the sale-deed was executed in favour of respondent No. 1 in the teeth of the order of injunction passed by the trial Court, the same appears to be unlawful.” 23. The transfer of property by son in 1976 in teeth of injunction is held to be unlawful and void. 24. So far as the third substantial question urged by the appellant regarding justification of lower Appellate Court to grant specific performance of contract instead of directing return of earnest money alongwith interest in view of Section 12 and 14 is concerned, is directly and substantially linked to the previous two questions. It would be worthwhile to reiterate that an specific issue framed on the question as to whether defendant was the exclusive owner of the suit property was stuck off and had become final. The pleading and evidence on record with regard to the right held by the son in the property was full of contradictions and remained unsubstantiated. The manner in which suit property has been transferred by son, in teeth of injunction order, claiming himself to be the exclusive owner of suit property, creates further cloud on the defendant’s plea. The pleading and evidence on record with regard to the right held by the son in the property was full of contradictions and remained unsubstantiated. The manner in which suit property has been transferred by son, in teeth of injunction order, claiming himself to be the exclusive owner of suit property, creates further cloud on the defendant’s plea. The defendant once had failed to plead and prove the nature of right held by others in the suit property, it was not open for the Trial Court to assume right of son in the property, especially when no issue was framed and evidence was not reliable. Lower Appellate Court was clearly justified in holding that Trial Could had enlarged the scope of proceedings. In such view of the matter, provisions of Section 12 and 14 of Specific Relief Act are not attracted, particularly in light of the discussions made on the first two substantial questions. The last question is answered accordingly. 25. Having noticed the peculiar facts of this case, an inescapable conclusion to follow would be that defendant appellant had not approached the Court with clean hands. His conduct is clearly lacking in bona fide. The stand taken by the defendant was calculated and engineered to frustrate claim of the plaintiff. In such circumstances the long lapse of time or the transfer made in teeth of injunction would not be and ought not be a factor to deny the relief prayed for in the Suit. 26. Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. ———————