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2015 DIGILAW 2689 (MAD)

M. Manimekalai v. Insurance Ombudsman

2015-07-31

R.MAHADEVAN

body2015
Order R. Mahadevan, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed seeking a Writ of Certified Mandamus to quash the impugned letter issued by the first respondent dated 25.09.2014, in Ref:CHN-L-029-1415-0531 and direct the respondents 2 to 4 herein to disburse the claim made by the petitioner based on the Endowment Assurance Policy No. 745871240 within the stipulated period that may be fixed by this Court. The case of the petitioner is that her husband insured his life with the fourth respondent for a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs only) in Policy No. 745871240 and the date of commencement of the policy is 14.03.2009. In the said policy, the petitioner has been nominated as 'Nominee' to receive the claim. Meanwhile, he died in a road accident on 25.07.2011 and a case in Cr. No. 308 of 2011 under Sections 279 and 337 I.P.C. altered into Section 304-A I.P.C. was registered on 25.07.2011. The husband of the petitioner left behind himself, the petitioner-his wife, two minor daughters and his parents, as legal heirs. On the claim made by the petitioner, the third respondent, by his letter dated 20.02.2012, rejected her claim stating that her husband did not maintain good health and suffered diabetes and hence, repudiated the claim and thereby, directed the petitioner to approach the second respondent, if she is aggrieved. The second respondent, by his letter dated 22.08.2012, confirmed the order passed by the third respondent. Challenging the same, the petitioner approached the first respondent, who, in turn, passed the impugned order. Hence, the present writ petition. 2. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, it is, inter alia, contended that the husband of the petitioner was a known diabetic and had been under treatment before taking the policy in question and it has also been proved by the relevant medical records and since the same has been suppressed by the husband of the petitioner at the time of taking the policy, the claim of the petitioner was repudiated and hence, prayed for the dismissal of this writ petition. 3. Mr. A. Saravanan, learned Counsel for the petitioner made the following submissions: 3.1. 3. Mr. A. Saravanan, learned Counsel for the petitioner made the following submissions: 3.1. The first respondent denied the claim of the petitioner stating that the appeal filed by the petitioner is time barred, however, it could not be so, for the reason that the petitioner had already approached the third respondent seeking to disburse the amount under the policy of her husband, but, the third respondent rejected the same, by his order dated 20.02.2012. 3.2. Challenging the order of the third respondent, the appeal filed before the second respondent was also rejected and thereafter only, the petitioner moved before the first respondent and hence, the reasons set out in the impugned order are not tenable. 3.3. The husband of the petitioner died in a road accident, that took place on 01.08.2011 and a case in Cr. No. 308 of 2011 was also registered in this regard and therefore, the rejection order passed by the first respondent is liable to be quashed. 3.4. Originally, the third respondent rejected the claim of the petitioner on 20.02.2012, on the ground that the husband of the petitioner had suppressed the material facts as to his ailment, namely, ' diabetes mellitus' prior to the proposal of his life for assurance. 3.5. The third respondent has failed to consider as to whether the alleged statements given by the husband of the petitioner at the time of proposing the insurance policy, are material or not and in the absence of the same, the claim of the petitioner cannot be withheld at any point of time. Hence, he prayed for quashing the impugned order. 4. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance on the following decisions: (i) In Ratan Lal v. Metropolitan Insurance Co. reported in AIR 1959 PATNA 413, the Patna High Court distinguished the material facts to be disclosed while proposing an insurance policy and further held as follows: "5. The well-settled law in the field of insurance is that contracts of insurance including the contracts of life assurance are contracts uberrima fides and every fact of materiality must be disclosed otherwise there is good ground for rescission. 1 And this duty to disclose continues up to the conclusion of the contract and covers any material alteration in the character of the risk which may take place between proposal and acceptance. Looker v. Law Union and Rock Insurance Co., (1928) 1 KB 554. 1 And this duty to disclose continues up to the conclusion of the contract and covers any material alteration in the character of the risk which may take place between proposal and acceptance. Looker v. Law Union and Rock Insurance Co., (1928) 1 KB 554. Jessel M.R. in London Assurance Co. v. Monsel, (1879) 11 Ch D 363, observed: "As regards the general principle I am not prepared to lay down as making any difference in substance between one contract of assurance and another. Whether it is life, or fire, or marine insurance, I take it good faith is required in all cases and though there may be certain circumstances from the peculiar nature of marine insurance, which require to be disclosed, and which do not apply to other contracts of insurance, that is rather in my opinion an illustration of the application of the principle than a distinction of principle." Therefore, in this case non-disclosure of material facts even in the absence of misrepresentation or fraud may make the contract voidable at the instance of the parties to whom 'uberrima fides' is due. But then in such cases sometimes a ticklish question arises as to what is a material fact. Authorities say that any fact which tends to suggest that the life insured is likely to fall short of the average duration is a material fact Thomson v. Weems, (1884) 9 AC 671; and rightly so for after all life assurance is nothing but a scientific assessment of an average duration of a life, and that is not possible unless all correct data about that life are diligently and faithfully made available to the company. But then the border line between what is material and what is not material is more often than not so faint and dim that there is always a danger of one being taken for the other. Therefore, in order to avoid this danger one has to be careful in drawing a distinction between what is illness or material change in health and what is ordinary simple disorder. A disorder is not one 'tending to shorten life' simply from the circumstance that the assured dies from it. Watson v. Mainwaring, (1813) 4 Taunt 763. A good health means reasonably good health. Yorke v. Yorkshire Insurance, (1918) 1 KB 662; and National Mutual v. Smallfield, (1922) N.Z. Law 1074. A disorder is not one 'tending to shorten life' simply from the circumstance that the assured dies from it. Watson v. Mainwaring, (1813) 4 Taunt 763. A good health means reasonably good health. Yorke v. Yorkshire Insurance, (1918) 1 KB 662; and National Mutual v. Smallfield, (1922) N.Z. Law 1074. A warranty of good health can "never mean that a man has not in him the seeds of some disorder. We are all born with the seeds of mortality in us' Willis v. Poole, (1780) 2 Parks' Marine Insurance 8th Ed. p. 935. Life insurance is peculiar in that the assured is often ignorant as to the fact most material in assessing the premium -- the state of his own health. Though he may have a general idea as to his own physical well-being, he may well be unaware of an incipient but deadly disease within his system that a doctor might have diagnosed. The rule is, warranties apart, that the insurers may only avoid the policy if the assured knowingly misrepresents his state of health. It is true that this is not consistent with what Roche J., laid down in Graham v. Western Australian Insurance, (1931) 40 LR 94." (ii) Union of India v. Sohanlal Sampatlal reported in (1972) 85 L.W. 38 S.N. : AIR 1971 Supreme Court 432. (iii) P.C. Chacko and another v. Chairman, LIC of India reported in 2008 (2) L.W. 528 : (2008) 1 Supreme Court Cases 321, wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has observed as under: "13. There are three conditions for application of second part of Section 45 of the Insurance Act which are:- (a) the statement must be on a material matter or must suppress facts which it was material to disclose; (b) the suppression must be fraudulently made by the policy-holder; and (c) the policy-holder must have known at the time of making the statement that it was false or that it suppressed facts which it was material to disclose. [See Mithoolal Nayak, AIR 1962 SC 814 : 1962 Supp (2) SCR 571] 14. The insureds brother was an agent of the Life Corporation of India. It was he, who had asked the insured to take the insurance policy. He, being an authorized agent of the Life Insurance Corporation, presumably knew the effect of misstatement of facts. [See Mithoolal Nayak, AIR 1962 SC 814 : 1962 Supp (2) SCR 571] 14. The insureds brother was an agent of the Life Corporation of India. It was he, who had asked the insured to take the insurance policy. He, being an authorized agent of the Life Insurance Corporation, presumably knew the effect of misstatement of facts. Misstatement by itself, however, was not material for repudiation of the policy unless the same is material in nature. 15. The insured furthermore was aware of the consequence of making a misstatement of fact. If a person makes a wrong statement with knowledge of consequence therefor, he would ordinarily be estopped from pleading that even if such a fact had been disclosed, it would not have made any material change. 16. The purpose for taking a policy of insurance is not, in our opinion, very material. It may serve the purpose of social security but then the same should not be obtained with a fraudulent act by the insured. Proposal can be repudiated if a fraudulent act is discovered. The proposer must show that his intention was bona fide. It must appear from the face of the record. In a case of this nature it was not necessary for the insurer to establish that the suppression was fraudulently made by the policy holder or that he must have been aware at the time of making the statement that the same was false or that the fact was suppressed which was material to disclose. A deliberate wrong answer which has a great bearing on the contract of insurance, if discovered may lead to the police being vitiated in law." (iv) In Santosh Kanwar v. LIC of India [Revision Petition No. 2049 of 2000, decided on 09.09.2008], the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, has found that unless the suppression of the disease or ailment is material, the claim could not be repudiated and further, observed thus: "Dealing with similar facts, the Bombay High Court observed in the case of Dipashri (supra) that the insured has taken leave on various occasions by stating that he was suffering from pain on account of Piles, Hypertension, Influenza Dysentery, Influenza, Fever, Diarrhoea, Sprain in leg and Fever. The Court held that non-disclosure of such ailment would hardly be a ground for repudiating the claim. The Court held that non-disclosure of such ailment would hardly be a ground for repudiating the claim. After discussing the Apex Courts judgment in the case Mithoolal Nayak (supra), the Bombay High Court finally held that: The action of the Corporation in concluding from that certificate that the deceased was suffering from serious ailments or illness and thereby repudiating the contract is wholly illegal. The Corporation has raised false bogie of inaccurate statements only to defeat the just claim of the poor widow and the action of the Corporation deserves to be deplored. In the first instance, there was no suppression whatsoever by the deceased. It was not necessary for the deceased to disclose trivial ailments like fever, flue or dysentery. In the judgment, the non-disclosure of the fact that the deceased was suffering from fever or down with flue on some occasions is not material matter and, therefore, the failure to disclose the same cannot be construed as suppression of the relevant fact. As laid down by the Supreme Court, it is not suppression of the fact which is sufficient to attract second para of S. 45 of the Insurance Act but what is required is that such suppression should be fraudulently made by the policy-holder. The expression fraudulently connotes deliberate and intentional falsehood or suppression and some strong material is required before concluding that the policy-holder had played a fraud on the Corporation. In our view, the aforesaid observation would equally apply to the facts of the present case. Undisputedly, the insured deceased, who was a teacher, died on 29.8.1995 due to left lobe of liver tumor, which was not noticed even by the doctor at Jhalawar where the deceased took first treatment. This fact was only clearly noticed by the Tata Memorial Hospital, Mumbai after 11.8.1995. Certainly, it is to be highlighted and noted that for the alleged suffering, the employees of the Government or Semi-government bodies take medical leave for various purposes but that should not be made a ground for repudiation of the claim unless the suppression of the disease or ailment is material and that the insurance company arrives at a conclusion that it would not have granted insurance cover if the said facts were disclosed or would have taken larger premium." (v) Shanti Devi v. Office of Insurance Ombudsman reported in 2009 ACJ 1534 , wherein it is held as follows: "8. Hence, we are of the view that the incident subsequent to the execution of the document if not related to the execution of the policy and two years being the reasonable ground can not be a valid ground for the purpose of repudiation. A suffering or a disease or any death not arising out of any false or misstatement at the time of making the policy can not be a ground for repudiation by the insurance company as alleged or at all. It has to be related to the execution of the document. ********** ********** 11. According to us, fraud and equity can not run simultaneously. If it is a question of genuine fraud there is no scope of showing any equitable justice towards any insured but when at an occasion the authority made an effort for mediation it is to be understood that the insurance company was also not in a position to come to a definite finding about any falsity. Therefore, it can be safely presumed that the question of any falsity does not arise otherwise the Ombudsman could not have poised down to a position of making effort of mediation to render equitable justice. " (vi) Life Insurance Corporation of India v. The Insurance Ombudsman reported in 2009-4-L. W. 331 : 2010(1) CWC 71 , wherein it is held as under: "12. We have noted the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant. There is good merit in his submission. At the same time, though it is a case of suppression, it is difficult to say that it is a case of material suppression. The accident that occurred an year and half earlier does not appear to be a serious accident inasmuch as the deceased was discharged on the same day. As far as the ailment of Diabetes is concerned, it also appears that the deceased was under treatment for a period of three months prior to the date on which he died. The deceased was an young person of 32 years. He was an Engineer and also a businessman. Surely, nobody anticipated the person at that age to suffer a massive heart attack. Undoubtedly, he had some difficulty and that was the reason why it was necessary to have his life covered. The deceased was an young person of 32 years. He was an Engineer and also a businessman. Surely, nobody anticipated the person at that age to suffer a massive heart attack. Undoubtedly, he had some difficulty and that was the reason why it was necessary to have his life covered. It is therefore only that he had gone for life insurance as many others would go at that age with the kind of ailment that he was suffering. This would not come in the category of material suppression, though as rightly held by the Ombudsman and accepted by the learned Single Judge, this will be a case of suppression. The Ombudsman has reduced the amount payable from Rs. 10 lakhs to Rs. 5 lakhs. The premium payable was Rs. 3,346/- per year and the premium was to be paid for a period of 20 years. It is rather unfortunate that the person concerned had died within a few months after the proposal was submitted. We do not think that this is a case where we can fault the judgment of the Ombudsman or that of the learned Single Judge. The deceased has left behind the second respondent and a child. The appellant will see to it that the amount is disbursed to the second respondent within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order." (vii) Ram Dulari Devi v. L.I.C. of India reported in 2010 ACJ 1035 , wherein it is held as follows: "12. There is no dispute about the well settled proposition of law with regard to estoppel, acquisition or waiver when a person makes a wrong statement to the insurance company with knowledge of consequence thereof. In the matter of LIC of India v. Asha Goel reported in (2001) 2 SCC 160 whereupon reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondents at para-12 it was held as under: "12. ... The contracts of insurance including the contract of life assurance are contracts uberrima fides and every fact of material (sic material fact) must be disclosed, otherwise, there is good ground for rescission of the contract. The duty to disclose material facts continues right up to the conclusion of the contract and also implies any material alteration in the character of the risk which may take place between the proposal and its acceptance. The duty to disclose material facts continues right up to the conclusion of the contract and also implies any material alteration in the character of the risk which may take place between the proposal and its acceptance. If there are any misstatements or suppression of material facts, the policy can be called into question. For determination of the question whether there has been suppression of any material facts it may be necessary to also examine whether the suppression relates to a fact which is in the exclusive knowledge of the person intending to take the policy and it could not be ascertained by reasonable enquiry by a prudent person." 13. In (2008) 1 SCC 321 (P.C. Chako & Another Vs. Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India & others), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering an identical issue with regard to claim of insurance policy on the ground of misstatement held that misstatement by itself was not a reason for rescission of the policy unless the same is material in nature. However, a deliberate wrong answer given by insured having a great bearing on contract of insurance may lead to policy being vitiated in law. It also reiterated that the policy can be repudiated if obtained with a fraudulent act. In the aforesaid case the insured has under gone an operation for adenoma thyroid prior to the policy and while answering question in the application form for obtaining the policy, he had denied that he had undergone any operation and thus, it was held that the operation being very serious in nature and there was a deliberate wrong answer which had a great bearing on the contract of the insurance and will certainly amount to obtaining policy with a fraudulent act and can be repudiated. 14. It will be evident on consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case that the ingredients and the requirement under Section45 of the Insurance Act does not apply to the present facts of the case since the statement made was neither fraudulent nor amounts to suppression of material fact. Secondly, the policy holder cannot be said to have the knowledge at the time of making the statement that it was false or it suppressed material facts for the sole reason that the certificate clearly proved beyond doubt that he was fit and accordingly given a fitness certificate. Secondly, the policy holder cannot be said to have the knowledge at the time of making the statement that it was false or it suppressed material facts for the sole reason that the certificate clearly proved beyond doubt that he was fit and accordingly given a fitness certificate. Thus, being on medical leave by itself cannot amount to suppression of material facts nor can it by any stretch of imagination said to be fraudulent or greatly material to be disclosed. There is another aspect of the matter that the prescribed period is two years as provided under Section 45 of the Act for repudiation of such policies and after expiry of two years thereof the policy cannot be called in question by the insurer. In the instant case the policy was entered into in 1999 whereas the impugned letter under challenge has been issued in the year 2004. 15. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned letter dated 04.2.2004 issued under the signature of Senior Divisional Manager is hereby quashed. The respondents are accordingly directed to pay as per the sum assured in the policies to the petitioner, who is nominee of the deceased policy holder, within a period of two months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order." (viii) Krapa Vidpyavathi v. L.I.C. of India reported in 2013 ACJ 1335. (ix) P.V. Suresh v. Insurance Ombudsman reported in 2014 ACJ 49. (x) G. Muthupackiam v. Zonal Manager, L.I.C. of Indiareported in 2014 ACJ 1401, wherein, this Court, in similar circumstances, laid down thus: "11. In the present case, the petitioner's son unfortunately died out of cancer on 06.09.2006. When there was no allegation that there was a symptom of cancer before taking policy or before even renewing his policy, the repudiation beyond the period of two years, is not in order, therefore, the policy cannot be called in question beyond the period of two years from the date on which it was effected. Further, there are facts that the deceased had been taking medicines and injections would not be sufficient to invalidate the policy. Further, there are facts that the deceased had been taking medicines and injections would not be sufficient to invalidate the policy. There are many persons with varying degrees of hypochondria, who imagine they are suffering from all sorts of disease and go on taking medicines whether they are necessary or not, therefore, they cannot be said to be suffering from any ailment or to be receiving any treatment for any ailment and in such cases, the policy cannot be avoided merely by referring to the fact that they had been taking some medicines. 12. In the case of Kalyanai Achi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India (1979 Mad LW 662), this Court has held that there must be satisfactory proof that the assured was suffering from ailments, which means there must be proof of proper diagnosis and there must also be further proof that the doctor had communicated to the assured that he was suffering from particular disease or the assured himself knew that he was suffering from those ailments and that it is only if such knowledge is made out that question of a failure to disclose at all would arise. But, in the present case, as I already mentioned above, there is no proof that the assured was suffering from any ailment at the time of taking policy or at the time of revival of policy. In fact, the panel doctors also, after thorough check up of the policy holder, issued the policy on 15.05.2004, under policy No. 321586863. Had the policy holder knew about his disease, he would not have revived his policy. 13. Further, it is a common knowledge that when the Corporation grants a policy of high bonus and maturity value, it normally insists even for Eco-Cardiogram along with other medical check-up of the insured after which if the policy is issued, it will have to be presumed that the authorised Doctor of the Corporation has cross checked the information furnished by the insured. If this requirement is not followed by the Corporation, it has only to blame itself and not the insured, for, if this were not the right course and the Corporation is allowed to raise a plea of this nature after the death of the insured, the whole purpose of taking the insurance policy itself will get frustrated, which would not only be against equity and justice, but also against the principle of contractual obligation, since the contracting parties are expected to enter into a contract after fully understanding the pros and cons and its Implication, and also to bear the consequence in case of any lapse. The nature of transaction between the Insurance Companies with the insured is clearly in the nature of proposal and acceptance, which gives rise to contractual obligation after the proposal is signed and accepted by the Corporation after which the policy is issued and once that process is complete neither of the contracting parties can be permitted to raise a plea that the contract was void after its execution. This being the well acknowledged legal position, the insurance company cannot be permitted to raise a plea that the deceased insured had not disclosed about his illness at the time of taking the policy, when it was also duty of the Insurance Company to verify the correctness of the information furnished by the insured. This duty of the Insurance Company is akin to the obligation of the insured, who is legally bound to pay the insurance premium regularly and well within time and in the event of failure to do so, the Insurance Company may refuse to pay the maturity amount, therefore, the Corporation cannot be permitted to raise a plea regarding non-furnishing of information to the Corporation after the death of the insured. 14. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order passed by the second respondent is set aside. The respondents are directed to pay the insured amount as expeditiously as possible to the nominee, namely, the petitioner herein." (emphasis added.) 5. Per contra, Mr. S. Karthick, learned Counsel for the respondents made the following submissions: 5.1. The husband of the petitioner was a known diabetic and he had been under treatment before the commencement of the policy. 5.2. The respondents are directed to pay the insured amount as expeditiously as possible to the nominee, namely, the petitioner herein." (emphasis added.) 5. Per contra, Mr. S. Karthick, learned Counsel for the respondents made the following submissions: 5.1. The husband of the petitioner was a known diabetic and he had been under treatment before the commencement of the policy. 5.2. The said factum of his ailment has been suppressed by the husband of the petitioner at the time of proposing the policy and later, it came to be proved by the relevant medical records pertaining to him. 5.3. The insurance policy, therefore, needs to be repudiated on the ground of suppression of material facts and accordingly, the claim of the petitioner was repudiated by the third respondent. 5.4. On appeal, the claim of the petitioner has been rightly rejected by the second respondent and further, the first respondent has also held the claim of the petitioner as time-barred one. 5.5. The deliberate wrong answer given by the insured would have a great bearing on the contract of insurance and hence, the policy may be repudiated. In support of the same, he placed reliance on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in P.J. Chacko v. Chairman, L.I.C. of India reported in, AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 424. 5.6. As held in the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Satwant Kaur Sandhu v. New India Assurance Company Ltd., [Civil Appeal No. 2776 of 2002, decided on 10.07.2009.], in a contract of insurance, any fact which would influence the mind of a prudent insurer in deciding whether to accept or not to accept the risk is a 'material fact' and if the proposer has knowledge of such fact, he is obliged to disclose it, particularly, while answering the questions in the proposal form. 5.7. Here, in the case on hand, the husband of the petitioner, while answering the questions regarding his state of health, had deliberately refrained from revealing his ailment and hence, he had suppressed the material fact while proposing the insurance policy, that came to be rightly repudiated by the third respondent. Therefore, he prayed for the dismissal of this writ petition. 6. I have carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the materials available on record. 7. It is seen that the husband of the petitioner insured his life with the fourth respondent for a sum of Rs. Therefore, he prayed for the dismissal of this writ petition. 6. I have carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the materials available on record. 7. It is seen that the husband of the petitioner insured his life with the fourth respondent for a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs only) in Policy No. 745871240. The date of commencement of the said policy is 14.03.2009. While so, he died in a road accident on 25.07.2011 and a criminal case was also registered in that regard. The petitioner and her two minor daughters are the legal heirs of the deceased insured. When the petitioner approached the respondents claiming the amount insured, the third respondent, by his letter dated 20.02.2012, rejected her claim on the ground that her husband failed to maintain good health, due to which, he suffered diabetes and accordingly, repudiated the claim. 8. Now, the main grievance of the petitioner is that the reasons assigned by the respondents for repudiating the claim of the petitioner are not tenable and having accepted the proposal of the insured, the respondents are not justified in rejecting the same on the ground that the insured had suppressed the material facts. 9. In similar circumstances, this Court, in G. Muthupackiam v. Zonal Manager, L.I.C. of India reported in 2014 ACJ 1401, has elaborately dealt with an identical issue and held that 'it is a common knowledge that when the Corporation grants a policy of high bonus and maturity value, it normally insists even for Eco-Cardiogram along with other medical check-up of the insured after which if the policy is issued, it will have to be presumed that the authorised Doctor of the Corporation has cross checked the information furnished by the insured. If this requirement is not followed by the Corporation, it has only to blame itself and not the insured, for, if this were not the right course and the Corporation is allowed to raise a plea of this nature after the death of the insured, the whole purpose of taking the insurance policy itself will get frustrated, which would not only be against equity and justice, but also against the principle of contractual obligation, since the contracting parties are expected to enter into a contract after fully understanding the pros and cons and its Implication, and also to bear the consequence in case of any lapse. The nature of transaction between the Insurance Companies with the insured is clearly in the nature of proposal and acceptance, which gives rise to contractual obligation after the proposal is signed and accepted by the Corporation after which the policy is issued and once that process is complete neither of the contracting parties can be permitted to raise a plea that the contract was void after its execution. This being the well acknowledged legal position, the insurance company cannot be permitted to raise a plea that the deceased insured had not disclosed about his illness at the time of taking the policy, when it was also duty of the Insurance Company to verify the correctness of the information furnished by the insured. This duty of the Insurance Company is akin to the obligation of the insured, who is legally bound to pay the insurance premium regularly and well within time and in the event of failure to do so, the Insurance Company may refuse to pay the maturity amount, therefore, the Corporation cannot be permitted to raise a plea regarding non-furnishing of information to the Corporation after the death of the insured. 10. A mere reading of the above decision of this Court would show that the act of the respondents in repudiating the claim of the petitioner is not in accordance with law and now, they cannot raise such a plea after the death of the husband of the petitioner, namely, the insured. 11. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, in the light of the above decision of this Court in G. Muthupackiam v. Zonal Manager, L.I.C. of India reported in 2014 ACJ 1401, the impugned letter of the first respondent dated 25.09.2014, in Ref: CHN-L-029-1415-0531, is liable to be quashed and accordingly, it is quashed. In the result, this writ petition is allowed and the respondents 2 to 4 are directed to disburse the claim made by the petitioner based on the Endowment Assurance Policy No. 745871240 within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed. No costs.