JUDGMENT Suneet Kumar, J. The petitioner/landlord is assailing the order dated 08 February 2010 passed by the Additional District Judge, Allahabad in Rent Control Appeal No.178 of 2005 Kishan Chand Vs. Smt. Anisha Begum, rejecting the release application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. 2. The petitioner filed an application for release of the disputed premises before the Prescribed Authority being case No.44 of 1991. It was urged by the landlord that she purchased the property in question from the erstwhile owner, the respondent tenant had since purchased a part of house no. 179 Roshan Bagh, Allahabad, therefore, respondent/tenant would not require or need of the premises. The release application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority. Aggrieved, respondent/tenant preferred an appeal contending that the house as alleged by the landlord, which though purchased by the respondent was subsequently sold, further no notice in terms of the provisions contained in proviso to Section 21 of Act No. 13 of 1972 was given to the petitioner before filing the release application, which being mandatory in nature would render the proceedings bad in law. 3. The appellate court, on the issue of notice was of the view that since the petition was filed 11 years after the date of purchase of the disputed premises, the notice as contemplated under section 21 was not required to be given to the respondent. Further, since the petitioner did not file any rejoinder/replication to controvert the assertion made in the objections/written statement, therefore, the appellate court was justified in holding the version of the respondent being correct. The appeal was allowed, the release application was rejected. 4. The first point for determination is as to whether the release petition was maintainable in view of the provisions contained in first proviso to Section 21 (1) of Act No. 13 of 1972. The appeal was allowed, the release application was rejected. 4. The first point for determination is as to whether the release petition was maintainable in view of the provisions contained in first proviso to Section 21 (1) of Act No. 13 of 1972. The first proviso requires that where the building was in occupation of the tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such purchase be made after the commencement of the Act, no application shall be entertained on the grounds, mentioned in Clause (a), unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of such purchase and the landlord has given a notice of that in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application, and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years. 5. The appellate Court decided the objection against the respondent/tenant and in favour of the petitioner/landlord. It has been noted in the impugned order that the petitioner purchased the disputed property by way of sale deed on 16 December 1980, thereafter, a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was given to the respondent, informing the respondent of the purchase of the suit property. Thereafter, a suit was filed in 1981. After a lapse of 11 years in 1991 present proceedings were initiated for release of the building which was decided in 2005. The Supreme Court in Nirbhaya Kumar vs. Maya Devi, 2009 (1) ARC 768 observed that after expiry of three years of the proceedings protection given to the tenant has no further relevance. 6. The learned counsel for the respondents placed heavy reliance on the decision rendered in Martin & Harris Ltd. s. VIth Additional District Judge and others, 1998 (1) ARC 109, wherein, the Court held that the notice under proviso to Section 21 is mandatory, but in the facts of that case, it was not an issue before the Supreme Court as to whether the tenant had prior notice regarding the purchase of the property and the release application was filed after three years. The purpose of notice as contemplated under proviso to Section 21 of the Act No. 13 of 1972 is merely to protect the interest of the tenant by informing that the property has been purchased. The purpose of notice as contemplated under proviso to Section 21 of the Act No. 13 of 1972 is merely to protect the interest of the tenant by informing that the property has been purchased. The appellate Court was justified in taking a view in the facts of the present case that there was sufficient compliance of the provisions regarding notice, which in my opinion does not call for any interference. 7. The appellate Authority allowed the appeal of the respondent/tenant merely on the ground that the affidavit (paper no. 63-B) filed by the tenant/respondent in support of the objections/written statement was not controverted by the petitioner/landlady by filing rejoinder/replication, therefore, the appellate court was of the view that the contents of the uncontroverted affidavit would deem to be correct. 8. There is no provision under Act No. 13 of 1972 for filing rejoinder affidavit/replication, therefore, the principles enshrined under Order 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply to the proceedings before the Authorities under Act No. 13 of 1972. Rule 9 of Order 8 provides that no pleading subsequent to the written statement is required to be presented except by the leave of the Court. Reliance was placed on decisions rendered in Ramesh Lal Kapoor Vs. IX Additional District Judge, 1996 (1) ARC 600 and Iswar Lal and another vs. Ashok and another, AIR 1998. 9. Provisions of Act No. 13 of 1972 nor the rules framed thereunder require the plaintiff to file rejoinder affidavit rebutting the allegations made by the tenant in the objections/written statement, failure to file rejoinder affidavit would not tantamount to be an admission of the plea taken in the written statement. The onus is upon the tenant to prove the facts stated in the objection/written statement, unless substantiated by cogent evidence, the landlord is not required to rebut the same. (Refer: Direndra Mohan Saxena vs. Prescribed Authority Bareilly and others, 1990 (2) ARC 178 and Kripal Singh vs. Ist Additional District Judge, 1995 (3) AWC 1548 : 1995 (1) ARC 378). 10. The pleadings before the Court below would reflect that in paragraph 5 of the release application petitioner pleaded that tenant acquired a residential house being house no. 179, Roshan Bagh, Allahabad, therefore, in terms of Explanation (1) to Section 21(1)(a) of Act 1972, the tenant would be debarred from raising any objection to the release of the disputed premises. 10. The pleadings before the Court below would reflect that in paragraph 5 of the release application petitioner pleaded that tenant acquired a residential house being house no. 179, Roshan Bagh, Allahabad, therefore, in terms of Explanation (1) to Section 21(1)(a) of Act 1972, the tenant would be debarred from raising any objection to the release of the disputed premises. The matter regarding release, therefore, would be a matter between the landlord and the Court. The landlord in that eventuality would be required to only prove bona fide need of the premises. The respondent/tenant in the written statement admitted the purchase of the residential premises, but would urge that the premises was sold during the pendency of the proceedings, being a distress sale due to loss incurred in business. Thus, averment made in the written statement being a question of fact was required to be proved by the tenant by leading evidence or on an affidavit. Mere non rebuttal of the assertion by the landlord would not mean that the averments stated by the tenant is taken to be correct. The appellate Court committed an error in shifting the burden upon the landlord to prove a fact which was exclusively in the knowledge of the tenant. 11. It is admitted that a residential premises was purchased by the landlord, then in view of Explanation (1), which provides that in case of a residential building the tenant or any member of his family has build or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same city, municipality, no objection by the tenant against an application under Sub-section 21(1) shall be entertained. The respondent did acquire the residential premises as referred to by the petitioner in the release application. 12. In my opinion the appellate Authority was not justified in accepting the averments of the written statement being correct merely for the reason that the petitioner/landlord had not rebutted it by filing a rejoinder affidavit. The Prescribed Authority returned a finding on the bona fide need of the disputed premises which has not been assailed by the respondent, further finding being a question of fact cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction. 13. For the reasons, stated herein above the appellate order dated 8 February 2010 being unsustainable is accordingly, set aside. The Prescribed Authority returned a finding on the bona fide need of the disputed premises which has not been assailed by the respondent, further finding being a question of fact cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction. 13. For the reasons, stated herein above the appellate order dated 8 February 2010 being unsustainable is accordingly, set aside. The order dated 19 March 2005 passed by the Prescribed Authority is affirmed. 14. It is made clear that no other point was pressed or urged by the learned counsel for the parties. 15. It is provided that in case the respondent furnishes an undertaking on oath before the Additional District Judge (Room No. 1), Allahabad within ten days from today that the respondent shall vacate the premises in question and hand over the possession of the same peacefully to the petitioner-landlord on or before 31 January 2016. The respondent shall deposit the monthly rent of the premises in question before the Court below, as per the current rent fixed and shall continue to deposit the same by 07th of the each calendar month till the vacation of the premises in question, which amount may be permitted to be withdrawn by the petitioner-landlord after due verification by the Court concerned. 16. It is made clear that in the event of default committed by the petitioner/tenant in any of the conditions, the order shall stand automatically vacated without reference to the Court. 17. Subject to the above, the writ petition is allowed. 18. No order as to cost.