ORDER K.K. Sasidharan, J. 1. The learned Additional District Munsif, Madurai Town, directed delivery of the property to the respondents after dispossessing the petitioners. The Court Amin executed the delivery order. When the High Court set aside the order passed by the Executing Court, the petitioners wanted restitution. The application was dismissed by the learned Executing Judge by pleading helplessness primarily on the ground that delivery was not recorded, notwithstanding the fact that the actual delivery was given to the respondents. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The respondents filed a suit in O.S. No. 968 of 2005 against the petitioners. The Trial Court decreed the suit. Thereafter, the respondents filed Execution Petition in E.P. No. 111 of 2011 to execute the decree. 3. The Executing Court passed an ex parte delivery order on 10 October, 2012. The delivery order was executed very promptly by the Court Amin. The petitioners were dispossessed and the property was handed over to the respondents. The delivery order passed by the Executing Court on 10 October, 2012 was set aside by the High Court in C.R.P. No. 385 of 2013. The petitioners immediately thereafter filed an application in E.A. No. 92 of 2013 to put them in possession by way of restitution. The learned Executing Judge rejected the application primarily on two grounds. The first ground relates to the fact that delivery though effected was not recorded. The other ground relates to the non-application of Section 144 of Code of Civil Procedure. According to the learned Judge, only when a decree passed in a suit or a decreetal order passed in an application is set aside after execution, Section 144 of Code of Civil Procedure would come into play. 4. The core issue is as to whether the petitioners are entitled to an order of restitution as provided under Section 144 of Code of Civil Procedure, in view of their dispossession by the Court Amin, pursuant to the delivery order passed by the Executing Court, and setting aside the said order by the High Court after effecting delivery. 5. There are certain admitted factors insofar as the subject case is concerned. The respondents obtained a decree in O.S. No. 968 of 2005. They have filed E.P. No. 111 of 2011 to execute the decree. The Executing Court passed a delivery order on 10 October, 2012. 5. There are certain admitted factors insofar as the subject case is concerned. The respondents obtained a decree in O.S. No. 968 of 2005. They have filed E.P. No. 111 of 2011 to execute the decree. The Executing Court passed a delivery order on 10 October, 2012. The Court Amin has given delivery to the respondents by evicting the petitioners. The learned Executing Judge, at the first instance, observed that delivery was not recorded and as such, re-delivery is not possible. There is absolutely no merit in the said finding. The Court, which has passed the delivery order, is bound to restore the parties to their original position. The Court cannot plead helplessness in such cases. It was only on account of the act of the Court, the petitioners were dispossessed. The order directing delivery was set aside by the High Court. The petitioners are, therefore, legally entitled to re-possess the property by way of restitution. The learned Executing Judge appears to have ignored the legal maxim that act of Court shall not prejudice a party. 6. The learned Executing Judge has given another reason to deny restitution. According to the learned Judge, only when a decree passed in a suit or a decretal order passed in an application is set aside after execution of decree, Section 144 could be invoked. Here again, the learned Executing Judge has overlooked the provision and decisions rendered by Courts interpreting Section 144 of Code of Civil Procedure. 7. The issue raised by the petitioners is no longer res integra, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P. [2004-3-L.W. 286 : 2003(8) SCC 648 ]. The following observation would make the legal position very clear and would prove that the learned Executing Judge was not correct on law. "27. Section 144 of the C.P.C. is not the fountain source of restitution; it is rather a statutory recognition of a pre-existing rule of justice, equity and fair play. That is why it is often held that even away from Section 144 the Court has inherent jurisdiction to order restitution so as to do complete justice between the parties. "27. Section 144 of the C.P.C. is not the fountain source of restitution; it is rather a statutory recognition of a pre-existing rule of justice, equity and fair play. That is why it is often held that even away from Section 144 the Court has inherent jurisdiction to order restitution so as to do complete justice between the parties. In Jai Berham v. Kedar Nath Marwari (1922) 49 I.A. 351, their Lordships of the Privy council said: "It is the duty of the Court under Section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code to place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed. Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the Court to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved." Cairns, L.C., said in Rodger v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris:(1871) CR 3 P.C. (ER p.125) "One of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take cars that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the suitors and when the expression, the act of the Court is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary Court, or of any intermediate Court of appeal, but the act of the Court as a whole from the lowest court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case". This is also on the principle that a wrong order should not be perpetuated by keeping it alive and respecting it, A.A. Nadar v. S.P. Rathinasami, (1971)1 MLJ 220 . In the exercise of such inherent power the Courts have applied the principles of restitution to myriad situations not strictly falling within the terms of Section 144. 28. That no one shall suffer by an act of the court is not a rule confined to an erroneous act of the court; the 'act of the court' embraces within its sweep all such acts as to which the court may form an opinion in any legal proceedings that the court would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the facts and the law. The factor attracting applicability of restitution is not the act of the Court being wrongful or a mistake or error committed by the Court; the test is whether on account of an act of the party persuading the Court to pass an order held at the end as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining an advantage which it would not have otherwise corned, or the other party has suffered an impoverishment which it would not have suffered but for the order of the Court and the set of such party. The quantum of restitution, depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case, may take into consideration not only what the party excluded would have made but also what the party under obligation has or might reasonably have made. There is nothing wrong in the parties demanding being placed in the same position in which they would have been had the court not intervened by its interim order when at the end of the proceedings the court pronounces its judicial verdict which does not match with and countenance its own interim verdict. Whenever called upon to adjudicate, the court would act in conjunction with what is the real and substantial justice. The injury, if any, caused by the act of the court shall be undone and the gain which the party would have earned unless it was interdicted by the order of the court would be restored to or conferred on the party by suitably commanding the party liable to do so. Any opinion to the contrary would lead to unjust if not disastrous consequences. Litigation may turn into a fruitful industry. Though litigation is not gambling yet there is an element of chance in every litigation. Unscrupulous litigants may feel encouraged to approach the Courts, persuading the court to pass interlocutory orders favourable to them by making out a prima facie case when the issues are yet to be heard and determined on merits and if the concept of restitution is excluded from application to interim orders, then the litigant would stand to gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of the interim order even though the battle has been lost at the end. This cannot be countenanced, we are, therefore, or the opinion that the successful party finally held entitled to a relief assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated by award of interest at a suitable reasonable rate for the period for which the interim order of the court withholding the release of money had remained in operation." 8. Since the learned Judge committed a jurisdictional error factually and legally, the petitioners are entitled to succeed. 9. In the result, the order dated 29 August, 2013 is set aside. The learned Additional District Munsif, Madurai Town, is directed to put the petitioners in possession of the property in question. The process of restitution should be carried out by the Court Amin, if necessary, with police protection, within a period of three days from the date of receipt or production of a copy of this order. In the upshot, I allow the Civil Revision Petition. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.