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2015 DIGILAW 279 (UTT)

SURENDRA v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

2015-05-27

U.C.DHYANI

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JUDGMENT U.C. Dhyani, J.(Oral) Since aforementioned criminal appeals have arisen out of the same incident and common judgment and order passed by the court below, therefore, they are being disposed of together for the sake of brevity and convenience. 2. An FIR was lodged by PW1 against four named and four unnamed accused on 04.11.1996 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 452, 324, 307, 323, 506 IPC. 3.After investigation of the case, a separate chargesheet was submitted against accused Ranjeet Singh for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 452, 324, 323, 307, 506 IPC. Another chargesheet was submitted against rest of the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 452, 324, 323 IPC. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions. When the trial began and prosecution opened it’s case, charge for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 324/149, 307/149, 506 and 452 IPC was framed against the accused-appellants, who pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4.PW1 Jogendra, PW2 Narendra, PW3 Gajendra, PW4 Satyapal, PW5 Vikram, PW6 Chandra Pal Singh, PW7 S.I. Bhanwar Singh and PW8 Dr. D.D. Lumba were examined on behalf of the prosecution. Incriminating evidence was put to the accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., in reply to which they said that they were falsely implicated in the case. No evidence was given in defence. After considering the evidence on record, learned Addl. Sessions Judge/I F.T.C., Roorkee, District Haridwar, vide judgment and order dated 28.06.2003, convicted the accused under Sections 148, 323/149, 324/149, 325/149 and 452 IPC and sentenced them accordingly. Aggrieved against the same, the appellants preferred aforesaid criminal appeals before this Court. 5. A compounding application, being CRMA no. 867 of 2015, has been filed by the parties to indicate that they have buried their differences and have settled their dispute amicably. Said application is supported by the affidavits of appellant Raj Singh (one of the convicts) and injured Jogendra. 6.Injured persons, namely, Karan Singh, Raj Singh, Ranjeet Singh, Bhanwar Singh and Satish as well as informant-complainant Jogendra are present in person before the Court, duly identified by their counsel Mr. K.S. Verma, who stated that they have amicably settled the dispute with the accused-appellants and are no more interested in prosecuting them. 6.Injured persons, namely, Karan Singh, Raj Singh, Ranjeet Singh, Bhanwar Singh and Satish as well as informant-complainant Jogendra are present in person before the Court, duly identified by their counsel Mr. K.S. Verma, who stated that they have amicably settled the dispute with the accused-appellants and are no more interested in prosecuting them. They say that although the appellants have been convicted by the trial court, but what they want is that they should be acquitted of the said charges and should not be sent to jail, in as much as the parties have resolved their disputes amicably. Accused-appellants are also present in person before the Court, duly identified by their counsel Mr. Navneet Kaushik, who also affirm what is stated by the injured persons as well as complainant in the open Court. 7. These injured persons as well as the complainant are the accused-appellants in the cross case. They have been convicted and sentenced and against the same criminal appeal no. 202 of 2003 is pending adjudication before this Court. 8.Whereas some of the offences alleged against the accused-appellants are compoundable offences within the scheme of Section 320 of Cr.P.C., the others are not? 9.The only question which is left for consideration of this Court is whether the injured persons as well as the complainant should be permitted to compound the offences alleged and proved against the accused-appellants or not? 10. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Dimpey Gujral vs Union Territory through Administrator U.T. Chandigarh and others, [2013 (123) AIC 119 (S.C.) and Narenda Singh and others vs State of Punjab and another, (2014)* 6 SCC 466, has permitted compounding of such type of offences, within the scheme of Section 320 of Cr.P.C. 11. It will also be useful to reproduce the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and another (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160, wherein it was observed, in the context of such cases, as under: “The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarized thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint of F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statues like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” 12. It will be useful to reproduce Sub-section (5) of Section 320 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, here-in-below: “When the accused has been committed for trial or when he has been convicted and an appeal is pending, no composition for the offence shall be allowed without the leave of the Court to which he is committed, or, as the case may be, before which the appeal is to be heard.” 13.Sub-section (5) of Section 320 of Cr.P.C. envisages that even if the offences are compoundable, but if the appellants have been convicted and criminal appeal against their conviction and sentence is pending, compounding may be done only with the permission of the Appellate Court. The same is the situation here. Keeping in view the pronouncement of Hon’ble Apex Court in Dimpey Gujral’s case (supra), Narenda Singh’s case (supra) and Gian Singh’s cases (supra), this Court is of the view that the injured persons as well as the complainant should be permitted to compound the offences proved against the accused-appellants to secure the ends of justice. 14. Since the injured persons as well as complainant and the appellants belong to nearby villages, therefore, this Court is of the opinion that granting permission to the injured persons as well as the complainant to compound the offences proved against the accused-appellants shall go a long way in maintaining peace and harmony in their villages. 15. Compounding application no. 867 of 2015 is allowed. As a consequence thereof, criminal appeals are also allowed. The conviction and sentence awarded to the appellants by the court below is hereby set aside. They are acquitted of the charge of offences proved against them. Appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds are cancelled and sureties stand discharged. They need not surrender. 16. 867 of 2015 is allowed. As a consequence thereof, criminal appeals are also allowed. The conviction and sentence awarded to the appellants by the court below is hereby set aside. They are acquitted of the charge of offences proved against them. Appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds are cancelled and sureties stand discharged. They need not surrender. 16. Let a copy of this judgment alongwith the lower court records be sent to the Court below for compliance.