JUDGMENT Hon’ble Yashwant Varma, J.—The challenge in the present writ petition is to an order dated 9.2.2009 dismissing the petitioner, who was a Constable in the Armed Police, from service. The order itself has been passed in exercise of powers conferred by Rule 8(2)(b) of the U.P. Police Officers of Subordinate Rank (Punishment And Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the “Rules, 1991”). The provision aforementioned confers discretion upon the Authority to dispense with the inquiry contemplated and liable to be conducted before dismissing/removing a person or inflicting upon him the punishment of reduction in rank. A reading of the aforesaid provision shows that the said power is available to be exercised if the Authority is satisfied that for reasons recorded in writing, it is not practicable to hold such an inquiry. The provision in such sense is akin to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. 2. A reading of the impugned order establishes that the respondent No. 2 has chosen to exercise the said power on the ground that in the departmental proceedings, no person will come forward to give evidence. He further records that the continuance of the petitioner in service would have a deleterious effect on other employees of the Department. 3. A reading of the impugned order shows that on 5.2.2009, information with regard to the conduct of the petitioner was received at about 4:25 in the evening and when police authorities arrived on the scene, it is alleged, that the petitioner was found in an intoxicated state and that his rifle was placed against the wall. Finding the petitioner in such a state, the police authorities, who had arrived at the scene, took into their custody the weapon and ammunition on the person of the petitioner whereafter, he was taken for a medical examination to Lala Lajpat Rai Hospital, Kanpur. The impugned order further records that upon a medical examination being conducted, the authorities submitted a report which corroborated the fact of the Petitioner being under the influence of alcohol and in a state of inebriation during duty hours. The impugned order further records that upon a medical examination being conducted, the authorities submitted a report which corroborated the fact of the Petitioner being under the influence of alcohol and in a state of inebriation during duty hours. The impugned order then proceeds to record various findings on the past conduct of the petitioner and concludes that the conduct of the petitioner was clearly unbecoming of a member of a disciplined force and that his continuance in service would clearly not be in the general interest of discipline in the Department and that the conduct of the petitioner clearly amounted to shaking the confidence which the members of the general public were entitled to expect from a member of a disciplined force. 4. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that ultimately the respondent No. 2 proceeds to record that no person would come forward to give evidence against the petitioner and in the absence of evidence being submitted against him he would get away scot free. The respondent No. 2 thereafter proceeds to impose the punishment of dismissal upon him by exercise of powers under Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules, 1991. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner has submitted that the impugned order is clearly illegal inasmuch as there was no material before the Respondent Authority which justified the formation of opinion that it was not “reasonably practicable” to hold the enquiry against the Petitioner. He would submit that the circumstances did not warrant the invocation of powers conferred by Rule 8 (2) (b) of the Rules, 1991. He has further submitted that the respondent has committed a manifest illegality inasmuch as on the one hand he records that there was more than ample evidence against the Petitioner and on the other that no one would come forward to depose against him. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents and opposing the writ petition has submitted that the petitioner’s work and conduct was never satisfactory and that earlier too he had been suspended from duty in 1994 and that he was also imposed penalty in the year 1997. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents and opposing the writ petition has submitted that the petitioner’s work and conduct was never satisfactory and that earlier too he had been suspended from duty in 1994 and that he was also imposed penalty in the year 1997. Referring to the material gathered in the course of inquiry into the above incident, the learned Standing Counsel further pointed out that on the date of occurrence of the incident in question, the petitioner was found to be present in the Branch premises in a drunken state and is alleged to have misbehaved with the customers. Upon receiving such information, the police of P.S. Najirabad reached the bank premises and took him as also his rifle and ammunition into their custody. He submitted that the medical examination corroborated the fact that the Petitioner was intoxicated at the relevant time and the respondent was therefore justified in terminating the services of the Petitioner. He submitted that the invocation of powers under Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules, 1991 was based upon the subjective satisfaction of the respondent and the same did not commend any interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. Before proceeding further it would be apposite to notice the language of Rule 8 upon which the resolution of the instant controversy would pivot : “8. Dismissal and removal—(1) No police officer shall be dismissed or removed from service by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority. 2. 7. Before proceeding further it would be apposite to notice the language of Rule 8 upon which the resolution of the instant controversy would pivot : “8. Dismissal and removal—(1) No police officer shall be dismissed or removed from service by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority. 2. No police officer shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after proper inquiry and disciplinary proceedings as contemplated by these rules: Provided that this rule shall not apply: (a) Where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) Where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such enquiry; or (c) Where the Government is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such enquiry.” A bare reading of the aforesaid provision makes it apparent that the holding of an inquiry and initiation of disciplinary proceedings against a police officer who is liable to be dismissed/removed from service, reduced in rank is the normal rule. Rule 8(2)(b) is in the nature of an exception and resorted thereto is to be had where the authority is satisfied that it would not be “reasonably practicable” to hold an inquiry. The satisfaction must be born out from the record in light of the fact that the said provision itself mandates that the authority would record reasons in support of his conclusion that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such an inquiry. 8. In the opinion of the Court, no doubt the subjective satisfaction recorded by the Disciplinary Authority exercising power under Rule 8 (2)(b) is entitled to weight and is not be lightly interfered with. This because he is the man on the spot and has access to the material on the basis of which the opinion is formed. Here, however, a caveat needs to be inserted. 9. Firstly, when such an order is questioned in Court, the validity of the order cannot be upheld on the mere ipse dixit of the Disciplinary Authority. In other words the satisfaction arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority cannot be arbitrary but must be based on objectivity. Here, however, a caveat needs to be inserted. 9. Firstly, when such an order is questioned in Court, the validity of the order cannot be upheld on the mere ipse dixit of the Disciplinary Authority. In other words the satisfaction arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority cannot be arbitrary but must be based on objectivity. Secondly, the Court must be apprised of the material or the objective facts which compelled him to form the opinion that it was not “reasonably practicable” to hold the enquiry. 10. Considering a case which involved interpretation of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India (a provision in pari materia to Rule 8[2][b]) the Supreme Court of India in Risal Singh v. State of Haryana and others, 2014 (13) SCC 244 , reiterated the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, 1985 (3) SCC 398 and Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, 1991 (1) SCC 362 , in the following terms : “6. We have already reproduced the order passed by the competent authority. On a bare perusal of the same, it is clear as day that it is bereft of reason. Non-ascribing of reason while passing an order dispensing with enquiry, which otherwise is a must, definitely invalidates such an action. In this context, reference to the authority in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, 1985 (3) SCC 398 , is apposite. In the said case the Constitution Bench, while dealing with the exercise of power under Article 311(2)(b), has ruled thus: (SCC p. 503, para 130) “130. The condition precedent for the application of clause (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that ‘it is not reasonably practicable to hold’ the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. What is pertinent to note is that the words used are ‘not reasonably practicable’ and not ‘impracticable’. According to the Oxford English Dictionary ‘practicable’ means ‘Capable of being put into practice, carried out in action, effected, accomplished, or done; feasible’. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the word ‘practicable’ inter alia as meaning ‘possible to practice or perform: capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished: feasible’. Further, the words used are not ‘not practicable’ but ‘not reasonably practicable’. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the word ‘reasonably’ as ‘in a reasonable manner: to a fairly sufficient extent’. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the word ‘practicable’ inter alia as meaning ‘possible to practice or perform: capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished: feasible’. Further, the words used are not ‘not practicable’ but ‘not reasonably practicable’. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the word ‘reasonably’ as ‘in a reasonable manner: to a fairly sufficient extent’. Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation.” 11. In Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, the Court, while dealing with the exercise of power as conferred by way of exception under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution, opined as follows: (SCC p. 369, para 5) “5. ... Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the material placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry. This is clear from the following observation at SCR p. 270 of Tulsiram case: (SCC p. 504, para 130) A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the department’s case against the Government servant is weak and must fail.’ The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the authority concerned. When the satisfaction of the authority concerned is questioned in a Court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the officer concerned.” 8. After so stating, the two-Judge Bench quashed the order of dismissal and directed the appellant to be reinstated in service forthwith with the monetary benefits. Be it noted, it was also observed therein that it would be open to the employer, if so advised, notwithstanding the lapse of time, to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings. 9. After so stating, the two-Judge Bench quashed the order of dismissal and directed the appellant to be reinstated in service forthwith with the monetary benefits. Be it noted, it was also observed therein that it would be open to the employer, if so advised, notwithstanding the lapse of time, to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings. 9. Recently, in Reena Rani v. State of Haryana, after referring to the various authorities in the field, the Court ruled that when reasons are not ascribed, the order is vitiated and accordingly set aside the order of dismissal which had been concurred with by the Single Judge and directed for reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits. It has also been observed therein that the order passed by this Court would not preclude the competent authority from taking action against the appellant in accordance with law. 10. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid authorities, the irresistible conclusion is that the order passed by the Superintendent of Police dispensing with the inquiry is totally unsustainable and is hereby annulled. As the foundation founders, the order of the High Court giving the stamp of approval to the ultimate order without addressing the lis from a proper perspective is also indefensible and resultantly, the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority has to pave the path of extinction.” 12. It is in the above background that the order impugned here is liable to be judged. A perusal of the order assailed in this writ petition shows that the disciplinary authority has taken a self-contradictory stand. On the one hand, he records that there is conclusive and adequate evidence against the petitioner, and in the same breath, he proceeds to hold that in the departmental inquiry no person would come forward to give evidence against the petitioner. 13. It is not borne out from the record as to and on what material, this apprehension was based. Admittedly, the petitioner is alleged to have been apprehended at the branch of the Bank by the police authorities in a state of intoxication. Even it were assumed, for the sake of argument, that the members of the police force who apprehended the petitioner would not come forward, the bank officers and employees, who were witnesses to the incident were always there. Even it were assumed, for the sake of argument, that the members of the police force who apprehended the petitioner would not come forward, the bank officers and employees, who were witnesses to the incident were always there. The order of the Disciplinary Authority does not even whisper that an attempt was made to muster the statements of the members of the police party who had apprehended the petitioner at the bank premises and that they had refused. More fundamentally it was admitted that the petitioner on being apprehended at the bank premises was taken to a hospital, where he underwent a medical examination. The result of the said medical examination proved that the petitioner was in a state of intoxication at the relevant time. The impugned order nowhere records as to why it was not practicable to either examine the attending doctors and other persons involved in the medical examination of the petitioner. The impugned order also does not record that it was impracticable to have the Medical Examination report proved. 14. More importantly, it must be borne in mind that when powers under provisions such as those contained in Clause (b) of Rule 8(2) are exercised, there must exists material before the authority which enables him to form an opinion that it is not reasonably practicable to hold the departmental inquiry. No such material appears to have been in existence at the time when the impugned order was passed. At least, the order does not refer to or rely upon any such material. Nor was any such material laid before this Court to justify the passing of the order impugned. 15. In the opinion of the Court, the circumstances and the nature of the persons who were likely to be involved in bringing home the charge against the petitioner were clearly present and there was no material on the basis of which a reasonable person could have come to a conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a regular inquiry against the petitioner. 16. Accordingly and in view of the above, this Court has no option but to record its conclusion that the impugned order cannot be sustained. In view of the above conclusions the present writ petition deserves to be and is consequently allowed. The order dated 9.2.2009 is hereby quashed. 16. Accordingly and in view of the above, this Court has no option but to record its conclusion that the impugned order cannot be sustained. In view of the above conclusions the present writ petition deserves to be and is consequently allowed. The order dated 9.2.2009 is hereby quashed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is left open to the respondent to conduct a regular departmental inquiry against the petitioner in respect of the incident in question in accordance with the rules applicable. ——————