JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashwani Kumar Mishra, J.—Defendant-appellant Bachan, born out of wedlock of Jagardeo and Smt. Muneshari, has filed the present second appeal, challenging the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in Original Suit No. 390 of 1981 dated 18.3.1983, affirmed in appeal vide order dated 30.4.1986, decreeing plaintiff’s suit for cancellation of gift deed dated 5.2.1959. 2. Original suit has been instituted on 11.9.1980 by Jeodhan Prasad, the original plaintiff, (hereinafter referred to as ‘plaintiff’) for cancellation of gift deed dated 5.2.1959 executed in favour of eldest sons of his three daughters, namely Bachan son of Smt. Muneshari, Kamta son of Smt. Duleshari, Kunj Bihari son of Smt. Shanti Devi. In the suit Kamta, Bachan and Kunj Bihari were the once arrayed as defendants. As per plaint, the suit property consisted of residential house constructed by plaintiff. It is stated that one of the daughters of plaintiff, namely Smt. Shanti Devi, had got a gift deed executed from the plaintiff on 4.3.1980, in respect of part of agricultural land of the plaintiff, while the plaintiff had gone to execute a will. When such fact came to the notice of the plaintiff, he asked his daughter Smt. Shanti Devi to get the gift deed cancelled, but she refused to do so, and she also stated that plaintiff no longer has any concern or ownership over the house and that he may disassociate himself from the house also. Plaintiff alleges that he was shocked and on a necessary inquiry, he came to know from the office of Sub Registrar that in the year 1959 when he had gone to executed a will, the respective mothers of the defendants had got a gift deed executed on 5.2.1959. Consequently, plaintiff instituted two suits on consecutive dates i.e. Original Suit No. 295 of 1981 was filed on 10.9.1981 for cancellation of gift deed dated 4.3.1980, executed in favour of Smt. Shanti Devi, whereas Original Suit No. 390 of 1981 was filed on the very next day on 11.9.1981 for cancellation of gift deed dated 5.2.1959. Consequently, plaintiff instituted two suits on consecutive dates i.e. Original Suit No. 295 of 1981 was filed on 10.9.1981 for cancellation of gift deed dated 4.3.1980, executed in favour of Smt. Shanti Devi, whereas Original Suit No. 390 of 1981 was filed on the very next day on 11.9.1981 for cancellation of gift deed dated 5.2.1959. The Original Suit No. 295 of 1981 was dismissed by the trial Court, but has been decreed in Civil Appeal No. 292 of 1982, against which Second Appeal No. 1939 of 1986 has been filed, whereas Original Suit No. 390 of 1981 has been decreed by both the Courts below, against which the present Second Appeal No. 1736 of 1986 has been filed. Both the appeals have been heard together and are being decided by separate judgments delivered in respective appeals. 3. The Second Appeal No. 1939 of 1986 has been decided first, vide order of date, observation made by this Court, while deciding the aforesaid appeal, have material bearing upon disposal of the present appeal as well inasmuch as plaint of the present suit refers to filing of previous suit and, as such, para 10 to 13 of the said judgment are reproduced : “10. Having considered the submissions raised and upon perusal of the material brought on record, it is undisputed that a gift deed was executed in favour of the defendant, which was registered on 4.3.1980. The suit for cancellation of the gift deed has been filed on 10.9.1981, which is almost after one and half year. In para-18 of the plaint, the ground taken for cancellation of the gift deed is that plaintiff is an old person, who is not in good health and, therefore, taking advantage of it, the gift deed has been got executed, although he intended to execute a Will. In the plaint, however, there is no case set up by the plaintiff that on the relevant date, he was suffering from high fever and on account of his ill health, he had not been able to understand the contents of the registered deed. In the plaint, however, there is no case set up by the plaintiff that on the relevant date, he was suffering from high fever and on account of his ill health, he had not been able to understand the contents of the registered deed. The statement made in Para-18 A of the plaint is reproduced below : ^^;g fd oknh ,d cw<+k vkneh gS mldh lsgr ges'kk [kjkc jgrh gSA mldh fu;r ges'kk ;g jgh gS fd mlds tk;nkn ds okfjlku mlds ejus ds ckn mlds uoklkxku gksos vkSj oknh ds fny esa cjkcj ;g Mj jgk fd vxj oknh dksbZ bUrtke ugh djsxk rks mlds HkkbZ Hkrhts geykoj gks tk;sxsA eqnbZ ds bl fu;r dh tkudkjh eqnkysgk dks c[kwch Hkh il eqn~kysgk o mlds 'kkSgj us oknh dks ;g ;dhu fnykdj dh oknh viuh vkjkft;rk dk olh;rukek vius uoklkxku ds gd esa fy[k jgk gS eqnkysgk o mlds 'kkSgj os eqnbZ dh detksfj;ksa dk uktk;t Qk;nk mBkdj esyh dkfrc o xokgku dh enn ls otk; olh;rukek ds fgCckukek otwn esa yk;s gSA^^ 11. The aforesaid statement clearly goes to show that what is stated in the pleading is the fact that the plaintiff is old person and is not keeping in good health. There is no statement in the plaint that on the relevant date, he was not well or was suffering from high fever. There was no case set up in the plaint that plaintiff because of his illness had not understood the contents of the document or his ability to understand was impaired. In the absence of any such circumstances having been pleaded, no amount of oral evidence suggesting high fever as a ground to impair his ability to understand could have been looked into. Law is settled that in the absence of pleading, no amount of evidence could be looked into. Order-VI Rule-4 stairs against the view taken by the lower appellate Court. Legal position in this regard is well-settled. Constitution Bench in Bishundeo Narain and another v. Seojeni Rai and others, AIR 1951 SC 280 , observed as under in Para-25 : “It is also to be observed that no proper particulars have been furnished. Order-VI Rule-4 stairs against the view taken by the lower appellate Court. Legal position in this regard is well-settled. Constitution Bench in Bishundeo Narain and another v. Seojeni Rai and others, AIR 1951 SC 280 , observed as under in Para-25 : “It is also to be observed that no proper particulars have been furnished. Now if there is one rule which is better established than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Court ought to take notice however strong the language in which they are couched may be, and the same applies to undue influence and coercion. See Order 6, rule 4, Civil Procedure Code.” 11. It appears that the plaintiff had a residential house and apart from having certain agricultural properties. In respect of the house, he had executed a gift deed on 5.2.1959 in which the residential house has been given to the 3 sons of his 3 daughters equally, who were all minors at that point of time, under the guardianship of their mothers. In respect of the agricultural property also, the plaintiff appears to have executed a gift deed to Duleshari on 3.3.1980 and again a gift deed was executed on 4.3.1980 in favour of Smt. Shanti. In the oral statement, plaintiff stated that he neither intended to execute a gift deed in favour of Duleshari nor in favour of Shanti but a suit for cancellation of gift deed was filed only in respect of Shanti. It has further been noticed that the son of Duleshari i.e. Kamta has got an adoption deed executed in favour of his son from the plaintiff. In such circumstances, in the opinion of this Court trial Court was not unjustified in drawing an inference that the plea of the plaintiff that all his previous gift deeds were got fraudulently executed are not worthy of credence when plaintiff is educated and was a responsible officer with the Central Government. In such circumstances, in the opinion of this Court trial Court was not unjustified in drawing an inference that the plea of the plaintiff that all his previous gift deeds were got fraudulently executed are not worthy of credence when plaintiff is educated and was a responsible officer with the Central Government. The lower appellate Court has only taken note of one part of the statement of plaintiff that he was living with Smt. Duleshari and his son Kamta and on the basis of such statement, an inference has been drawn that the execution of gift deed in favour of Smt. Duleshari was justified whereas it was unjustified for Smt. Shanti. This reasoning of the lower appellate Court cannot be sustained because in the statement, the plaintiff has clearly stated that he did not intend to execute a gift deed either in favour of Smt. Duleshari or in favour of Shanti, and as such the finding returned in this regard by the lower appellate Court that gift deed in favour of Duleshari was obvious is contrary to the specific statement of plaintiff which was ignored. The statement of the plaintiff in his deposition before the trial Court is reproduced : ^^lu~ 1959 es eS olh;r ukek fy[kuk pkgrk Fkk ijUrq esjs uokls] jkecpu] dkerk o daqt fcgkjh us /kks[kk nsdj fgCck ukek fy[kok fy;k FkkA fnuakd 3&3&1980 dks Hkh eSus vius yM+dh nqys'ojh ds gd esa olh;r ukek fy[kuk pkgrk Fkk ijUrq mlus /kks[kk nsdj fgCck uke fy[kk fy;k FkkA fnuakd 3&3&1980 okys MhM ds ckjs esa eq>s irk gh ugh gS fd og Hkh fgCckukek fy[kok fy;k x;k gS^^ It is admitted that no suit for cancellation of gift deed dated 3.3.1980 has been filed. The finding in this regard is based on no evidence and is perverse. The lower appellate Court, more over, has not taken note of the fact that the plaintiff was an educated person who was holding a responsible post of Deputy Office Superintendent in the office of Central Government,and therefore, once it was admitted to the plaintiff that he had incorporated his signatures on the gift deed, which was registered, the inference that he had not understood its contents could not have been so lightly drawn. The lower appellate Court has further failed to keep in view the settled principle that Trial Judge had the benefit of observing the demeanor of plaintiff who was clearly in a fine mental state when he deposed before the trial judge as has been recorded by the trial judge. The appearance and gesture of witness had relied upon by the trial judge to favour his conclusion, which benefit was not available to the appellate Court. It would be worthwhile to refer to the decision of Prevy Council in AIR 1949 PC 32 ,relied upon in Sarju Prasad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh and others, in AIR (38) 1951 SC 120. Para-7 is reproduced : “The question for our consideration is undoubtedly one of fact, the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of the oral evidence adduced in the case. In such cases, the appellate Court has got to bear in mind that it has not the advantage which the trial Judge had in having the witnesses before him and of observing the manner in which they deposed in Court. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate Court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. The rule is — and it is nothing more than a rule of practice — that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge’s notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact. appellants’ favour. The High Court passed no opinion upon it having ruled as already stated on the issue of fact”. 11. appellants’ favour. The High Court passed no opinion upon it having ruled as already stated on the issue of fact”. 11. The submission advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent that the plaintiff wanted to give his land in equal proportion and that is why the gift deed was cancelled, also does not appeal inasmuch as the house property was given in equal proportion to the then minor sons of 3 daughters in 1959 and the plaintiff had executed separate gift deed in respect of agricultural land also but it was all being disputed after decades by filing suits on consecutive dates. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent also cannot be accepted in view of the subsequent claim of adoption set up in favour of grand son of Smt. Duleshari i.e. Sanjai son of Kamta, which had the effect of excluding the rights of other 2 daughters. The object of giving property to the three daughters by way will stated in oral testimony is clearly contrary to materials available on record. 12. In view of the discussions made above, the substantial questions, noticed above, are answered by holding that in the absence of any specific pleadings made in the suit with regard to the gift deed having been executed while plaintiff was unwell and was running in high fever and thereby limiting his understanding, such an inference could not be drawn by the lower appellate Court, keeping in view the provisions of Order-VI Rule-4 of the Civil Procedure Code. In the absence of specific pleadings about the nature of fraud played, the suit could not have been decreed. It is further observed that the plaintiff had not been able to prove his case and in view of the fact that the gift deed was registered and circumstances for its cancellation since have not been pleaded, the registration was a sufficient circumstance to indicate execution of the deed. Moreover, the oral statement of the plaintiff, noticed above, since has been ignored, as such, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court could not be sustained and the last substantial question is answered accordingly. 13. In such view of the matter and for the discussions aforesaid, I am of the considered opinion that the lower appellate Court has erred in law in setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and decreeing the plaintiff’s suit. 13. In such view of the matter and for the discussions aforesaid, I am of the considered opinion that the lower appellate Court has erred in law in setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and decreeing the plaintiff’s suit. In view of the substantial question framed and answered above, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court cannot be sustained and the same is set aside. The judgment and decree of the trial Court is restored and the plaintiff’s suit stands dismissed.” 4. A perusal of the plaint of Original Suit No. 390 of 1981, apart from referring to the alleged fraud played upon plaintiff in getting the gift deed executed on 4.3.1980 in favour of one of the daughters Smt. Shanti Devi, states that it was only in the context of fraud having been noticed in execution of gift deed dated 4.3.1980 that the plaintiff came to know about execution of gift deed in the year 1959. It is stated that defendants and their mothers, who were all daughters of the plaintiff wanted to dispossess the plaintiff from his house and were also ill-treating the plaintiff by subjecting him to physical cruelty. It is stated that defendants and their mothers, who were all daughters of the plaintiff wanted to dispossess the plaintiff from his house and were also ill-treating the plaintiff by subjecting him to physical cruelty. Plaintiff states in para 13 that he has filed the suit for cancellation of gift deed dated 4.3.1980 and that the present suit is being filed for cancellation of gift deed dated 5.2.1959 on following allegations : ^^5& ;g fd oknh dh rhu yM+fd;kW nqysljh] 'kkUrh o equsljh gSA dkerk izlkn nqysljh dk yM+dk gSA dqUtfogkjh 'kkUrh dk yM+dk gS cPpu equSljh dk yM+dk gS oknh dh bPNk ges'kk ;g jgh fd oknh ds ejus ds ckn oknh dh dqy tk;nkn ds ekfyd oknh dh yM+fd;kW o mlds cPps gksosA ¼v½ ;g fd oknh dh [okfg'k ;g jgh gS fd oknh dh lc tk;nkn eqnkysgqe ,oa muds eka dks feys vkSj oknh dks blh fu;r ls eqnkysge dh eka ftlesa 'kkUrh nsoh lcls vxqvk Fkh olh;r ukek fy[kus dh xjt ls jftLVªh nrj ys x;hA ijUrq eqnkysge ds ekrkvksa ds fny esa Mj Fkk fd olh;r ukek fdlh le; cnyk tk ldrk gS bl eqn~nkysge dh ekrkvksa us olh;r ukek ds ctk; fgCck ukek rgjhj djk fy;kA ¼c½ ;g fd fgCck ukek dk dHkh usQkt ugha gqvk oknh gj nks tk;nkn ij ekfydkuk dkfot gS tSlk fd Åij dgk tk pqdk gSA ¼l½ ;g fd oknh vius yM+fd;ksa ls I;kj djrk jgk gSA 1959 esa Hkh muds vlj esa Fkk oknh ij mldh yM+fd;ksa dk cgqr vlj Fkk ij bu yM+fd;ksa us vius vlj o dkcw dk uktk;t Qk;nk mBk dj /kks[kk nsdj fgCck ukek fy[kk fy;k ;g fgCck ukek /kks[kk o Qjsc eqnkysge o mlds ?kj okyksa ds /kks[ks dk urhtk gSA ¼n½ ;g fd xokgku gkfl;k o dkfro eqnkysge o muds ekrkvksa ds vlj ds FksA ¼j½ ;g fd oknh dh rch;r ml le; cgqr [kjkc Fkh vkSj izfroknhx.k dh ekrkvksa us ;gh le>k;k fd oknh izfroknhx.k ds gd esa olh;r ukek fy[k nsos oknh olh;r ukek fy[kus x;k izfroknhx.k dh ekrkvksa us ;g lkspk fd oknh dHkh okn esa cny u tk; vius esyh xokgk dks dkfro dks lkft'k esa djds fgCck ukek ctwj esa yk;s gS vkSj nQ~rj ds vgydkjku dks vius rjQ ekiy djds ojoDr jftLVzh Hkh ;g ugha tkfgj gksus fn;k fd oknh fgCck fy[k jgk gSA ^^ 5. The suit has been contested by Bachan and Kunj Bihari on the ground that the gift deed has been voluntarily executed by the plaintiff out of his love and affection for eldest sons of his three daughters, which was duly given effect to, with recording of names of defendants over the suit property, upon an application filed by the plaintiff himself for mutation. It was stated that the defendants at the time of execution of gift deed dated 5.2.1959 were all minor and the question of playing any fraud by the defendants did not arise. It is stated that the gift deed was executed, as plaintiff had no surviving male child and he apprehended that after death of plaintiff, his brothers and their family may interfere with the rights of his three daughters and their sons and that is why the gift deed was executed. It was also stated that the gift deed was given effect to and was kept in the custody of Duleshari mother of defendant Kamta. It is admitted that Kamta has not contested the suit. It has further come on record that after filing of suit in September, 1981, Kamta son of Duleshari has got an adoption deed executed in favour of his son namely Sanjay from plaintiff Jeodhan Prasad on 27.10.1981, as a result of which, it is apparent that only if two gift deeds are cancelled that the property would devolve upon Sanjay son of Kamta and not otherwise. Various other submissions were also raised by the defendants, including the plea that filing of the suit was at the instigation of Kamta for the obvious benefit of his son and that the suit was grossly barred by limitation and was otherwise barred by principle of acquiescences and estoppels. 6. Various other submissions were also raised by the defendants, including the plea that filing of the suit was at the instigation of Kamta for the obvious benefit of his son and that the suit was grossly barred by limitation and was otherwise barred by principle of acquiescences and estoppels. 6. The trial Court on the basis of respective pleadings of the parties framed following eight issues : ^^1& D;k fookfnr cSukek tks oknh }kjk izfroknhx.k ds gd esa fnukWad 5&2&59 dks fd;k x;k gS okn i= dh /kkjk 14 ds vk/kkj ij fujLr gksus ;ksX; gSA 2& D;k oknh izfroknh ua0 23 dk fgCckukek ds i'pkr ykblsUlh gSA 3& D;k nkok oknh le; ckf/kr gSA 4& D;k nkok oknh ekSu lEifŸk rFkk o fooU/ku ds fl)kUr ls ckf/kr gSA 5& D;k okn /kkjk 34 fof'k"V vf/kfu;e ls ckf/kr gSA 6& D;k okn dk ewY;kadu de gS vkSj U;k; 'kqYd de vnk fd;k gSA 7& D;k nkok oknh bl U;k;ky; ds /kfu; {ks=kf/kdkj esa gSA 8& vU; vuqrks"kA^^ 7. Plaintiff appeared as a witness before the trial Court and his claim was supported by Kamta Dubey, who appeared as P.W.2, and five witnesses appeared on behalf of the defendants, including Muneshari and Kunj Bihari. Various documentary evidence was also led by the parties. Issue No. 1 and 2 were tried together by the trial Court, which were the main issues, and trial Court observed that the original gift deed had not been produced and proved. It was further recorded by the trial Court that plaintiff never intended to executed the gift deed in favour of defendants and his intention merely was to execute a will. Trial Court further noticed that the gift deed appears to have been got executed by exercising undue influence by the daughters, and therefore, the issue No. 1, 2 & 3 were decided in favour of plaintiff, by holding that the gift deed was fraudulently got executed. Issue No. 3, which was with regard to the suit being barred by limitation, was answered by the trial Court, by holding that since the plaintiff had acquired knowledge of gift deed only in the year 1981, therefore, the suit was the limitation. Issue No. 4 and 5 were also decided in favour of the plaintiff and consequently, the suit was decreed on 18.3.1983. 8. Issue No. 4 and 5 were also decided in favour of the plaintiff and consequently, the suit was decreed on 18.3.1983. 8. Defendant Bachan filed Civil Appeal No. 100 of 1983, in which lower appellate Court concurred with the view expressed by the trial Court. It was stated that there was inconsistencies in the stand of the defendants, as to who are in possession of the original gift deed and since the execution of gift deed had not been established, therefore, the suit has rightly been decreed. 9. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgments of the Courts below, the instant second appeal has been filed by the defendant-appellant Bachan. Appeal has been admitted on 22.3.1990, on substantial question Nos. 1, 2 & 3, formulated in the memo of appeal, which are as under : “1. Whether the plaintiff’s suit is barred by time? 2. Whether the particulars of fraud were neither pleaded and proved for cancellation of the gift deed dated 5th February, 1959? 3. Whether the Courts below have ignored the own admission of Jeodhan Prasad, the plaintiff, which falsity his case pleaded in the plaint?” 10. I have heard Dr. Vinod Kumar Rai, learned counsel appearing for the defendant-appellant and Sri A.C. Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs-respondents, in support of the appeal. 11. Learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, with reference to the substantial questions framed above, submits that the suit was grossly barred by limitation, inasmuch as the gift deed was executed on 5.2.1959, whereas the suit got filed in the year 1981. It has been stated that the plaintiff has admitted himself to be an educated person, who was working as Deputy Office Superintendent in Bareilly Opium Factory of the Central Government in 1976. It has been stated that the plaintiff was 41 years of age in 1959 and in view of his admission made in oral statement that being a responsible officer, he always signed a document after reading its content, it cannot be assumed that plaintiff was not aware of the contents of deed executed in the year 1959. It has further been stated that the plaint was absolutely silent as to in what manner fraud has been played upon the plaintiff and the suit itself is liable to have been dismissed under Order VI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘’Code’). It has further been stated that the plaint was absolutely silent as to in what manner fraud has been played upon the plaintiff and the suit itself is liable to have been dismissed under Order VI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘’Code’). It has further been stated that plaintiff has admitted that he wanted his property to devolve upon his three daughters and their sons and no circumstance of undue influence of fraud has been pleaded or established. It has also been stated that the alleged accrual of cause is wholly imaginary and could not be relied upon. It has further been stated that both the Courts below have ignored the fact that it was subsequent adoption by plaintiff of Sanjay son of Kamta, which fact stands admitted in the oral testimony of the plaintiff, which in fact was the cause for subsequent filing of suits, so as to disinherit the defendants from the suit property, and thereby to secure the rights in favour of Kamta and his son Sanjay to the exclusion of other two daughters and their sons, but the Courts below have failed to advert on this crucial aspect. 12. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, on the other hand, submits that in fact no gift deed was executed and the plaintiff merely had gone to execute a will in respect of house on 5.2.1959 and the findings returned by both the Courts below for decretal of suit is not liable to be interfered with in the present appeal, as the judgment of Courts below are concluded by findings of fact. 13. Having considered the submissions, aforesaid, it would be relevant to refer to the averment made in para 14 of the plaint, on the basis of which prayer for cancellation of gift deed has been made. Plaintiff has categorically admitted that he had in fact executed a deed on 5.2.1959 and the issue is only as to whether such document was a will, as alleged by the plaintiff, or was a gift, as has been claimed by the defendants. What is stated in para 14 of the plaint is that plaintiff loved all his daughters and was under their influence and that the daughters exercising their undue influence fraudulently got the gift deed executed in place of will. What is stated in para 14 of the plaint is that plaintiff loved all his daughters and was under their influence and that the daughters exercising their undue influence fraudulently got the gift deed executed in place of will. It was also stated that the plaintiff was seriously ill at that point of time and defendants’ mothers had persuaded the plaintiff to execute a will, to which plaintiff agreed, but a gift instead of will was got executed, so that the plaintiff may not subsequently change. It is also stated that even at the time when the gift deed was being registered the plaintiff was not allowed to understand the contents of the document. 14. From the pleadings made in the suit, it is apparent that no particular details, with regard to manner and nature of fraud having been practiced in execution of the gift, have been pleaded, and therefore, particulars of alleged fraud are absolutely lacking. It is admitted fact on record that plaintiff was an educated person, who was an employee of Central Government working with the Bareilly Opium Factory from where he retired as Deputy Office Superintendent in 1976. Even when the plaintiff appeared to give his oral testimony, he was clearly in senses and understood the impact of statements made by him before the trial Court, as has been observed by the trial Court in connected matter. If the plaintiff was in senses, when he was above 70, it would be difficult to conceive that such an educated person, working on a responsible position in a Central Government Undertaking, would not know the contents of the deed, which he executes. The presumption of illiteracy of a Pardanasin lady or that of an old person would not be available to the plaintiff, who is an educated person and was holding a responsible post in the concern of the Central Government, and was merely 41 years of age at the relevant point of time. No evidence of any serious ailment to the plaintiff in 1959 has been brought on record. The repeated plea, subsequently taken in the plaint field after 21 years that he wanted to execute a will but by fraud a gift was got executed otherwise does not appeal to reason as will would be executed once and not repeatedly, as in the plaintiff’s case. The repeated plea, subsequently taken in the plaint field after 21 years that he wanted to execute a will but by fraud a gift was got executed otherwise does not appeal to reason as will would be executed once and not repeatedly, as in the plaintiff’s case. Admittedly, plaintiff has executed three different gift deed in 1959, 3.3.1980 and 4.3.1980 and plaintiff alleges that he wanted to execute a will and gift was a result of fraud. There is further no statement in the plaint about nature of ailment of plaintiff in 1959, when he was only of 41 years nor it has been stated that plaintiff’s ability to understand the nature of document executed was lost due to illness. In the absence of any specific pleading with regard to practicing of fraud, the provisions of Order VI Rule 4 of the Code would be clearly attracted in the facts of the present case, which reads as under : “4. Particulars to be given where necessary.- In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with date and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading.” 15. Perusal of the aforesaid provisions would show that where fraud, undue influence and coercion is made the basis of a suit, then such acts of fraud, undue influence and coercion must be furnished with full particulars in the pleading and the case will have to be decided only on the particulars so givenn in the pleading. General allegations are insufficient and no amount of evidence would be taken note of in the absence of pleading. Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bishundeo Narain and another v. Seojeni Rai and others, AIR 1951 SC 280 , observed as under in para 25 : “25. It is also to be observed that no proper particulars have been furnished. Now if there is one rule which is better established than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. Now if there is one rule which is better established than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Court ought to take notice however strong the language in which they are couched may be, and the same applies to undue influence and coercion. See Order 6, rule 4, Civil Procedure Code.” 16. In the oral testimony of plaintiff, which has been scanned by this Court, particulars of fraud has not been substantiated. The plaintiff has admitted that he loved his three daughters and had made a statement in the plaint that he wanted to give his property to all the three daughters and their sons, which fact was so mentioned in the plaint. It has, however, been stated that now he is not keen to give his property to the daughters. It was further admitted by the plaintiff that he had adopted Sanjay son of Kamta and an adoption deed has been executed. It has been stated that in 1959 plaintiff was not well and his daughter Smt. Shanti Devi asked that a will in respect of three daughters be executed over the suit property and as per her advised, plaintiff agreed to execute a will. Following passage from the statement of plaintiff is reproduced : ^^eq>s 3 yM+fd;ka gSA equesjh] o 'kkUrh gSa] eSa vdsys jgrk gwW fdlh ds ikl ugh jgrk gwWA esjh L=h Hkh ej pqdh gS esjk dksbZ yM+dk ftUnk ugha gSA eSa vius HkkbZ Hk`xw ls Hkh vyx jgrk gwsWA esjh ;g n'kk djhc nks o"kksaZ ls gS tks rhuksa vknfe;ksa ds djrwr ls gSA eq>s viuh rhuksa yM+fd;ksa ls eqgCcr gSA eq>s vius rhuksa ukfr;ksa ls tks eqdnek esa eqYykfte gSA eqgCcr ugha gSA eSa viuh tk;nkn viuh yM+fd;ksa dks ugh nsuk pkgrk gwWA vkSj vc nsus dh bPNk ugh gSA djhc 2 o"kZ ls nsus dh bPNk u jgh gSA ftl oDr eSus nkok nkf[ky fd;k ml fnu ls esjh bPNk ugha gSA^^ 17. Following passage from the Statement of plaintiff are also reproduced : ^^;g dguk xyr gS fd tuojh lu~ 1959 esa eSaus viuh rhuksa yM+fd;ksa ls ;g dgk gks fd eSa rqe yksxksa ds uke fgCck fy[kuk pkgrk gWwA ;g dguk xyr gS fd esjh yM+fd;ksa us fgCckukek dks dcwy o etawj fd;k gSA ;g ljklj xyr gS fd nLrkost futkbZ rhuksa izfroknhx.k ds uke gksus ds dkj.k fgCckukek vius ikl j[k fy;kA^^ 18. Both the Courts below have held that gift deed has not been proved. For coming to such conclusion, both the Courts below have relied upon the fact that the original gift deed has not been produced, although its certified copy was produced before the Court. The specific case of the defendants that the gift deed was not in possession of defendants and that it actually was with Duleshwari mother of Kamta, has been ignored. It was obvious that if Kamta was supporting the plaintiff, and a case of adoption in favour of Sanjay son of Kamta was clearly brought on record, it would be obvious that original gift deed would not be produced if it was wiith Smt. Duleshari or was with plaintiff, as was claimed by some of the witnesses and no adverse inference against the defendant could have been drawn. The execution of a deed on 5.2.1959 was otherwise admitted to the plaintiff. It was admitted to plaintiff that he had gone to the office of Sub Registrar and had signed the document. In such circumstances, mere non production of original gift deed was not a material circumstance. The Courts below, therefore, misdirected themselves in entering upon issues, which were clearly admitted to the plaintiff himself. The Courts below were required to consider as to on the pleadings, made in the suit, the deed itself was liable to be cancelled. It was on record that the gift deed had been given effect to and the names of defendants were mutated upon the property in 1961 itself. The defendants further brought on record documents to show house tax etc., which were being deposited by them. It was on record that the gift deed had been given effect to and the names of defendants were mutated upon the property in 1961 itself. The defendants further brought on record documents to show house tax etc., which were being deposited by them. In view of the admitted position appearing on record that plaintiff was an educated person, who retired as an employee of Central Government and in the absence of any pleading in the plaint specifying the nature of illness, which had curtailed the understanding of an educated man regarding the document executed by him, the Courts below could not have proceeded to decree the plaintiff’s suit. The allegations made in the plaint are absolutely vague and general, and no specific allegation of undue influence or fraud has been specifically narrated or substantiated in evidence. The two suits filed on consecutive dates appeared to have been filed only with an intent to deny rights of the defendants over the suit property for securing rights over the suit property in favour of Sanjay son of Kamta, adopted on 27.10.1981 by plaintiff. The true intent of filing of the suit was thus clearly ignored, particularly when the pleadings were absolutely silent with regard to undue influence or fraud played upon the plaintiff. Both the Courts below have absolutely failed to consider this aspect of the matter. 19. In view of the discussions, aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that in the absence of any particulars mentioned with regard to playing of fraud or undue influence in executing the gift deed dated 5.2.1959, substantial question No. 2 is answered in favour of defendants and it is held that on the basis of plaint averment, the suit could not have been decreed. Based upon the pleadings and evidence brought on record, this Court has no hesitation in holding that in view of the answer made on the second substantial question itself, the judgment and decree of the Courts below are not liable to be sustained and plaintiff’s suit is liable to fail. 20. For the reasons, aforesaid, no further consideration of other substantial question with regard to the suit being barred by limitation, or that an admission of plaintiff has been ignored need be deliberated any further in the present appeal. 21. Consequently, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. 20. For the reasons, aforesaid, no further consideration of other substantial question with regard to the suit being barred by limitation, or that an admission of plaintiff has been ignored need be deliberated any further in the present appeal. 21. Consequently, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgments and decrees passed by the trial Court dated 18.3.1983, as well as by the appellate Court dated 30.4.1986 in Original Suit No. 390 of 1980 are set aside and the plaintiff’s suit is dismissed. 22. There shall be, however, no order as to costs.