JUDGMENT : Hon’ble K.M. Joseph, C.J. (Oral) This is a writ petition purported to be one filed in public interest litigation jurisdiction. Petitioner in the space of the first paragraph of the writ petition seeks to justify his locus to approach this Court invoking the public interest jurisdiction, which reads as follows: “1. That the petitioner is the resident of Rishikesh Town and is representing the residents of ward no. 15 in Municipality of Rishikesh as the nominated Municipal member and is a public spirited person and is raising the grievance of not only the residents of the ward but the general affected public of Rishikesh Town, through this Public Interest Litigation. Petitioner has only public interest in the matter involved and has no personal interest. True and correct copy of the Passport and PAN Card is being marked and annexed as Annexure No. 1 (Colly.).” 2. He seeks to impugn two Government Orders dated 05.02.2000 and 31.07.2000 as ultra vires in regard to imposition of restriction on any type of activities within 200 meters from the banks of holy Ganges. 3. Briefly put, the case of the petitioner is as follows: There was a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) No. 103 of 2011 to remove the constructions built in and after the year 2000 within 200 meters from the banks of river Ganges. The said writ petition was allowed by Annexure -2 judgment dated 26.02.2013. Therein, notices for demolition were issued not only to the private respondents, but also to general public at large on the basis of constructions having been made within 200 meters from the banks of river Ganges. It is stated that there are different towns on the banks of holy Ganges right from Uttarkashi till Kolkata. Different constructions; residential and commercial are existing and are being undertaken on both the banks of the river Ganges so as to fulfill the requirement of the day. Previously the drains and sewerages were connected to the holy river. Even at present, different drains in Haridwar town, Roorkee town are connected to the Ganges. The Haridwar Development Authority was constituted in and around the year 1986. There is a reference to another public interest litigation filed in the High Court of Allahabad to prevent the holy river from being polluted. Even at present, different drains in Haridwar town, Roorkee town are connected to the Ganges. The Haridwar Development Authority was constituted in and around the year 1986. There is a reference to another public interest litigation filed in the High Court of Allahabad to prevent the holy river from being polluted. The State of U.P. to save the holy Ganges from pollution issued Government Order dated 05.02.2000, according to which, any type of activities from the bank of the river Ganges were restricted and the said Government Order was made mild by another Government Order dated 31.07.2000 (the impugned Government Orders), according to which, the religious Math, Ashram, temples and other religious buildings, heritage buildings were exempted and were permitted the construction(s)/ maintenance with certain restrictions in regard to the construction, non polluting the holy Ganges, non-felling of the drainage and sewerage in the holy Ganges and with further approval from the Water Works Department and the Development Authorities. No restriction was ever imposed with regard to the sale and purchase of the properties on both the banks of the river within the area of 200 meters. Petitioner alleged violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India; he has further alleged contravention of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. 4. Pleadings have been exchanged, orders have been passed and we took up this matter for hearing today. 5. We heard the learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Siddharth Singh and the learned Advocate General on behalf of the State. 6. This litigation is purported to be filed in public interest litigation jurisdiction. Public interest litigation has gone a long way from the time of its birth in the early 1980s. In S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India reported in 1981 Supp SCC 87 case, the Hon’ble Apex Court expounded the concept of locus standi. As expounded by it, the Court referred to the concept of primary standing and secondary standing. The Court took the view that in a country like India, where there are millions of disadvantaged persons, their legal and constitutional rights cannot be trampled upon and, in the said context, the Court took the view that it is open to any person, who may not be personally aggrieved, to approach the Court to take up the cause of any disadvantaged Sections. We notice that in Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee and another vs. C.K. Rajan and others reported in (2003) 7 SCC 546 , a three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court has delineated the scope of the public interest litigation after an exhaustive review of earlier case law and has held as follows: “45. Pro bono publico constituted a significant state (SIC) in the present-day judicial system. They, however, provided the dockets with much greater responsibility for rendering the concept of justice available to the disadvantaged sections of the society. Public interest litigation has come to stay and its necessity cannot be overemphasized. The courts evolved a jurisprudence of compassion. Procedural propriety was to move over giving place to substantive concerns of the deprivation of rights. The rule of locus standi was diluted. The Court in place of disinterested and dispassionate adjudicator became an active participant in the dispensation of justice. 46. But with the passage of time, things started taking different shapes. The process was sometimes abused. Proceedings were initiated in the name of public interest litigation for ventilating private disputes. Some petitions were publicity-oriented. 47. A balance was, therefore, required to be struck. The Courts started exercising greater care and caution in the matter of exercise of jurisdiction of public interest litigation. 48. The Court insisted on furnishing of security before granting injunction and imposing very heavy costs when a petition was found to be bogus. It took strict action when it was found that the motive to file a public interest litigation was oblique. 49. The decisions rendered by this Court in different types of public interest litigations are varied. 50. The principles evolved by this Court in this behalf may be suitably summarized as under : (i) The Court in exercise of powers under Article 32 and Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain a petition filed by any interested person in the welfare of the people who is in a disadvantaged position and, thus, not in a position to knock the doors of the Court. The Court is constitutionally bound to protect the fundamental rights of such disadvantaged people so as to direct the State to fulfill its constitutional promises. (See S.P. Gupta Vs. Union of India [1981 (supp) SCC 87], People’s Union for Democratic Rights and Others Vs. Union of India (1982) 2 SCC 494 , Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs. The Court is constitutionally bound to protect the fundamental rights of such disadvantaged people so as to direct the State to fulfill its constitutional promises. (See S.P. Gupta Vs. Union of India [1981 (supp) SCC 87], People’s Union for Democratic Rights and Others Vs. Union of India (1982) 2 SCC 494 , Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs. Union of India and Others (1984) 3 SCC 161 and Janata Dal Vs. H.S. Chowdhary and Others (1992) 4 SCC 305 ) (ii) Issues of public importance, enforcement of fundamental rights of a large number of public vis-Ã -vis the constitutional duties and functions of the State, if raised, the Court treats a letter or a telegram as a public interest litigation upon relaxing procedural laws as also the law relating to pleadings. (See Charles Sobraj Vs. Supdt. Central Jail, Tihar, New Delhi (1978) 4 SCC 104 and Hussainara Khatoon and Others Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81 ). (iii) Whenever injustice is meted out to a large number of people, the Court will not hesitate in stepping in. Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India as well as the International Conventions on Human Rights provide for reasonable and fair trial. In Mrs. Mankeka Sanjay Gandhi and Another Vs. Miss Rani Jethmalani, AIR 1979 SC 468 , it was held: “2. Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the dispensation of justice and the central criterion for the court to consider when a motion for transfer is made is not the hypersensitivity or relative convenience of a party or easy availability of legal services or like mini-grievances. Something more substantial, more compelling, more imperiling, from the point of view of public justice and its attendant, environment, is necessitous if the Court is to exercise its power of transfer. This is the cardinal principle although the circumstances may be myriad and vary from case to case. We have to test the petitioner’s grounds on this touch-stone bearing in mind the rule that normally the complainant has the right to choose any court having jurisdiction and the accused cannot dictate where the case against him should be tried. Even so, the process of justice should not harass the parties and from that angle the court may weigh the circumstances.” (See also Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) By LRs. and Anr. Vs. B.D. Agarwal and Ors. Even so, the process of justice should not harass the parties and from that angle the court may weigh the circumstances.” (See also Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) By LRs. and Anr. Vs. B.D. Agarwal and Ors. 2003 (5) SCALE 138 ). (iv) The common rule of locus standi is relaxed so as to enable the Court to look into the grievances complained on behalf of the poor, the depraved (SIC), the illiterate and the disabled who cannot vindicate the legal wrong or legal injury caused to them for any violation of any constitutional or legal right. (See Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union Vs. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344 , S.P. Gupta (supra), People’s Union for Democratic Rights (supra), Dr. D.C. Wadhwa Vs. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 378 and Balco Employees’ Union (Regd.) Vs. Union of India and Others [ (2002) 2 SCC 333 ]). (v) When the Court is prima facie satisfied about variation of any constitutional right of a group of people belonging to the disadvantaged category, it may not allow the State or the Government from raising the question as to the maintainability of the petition. (See Bandhua Mukti Morcha (supra)). (vi) Although procedural laws apply on PIL cases but the question as to whether the principles of res judicata or principles analogous thereto would apply depends on the nature of the petition as also facts and circumstances of the case. (See Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra Vs. State of U.P. 1989 Supp (1) SCC 504 and Forward Construction Co. and Others Vs. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.), Andheri and others (1986) 1 SCC 100). (vii) The dispute between two warring groups purely in the realm of private law would not be allowed to be agitated as a public interest litigation. (See Ramsharan Autyanuprasi and Another Vs. Union of India and Others 1989 Supp (1) SCC 251). (viii) However, in an appropriate case, although the petitioner might have moved a Court in his private interest and for redressal of the personal grievances, the Court in furtherance of the public interest may treat it necessary to enquire into the state of affairs of the subject of litigation in the interest of justice. (See Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil Vs. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi and Others (1987) 1 SCC 227 ). (See Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil Vs. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi and Others (1987) 1 SCC 227 ). (ix) The Court in special situations may appoint a Commission, or other bodies for the purpose of investigating into the allegations and finding out facts. It may also direct management of a public institution taken over by such committee. (See Bandhua Mukti Morcha (supra), Rakesh Chandra Narayan Vs. State of Bihar 1989 Supp (1) SCC 644 and A.P. Pollution Control Board Vs. Prof. M.V. Nayudu (1999) 2 SCC 718 ). In Sachidanand Pandey and Another Vs. State of West Bengal and Others [ (1987) 2 SCC 295 ], this Court held: “61. It is only when courts are apprised of gross violation of fundamental rights by a group or a class action on when basic human rights are invaded or when there are complaints of such acts as shock the judicial conscience that the courts, especially this Court, should leave aside procedural shackles and hear such petitions and extend its jurisdiction under all available provisions for remedying the hardships and miseries of the needy, the underdog and the neglected. I will be second to none in extending help when such is required. But this does mean that the doors of this Court are always open for anyone to walk in. It is necessary to have some self-imposed restraint on public interest litigants.” In Janata Dal Vs. H.S. Chowdhary and Others (1992) 4 SCC 305 , this Court opined : “109. It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out the tears of the poor and needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. Similarly, a vexatious petition under the colour of PIL brought before the court for vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold.” The Court will not ordinarily transgress into a policy. It shall also take utmost care not to transgress its jurisdiction while purporting to protect the rights of the people from being violated. In Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of India & Others [ (2000) 10 SCC 664 ], it was held: “229. It shall also take utmost care not to transgress its jurisdiction while purporting to protect the rights of the people from being violated. In Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of India & Others [ (2000) 10 SCC 664 ], it was held: “229. It is now well settled that the courts, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, will not transgress into the field of policy decision. Whether to have an infrastructural project or not and what is the type of project to be undertaken and how it has to be executed, are part of policy-making process and the courts are ill-equipped to adjudicate on a policy decision so undertaken. The court, no doubt, has a duty to see that in the undertaking of a decision, no law is violated and people’s fundamental rights are not transgressed upon except to the extent permissible under the Constitution. Even then any challenge to such a policy decision must be before the execution of the project is undertaken. Any delay in the execution of the project means overrun in costs and the decision to undertake a project, if challenged after its execution has commenced, should be thrown out at the very threshold on the ground of latches if the petitioner had the knowledge of such a decision and could have approached the court at that time. Just because a petition is termed as a PIL does not mean that ordinary principles applicable to litigation will not apply. Latches is one of them. 232. While protecting the rights of the people from being violated in any manner utmost care has to be taken that the court does not transgress its jurisdiction. There is, in our constitutional framework a fairly clear demarcation of powers. The court has come down heavily whenever the executive has sought to impinge upon the court’s jurisdiction.” (x) The Court would ordinarily not step out of the known areas of judicial review. The High Courts although may pass an order for doing complete justice to the parties, they does not have a power akin to Article 142 of the Constitution of India. (xi) Ordinarily the High Court should not entertain a writ petition by way of Public Interest Litigation questioning the constitutionality or validity of a statute or a statutory rule. 51. In M.C. Mehta Vs. Kamal Nath [ (2000) 6 SCC 213 , it was held: “20. (xi) Ordinarily the High Court should not entertain a writ petition by way of Public Interest Litigation questioning the constitutionality or validity of a statute or a statutory rule. 51. In M.C. Mehta Vs. Kamal Nath [ (2000) 6 SCC 213 , it was held: “20. The scope of Article 142 was considered in several decisions and recently in Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409 by which the decision of this Court in Vinay Chandra Mishra, Re (1995) 2 SCC 584 was partly overruled, it was held that the plenary powers of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution are inherent in the Court and are “COMPLEMENTARY” to those powers which are specifically conferred on the Court by various statutes. This power exists as a separate and independent basis of jurisdiction apart from the statutes. The Court further observed that though the powers conferred on the Courts by Article 142 are curative in nature, they cannot be construed as powers which authorise the Court to ignore the substantive rights of a litigant. The Court further observed that this power cannot be used to “supplant” substantive law applicable to the case or cause under consideration of the Court. Article 142, even with the width of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby achieve something indirectly which cannot be achieved directly.” (See also Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409 ) 52. This Court in BALCO Employees’ Union (Regd.) (supra) succinctly opined: “Public interest litigation, or PIL as it is more commonly known, entered the Indian judicial process in 1970. It will not be incorrect to say that it is primarily the Judges who have innovated this type of litigation as there was a dire need for it. At that stage, it was intended to vindicate public interest where fundamental and other rights of the people who were poor, ignorant or in socially or economically disadvantageous position and were unable to seek legal redress were required to be espoused. At that stage, it was intended to vindicate public interest where fundamental and other rights of the people who were poor, ignorant or in socially or economically disadvantageous position and were unable to seek legal redress were required to be espoused. PIL was not meant to be adversarial in nature and was to be a cooperative and collaborative effort of the parties and the court so as to secure justice for the poor and the weaker sections of the community who were not in a position to protect their own interests. Public interest litigation was intended to mean nothing more than what words themselves said viz. “litigation in the interest of the public”. 78. While PIL initially was invoked mostly in cases connected with the relief to the people and the weaker sections of the society and in areas where there was violation of human rights under Article 21, but with the passage of time, petitions have been entertained in other spheres. Prof. S. B. Sathe has summarised the extent of the jurisdiction which has now been exercised in the following words : “PIL may, therefore, be described as satisfying one or more of the following parameters. These are not exclusive but merely descriptive : - Where the concerns underlying a petition are not individualist but are shared widely by a large number of people (bonded labour, undertrial prisoners, prison inmates). - Where the affected persons belong to the disadvantaged sections of society (women, children, bonded labour, unorganised labour etc.). - Where judicial law making is necessary to avoid exploitation (inter-country adoption, the education of the children of the prostitutes). - Where judicial intervention is necessary for the protection of the sanctity of democratic institutions (independence of the judiciary, existence of grievances redressal forums). - Where administrative decisions related to development are harmful to the environment and jeopardize people’s right to natural resources such as air or water.” 79. There is, in recent years, a feeling which is not without any foundation that public interest litigation is now tending to become publicity interest litigation or private interest litigation and has a tendency to be counterproductive. 80. PIL is not a pill or a panacea for all wrongs. There is, in recent years, a feeling which is not without any foundation that public interest litigation is now tending to become publicity interest litigation or private interest litigation and has a tendency to be counterproductive. 80. PIL is not a pill or a panacea for all wrongs. It was essentially meant to protect basic human rights of the weak and the disadvantaged and was a procedure which was innovated where a public-spirited person files a petition in effect on behalf of such persons who on account of poverty, helplessness or economic and social disabilities could not approach the court for relief. There, have been, in recent times, increasingly instances of abuse of PIL. Therefore, there is a need to re-emphasize the parameters within which PIL can be resorted to by a petitioner and entertained by the court. This aspect has come up for consideration before this Court and all we need to do is to recapitulate and re-emphasize the same.” 53. We do not intend to say that the dicta of this Court in Balco Employees Union (supra) contains the last words. But the same may be considered to be in the nature of guidelines for entertaining a public interest litigation. 54. Incidentally, on the administrative side of this Court, certain guidelines have been issued to be followed for entertaining Letters/ Petitions received by this Court as Public Interest Litigation. 55. We do not intend to lay down any strict rule as to the scope and extent of a Public Interest Litigation, as each case has to be judged on its own merits. Furthermore, different problems may have to be dealt with differently.” 7. In this case, there is no pleading as such that the petition was filed on behalf of any disadvantaged Section of the society. What the petitioner wishes the Court to adjudicate is the vires of the Government Orders of the year 2000 issued by the State of U.P., which is binding on the State of Uttarakhand also under the State Reorganisation Act. No doubt, the case of the petitioner is that it is the recent judgment of the Court in a public interest litigation, which constrained him to approach this Court. There is no review as such of the judgment sought by anyone. Article 300A of the Constitution of India is one of the grounds for approaching this Court. No doubt, the case of the petitioner is that it is the recent judgment of the Court in a public interest litigation, which constrained him to approach this Court. There is no review as such of the judgment sought by anyone. Article 300A of the Constitution of India is one of the grounds for approaching this Court. Article 300A of the Constitution of India prohibits deprivation of property of any person save by procedure established by law. There could arise questions like whether there is any deprivation at all in this case or whether there is only restriction? Who can allege deprivation of his right, but the owner of the right alone. As far as Article 14 is concerned, no doubt, temples, Maths are treated differently. We need not go into these aspects at the instance of the petitioner. We are mindful of the order passed by this Court in the public interest litigation. No doubt, the learned Advocate General would submit that there is new legislation enacted by the Uttarakhand legislature. The said legislation was passed in the year 2012. In the light of that, Sri Siddharth Singh would also have a case that, in the light of the subsequent legislation, the executive order would fade into insignificance and there cannot be any demolition carried out. Sri Siddharth Singh also has a case, no doubt, that, on the basis of this public interest litigation, persons, who have got themselves impleaded, are, therefore, persons, who are aggrieved and the petitioner came to Court as an elected representative. There are only three persons, who have intervened, we stand informed by Sri Siddharth Singh. 8. We are of the view that this petition deserves to be dismissed as we are of the view that this litigation would not fall within the four walls of type of litigation, which could be classified as a public interest litigation, having regard to the nature of the pleadings also in the case. 9. In such circumstances, though we did toy with the idea of imposing a heavy cost, we restrained ourselves from doing so, but we dismiss the writ petition. 10. We make it clear that this judgment will not stand in the way of any aggrieved party approaching the Court and seeking relief as he/she may be entitled to and he/she is advised to.