ORDER Several cases stand registered at various police stations informing commission of offences in the conduct of granite quarry operations. As many common questions arise and the submissions of some counsel in certain petitions have been adopted by others, these petitions may be disposed of under a common order. 2. The tabular statement herein below informs, in brief, the complaint allegations and the offences alleged: Crl.O.P (MD)No Crime No. On the file of Offences Name of the complainant Nature of allegation 14908/ 2012 161/ 2012 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 447, 379 IPC r/w 3(1) of TNPPDL Act and 4(1), 4(2)(A), 4(3), 21(b) and (5) of MMDR Act. A.Parthiban, VAO M/s.Olympus Granite Pvt. Ltd. was granted lease for conducting quarry operations in S.No.259/ 4B2 at Keelavalavu village. They trespassed into the poramboke lands (TAMIN) and conducted quarry operations. 14668/ 2012 183/ 2012 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 447, 379, 109, 120(b), 201, 406, 420 IPC r/w 3(1), 4(1) of TNPPDL Act, 4(1), 4(2)(A), 4(3), 21(b) and 5 of MMDR Act and 4 of Explosives Substances Act Mohamed Ali, VAO Petitioner was granted lease in respect of S.No. 209/3F at E.Malampatti Village. However, petitioner trespassed into the adjacent poramboke land (S.No.210) and conducted quarry operations. 16107/ 2013 225/ 2013 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 147, 447, 379, 434, 304(ii) r/w 511 IPC and 3(1) of TNPPDL Act r/w 4(1) 4(1)(A) r/w 21, 23 MMDR Act 1957 and 4 of Explosives Substances Act, 1908 P.Ravichandra Prabhu, VAO Quarrying lease was granted to first petitioner. He along with other accused illegally carried out quarrying operation in the adjacent land in S.F.No.70/1, 70/8A, 71/6, 71/7, 71/8, 72/2, 72/5B2, 72/15, 75/12, 75/14A using explosives. 16108/ 2013 415/ 2013 Othakadai Police Station, Madurai District 120(B), 406, 420, 447, 379, 304(ii) r/w 511 IPC and 3(1)(2) of TNPPDL Act and 4(A), 4(1)(A) and 21 of MMDR Act and 3(a), 4(a) of Explosives Substances Act, 1908 Vincent Xavier Raj, Tahsildar, Madurai District Mining lease granted in respect of S.F.No.56/1 & 94/6. However, accused illegally conducted quarrying operations in the adjacent lands and caused loss to the Government. 4774/ 2013 146/ 2012 Pattiveeran patti Police Station, Dindigul District 379, 420 IPC and 4(1)(A) of Mines and Minerals Regulation Act, 1952. P.Paranjothi, VAO Accused illegally conducted quarrying operation in the Government poromboke land. However, accused illegally conducted quarrying operations in the adjacent lands and caused loss to the Government. 4774/ 2013 146/ 2012 Pattiveeran patti Police Station, Dindigul District 379, 420 IPC and 4(1)(A) of Mines and Minerals Regulation Act, 1952. P.Paranjothi, VAO Accused illegally conducted quarrying operation in the Government poromboke land. 6597/ 2013 155/ 2012 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 447, 379, 201 IPC r/w 3(1) of TNPPDL Act and 4(1), 4(2) (A), 4(3) and 21(b) (5) of MMDR Act. M.Akbar Sait, VAO PRP exports was granted quarrying lease. However, they trespassed into the adjacent poramboke land and illegally carried out quarrying operation. 6595/ 2013 62/ 2013 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 447, 379, 201, 420, 109, 120(B) IPC r/w 3(1) of TNPPDL Act and 4(1)(A), 21 & 23 of MMDR Act, 1957 and 4 of Explosives Substances Act. M.Akbar Sait, VAO M/s.PRP exports has been granted mining lease. They trespassed into the Government poramboke land and illegally carried out quarrying operation. 6596/ 2013 61/ 2013 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 120(B), 109, 447, 379, 420, 201, 304(1) IPC r/w 3(1) of TNPPDL Act and 4(1)(A), 21, 23 of MMDR Act, 1957 and 4 of Indian Explosives Substances Act. M.Akbar Sait, VAO One Kottaiveeran (lessee) has been granted mining lease for Survey No.99, Keelaiyur village, Government poramboke Land, who, in turn entered into an agreement dated 01.04.2000 with one P.Palanichamy and K.Murugesan for conducting quarry operation in the same lease hold area. The further allegation is that the accused trespassed into the Government poramboke land, used explosives to blast granite and stole the same causing loss to the Government. 6410/ 2013 508/ 2012 Othakadai Police Station, Madurai District 447, 379, 409, 406, 420, 109, 120(B) IPC r/w 3(1) of TNPPDL Act and 4(1), 4(1)(A) and 21 & 23 of MMDR Act, 1957 and 4 of Explosives Substances Act and 5 of TN Protection of Tanks and Eviction of Encroachment Act, 2007 M.Prabhakaran VAO Petitioner's firm and their employees trespassed into the Government poramboke land in Survey No.224/12 and carried out quarrying operation. 6430/ 2013 171/ 2012 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 447, 379, 201, 406, 420, 109, 120(B) IPC r/w 3(1), 4(1) of TNPPDL Act and 4(1), 4(2)(A), 4(3) and 21B & 5 of MMDR Act, 1957 and 4 of Explosives Substances Act A.Mohamed Ali, VAO Accused trespassed into the Government poramboke land and illegally carried out quarry operation. 6681/ 2013 257/ 2012 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 447, 109, 379, 406, 420 IPC, 3(1) of TNPPDL Act r/w 4(1), 4(1) A & 21, 23 of MMDR Act 1957, 4 of Explosives Substances Act M.Akbar Sait, VAO M/s.PRP exports trespassed into the poramboke land and illegally carried out mining work. 6682/ 2013 256/ 2012 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 447, 109, 406, 420, 379 IPC, 3(1) of TNPPDL Act r/w 4(1), 4(1)A & 21, 23 of MMDR Act, 1957 & 4 of Explosives Substances Act. M.Akbar Sait, VAO M/s.PRP granites and its employees alleged to have trespassed into S.No.32/1, 232/2A1, 232/2A2, 231/2, 231/3, 231/5A1, 231/5A2, 231/5B and illegally carried out quarrying operations using explosives. 6683/ 2013 258/ 2012 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 447, 379, 406, 420, 109 IPC, 3(1) of TNPPDL Act r/w 4(1), 4(1)(A), 21, 23 of MMDR Act, 1957 and 4 of Explosives Substances Act. M.Akbar Sait, VAO M/s.PRP exports and its employees alleged to have trespassed into poramboke land and carried out mining work. 6436/ 2013 509/ 2012 Othakadai Police Station, Madurai District 447, 379, 406, 420, 409, 109, 120(B) IPC r/w 3(1) of TNPPDL Act and 4(1), 4(1-A) and 21 & 23 of MMDR Act, 1957 and 5 of Tamil Nadu Protection of Tanks and Eviction of Encroachment Act, 2007. M.Prabhakaran, VAO Petitioners alleged to have trespassed into the poramboke land in S.No. 200/4 and 200/6 and illegally carried out mining work. 6438/ 2013 175/ 2012 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 447, 379, 406, 420 IPC, 3(1) of TNPPDL Act r/w 4(1), 4(2) (A), 4(3) and 21(b) (5) of MMDR Act, 1957. A.Parthiban, VAO M/s.PRP granites trespassed into the land situated nearby Vembakudi Kanmoi in S.No.67/12 and illegally carried out quarrying operation. 7581/ 2013 105/ 2013 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 447, 379, 434, 304(i) r/w 511 IPC and 3a(A) of Explosives Substances Act. M.Akbar Sait, VAO M/s.PRP granites and its employees illegally trespassed into the poramboke land and carried out quarrying operation using explosives. 7581/ 2013 105/ 2013 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 447, 379, 434, 304(i) r/w 511 IPC and 3a(A) of Explosives Substances Act. M.Akbar Sait, VAO M/s.PRP granites and its employees illegally trespassed into the poramboke land and carried out quarrying operation using explosives. 7595/ 2013 107/ 2013 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 120-B, 430, 447, 379, 434, 304(i) r/w 511 IPC and 3a(A) of Explosives Substances Act and 3(i)(ii) of TNPPDL Act M.Akbar Sait, VAO M/s.PRP granites and its employees illegally trespassed into the poramboke land and carried out quarrying operation using explosives. 12970/ 2013 201/ 2013 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 147, 447, 379, 406, 409, 420, 120(b) IPC and 3(1) of TNPPDL Act and 4(1), 4(1-a), 21, 23 of MMDR Act C.Venkatasubb u, retired Thasildar & Power Agent of K.N.Solairajan De facto complainant is the power agent of one K.N.Solairajan. He was granted permission to carry out quarrying operation in S.F.No.297/5 for 10 Hectares. However, they have been permitted to use only 2 Hectares. It is alleged that TAMIN and its raising contractors Sindhu Granite and PRP Granites and Exports have illegally conducted quarrying operation in the area allotted to the complainant. On representation, the de facto complainant was permitted to carry out quarry operation in the area allotted to him by the then Collector. However, the present Collector has sent a show cause notice to the de facto complainant three months back questioning illegal conduct of quarry operation. 15862/ 2013 221/ 2013 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 147, 406, 420, 447, 434, 379, 304(ii) r/w 511 IPC, 3(1) of TNPPDL Act and 4(1), 4(1)(A), 21, 23 of MMDR Act and 4 of Explosives Substances Act. A.Poopandi, Revenue Inspector The accused trespassed into the adjacent poramboke land and carried out quarrying operation using explosives. 15863/ 2013 223/ 2013 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 147, 447, 379 IPC r/w 3(1) of TNPPDL Act and 4(1), 4(1) (A), 21, 23 of MMDR Act and 4 of Explosives Substances Act. P.Ravichandra Prabhu, VAO The accused trespassed into the adjacent poramboke land and carried out quarrying operation using explosives. 15864/ 2013 222/ 2013 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 147, 447, 379, 406, 434, 420, 304(ii) r/w 511 IPC, 3(1) of TNPPDL Act, 4(1) 4(1)(A) r/w 21, 23 of MMDR Act, 1957 & 4 of Explosives Substances Act, 1908. P.Ravichandra Prabhu, VAO The accused trespassed into the adjacent poramboke land and carried out quarrying operation using explosives. 15864/ 2013 222/ 2013 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 147, 447, 379, 406, 434, 420, 304(ii) r/w 511 IPC, 3(1) of TNPPDL Act, 4(1) 4(1)(A) r/w 21, 23 of MMDR Act, 1957 & 4 of Explosives Substances Act, 1908. P.Ravichandra Prabhu, VAO The accused trespassed into the adjacent poramboke land and carried out quarrying operation using explosives. 16484/ 2013 418/ 2013 Melur Police Station, Madurai 120(b), 406, 420, 434, 447, 430, 379, 304(2) r/w 511 IPC, 3(a), 4(a) of Explosives Substances Act, 3(1) (2) of TNPPDL Act and 4(A), 4(1) and 21(b) of MMDR Act. S.Anuradha, VAO Between 2009 and 2012, petitioner's firm carried out illegal quarrying operation in the adjacent poramboke land using explosives. 6667/ 2013 487/ 2012 Othakadai Police Station, Madurai 447, 341 IPC and 3(1) of TNPPDL Act and 4 & 5 of Tamil Nadu Protection of Tanks and Eviction of Encroachment Act, 2007. P.Archunan PRP granites dumped granite waste, debris and other rock materials in the water bodies. 6668/ 2013 497/ 2012 Othakadai Police Station, Madurai District 447, 341 IPC and 3(1) of TNPPDL Act and 5 of Tamil Nadu Protection of Tanks and Eviction of Encroachment Act, 2007. Marichamy, AE, PWD, Madurai PRP granites dumped granite waste, debris and other rock materials in the water bodies. 6669/ 2013 498/ 2012 Othakadai Police Station, Madurai District 447, 341 IPC and 3(1) of TNPPDL Act and 5 of Tamil Nadu Protection of Tanks and Eviction of Encroachment Act, 2007. Marichamy, AE, PWD, Madurai Encroached Chittampatti Tributary canal in 2006 and destroyed the same. 7268/ 2013 194/ 2013 B1 Melur Police Station, Madurai 447, 295, 295(A), 296, 430 IPC & 3(i) (ii), 3(2) of TNPPDL Act. M.Jeevaveeran Accused encroached the temple lands, ponds, wells, which were said to have been used by the Narasingampatti village people for worship. 22808/ 2014 158/ 2012 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 379 IPC & 3(1) of TNPPDL Act @ 447, 379, 109, 120(b), 406 IPC r/w 3(1) & 4(1) of TNPPDL Act and 4(1), 4(2)(A), 4(3), 21(b)(5) of MMDR Act and 4 of Explosives Substances Act Rukmani, VAO M/s.Om Sri Granites was granted lease to carry out quarry operations. 22808/ 2014 158/ 2012 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 379 IPC & 3(1) of TNPPDL Act @ 447, 379, 109, 120(b), 406 IPC r/w 3(1) & 4(1) of TNPPDL Act and 4(1), 4(2)(A), 4(3), 21(b)(5) of MMDR Act and 4 of Explosives Substances Act Rukmani, VAO M/s.Om Sri Granites was granted lease to carry out quarry operations. However, the accused trespassed into poramboke land and conducted quarry operations 22813/ 2014 222/ 2012 Keelavalavu Police Station, Melur Taluk, Madurai 447, 430 and 3(1) of TNPPDL Act P.Balasubrama niyan, Junior Engineer M/s.Om Sri Granties encroached the kanmoi in S.No.44, belonging to Public Works Department, stocked granites and damaged the same and thereby caused loss to the Government 5431/ 2014 142/ 2013 Vikkiramang alam Police Station, Madurai 447, 379, 434, 417, 420, 430, 467, 468, 304(ii) & 511 IPC, 3(1) of TNPPDL Act, 1992, 6, 3(a) and 4(a) of Explosives Substances Act, 1908 and 4(1)(A), 21 and 23 of MMDR Act, 1957 A.Thirupathi, VAO Accused firm illegally conducted quarry operation in the adjacent poramboke land. 22247/ 2014 546/ 2012 Othakadai Police Station, Madurai District 147, 447 IPC and 3(1) of TNPPDL Act and 5 of Tamil Nadu Protection of Tanks and Eviction of Encroachment Act, 2007 Marichamy, AE, PWD, Madurai M/s.Kumar exports encroached and damaged the irrigation channel situated at S.No.159/1, Kodikulam, and caused loss to the tune of Rs.20 lakhs. 5200/ 2015 12/ 2015 District Crime Branch, Madurai. 447, 379, 120(b), 420, 430, 434, 304(ii) r/w 511 of IPC, 3(1)(ii) of TNPPDL Act, 6 r/w 3(a) & 4(a) of Explosives Substances Act and 4(1), 4(1A), 21 and 23 of MMDR Act. C.Rathinavel Thasildar Accused excavated 1554.04 stones in excess of lease granted as also excavated stones in the non-permitted areas. 5201/ 2015 12/ 2015 District Crime Branch, Madurai 447, 379, 120(b), 420, 430, 434, 304(ii) r/w 511 of IPC, 3(1)(ii) of TNPPDL Act, 6 r/w 3(a) & 4(a) of Explosives Substances Act and 4(1), 4(1A), 21 and 23 of MMDR Act. C.Rathinavel Thasildar Accused excavated stones exceeding their limit as also excavated stones in the non-permitted areas. 5201/ 2015 12/ 2015 District Crime Branch, Madurai 447, 379, 120(b), 420, 430, 434, 304(ii) r/w 511 of IPC, 3(1)(ii) of TNPPDL Act, 6 r/w 3(a) & 4(a) of Explosives Substances Act and 4(1), 4(1A), 21 and 23 of MMDR Act. C.Rathinavel Thasildar Accused excavated stones exceeding their limit as also excavated stones in the non-permitted areas. 3316/ 2015 17/ 2015 District Crime Branch, Madurai 120(B), 447, 379, 434, 420, 304(ii) IPC r/w 511 IPC and 3(1) of TNPPDL Act and 3(a), 4(a) of Explosives Substances Act and 4(1), 4(1-A) and 21 of MMDR Act S.Pandiyarajan, VAO Accused were granted quarrying lease in respect of S.No.94/2 for a period of 10 years. They trespassed into the adjacent poramboke land (Udasakullam) along with other accused and carried out quarrying operation using explosives and transported granite blocks. 5146/ 2015 23/ 2015 District Crime Branch, Madurai 120(B), 379, 420, 434, 447, 304(ii) r/w 511 IPC and 3(i) of TNPPDL Act and 3(a), 4(a) of Explosives Substances Act and 4(1), 4(1-A), 21 of MMDR Act. A.Thirupathi, VAO Carried out quarrying operation in the poramboke land. 4521/ 2015 22/ 2015 District Crime Branch, Madurai District. 120(B), 447, 379, 434, 420, 304(ii) IPC r/w 511 IPC and 3(1) of TNPPDL Act and 3(a), 4(a) of Explosives Substances Act and 4(1), 4(1-A) and 21 of MMDR Act G.Azhagupand- ian, VAO Petitioner granted lease for ten years towards conducting quarry operations. However, he trespassed into the poramboke land and conducted quarry operations. 3080/ 2015 18/ 2015 District Crime Branch Police Station, Madurai 120(B), 447, 379, 434, 420, 304(ii) r/w 511 IPC, 3(i) of TNPPDL Act, 3(a), 4(a) of Explosives Substances Act and 4(1), 4(1-A) of MMDR Act S.Pandiyarajan, VAO Lease was granted for a period of 10 years in favour of Solairajan. The said Solairajan appointed the petitioners and one another as his Power of Attorney. On the strength of the said Power of Attorney, the petitioners trespassed into the adjacent poramboke land and conducted quarry operations. 6206/ 2013 P.R.C. No.11/ 2013 Crime No. 146/ 2012 JM, Nilakottai. Pattiveeran patti Police Station, Dindigul District 120(b) r/w 447, 379, 420, 434, 304 IPC and 3(1) & 4 of TNPPDL Act, 1992 and 3(a), 4(a) & (b) r/w 6 of Explosives Substances Act, 1908 r/w 109, 114 and 511 IPC P.Paranjothi, VAO Accused illegally conducted quarrying operation in the Government Poramboke land. Pattiveeran patti Police Station, Dindigul District 120(b) r/w 447, 379, 420, 434, 304 IPC and 3(1) & 4 of TNPPDL Act, 1992 and 3(a), 4(a) & (b) r/w 6 of Explosives Substances Act, 1908 r/w 109, 114 and 511 IPC P.Paranjothi, VAO Accused illegally conducted quarrying operation in the Government Poramboke land. 7481 of 2013 P.R.C. No.9/13 Crime No. 224/1 2 JM, Melur, Madurai District. Keelavalavu Police Station, Madurai District 120-B, 147, 447, 430, 434 r/w 109, 104, 149 IPC and 3(i) (ii) of TNPPDL Act V.Sridharan, AE, PWD, Madurai District. Between 2004 and 2011, the accused trespassed into Koorankulam and Sirumanikam Kanmai and other water channels and dumped waste granite and debris therein. It was further alleged that the accused illegally encroached 'kanmais' and refused to remove the materials dumped therein despite request. 7482 of 2013 P.R.C. No.10 of 2013, Crime No. 228 of 2012 JM, Melur, Madurai District. Keelavalavu Police Station, Madurai District 120-B, 147, 447, 430, 434 r/w 109, 104, 149 IPC and 3(i) (ii) of TNPPDL Act, 1992 V.Sridharan, AE, PWD, Madurai District. Between 2004 and 2011, the accused trespassed into Koorankulam and Sirumanikam Kanmai and other water channels and dumped waste granite and debris therein. It was further alleged that the accused illegally encroached 'kanmais' and refused to remove the materials dumped therein despite request of the officials. 7644 of 2013 P.R.C. No.11/ 2013 Crime No.157/ 2012 JM, Melur, Madurai District. Keelavalavu Police Station, Madurai District 147, 447, 379 r/w 120-B IPC and 3(i)(ii) of TNPPDL Act Mohamed Ali, VAO M/s.PRP Granites illegally trespassed into Government Water Catchment Areas situated at Survey No.233/2, E.Malampatti Village, took away 300 tractor loads of sand, used the same to fill up pits created by them and put up a hut towards storage of materials. These petitions have been filed seeking quash of cases registered under above mentioned crime numbers. 3. Heard learned senior counsel, Mr. P. Wilson, Mr. M. Ajmalkhan, Mr. Veerakathiravan and others for petitioners and Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned senior counsel, assisted by learned Public Prosecutor on behalf of the State. 4. Starting with the case registered in Crime No.12 of 2015 on the file of the District Crime Branch, Madurai, (Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5200 of 2015) wherein the complaint allegation is that the accused excavated granite stones beyond the permitted limit as also excavated the same in non-permitted areas, Mr. 4. Starting with the case registered in Crime No.12 of 2015 on the file of the District Crime Branch, Madurai, (Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5200 of 2015) wherein the complaint allegation is that the accused excavated granite stones beyond the permitted limit as also excavated the same in non-permitted areas, Mr. P. Wilson, learned senior counsel, submitted that quarry operations had been conducted under due licence upon property belonging to first petitioner in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5200 of 2015 and his brother. The allegation of commission of offences u/s.447, 379, 120(b), 420, 430, 434, 304(ii) r/w 511 of IPC, 3(1)(ii) of TNPPDL Act, 6 r/w 3(a) & 4(a) of Explosives Substances Act and 4(1), 4(1A), 21 and 23 of The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, was misplaced and the offences alleged would not be made out. Learned senior counsel submitted that in circumstances where the accused admittedly were carrying out quarrying operations under due licence, violations, if any of the terms, can, at best result in recoveries by the State in keeping with Sections 25 and 26 of The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'MMDR Act'). 5. Learned senior counsel submitted that in Thressiamma Jacob and others vs. Geologist, Department of Mining and Geology and Others [ 2013 (9) SCC 725 ], a Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had held that ownership of sub-soil/mineral wealth normally would follow the ownership of the land, unless the owner of the land is deprived of the same by some valid process and that the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, does not declare proprietary rights of the State in mineral wealth, nor does it contain any provision divesting any owner of a mine of his proprietary rights. Under proceedings in Na.Ka.318/2012/Minerals dated 01.08.2012, the District Collector, Madurai, had, taking note of allegations of illegal activities, irregularities and conduct of quarrying operations beyond permitted limits, constituted squads for sudden inspection of quarries in specific areas and called for reports from them. The inspecting officials were required to keep in mind specific factors informed as 'a to i' and to report within 15 days. The inspecting officials were required to keep in mind specific factors informed as 'a to i' and to report within 15 days. Terming the committee constituted by the District Collector illegal and one which was unipolar in that it was vindictively directed against quarry operators and there was not even an attempt to fix responsibility on any erring officials and referring to G.O.(Ms).No.63 Industries (MMA-1) dated 11.05.2005, wherein District Collectors and specific revenue officials as also specified officials concerned with Geology and Mining had been authorised by the State Government in exercise of powers u/s.24 of the MMDR Act and G.O.(Ms).No.135 Industries (MMA.1) Department dated 13.11.2009, wherein again the District Collectors had been directed to constitute District Welfare task forces comprising of specified officials, learned senior counsel, contended that the constitution of the District Collector's committee/team under proceedings in Na.Ka.318/2012/Minerals dated 01.08.2012 was in total violation of Sections 24 and 26 of the MMDR Act. 6. Learned senior counsel submitted that every quarry operator had to maintain registers. There were corresponding registers to be maintained by departmental officials. It was necessary to obtain permits for transport of mineral/granite and the same was permitted only after inspection by officials and upon payment of seigniorage fees. Further, the removal and transportation of granite from a quarry only could be effected after obtaining bulk transport permit and facsimile discharge slip from due authority in keeping with Rule 36(5)(b) of The Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959. Each of such slips was to be used to inform the particulars of the granite transported, the vehicle number etc. There was a task force operating under the Collector's supervision to ensure compliance with the rules. Though the petitioners conducted quarry operations and effected transport in keeping with the rules, the State, after a period of 8 years, wrongly alleged that granite illegally was removed. 7. It is the submission of learned senior counsel that the MMDR Act was a special enactment containing specific provisions also for levy of penalties. The same was a self-contained Code and the general law was excluded. Learned senior counsel referred to Section 4, 4(1-A) and 21 of the MMDR Act which read thus: “4. 7. It is the submission of learned senior counsel that the MMDR Act was a special enactment containing specific provisions also for levy of penalties. The same was a self-contained Code and the general law was excluded. Learned senior counsel referred to Section 4, 4(1-A) and 21 of the MMDR Act which read thus: “4. Prospecting or mining operations to be under license or lease.-(1) No person shall undertake any reconnaissance, prospecting or mining operations in any area, except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a reconnaissance permit or of a prospecting license or, as the case may be, of a mining lease, granted under this Act and the rules made thereunder: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect any prospecting or mining operations undertaken in any area in accordance with the terms and conditions of a prospecting license or mining lease granted before the commencement of this Act which is in force at such commencement: Provided further that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any prospecting operations undertaken by the Geological Survey of India, the Indian Bureau of Mines, the Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research of the Department of Atomic Energy of the Central Government, the Directorates of Mining and Geology of any State Government (by whatever name called), and the Mineral Exploration Corporation Limited, a Government company within the meaning of section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956: Provided also that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any mining lease (whether called mining lease, mining concession or by any other name) in force immediately before the commencement of this Act in the Union territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. (1-A) No person shall transport or store or cause to be transported or stored any mineral otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. (2) No reconnaissance permit, prospecting license or mining lease shall be granted otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. (3) Any State Government may, after prior consultation with the Central Government and in accordance with the rules made under section 18, undertake reconnaissance, prospecting or mining operations with respect to any mineral specified in the First Schedule in any area within that State which is not already held under any reconnaissance permit, prospecting license or mining lease. 21. (3) Any State Government may, after prior consultation with the Central Government and in accordance with the rules made under section 18, undertake reconnaissance, prospecting or mining operations with respect to any mineral specified in the First Schedule in any area within that State which is not already held under any reconnaissance permit, prospecting license or mining lease. 21. Penalties.-(1) Whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (1-A) of section 4 shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to twenty five thousand rupees, or with both. (2) Any rule made under any provision of this Act may provide that any contravention thereof shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both, and in the case of a continuing contravention, with an additional fine which may extend to five hundred rupees for every day during which such contravention continues after conviction for the first such contravention. (3) Where any person trespasses into any land in contravention of the provisions of sub-section(1) of section 4, such trespasser may be served with an order of eviction by the State Government or any authority authorised in this behalf by that Government and the State Government or such authorised authority may, if necessary, obtain the help of the police to evict the trespasser from the land. (4) Whenever any person raises, transports or causes to be raised or transported, without any lawful authority, any mineral from any land, and, for that purpose, uses any tool, equipment, vehicle or any other thing, such mineral, tool, equipment, vehicle or any other thing shall be liable to be seized by an officer of authority specially empowered in this behalf. (4-A) Any mineral, tool, equipment, vehicle or any other thing seized under sub-section (4), shall be liable to be confiscated by an order of the Court competent to take cognizance of the offence under sub-section(1) and shall be disposed of in accordance with the directions of such Court. (4-A) Any mineral, tool, equipment, vehicle or any other thing seized under sub-section (4), shall be liable to be confiscated by an order of the Court competent to take cognizance of the offence under sub-section(1) and shall be disposed of in accordance with the directions of such Court. (5) Whenever any person raises, without any lawful authority, any mineral from any land, the State Government may recover from such person the mineral so raised, or where such mineral has already been disposed of, the price thereof, and may also recover from such person, rent, royalty or tax, as the case may be, for the period during which the land was occupied by such person without any lawful authority. (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an offence under sub-section (1) shall be cognizable.” 8. It is the submission of learned senior counsel that the above provisions dealt with every conceivable violation under the MMDR Act, including trespass. Section 22 of the MMDR Act stipulates that cognizance of any offence under the MMDR Act could be taken only upon complaint. Therefore, registration of a First Information Report under section 154 Cr.P.C. was not permitted. Learned senior counsel submitted that while other enactments such as The Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 and The Explosives Substances Act, 1908, specifically informed that the operations of the other Acts was not barred, the MMDR Act did not inform so. The necessary inference would be that application of other acts including the Criminal Procedure Code/Indian Penal Code stood barred. Learned senior counsel next submitted that there were no averments in the complaint as would attract the application of the Explosives Substances Act. 9. Learned senior counsel contends that alleging the same violations, two cases in Crime No.187 of 2012 for offences u/s.4 and 5(1) of the Explosives Substances Act, 1908 and Crime No.196 of 2012 for offences u/s.447, 379, 406, 420 IPC, 3(1) of TNPPDL Act r/w 4(1)(a), 4(2)(a), 4(3) and 21(b)(5) of MMDR Act, 1957, stand registered. Referring to the objects and reasons of The Tamil Nadu Public Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act, 1992, learned senior counsel contended that no offence under such Act would stand attracted. Referring to the objects and reasons of The Tamil Nadu Public Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act, 1992, learned senior counsel contended that no offence under such Act would stand attracted. Learned senior counsel termed the First Information Report absurd and inherently improbable placing reliance on State of Haryana and others v. Bhajanlal and others [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335], wherein it has been observed that the following situations would justify quash of FIR: “102. ... (1) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; (2) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code; (3) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused; (4) where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code; (5) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (6) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party; (7) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 10. The District Collector, Madurai, had issued a show cause notice on 11.02.2013 calling upon one Tvl.Sri Aishwarya Rock Export to appear for personal hearing on 21.03.2013 at 05.00 p.m. and to show cause as to why the report of the special team should not be accepted and acted upon in accordance with the provisions under sub-section (5) of Section 21 of the MMDR Act. Even while such matter was pending adjudication and even before directing the conduct of inspection by the 'Collector's Committee', cases malafidely had been registered against petitioners. A Division Bench of this Court in Sengol and others vs. State [ 2012 (2) CTC 369 ] had held thus: “46. In view of the foregoing discussions, we answer the questions referred to us as follows:- (i) Since, the offences under the Indian Penal Code involved in the cases before us and an offence under Section 21 of the Mines and Minerals [Development and Regulation] Act, 1957 are not the same offences in terms of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India, the provisions of the Mines and Minerals [Development and Regulation] Act will not exclude the provisions of IPC. Therefore, in respect of sand theft, it will be lawful for the police to register a case as provided in Section 154 Cr.P.C., under Section 379 and other relevant provisions of IPC, investigate the same as per the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and to lay a final report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, upon which it will be well within the competence of the jurisdictional Magistrate to take cognizance. Therefore, such an FIR, where case has been registered only under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, shall not be liable to be quashed. (ii) If an act of the accused constitutes offences under Indian Penal Code as well as the provisions of the Mines and Minerals [Development and Regulation] Act, the registration of a case both under the provisions of Indian Penal Code and the Mines and Minerals [Development and Regulation] Act is not illegal and the police may proceed with the investigation. (ii) If an act of the accused constitutes offences under Indian Penal Code as well as the provisions of the Mines and Minerals [Development and Regulation] Act, the registration of a case both under the provisions of Indian Penal Code and the Mines and Minerals [Development and Regulation] Act is not illegal and the police may proceed with the investigation. However, the police shall file a police report only in respect of the offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code and in respect of the offences punishable under the Mines and Minerals [Development and Regulation] Act, he may file a separate complaint, provided he has been authorised under Section 22 of the said Act. (iii) In any event, if the police officer, files a final report in respect of offences under IPC as well as under Section 21 of the Mines and Minerals [Development and Regulation] Act, the Magistrate may take cognizance of the offences under IPC alone and proceed with the trial. (iv) In respect of offences under the Mines and Minerals [Development and Regulation] Act, the court shall take cognizance only on a complaint filed by a person authorised in that behalf by the Central Government or State Government and not on a police report. (v) In the State of Tamil Nadu, so long as the notification issued under G.O.Ms.No.114, Industries (MMC.I) Department, dated 18.09.2006 authorising the Inspectors of Police to file complaints under Section 22 of the Mines and Minerals Act, is in force, on completing the investigation in respect of the offence under section 21 of the Mines and Minerals Act, it will be lawful for the Inspector of Police concerned, as an authorised person, to file a complaint under Section 22 of the Mines and Minerals Act before the jurisdictional Magistrate, upon which the Magistrate may take cognizance.” 11. Learned senior counsel submitted that the said finding stands overruled by the Supreme Court under decision in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay [ 2014 (9) SCC 772 ]. Learned senior counsel also contended that had the decision in Thressiamma Jacob's case been brought to notice while dealing with Sanjay's case, the Supreme Court would not have taken the view that in respect of natural resources, the doctrine of public trust applied and hence, it could not be made subjects of private ownership. 12. Mr. Learned senior counsel also contended that had the decision in Thressiamma Jacob's case been brought to notice while dealing with Sanjay's case, the Supreme Court would not have taken the view that in respect of natural resources, the doctrine of public trust applied and hence, it could not be made subjects of private ownership. 12. Mr. Veerakathiravan, learned counsel, submitted that the case in Crime No.183 of 2012 on the file of Keelavalavu Police Station has been registered for offences u/s.447, 379, 109, 120(b), 201, 406, 420 IPC r/w 3(1), 4(1) of TNPPDL Act, 4(1), 4(2)(A), 4(3), 21(b) and 5 of Mines & Minerals Development & Regulation Act and 4 of Explosives Substances Act, on the allegation that a concern by name RR Granite Works had been granted mining lease in respect of an extent of 9.29 acres in S.No.209/3F, E.Malampatti village, but such concern, acting along with others, had trespassed into the adjoining S.No.210, Government land, and using unlawful means had done away with granite of approximately 690 sq.mtrs. Case in Crime No.22 of 2015 on the file of the Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Madurai District, has been registered for offences u/s.120(B), 447, 379, 434, 420, 304(ii) IPC r/w 511 IPC, 3(1) of TNPPDL Act, 3(a), 4(a) of Explosives Substances Act and 4(1), 4(1-A) and 21 of MMDR Act and the accusation is of having done away with granite of 7171.62 sq.mtrs, of value of Rs.28.68 crores, the allegations otherwise being similar. 13. Learned counsel submitted that the allegation against the accused is of their having done away with 690 sq.mtrs. of granite by forming two pits and of having refilled the same. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioners were not the original lessees and the mine was not a virgin mine. The original lease in respect of S.No.209 have been granted in the year 1999 to a different party while petitioners had obtained renewal of the quarry lease under G.O.(3D) No.55, Industries (MMB1) Department, dated 05.05.2004. Merely towards having access to the public road, the pits earlier formed had been filled up with sand and solely for such reason, petitioners now find themselves arrayed as accused. One of the conditions imposed under G.O.(3D) No.55, Industries (MMB1) Department, dated 05.05.2004, was that 'the lessee should make his own arrangements for road pathways, channels, and ramp etc'. Merely towards having access to the public road, the pits earlier formed had been filled up with sand and solely for such reason, petitioners now find themselves arrayed as accused. One of the conditions imposed under G.O.(3D) No.55, Industries (MMB1) Department, dated 05.05.2004, was that 'the lessee should make his own arrangements for road pathways, channels, and ramp etc'. Learned counsel submits that the petitioners stand arrayed as accused since they have fulfilled the conditions in the lease agreement. 14. Complaining of a fraudulent investigation, learned counsel submitted that as per the Evaluation Report, the petitioner had conducted illegal mining in S.F.No.101(P) and S.F.No.101/1. However, the Evaluation Report regards another lessee by name V.Kottaiveeran informs 'the ground reality is revealed that the entire cut faces in the Southern side of the quarry is extended in to the above said patta lands and the said illegal quarrying might have been done by the lessee Thiru.V.Kottaiveeran and hence he is sole responsible for the said illegal quarrying in the patta land in S.F.No.100, 101 & 102/1'. Learned counsel contends that when the illegal mining on the said survey fields stands attributed to another, the complaint allegation against the petitioners totally is unwarranted. Case in Crime No.61 of 2013 had been registered against the said Kottaiveeran on 07.03.2013 and the case against the petitioners wrongly had been registered in Crime No.22 of 2015 on the file of District Crime Branch, Madurai District, Madurai, on 31.01.2015. Learned counsel referred to G.O.3D.No.12, Industries (MMB1) Department, dated 06.02.1998 and submitted that thereunder quarry lease in respect of S.No.100/1 had been granted to one Thiru.V.Purusothaman, who was the pattadhar and therefore, the First Information Report against petitioners in respect of the same survey field necessarily was false. Under Roc No:1521/97/Mines dated 05.12.1997, the Collector, Madurai, had recommended grant of quarry lease in respect of S.F.No.100/1 to the said Purusothaman and as on such date, there was no pit in the said survey field. There had been no complaint of the pattadhar. Therefore, the Evaluation Report which informs to the contra and which is the basis of the First Information Report, cannot hold water in the face of unimpeachable public record. Learned counsel submitted that though the Collector appointed an Evaluation Committee, their report did not afford any material for fixing of criminal liability. There had been no complaint of the pattadhar. Therefore, the Evaluation Report which informs to the contra and which is the basis of the First Information Report, cannot hold water in the face of unimpeachable public record. Learned counsel submitted that though the Collector appointed an Evaluation Committee, their report did not afford any material for fixing of criminal liability. Not even particulars of the dates of inspection, who accompanied the inspecting authorities and what was the evidence gathered, were stated. The Evaluation Committee had forwarded a report to the Collector through Thasildar, who required the Village Administrative Officer to prefer First Information Report. Learned counsel submitted that Bhajanlal's case was applicable. 15. Under Roc.No.Mines/1495/98 dated 19.02.1999, the Collector had made a demand for lease amount of Rs.22,54,537/- in respect of S.F.No.101, Keelaiyur Village, Melur Taluk. On failure to meet such demand, the lease was cancelled with effect from 25.05.1999 and the Thasildar, Melur, was directed to take over possession of blocks and other materials from the quarry site. Under communication to Government dated 25.05.1999, the Collector had informed that in keeping with his instructions, 23 blocks of 179.368 cbm had been taken over by the Thasildar, Melur. This Court, under orders in W.P.No.25401 batch dated 06.09.2007, had directed that the revised rental charges as fixed by the State Government should be paid within a period of eight weeks whereupon the applications for renewal of lease were to be considered and pending such considerations, petitioners were permitted to carry on quarry operations. Though the petitioner also had moved a writ petition, he had not resumed quarry operations. 16. Referring to the judgment in Sanjay's case, learned counsel submitted that therein the Supreme Court has not dealt with the Tamil Nadu Mines and Mineral Concession Rules. Lease is obtained in keeping with Rule 36A of the Rules and it is such rule that holds the field. The Central Granite Conservation and Development Rules, is not in force in Tamil Nadu. However in the Evaluation Report violation of such statutory rules are informed. MMDR Act is an inbuilt code and action, if any, was to be taken in keeping therewith. 17. Learned counsel submitted that the subject mines fell in the concurrent list. So far as the State was concerned, rules framed in keeping with Section 15 of the MMDR Act were in force. MMDR Act is an inbuilt code and action, if any, was to be taken in keeping therewith. 17. Learned counsel submitted that the subject mines fell in the concurrent list. So far as the State was concerned, rules framed in keeping with Section 15 of the MMDR Act were in force. Under section 15, the State Government had only regulatory power and was bound by the Rules. Section 15 of the Act and Rules read together formed an inbuilt code and the invocation of criminal law is beyond the scope of Section 15. All persons facing prosecution are lessees of State or concessionaires. Learned counsel relies on written arguments as also adopts the submission made by learned senior counsel Mr. P. Wilson. 18. Learned counsel submitted that there had been no investigation in the case in Crime No.183 of 2012. The counter only informed of alteration of First Information Report to include offences under the Explosives Substances Act. Learned counsel submitted that all quarries used the gang saw method for excavation and that if explosives were used the granite would be rendered gravel. It was not the case of the respondents that unlicensed persons used explosives. Use of explosives was necessary in mines to clear the earth at the surface. It is only thereafter that the granite which was at some depth could be reached. It was only during the hearing of the anticipatory bail petitions and towards denying petitioners bail that allegations of violation of Explosives Substances Act had been introduced. 19. Making specific submissions in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.14908 of 2012, learned counsel submitted that under G.O.(3D) No.46, Industries (MMB-I) Department, dated 14.07.2008, Tvl.Olympus Granites (P) Ltd., Madurai, had been granted quarry lease. Petitioner was one of the retired Directors of such concern. The allegation against the concern as per show cause notice dated 19.08.2011 was that the lessee had not maintained 10m safety distance to poramboke lands and also to the TAMIN lease area located in the adjoining survey field on the southern side. The allegation is that the concern had not maintained the safety distance as also that it had dumped waste granites, debris in adjacent poramboke and patta lands located outside the lease area. The concern had caused a reply to the show cause notice on 22.09.2011. The allegation is that the concern had not maintained the safety distance as also that it had dumped waste granites, debris in adjacent poramboke and patta lands located outside the lease area. The concern had caused a reply to the show cause notice on 22.09.2011. The Additional Chief Secretary to Government had afforded a personal hearing to the concern on the proposal to cancel its lease under communication dated 12.07.2012 and regards the alleged violation of lease conditions viz., “ i. The lessee company has not provided 10 mtrs. safety distance adjacent to the lease granted area to TAMIN. ii. The lessee Company have been granted lease over an extent of 1.21.5 Hects. But they have carried out the quarrying operation in the small portion such as 0.12.0 hects. only in the safety zone. iii. The lessee has obtained the transport permit for the quantity of 2292.814 cbm. granite block but the said quantity could not be quarried in the extent of 0.12.0 hects. as per the above pit dimensions in S.F.No.297/5. iv. The lessee Company had misused the dispatch slip originally issued for the transportation of granite block from the S.F.No. 259/4B2 and they have illicitly removed and transported 1069.534 Cbm. quantity of granite blocks as per existing pit dimensions located in the safety Zone area. v. The lessee Company has not carried out quarrying operation in lease granted area without leaving the Safety distance.” Under such communication, the Government had fixed the percentage of recovery at 20%. Under communication dated 02.08.2012, under letter of its counsel, the concern had sought documents and time. Therefore, when the Additional Chief Secretary to Government was seized of the matter, the Village Administrative Officer had preferred a complaint contrary to the stand of the Additional Chief Secretary alleging commission of offences u/s.447, 379 IPC, 3(1) of TNPPDL Act and 4(1), 4(2)(a), 4(3) and 21-B(5) of MMDR Act, 1957. There was no 4(2)(a) section in such enactment. Preference of First Information Report informing a non-existent provision in law was proof of malafides which would justify quashing of the First Information Report. There had been no complaint from TAMIN and its records had not been verified. TAMIN was a State owned concern. TAMIN, the neighbouring lessee, was carrying on quarry operations, on specific terms and conditions. Preference of First Information Report informing a non-existent provision in law was proof of malafides which would justify quashing of the First Information Report. There had been no complaint from TAMIN and its records had not been verified. TAMIN was a State owned concern. TAMIN, the neighbouring lessee, was carrying on quarry operations, on specific terms and conditions. Where neither its records were verified nor its officials been enquired of, the Village Administrative Officer has no authority to file a complaint. Though a lengthy counter had been filed by the respondent State, there was nothing to inform collection of any evidence in support of the First Information Report allegations despite such First Information Report being of the year 2012. There was nothing to indicate how the de facto complainant was aware of the trespass alleged. The communication of the Principal Commissioner and Commissioner of Revenue Administration, Chepauk, Madras, informs that it was the responsibility of the Village Administrative Officers to detect and report illicit quarrying and transportation of mines and minerals in the villages under their charge to the Thasildar's concerned. Referring to a typed set, learned counsel submitted that amidst various duties, Village Administrative Officers were required to inspect lease sites and record particulars there regards in the 'adangal' register. The Village Administrative Officers were also required to maintain several account books. Account Book No.24 pertains to extracted mines within their jurisdiction. The account has to be maintained between January and December, from year to year. Learned counsel contended that a Village Administrative Officer, in dereliction of duty, he having not maintained Account Book No.24, had set the law in motion, This complaint was not based on his records but on the so called evaluation report submitted by the Inspector of Mines. As the basis of the First Information Report was the allegations levelled by the Village Administrative Officer, an incompetent official, in the absence of any complaint by TAMIN or verification of its records and apparently with intent to avoid action against him by revenue officials, the decision in Bhajanlal's case applied. 20. Learned counsel submitted that in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.22808 of 2014, complainant is the Junior Engineer, Public Works Department, while in Crl.O.P. (MD) No.22813 of 2014, complainant is the Village Administrative Officer. The First Information Report informs of storage of granite blocks in a Government channel. 20. Learned counsel submitted that in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.22808 of 2014, complainant is the Junior Engineer, Public Works Department, while in Crl.O.P. (MD) No.22813 of 2014, complainant is the Village Administrative Officer. The First Information Report informs of storage of granite blocks in a Government channel. The First Information Report has been registered on 06.08.2012 whereas the petitioner, who was the Director, had retired in 2010. The First Information Report speaks of occurrence from 2004. 21. Shri. Gandhi, learned counsel for petitioner in Crl.O.P.(MD) No. 6667 of 2013, submitted that stereotype allegations were made regards violation of rule 7 of the Tank Encroachment Act. As per Section 8 of such Act only a private complaint could be preferred. 22. Mr. Ajmal Khan, learned senior counsel, submitted that section 2 of MMDR Act, contained a declaration that “it is expedient in the interest of regulation of mines and mineral development, preservation of natural environment, control of floods, prevention of pollution or to avoid danger to public health or communications or to ensure safety of buildings, monuments or other structures or for such other purposes, as the State Government may deem fit, it may, by an order, in respect of any minor mineral, make premature termination of a prospecting license or mining lease with respect to the area or any part thereof covered by such license or lease.” 23. The Mines and Minerals Development Regulation Amendment Ordinance, 2015, has come into force on 12.01.2015 and passed by both the Houses of Parliament. Section 21 thereon made provision for constitution of special Courts towards ensuring speedy trial for offences of contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (1A) of section 4 of the Act. Therefore, such cases would have to be proceeded with only before the special Courts. Contending that a special enactment would override the application of general law, Mr. Ajmal Khan, learned senior counsel, submitted that any conduct of quarrying and transport of minerals other than under a permit or licence stood prohibited u/s.4 of the MMDR Act. Any offence u/s.21(1) of the MMDR Act had been made cognizable under Act 37 of 1986. Such provision being in effect from 10.02.1987. One of the objectives of the amending Act 37 of 1986 was to increase the quantum of punishment towards curbing the illegal mining activities. Any offence u/s.21(1) of the MMDR Act had been made cognizable under Act 37 of 1986. Such provision being in effect from 10.02.1987. One of the objectives of the amending Act 37 of 1986 was to increase the quantum of punishment towards curbing the illegal mining activities. It is the submission of learned senior counsel that therefore towards curbing illegal mining activities enhanced punishment is contemplated and mens rea stands excluded. There can be no offence u/s.379 IPC in the absence of mens rea. Section 379 IPC cannot be read in as it is in conflict with the special statute. Learned senior counsel submitted that Section 23-A of the Special Act provided for compounding of offences and the benefit of such provision could not be denied to persons accused by resort to the General Law. Learned senior counsel submitted that decision in Thressiamma's case would prevail over that in Sanjay's case, the former being that of a Larger Bench. The 2015th amendment ordinance, in Section 19, sought to enhance the punishment for contravention of provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (1A) of Section 4 upto five years. It also sought to enhance the fine to Rs. 5,00,000/- per hectare of mining area. 24. Learned senior counsel submitted that Rule 36-A of Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, providing for penalties, informed that any contravention of sub-section of Section 4 of the MMDR Act in any land would attract enhanced seionerage fees and in the alternative punishment as provided in sub section 1 of section 21 of the Act. The Division Bench of this Court had required the petitioners to go before the Collector. He contended that in the instant case, the District Collectors have issued show cause notices and therefore, proceedings for penalty and recovery were contemplated. Hence, when resort had been had to the alternative course there could be no criminal complaint as contemplated in Section 21 of the Act. He submitted that Rule 36-A (6) permitted use of machinery for quarrying of sand from river beds if such use was not detrimental to ecology whereas the Sanjay case proceeds on the assumption that any use of machinery was not permissible. 25. He submitted that Rule 36-A (6) permitted use of machinery for quarrying of sand from river beds if such use was not detrimental to ecology whereas the Sanjay case proceeds on the assumption that any use of machinery was not permissible. 25. Staying with the principles of interpretation of statutes, learned senior counsel referred to the following decisions: (i) In R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka and another [ AIR 1992 SC 81 ] wherein it had been held thus: 'When the General Rules were enforced the Special Rules were already holding the field. The Special Rules being “law” the application of the General Rules is excluded to the extent the field is occupied by the Special Rules.' (ii) Submitting that the recourse to legislative intent of the special enactment hold the field in the place of general law, learned senior counsel referred to the following observations in the decision of the Supreme Court in Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. L.V.A.Dixitulu and Ors. [ AIR 1979 SC 193 ]: “65. The primary principle of interpretation is that a Constitutional or statutory provision should be construed “according to the intent of they that made it” (Coke). Normally, such intent is gathered from the language of the provision. If the language or the phraseology employed by the legislation is precise and plain and thus by itself, proclaims the legislative intent in unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect to, regardless of the consequences that may follow. But if the words used in the provision are imprecise, protean, or evocative or can reasonably bear meaning more than one, the rule of strict grammatical construction ceases to be a sure guide to reach at the real legislative intent. In such a case, in order to ascertain the true meaning of the terms and phrases employed, it is legitimate for the Court to go beyond the arid literal confines of the provision and to call in aid other well-recognised rules of construction, such as its legislative history, the basis scheme and framework of the statute as a whole, each portion throwing light on the rest, the purpose of the legislation, the object sought to be achieved, and the consequences that may flow from the adoption of one in preference to the other possible interpretation. 66. 66. Where two alternative constructions are possible, the Court must choose the one which will be in accord with the other parts of the statute and ensure its smooth, harmonious working, and eschew the other which leads to absurdity, confusion, or friction, contradiction and conflict between its various provisions, or undermines, or tends to defeat or destroy the basic scheme and purpose of the enactment. These canons of construction apply to the interpretation of our Constitution with greater force, because the Constitution is a living, integrated organism, having a soul and consciousness of its own. The pulse beats emanating from the spinal cord of its basic framework can be felt all over its body, even in the extremities of its limbs. Constitutional exposition is not mere literary garniture; nor a mere exercise in grammar. As one of us (Chandrachud, J. as he then was) put it in Keshvananda Bharati's case, ''while interpreting words in a solemn document like the Constitution, one must look at them not in a school-masterly fashion, not with the cold eye of a lexicographer, but with the realization that they occur in 'a single complex instrument in which one part may throw light on the other' so that the construction must hold a balance between all its parts.” (iii) Learned senior counsel submitted that in Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and Ors. [ AIR 1987 SC 1023 ], it had been held thus: “37. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. It is by looking at the definition as a whole in the setting of the entire Act and by reference to what preceded the enactment and the reasons for it that the Court construed the expression 'Prize Chit' in Srinivasa and we find no reason to depart from the Court's construction.” (iv) Learned senior counsel submitted that in Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan, v. Binani Cements Ltd. and another [ 2014 (8) SCC 319 ], it had been held thus: “27. ... Alternatively, it can be said that where a Statute contains both a General Provision as well as specific provision, the later must prevail. 29. It is well established that when a general law and a special law dealing with some aspect dealt with by the general law are in question, the rule adopted and applied is one of harmonious construction whereby the general law, to the extent dealt with by the special law, is impliedly repealed. This principle finds its origins in the latin maxim of generalia specialibus non derogant, i.e., general law yields to special law should they operate in the same field on same subject.” (v) Learned senior counsel submitted that in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajanlal and others [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335], it had been held thus: “102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 102. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.” (vi) Learned senior counsel also relied on Jeewan Kumar Raut and another v. Central Bureau of Investigation [ 2009 (7) SCC 526 ], wherein it had been held thus: “26. It is a well-settled principle of law that if a special statute lays down procedures, the ones laid down under the general statutes shall not be followed. In a situation of this nature, the respondent could carry out investigations in exercise of its authorisation under Section 13(3)(iv) of TOHO. While doing so, it could exercise such powers which are otherwise vested in it. But, as it could not file a police report but a complaint petition only; sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code may not be applicable.” (vii) In Thressiamma Jacob and others v. Geologist, Department of Mining and Geology and others [ 2013 (9) SCC 725 ], the question of whether the owners of jenmom lands in the malabar area (part of Kerala) had proprietary right over sub soils and minerals under the soil was considered. Taking note of the legal position of rights over minerals as obtained in England, the Supreme Court examined whether the law of this country and with particular reference to the malabar area, regards the right over mines and minerals, was the same as obtained in England or was different. Inferring that the British had recognised that the State had no inherent right in law to be owner of all mineral wealth in this country and that they had recognised that such rights could inhere in private parties, at least zamindars and inamdars or ryots claiming under them in a given case, the Supreme Court held thus: “55. The Mines and Minerals Act is an enactment made by Parliament to regulate the mining activities in this country. The Mines and Minerals Act is an enactment made by Parliament to regulate the mining activities in this country. The said Act does not in any way purport to declare the proprietary rights of the State in the mineral wealth nor does it contain any provision divesting any owner of a mine of his proprietary rights. On the other hand, various enactments made by Parliament such as the Coking coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 and the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 make express declarations under Sections 4 and 7 respectively providing for acquisition of the mines and right in or over the land from which coal is obtainable. If the understanding of the State of Kerala that in view of the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, the proprietary rights in mines stand transferred and vest in the State, it would be wholly an unnecessary exercise on the part of Parliament to make laws such as the ones mentioned above dealing with the nationalisation of mines. 56. Even with regard to the minerals which are greatly important and highly sensitive in the context of the national security and also the security of humanity like uranium, the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 only provides under Section 5 for prohibition or regulation of mining activity in such mineral. Under Section 10 of the Act, it is provided that the Government of India may provide for compulsory vesting in the Central Government of exclusive rights to work those minerals. The said Act does not in any way declare the proprietary right of the State. 57. Similarly, the Oilfields (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 deals with the oilfields containing crude oil, petroleum, etc. which are the most important minerals in the modern world. The Act does not anywhere declare the proprietary right of the State. 58. For the abovementioned reasons, we are of the opinion that there is nothing in the law which declares that all mineral wealth/subsoil rights vest in the State, on the other hand, the ownership of subsoil/mineral wealth should normally follow the ownership of the land, unless the owner of the land is deprived of the same by some valid process. In the instant appeals, no such deprivation is brought to our notice and therefore we hold that the appellants are the proprietors of the minerals obtaining in their lands. In the instant appeals, no such deprivation is brought to our notice and therefore we hold that the appellants are the proprietors of the minerals obtaining in their lands. We make it clear that we are not making any declaration regarding their liability to pay royalty to the State as that issue stands referred to a larger Bench.” (viii) In Karnataka Rare Earth and another v. The Senior Geologist, Department of Mines and Geology and another [ 2004 (2) SCC 783 ], it had been held thus: “7. In our opinion, the demand by the State of Karnataka of the price of the mineral cannot be said to be levy of penalty or a penal action. The marginal note of the Section – 'Penalties', creates a wrong impression. A reading of Section 21 shows that it deals with a variety of situations. Sub-sections (1), (2), (4), (4A) and (6) are in the realm of criminal law. Sub-section (3) empowers the State Government or any authority authorized in this behalf to summarily evict a trespasser. Sub-section (5) empowers the State Government to recover rent, royalty or tax from the person who has raised the mineral from any land without any lawful authority and also empowers the State Government to recover the price thereof where such mineral has already been disposed of inasmuch as the same would not be available for seizure and confiscation. The provision as to recovery of price is in the nature of recovering the compensation and not penalty so also the power of the State Government to recover rent, royalty or tax in respect of any mineral raised without any lawful authority can also not be called a penal action. The underlying principle of Sub-section (5) is that a person acting without any lawful authority must not find himself placed in a position more advantageous than a person raising minerals with lawful authority.” 26. Placing reliance on the observations in Thressiamma and Karnataka Rare Earth cases, learned senior counsel submitted that petitioners were persons, who were conducting quarrying operations under lawful authority and upon property belonging to them. Learned senior counsel submitted that cases had been registered under four legislations but none of the offences in such legislations were made out. 27. Placing reliance on the observations in Thressiamma and Karnataka Rare Earth cases, learned senior counsel submitted that petitioners were persons, who were conducting quarrying operations under lawful authority and upon property belonging to them. Learned senior counsel submitted that cases had been registered under four legislations but none of the offences in such legislations were made out. 27. The accusation in Crime No.17 of 2015 on the file of Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Madurai (Crl.O.P.(MD)No.3316 of 2015) was that having obtained licence to carry out granite quarry operations in a particular area for a 10 year period between 08.12.2003 and 29.12.2013, the accused had conducted quarry operations in adjacent Government lands and in 2009 trespassed thereinto, damaged property, used explosives to blast granite and then stolen the same causing loss to the Government in a sum of Rs.46.05 crores. They also had not maintained a safety gap of 50 mtrs. in keeping with licence terms, caused a huge pit which was dangerous to the General Public, quarry workers as also animals despite knowledge that falling there into could cause death. First Information Report has been registered for offences u/s. 120(B), 447, 379, 434, 420, 304 IPC r/w 511 IPC, 3(i) TNPPDL Act, 3(a) and 4(a) of Explosives Substances Act, 4(1) and 4(1-A) and 21 of MMDR Act. Learned senior counsel, submitted that the main allegation was of theft. Theft is described in Section 378 IPC as follows: “378. Theft — Whoever, intending to take dishonestly any moveable property out of the possession of any person without that person’s consent, moves that property in order to such taking, is said to commit theft. Explanation to Section 378 IPC informs thus: Explanation 1 — A thing so long as it is attached to the earth, not being movable property, is not the subject of theft; but it becomes capable of being the subject of theft as soon as it is severed from the earth. Explanation 2 — A moving effected by the same act which affects the severance may be a theft. Explanation 3 — A person is said to cause a thing to move by removing an obstacle which prevented it from moving or by separating it from any other thing, as well as by actually moving it. Explanation 2 — A moving effected by the same act which affects the severance may be a theft. Explanation 3 — A person is said to cause a thing to move by removing an obstacle which prevented it from moving or by separating it from any other thing, as well as by actually moving it. Explanation 4 — A person, who by any means causes an animal to move, is said to move that animal, and to move everything which, in consequence of the motion so caused, is moved by that animal. Explanation 5 —The consent mentioned in the definition may be express or implied, and may be given either by the person in possession, or by any person having for the purpose authority either express or implied.” Learned senior counsel then referred to illustrations 'a' and 'k' which read thus: (a) A cuts down a tree on Z’s ground, with the intention of dishonestly taking the tree out of Z’s possession without Z’s consent. Here, as soon as A has severed the tree in order to such taking, he has committed theft. (k) Again, if A, having pawned his watch to Z, takes it out of Z’s possession without Z’s consent, not having paid what he borrowed on the watch, he commits theft, though the watch is his own property in as much as he takes it dishonestly. Learned senior counsel next referred to Section 22 which defines 'Movable property' thus: “22. "Movable property" — The words "movable property" are intended to include corporeal property of every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth.” 28. Learned senior counsel next referred to Section 22 which defines 'Movable property' thus: “22. "Movable property" — The words "movable property" are intended to include corporeal property of every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth.” 28. Submitting that the Indian Penal Code was an enactment of the year 1860 and therefore, whilst passing the Transfer of Property Act in the year 1882, Parliament must be deemed with knowledge of definition of movable property in the Indian Penal Code, learned senior counsel referred to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act which informs that immovable property does not include standing timber, growing crops or grass and that " attached to the earth" means- (a) rooted in the earth, as in the case of trees and shrubs; (b) imbedded in the earth, as in the case of walls or buildings; or (c) attached to what is so embedded for the permanent beneficial enjoyment of that to which it is attached; 29. Learned senior counsel submitted that movable property excluded land and things attached to the earth or permanently embedded to anything which is attached to the earth. 'Attached to the earth' had statutorily been defined to be what is (a) rooted in the earth, as in the case of trees and shrubs; (b) imbedded in the earth, as in the case of walls or buildings; or (c) attached to what is so embedded for the permanent beneficial enjoyment of that to which it is attached. Contending that mineral/granite was not attached to the earth but was in itself part of the earth and hence, did not constitute movable property amenable to the commission of offence u/s.378 IPC, learned senior counsel referred to the decision of this Court in Queen-Empress v. Kotayya and another [10 Mad.255] wherein a view was taken that severing and taking away not what was attached to the earth but was itself part of the earth would not attract the application of Section 378 IPC. Learned senior counsel submitted that the First Information Report of the year 2015 alleged that the accused had trespassed into the Government land in 2009 and therefore, admittedly the accused was in possession. Ownership was immaterial and the possession of property by the accused may even be wrongful. Learned senior counsel submitted that the First Information Report of the year 2015 alleged that the accused had trespassed into the Government land in 2009 and therefore, admittedly the accused was in possession. Ownership was immaterial and the possession of property by the accused may even be wrongful. Therefore, even if true, the act of severance of granite i.e., of what is part of the earth would not attract the offence of theft contemplated under section 378 IPC. 30. Section 434 IPC dealt with offence of mischief by destroying or moving, etc., a land-mark fixed by public authority. The First Information Report only alleged the creation of a pit by the accused and removal of border stones. Such allegation was in the realm of mere surmise and presumption. The offence of cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property covered u/s. 420 IPC required an element of deception at inception as also delivery of property as a result thereof. When admittedly the prosecution case is one of the petitioners being the licencees/lessees, no question of offence u/s.420 IPC arose. Learned senior counsel submitted that the allegation of an attempt to commit the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder on the averment that in causing a pit, the accused, intended persons, workmen and animals to fall there into and thus meet their death totally is unacceptable and no offence u/s.304 r/w 511 IPC would stand attracted. Learned senior counsel also contended that to commit the offence of criminal trespass physical possession of property was necessary. Mere constructive possession was not. Learned senior counsel referred to the following decision in Satish Chandra v. The King AIR (36) 1949 107, wherein it has been held thus: “[4] The point for determination is whether in these circumstances the petitioner can be found guilty of house trespass. In order to determine this point, it would be best to refer to the relevant sections of the Penal Code. Criminal trespass is defined in S.441 of the said Code. In order to constitute this offence, the accused must enter into property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property. It is clear from the wording of the section that there can be no criminal trespass unless the “intent” specified in the section is present. It is clear from the wording of the section that there can be no criminal trespass unless the “intent” specified in the section is present. The phrase “any person in possession of such property” is also to be remembered. The intent to annoy and intimidate must be not with respect to any and every person connected with the property but with respect to any person in actual possession of such property. A person in constructive possession is not contemplated by the section. Now, house trespass is defined in S.442, Penal Code which say that whoever commits criminal trespass by entering into or remaining in any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling, or any building used as a place for worship or as a place for the custody of property is said to commit house trespass. It is quite clear from this section that the mere trespassing into the house of another does not constitute house trespass within the meaning of S.442, Penal Code. The criminal intention and other ingredients specified in S.441 of the said Code defining criminal trespass must be present in order to constitute the offence of house trespass. In short house trespass means criminal trespass in respect of a house. These are the sections which need be referred to. The question is whether in view of the provisions of these sections it can be said that the petitioner committed house trespass. Taking all the allegations of the prosecution to be true it may be said that the petitioner took unlawful possession of the property. The mere taking of unlawful possession will not amount to either criminal trespass or house trespass. There is no evidence that the petitioner intended to commit any offence. An unlawful act is not necessarily an offence. The penal law deals with offences and an unlawful act which does not amount to an offence is a matter which has to be investigated by a Civil Court. [6] I hold that the criminal intent specified in S.441, Penal Code not having been established the charge of house trespass must fail. I accordingly set aside the order of conviction and sentence and acquit the accused. The fine, if paid, shall be refunded. The Rule is made absolute.” 31. [6] I hold that the criminal intent specified in S.441, Penal Code not having been established the charge of house trespass must fail. I accordingly set aside the order of conviction and sentence and acquit the accused. The fine, if paid, shall be refunded. The Rule is made absolute.” 31. On allegation of offence u/s.120-B IPC, learned senior counsel submitted that there was no allegation of meeting of minds between the accused and there was no averment regards the place and date thereof. Learned senior counsel also submitted that neither Section 4(a) nor 3(a) of the Explosives Substances Act would stand attracted. 32. Turning to Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5146 of 2015, learned senior counsel submitted that there was no dispute that the petitioner was the licencee under the MMDR Act. Therefore, the petitioner's possession of property cannot said to be unlawful. There had been no mention of malice on the part of the individual and the same could not be attributed to a group. Learned senior counsel also contended that Section 2(2) of the Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act, 1992, informed that the term 'mischief' shall have the same meaning of Section 425 IPC. To constitute mischief, there are three requirements viz., 1. Intention or knowledge of likelihood to cause wrongful loss or damage to the public or to any person. 2. Causing the destruction of some property or any change in it or in its situation. 3. Such change must destroy or diminish its value or utility or affect it injuriously. Section 3 of such Act provides for punishment for committing mischief in respect of property. Learned senior counsel contended that by very nature, quarry operations which involve extracting and removal of minerals could not be informed to be acts of mischief. 33. Learned senior counsel submitted that when offences under the Indian Penal Code did not stand attracted and only those under the MMDR Act remain, the respondent necessarily would have to move by way of private complaint. 33. Learned senior counsel submitted that when offences under the Indian Penal Code did not stand attracted and only those under the MMDR Act remain, the respondent necessarily would have to move by way of private complaint. Learned senior counsel referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay [ 2014 (9) SCC 772 ] and submitted that in paragraph No.70 of such judgment, the Supreme Court had held that 'in case of breach and violation of Section 4 and other provisions of the Act, the police officer cannot insist the Magistrate for taking cognizance under the Act on the basis of the record submitted by the police alleging contravention of the said Act.' 34. Mr. Ajmalkhan, learned senior counsel, has made the said submissions both in the Criminal Original Petitions seeking quash of First Information Reports as also in Crl.O.P.(MD).Nos.7644, 7481 & 7482 of 2013, which seek quash of the charge sheets in P.R.C.Nos.9, 10 and 11 of 2013 on the file of learned Judicial Magistrate, Melur, Madurai District. 35. Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the State, submitted that though it was the petitioners' contention that they were conducting mining operations upon their own land. This Court, in considering petitions seeking quash of First Information Reports would have to take the complaint allegations as correct and the question of whether or not a case for quash stood made out would have to be determined on such assumption. The question of proof of complaint allegations did not arise at this stage. It is the complaint averment that petitioners were removing granite from Government land. The Evaluation Report dated 18.01.2013 submitted by Deputy Director (Geology and Mining), O/o.Commissioner of G&M, Chennai, (camp at Madurai), informed of large scale quarrying in non-leased areas. The Evaluation Report specifically informed thus: “I. General Violation Noticed Under Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act 1957 1. The Lessee has encroached upon the adjoining poolankulam kanmai in SF.No.12/10 of poolankulam village and also in patta land bearing in SF.No.12/13A1, 12/13A2(P)(Non lease area) & 12/13B of poolankulam village and SF.No.101/1A1(P)(Non lease area), 101/2 of kalikappan village and indulged in illicit quarrying of granite in the said areas and violated sec 4(1) and 4(1A) of the said Act.” Therefore, quarrying and removal of granite from Government lands had been done. Offence u/s.379 IPC stood attracted as did other offences. Learned senior counsel also referred to a Map wherein the leased area was shown in green and non-leased area, wherein quarrying allegedly was carried out, was shown in red to emphasise that the Map revealed more red than green. Learned senior counsel submitted that when Government lands were encroached upon, Government was entitled to enter towards setting right matters. Several quarry operators including petitioners were not acting in keeping with the lease/license granted to them and were not submitting reports as required of them. This Court took cognizance of the rampant illegal mining activity and in passing orders in W.P.No.9860 of 2008 on 18.11.2009, required the State to be vigilant there against as also to take action against officials who failed to be so. 36. Learned senior counsel submitted that having opened a pit in the leased area the petitioners had crossed over and continued their quarry operations in non-leased areas, thereby causing huge loss to Government. Having done so, it now is contended that inspection there regards is illegal. Reliance on the MMDR Act to object registration of cases under the Indian Penal Code is misplaced. Government had, on orders of this Court, acted to prevent the menace. In Sanjay's case, the Supreme Court had held thus: “63. It is well known that a non-obstante clause is a legislative device which is usually employed to give overriding effect to certain provisions over some contrary provisions that may be found either in the same enactment or some other enactment, that is to say, to avoid the operation and effect of all contrary provisions. 64. In Liverpool Borough vs. Turner [(1860), 30 L.J. Ch. 379], Lord Campbell, C.J. at page 380 said:- “No universal rule can be laid down for the construction of statutes, as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory, with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed.” 65. It is the duty of courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed.” 65. In Pratap Singh v. Shri Krishna Gupta [ AIR 1956 SC 140 ], at page 141, the Supreme Court while interpreting the mandatory and directory provisions of statute observed as under:- “We do not think that is right and we deprecate this tendency towards technicality; it is the substance that counts and must take precedence over mere form. Some rules are vital and go to the root of the matter; they cannot be broken; others are only directory and a breach of them can be overlooked provided there is substantial compliance with the rules read as whole and provided no prejudice ensues; and when the legislature does not itself state which, Judges must determine the matter and, exercising a nice discrimination, sort out one class from the other along broad based, common-sense lines.” 66. The question is whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other.” 37. Therefore, where the Supreme Court had informed wrongful removal of sand/minerals to be theft, the petitioners' contention of being owners of land was irrelevant. The Division Bench of this Court in Sengol's case had held thus: “9. In all these cases, the crux of the allegations made against the petitioners in the FIRs is that they committed theft of sand from rivers and river beds belonging to the Government. The said act also constitutes violation of the provisions of the The Mines and Minerals Act. The above said act committed by the petitioners, according to the prosecution, not only constitutes an offence punishable under Section 21 of the Mines and Minerals Act, but also constitutes offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code, more particularly, Section 379 of IPC. The said act also constitutes violation of the provisions of the The Mines and Minerals Act. The above said act committed by the petitioners, according to the prosecution, not only constitutes an offence punishable under Section 21 of the Mines and Minerals Act, but also constitutes offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code, more particularly, Section 379 of IPC. That is how, in these cases, apart from invoking the provisions of The Mines and Minerals Act, in the FIRs, Section 379 and other provisions of IPC have also been invoked. 35. A cursory comparison of these two provisions with Section 378 of IPC would go to show that the ingredients are totally different. The contravention of the terms and conditions of mining lease, etc. constitutes an offence punishable under Section 21 of the Mines and Minerals Act, whereas dishonestly taking any movable property out of the possession of a person without his consent constitutes theft. Thus, it is undoubtedly clear that the ingredients of an offence of theft as defined in Section 378 of IPC are totally different from the ingredients of an offence punishable under Section 21(1) r/w Section 4 (1) and 4 (1A) of the Mines and Minerals Act.” 38. Learned senior counsel referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh, wherein the following principles stand reiterated as follows: “15. The issue of malafides looses its significance if there is a substance in the allegation made in complaint moved with malice. In Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 877 , this Court held as under: “It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant.” 16. In Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 1274, this Court held as under: “The ultimate test, therefore, is whether the allegations have any substance. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold because a political opponent or a person with political difference raises an allegation of commission of offence. Therefore, the plea of mala fides as raised cannot be maintained.” 17. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold because a political opponent or a person with political difference raises an allegation of commission of offence. Therefore, the plea of mala fides as raised cannot be maintained.” 17. In State of A.P. v. Goloconda Linga Swamy & Anr., AIR 2004 SC 3967 , this Court held as under: “It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of malafides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceeding.” (See also: K. Karunakaran v. State of Kerala, (2007) 1 SCC 59 ) Paragraphs 19 to 23 of such judgment also are relevant. “19. Scheme for inquiry/trial provided under the Cr.P.C. is quite clear. After investigation, report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. is to be submitted before the competent court i.e. Magistrate having jurisdiction in the matter and the magistrate may take cognizance under Section 190 Cr.P.C. However, it is still open to the magistrate to direct further investigation under the provisions of Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. If the case is triable by the Court of Sessions, the magistrate would commit the case to the said court under Section 209 Cr.P.C. It is for the court to examine whether there is sufficient material collected during investigation and filed along with the charge sheet that a prima facie view can be taken to proceed against the accused and in view thereof, frame charges under Section 228 Cr.P.C. At this stage the remedy available to the accused is to ask for discharge under Section 227 Cr.P.C. In case charges are framed the accused has to face the trial, charges can be added/altered at any stage of the trial, before the pronouncement of the judgment to suit the evidence adduced before the court, under the provision of Section 216 Cr.P.C. The only legal requirement is that a witness has to be recalled as provided under Section 217 Cr.P.C. when a charge is altered or added by the court. 20. In the instant case, charge sheet had been filed and the cognizance had been taken by the magistrate concerned; the committal proceedings have not yet taken place; and some of the offences attracted in this case are exclusively triable by the Sessions Court. 20. In the instant case, charge sheet had been filed and the cognizance had been taken by the magistrate concerned; the committal proceedings have not yet taken place; and some of the offences attracted in this case are exclusively triable by the Sessions Court. Umesh Kumar, appellant approached the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the charge sheet has been partly quashed observing that the provisions of Section 468 IPC are not attracted. 21. The question does arise as to whether such an order attained finality and in case the evidence is adduced before the court concerned, whether the trial court can still hold that the applicant is required to be tried for the offence under Section 468 I.P.C. and further whether the trial would be competent on the said charge in exercise of its power under Section 216 Cr.P.C.? 22. In State of Maharashtra v. Salman Salim Khan, AIR 2004 SC 1189 , this Court depreciated the practice of entertaining the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. at a pre-mature stage of the proceedings observing as under: “.... The arguments regarding the framing of a proper charge are best left to be decided by the trial court at an appropriate stage of the trial. Otherwise as observed in this case, proceedings get protracted by the intervention of the superior courts.... The High Court by the impugned order had allowed the said application quashing the charge under Section 304 IPC against the respondent herein while it maintained the other charges and direct the Magistrate's Court to frame the de novo charges ....... We are of the opinion that though it is open to a High Court entertaining a petition under Section 482 of the Code to quash charges framed by the trial Court, same cannot be done by weighing the correctness or sufficiency of evidence. In a case praying for quashing of the charge, the principle to be adopted by the High Court should be that if the entire evidence produced by the prosecution is to be believed, would it constitute an offence or not. The truthfulness, the sufficiency and acceptability of the material produced at the time of framing of charge can be done only at the stage of trial. ...... The truthfulness, the sufficiency and acceptability of the material produced at the time of framing of charge can be done only at the stage of trial. ...... we think the High Court was not justified in this case in giving a finding as to the non-existence of material to frame a charge for an offence punishable under Section 304, Part II, IPC, therefore so far as the finding given by the High Court is concerned, we are satisfied that it is too premature a finding and ought not to have been given at this stage .....”. (Emphasis added) The Court set aside the order of the High Court and left it open to the trial court to modify the charges in accordance with the evidence adduced before it. (See also: Sohan Lal & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1990 SC 2158 ) 23. A Constitution Bench of this Court reiterated a similar view in CBI & Ors. v. Keshub Mahindra etc., AIR 2011 SC 2037 observing that when the charges are framed, the court makes an endorsement till that stage. So charges are framed on the materials produced by the proseuction for framing the charges “at that stage”. Such indication is necessary otherwise the provisions contained in Sections 216, 323, 386, 397, 399, 401 etc, Cr.P.C., would be rendered nugatory and denuded a competent court of the powers under those provisions. The court cannot be restrained from exercising its powers either under Section 323 or Section 216 Cr.P.C.” 39. Learned senior counsel submitted that it was not open to petitioners to inform that no quarrying wrongfully was done. Such was a defence. It was not open to petitioners to raise defences while seeking quash of First Information Report. It was not open to them to say that the Committee constituted by the Collector was illegal as the MMDR Act had no application in respect of offences under the Indian Penal Code. The unequivocal judgment of the Supreme Court in Sanjay's case as also the Division Bench of this Court in Sengol's case conferred powers of investigation in respect of offences under the Indian Penal Code in keeping with the Criminal Procedure Code. In the face of such decisions of binding nature, there was no room for the contention of such Act overriding the General Act. 40. In the face of such decisions of binding nature, there was no room for the contention of such Act overriding the General Act. 40. Amidst other decisions, learned senior counsel referred to the decision in Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, wherein the Supreme Court, viewed with serious concern the stalling of proceedings owing to orders of stay passed by the High Courts in the country, called from the High Courts statistics of cases wherein proceedings had been stayed at the stage of registration of First Information Report, investigation, framing of charges and/or trial in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution or section 482 and/or 397 Cr.P.C. in cases of murder, rape, kidnapping and dacoity. In paragraphs 60 and 61 of its order, the Supreme Court observed thus: “60. The Court, upon a detailed and very anxious consideration of the aforesaid issues and specially huge pendency of arrears in different High Courts and considering the stand of the Central Government in its affidavit dated 18.1.2012 is giving the following directions. I.Certain directions are given to the High Courts for better maintenance of the Rule of Law and better administration of justice: While analyzing the data in aggregated form, this Court cannot overlook the most important factor in the administration of justice. The authority of the High Court to order stay of investigation pursuant to lodging of FIR, or trial in deserving cases in unquestionable. But this Court is of the view that the exercise of this authority carries with it the responsibility to expeditiously dispose of the case. The power to grant stay of investigation and trial is a very extraordinary power given to High Courts and the same power is to be exercised sparingly only to prevent an abuse of the process and to promote the ends of justice. It is therefore clear that: (i) such an extraordinary power has to be exercised with due caution and circumspection. (ii) Once such a power is exercised, High Court should not lose sight of the case where it has exercised its extraordinary power of staying investigation and trial. (iii) High Court should make it a point of finally disposing of such proceedings as early as possible but preferably within six months from the date the stay order is issued. 61. (ii) Once such a power is exercised, High Court should not lose sight of the case where it has exercised its extraordinary power of staying investigation and trial. (iii) High Court should make it a point of finally disposing of such proceedings as early as possible but preferably within six months from the date the stay order is issued. 61. It is true that this Court has no power of superintendence over High Court as the High Court has over district Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution. Like this Court, High Court is equally a Superior Court of Record with plenary jurisdiction. Under our Constitution High Court is not a Court subordinate to this Court. This Court, however, enjoys appellate powers over High Court as also some other incidental powers. But as the last court and in exercise of this Court's power to do complete justice which includes within it the power to improve the administration of justice in public interest, this Court gives the aforesaid guidelines for sustaining common man's faith in the rule of law and the justice delivery system, both being inextricably linked. .....” 41. A tabular column in such decision had informed the pendency of the categorised cases before this Court as on 12.04.2010 to be three in number and the contribution of this Court thereto, from a total of 20 High Courts where of particulars were available, to be 0.1%. 42. This Court has also heard Mr. S.Shanmugavelayutham, learned Public Prosecutor, who impressed upon this Court the following in Sanjay's case: “60. There cannot be any two opinions that natural resources are the assets of the nation and its citizens. It is the obligation of all concerned, including the Central and the State Governments, to conserve and not waste such valuable resources. Article 48-A of the Constitution requires that the State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and safeguard the forests and wildlife of the country. Similarly, Article 51-A enjoins a duty upon every citizen to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife, and to have compassion for all the living creatures. In view of the constitutional provisions, the doctrine of public trust has become the law of the land. Similarly, Article 51-A enjoins a duty upon every citizen to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife, and to have compassion for all the living creatures. In view of the constitutional provisions, the doctrine of public trust has become the law of the land. The said doctrine rests on the principle that certain resources like air, sea, water and forests are of such great importance to the people as a whole that it would be highly unjustifiable to make them a subject of private ownership.” 43. This Court has considered the rival submissions as also perused the materials available on record. 44. Our findings on the contentions raised on all but Crl.O.P.(MD) No. 6206 of 2013 are as follows: (i) In Satish Chandra v. The King [AIR (36) 1949 107], the factual circumstances were that the landlord/accused, having moved proceedings towards ejectment of the tenant/complainant before the rent controller, took possession of the premises, which had been left vacant by the tenant, by breaking there into. It was in such circumstance that it was held that the offence of criminal trespass covered u/s.441 IPC and which required an accused to enter into property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate him or annoy any person in possession of such property, must be committed with intent to annoy or intimidate any person in actual possession of such property. It was held that house trespass, which, in short, means criminal trespass in respect of a house, had not been committed. The observation that “a person in constructive possession is not contemplated by the section”, is made in the above context. Reliance placed upon such decision to support the proposition that actual possession as opposed to constructive possession was necessary to support an accusation of commission of criminal trespass, is misplaced. (ii) In support of the proposition that minerals/granite formed part of the earth as distinct from things attached to the earth and as such would not constitute movable property forming subject matter of theft, learned senior counsel, Mr. Ajmalkhan, relied on decision in Queen-Empress v. Kotayya and another [10 Mad.255]. This Court notes that while two Judges have taken the view espoused by learned senior counsel, one other has taken the view that on severance, that which is severed would be amenable to theft. Ajmalkhan, relied on decision in Queen-Empress v. Kotayya and another [10 Mad.255]. This Court notes that while two Judges have taken the view espoused by learned senior counsel, one other has taken the view that on severance, that which is severed would be amenable to theft. Finding itself in accord with such view, this Court would have raised a reference on the issue. However, the same becomes unnecessary as in Sanjay's case, the Supreme Court has held that acts such as those complained of in the present cases, do constitute theft. No doubt, it is true that in Thressiamma's case, the Supreme Court has recognised proprietary rights in private persons over the sub-soil/minerals in land owned by them and the offence of theft requires the act of taking moveable property out of the possession of a person. This Court's reliance on Sanjay's case is to the extent, that the same, in effect, recognises sand/minerals as moveable property. That the accusation in all the cases is that illegal mining was conducted also on poramboke lands cannot be lost sight of. There regards, allegations of theft certainly can be made. (iii) Acts of trespass would not be determined by whether the possession of the complainant is actual or constructive. The challenge to constitution of squads referred to as 'District Collectors Committee' being violative of sections 24 and 26 of MMDR Act, is unacceptable. It is erroneous to contend that MMDR Act is the be-all and end-all as far as the offences relating to minerals are concerned. In Sanjay's case, the Supreme Court has informed thus: “73. After giving our thoughtful consideration in the matter, in the light of the relevant provisions of the Act vis-a-vis the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal code, we are of the definite opinion that the ingredients constituting the offence under the MMDR Act and the ingredients of dishonestly removing sand and gravel from the riverbeds without consent, which is the property of the State, is a distinct offence under IPC. Hence, for the commission of offence under Section 378 IPC, on receipt of the police report, the Magistrate having jurisdiction can take cognizance of the said offence without awaiting the receipt of complaint that may be filed by the authorised officer for taking cognizance in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act. Hence, for the commission of offence under Section 378 IPC, on receipt of the police report, the Magistrate having jurisdiction can take cognizance of the said offence without awaiting the receipt of complaint that may be filed by the authorised officer for taking cognizance in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act. Consequently, the contrary view taken by the different High Courts cannot be sustained in law and, therefore, overruled. Consequently, these criminal appeals are disposed of with a direction to the Magistrates concerned to proceed accordingly.” (iv) As informed in the decision of this Court in Sengol's case while violation of the provisions of MMDR Act could invite a complaint u/s.22 of such enactment, it would be open to a police officer to investigate that which are perceived to be offences under the Indian Penal Code. For such perception, it is sufficient if the First Information Reports on a bare reading informs commission of cognizable offences. Courts cannot go by the label placed by the police whilst registering a case but would have to consider the substance of the allegations in the First Information Report to ascertain if any offence at all is made out. Once this Court finds that the allegation regards even one of the offences informed in the First Information Report is made out, this Court need not go into the question of whether other offences informed are made out or not. Even attempts to commit offences are made punishable u/s.511 IPC. It is in a very rare case that a First Information Report may be quashed. In all the instant cases, the allegations are that on the basis of licences/lease granted, petitioners have conducted quarry operations and in doing so, have trespassed into property belonging to Government, conducted themselves unlawfully and done away with granite belonging to Government. Given such allegations, the contentions of petitioners having proprietary right over the sub-soil/minerals by placing reliance on the decision in Thressiamma's case does not hold water. The present is not the stage where this Court would go into the truth or otherwise of the allegations. The allegations, if true, would make out cognizable offences. Given such allegations, the contentions of petitioners having proprietary right over the sub-soil/minerals by placing reliance on the decision in Thressiamma's case does not hold water. The present is not the stage where this Court would go into the truth or otherwise of the allegations. The allegations, if true, would make out cognizable offences. (v) The contention that the transport of granite necessarily are matters of record, that the complaints are long delayed, that no allegations have been made against officials and First Information Reports are vindictive against quarry owners, is unacceptable for the reason that it would be part of the investigating agencies function to ascertain whether 'records' are true and accurate. As would be its function to ascertain who are the persons, officials or otherwise, guilty of wrong doing. As oft stated, a First Information Report is not an encyclopaedia. (vi) Reliance on evaluation reports to inform that no offence stands committed by the petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD) Nos.14908 and 14668 of 2012, 4521 of 2015 since such reports inform of wrong doing by others in respect of the same property, is misplaced. First Information Reports allege commission of offences. What are the offences, if any committed and by whom, are matters for investigation. Where two cases have been registered in respect of wrong doing regarding the same property, the complaint in one would be treated as the First Information Report and that in the other a 161(3) Cr.P.C. statement. (vii) That in Durai @ Dayanithi and another vs. State [2013 (1) LW (Crl.) 481] this Court has accepted the proposition that the purpose of the Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act viz., prevention of damage to properties in the course of political meetings/processions, etc and recovery of compensation from the offenders, cannot be lost sight of. The contention regards using of explosives only to clear the subsoil and that doing so in excavation of granite would render the same gravel is not without merit. This Court would state that the prosecution allegation of commission of offence u/s.304 IPC i.e. culpable homicide not amounting to murder r/w 511 IPC i.e. attempt to commit offences, is without substance. To inform that in causing a pit, the accused, intended persons, workmen and animals to fall there into and thus meet their death, borders on the ridiculous. This Court would state that the prosecution allegation of commission of offence u/s.304 IPC i.e. culpable homicide not amounting to murder r/w 511 IPC i.e. attempt to commit offences, is without substance. To inform that in causing a pit, the accused, intended persons, workmen and animals to fall there into and thus meet their death, borders on the ridiculous. However, this Court would have to keep in mind that in filing the final report there is every possibility of the investigating officer/officers excluding offences under the Explosives Substances Act, Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act and 304 r/w 511 of Indian Penal Code. The logic of preferring complaints in respect of offences under the MMDR Act and of registration of cases and investigation in keeping with the Criminal Procedure Code in respect of Indian Penal Code offences would apply also viz-a-viz offences under the Tank Encroachment Act and Indian Penal Code. Resort to penalty and recovery as an alternative to prosecution in Rule 36-A of The Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, is to be read as applicable only to violation of provisions of the MMDR Act. The same cannot be extended to the offences under the Indian Penal Code. The objections to 'District Collectors Committee' and the registration of First Information Reports at the instances of allegedly erring Village Administrative Officers, run totally contra to the basic criminal law proposition that anybody can set the law in motion. When there are exceptions to such General Rule, the same are informed in the Criminal Procedure Code/other statutes. 45. Crl.O.P.(MD) No.6206 of 2013 stands on a different footing. Petitioner therein seeks quash of proceedings in P.R.C.No.11 of 2013 on the file of learned Judicial Magistrate, Nilakottai, as against him. 46. In such case, the case of the prosecution is that between 2007 and 2010, one Muralidharan illegally conducted quarry operations in Government land in S.No.1140, Iyyampalayam Village, damaged property, used explosives to blast granite and stole the same causing loss to the Government. He caused a huge pit which was dangerous to the general public, quarry workers as also animals despite knowledge that falling there into could cause death. He caused a huge pit which was dangerous to the general public, quarry workers as also animals despite knowledge that falling there into could cause death. Upon the direction of the Tahsildar, the Village Administrative Officer preferred a complaint before the first respondent against the said Muralidharan and a case was registered in Crime No.146 of 2012 for offences u/s.379 and 420 IPC and 4(1)(A) of the MMDR Act, 1952. On the basis of confession of the said Muralidharan and statements of two witnesses, the petitioner subsequently was arrayed as A2. Upon completion of investigation and filing of charge sheet informing commission of offences u/s.120(b) r/w 447, 379, 420, 434, 304 IPC and section 3(1) & 4 of Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act, 1992 and sections 3(a), 4(a) & (b) r/w. Section 6 of the Explosives Substances Act, 1908 r/w Sections 109, 114 and 511 IPC, the case was taken on file in P.R.C.No.11 of 2013 on the file of learned Judicial Magistrate, Nilakottai. 47. Mr. A. Ramesh, learned senior counsel for petitioner submitted that the 161 Cr.P.C. statement of LW-39 informs that his uncle and he held quarrying licence and conducted quarrying operations at Iyyampalayam Village till 2010. It further informs of his having left the quarrying area on 24.03.2010 after informing the neighbouring quarry owners, upon knowledge of cancellation of his licence. He had further stated that two or three days thereafter he had gone over to the office of the Assistant Director (Mines and Minerals) and submitted particulars of his excavation between 1998 and 2010 of 540 sq.mtrs. in keeping with the licence granted to him. He informed that thereafter he had not been anywhere near the quarry area. He claimed to have been informed over phone regards the petitioner, then a Minister of the State Government and others having illegally conducted quarry operations after a particular political party came to power in 2007. He claimed to have accompanied his uncle on other work to the Iyyampalayam village in October 2010, of their having caused enquiry regarding illegal quarry operations being conducted in the area licenced to him and of having been informed that such illegal quarry operations were being conducted at the behest of A2, the petitioner and his Personal Assistant. He claimed to have accompanied his uncle on other work to the Iyyampalayam village in October 2010, of their having caused enquiry regarding illegal quarry operations being conducted in the area licenced to him and of having been informed that such illegal quarry operations were being conducted at the behest of A2, the petitioner and his Personal Assistant. He has informed of such wrong doers having stopped quarry operations in March 2010 towards avoiding a bad name in view of the ensuing elections. 48. Learned senior counsel submitted that it was accepted case that between 1998 and 2003, LW-39 held a permit to conduct quarry operations in S.No.1140, Iyyampalayam village and had done so till 2010. The conversion to hill area and consequent ban on mining had come into force on 24.03.2003. It is the definite prosecution case that the poramboke land in question was leased out to LW-39 till the year 2003 and subsequently, was brought under the control of hill area conversion authority and thereafter, it was not leased out to anybody. It was the further case that the petitioner/A2 illegally had been carrying out quarrying operations from 2007 to 2010. However, LW-39 categorically had stated that he had carried out quarrying operation in the site till March 2010 and that he had discontinued from doing so from 24.03.2010. There absolutely was no direct evidence of the specific wrongful activity of petitioner/A2. Statements of the various witnesses which inform the presence of the petitioner at the quarrying area, are stereotype. Though the First Information Report had been registered also for offence under The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952, the charge sheet did not inform commission of offences under such Act. 49. LW-39 to 53 all were Government officials. None of their statements inform direct knowledge of alleged wrong doing by petitioner/A2. All they would inform was that they 'heard' there about and merely that as the petitioner was the 'political boss', they were afraid of transfer. Despite as many as sixty four witnesses having been examined, there was no material on when, where and how the petitioner had misconducted himself. The First Information Report in the case originally had been registered on 01.06.2012 for offences u/s.379 and 420 IPC and 4(1)(A) of the Mines and Minerals Regulation Act, 1952. Despite as many as sixty four witnesses having been examined, there was no material on when, where and how the petitioner had misconducted himself. The First Information Report in the case originally had been registered on 01.06.2012 for offences u/s.379 and 420 IPC and 4(1)(A) of the Mines and Minerals Regulation Act, 1952. Within three days, on 04.06.2012, the First Information Report had been altered to include offence u/s.21(1)(a) of the MMDR Act and section 3 of the Explosives Substances Act, 1908 and in doing so, the name of petitioner and others had been included. The same had been done on the basis of an alleged confession made by A1. Upon his arrest, effected without any enquiry, this petitioner and others had suffered arrest. 50. Learned senior counsel submitted that the recovery of explosive substances in a bush was most artificial. Learned senior counsel submitted that this petitioner was arrayed an accused with the aid of Section 120-B IPC. To inform the standard required to make a charge of criminal conspiracy, learned senior counsel relied on the decision in Central Bureau of Investigation, Hyderabad v. K. Narayana Rao [ 2012 (9) SCC 512 ]. Paragraph Nos.23 and 24 thereof read as follows: “23. Mr. Venkataramani, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent submitted that in support of the charge under Section 120-B, there is no factual foundation and no evidence at all. Section 120-A defines criminal conspiracy which reads thus: “120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy. — When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,— (1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy: Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. Explanation.— It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object. Section 120-B speaks about punishment of criminal conspiracy. While considering the definition of criminal conspiracy, it is relevant to refer Sections 34 and 35 IPC which are as under: “34. Explanation.— It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object. Section 120-B speaks about punishment of criminal conspiracy. While considering the definition of criminal conspiracy, it is relevant to refer Sections 34 and 35 IPC which are as under: “34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.— When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. 35. When such an act is criminal by reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge or intention. — Whenever an act, which is criminal only by reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge or intention, is done by several persons, each of such persons who joins in the act with such knowledge or intention is liable for the act in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone with that knowledge or intention.” 24. The ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy are that there should be an agreement between the persons who are alleged to conspire and the said agreement should be for doing of an illegal act or for doing, by illegal means, an act which by itself may not be illegal. In other words, the essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both and in a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available. Accordingly, the circumstances proved before and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. Even if some acts are proved to have been committed, it must be clear that they were so committed in pursuance of an agreement made between the accused persons who were parties to the alleged conspiracy. Inferences from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only when such circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. In other words, an offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion and surmises or inference which are not supported by cogent and acceptable evidence.” 51. Inferences from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only when such circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. In other words, an offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion and surmises or inference which are not supported by cogent and acceptable evidence.” 51. Learned senior counsel also placed reliance on decision of this Court in K.S. Narayanan and others v. S. Gopinathan [1982 Cri.L.J. 1611] wherein the following observations stand made: “12. ... Merely levelling a charge of conspiracy, without mentioning how, where, when and which of the conspirators hatched the conspiracy and for what purpose, or circumstances warranting an inference of existence of a conspiracy, is not enough to bring persons like A-8, retired Reserve Bank of India Governor, and A-9, retired I.C.S. officer to face the trial in a criminal court. ... 14. The case was fully argued on both sides and after giving my best consideration, I am of the opinion that this is a fit case where I ought to interfere under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is not easy to measure the injury likely to be inflicted on persons of the status of the petitioners by the vexatious and protracted criminal trial. It may be ultimately the accused will be acquitted. But that is not a sufficient ground for not rescuing them from what I consider to be a groundless and vexatious prosecution. Since prevention is better than cure, I quash the proceedings pending against the petitioners in C.C.Nos.23771 and 23772 of 1978 on the file of the II Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras. In the result, Cr.MP 4496 and 4498 of 1978 are allowed.” Quoted in the said decision also is the observation made by the Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority v. Lila D.Bhagat, AIR 1975 SC 495 , which reads thus: “In an appropriate case, it may be rather, is, permissible to protect a person from illegal and vexatious prosecution by grant of an appropriate writ or in exercise of the inherent or revisional powers of the High Court.” 52. On behalf of the respondent State, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that in the present petition, the challenge was to the charge sheet and contended that when there was prima facie material, this Court would not exercise its powers u/s.482 Cr.P.C. towards quashing proceedings at its infancy. On behalf of the respondent State, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that in the present petition, the challenge was to the charge sheet and contended that when there was prima facie material, this Court would not exercise its powers u/s.482 Cr.P.C. towards quashing proceedings at its infancy. Learned Public Prosecutor relied on the statements of as many as nine list witnesses to submit that such witnesses had spoken to the participation of the petitioner in wrong doing. Learned Public Prosecutor contended that as the petitioner wielded power, the witnesses were afraid and hence, the delay in initiating the case. Relying on the statement of LW-10, he contended that witnesses also were intimidated. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the case had been registered for offences u/s.379 IPC as also under the MMDR Act. In filing the charge sheet, the MMDR Act had been left out. The act of the Magistrate in taking cognizance also for offences under the MMDR Act reflected his independent application of mind. Learned Public Prosecutor relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in H.N. Rishbud & another v. State of Delhi to submit that even if there be errors in the investigation, the same would not vitiate the trial. 53. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that LW-40 had spoken to the recovery of explosives at the instance of an accused. Industries (MMA.1) Department, G.O.(Ms).No.135 dated 13.11.2009, informed that Village Administrative Officers, Tahsildars, Officers in-charge of the area shall be held responsible for not taking proper action against illegal mining and transportation of minerals and the District Collector was required to take departmental action against them and file a report to Government. Therefore, it was erroneous to contend that a complaint registered at the instance of the Village Administrative Officer was invalid. 54. By way of reply, learned senior counsel for petitioner submitted that a concerted effort stood made to rope in the petitioner as an accused. Stereotype statements belatedly had been recorded. The same did not inform particulars of time. 55. This Court has no hesitancy in accepting Crl.O.P.(MD)No.6206 of 2013 and quashing proceedings in P.R.C.No.11 of 2013 on the file of learned Judicial Magistrate, Nilakottai, insofar as the petitioner/A2 is concerned for the following reasons: (i) First Information Report in the case has been registered on 01.06.2012 at the instance of the Village Administrative Officer. 55. This Court has no hesitancy in accepting Crl.O.P.(MD)No.6206 of 2013 and quashing proceedings in P.R.C.No.11 of 2013 on the file of learned Judicial Magistrate, Nilakottai, insofar as the petitioner/A2 is concerned for the following reasons: (i) First Information Report in the case has been registered on 01.06.2012 at the instance of the Village Administrative Officer. It is difficult to accept the position that in informing commission of offences upto the year 2010 in the year 2012, the Village Administrative Officer was so uninformed that the participation of this petitioner was not mentioned in the complaint. However, within three days, on 04.06.2012, the First Information Report has been altered to array also this petitioner, who was a Minister in the former Government, as an accused. (ii) While the statements of LWs.39 to 53, Government Officials, merely are hearsay, that of the other witnesses demonstrably are vindictive attempts to rope in the petitioner. This Court carefully has perused the statements of LWs.12 to 31 and found that the contention of learned senior counsel for petitioner that the 'cut, copy and paste' procedure has been followed in ostensibly recording the same, is well-founded. In each of the statements of LWs.12 to 31, the following verbatim reproductions are found: Roughly translated, they inform thus: “Immediately, Minister I.Periyasamy, Thangavelu, his Personal Assistant and Muralidharan, came and on seeing the stones, stated that the stones were of good quality and instructed dispatch thereof to persons, who had placed orders with them. Minister I.Periyasamy stated that we are the ruling party and asked us not to be afraid. He asked us to inform him in case of any trouble. The work was completed by 09.00 a.m.” In each of the statements of LWs.12 to 19, the following verbatim reproductions are found: Roughly translated, they inform thus: “Three years later, in the year 2010, at about 10.00 a.m. Muralidharn, Minister I.Periyasamy and Thangavelu, his Personal Assistant, arrived at the place in their Car and informed Thirupathi and Sadayandi, to stop quarrying operation towards avoiding a bad name in the ensuing elections. On their instructions, everybody stopped the work and left the place. On their instructions, everybody stopped the work and left the place. Thereafter, nobody conducted quarry operations.” In the statements of LWs.20 to 25, the following is the verbatim reproduction: Roughly translated, they inform thus: Three years later, in the year 2010, at about 10.00 a.m. Muralidharn, Minister I.Periyasamy and Thangavelu, his Personal Assistant, arrived at the place in their Car and informed Thirupathi and Sadayandi, to stop quarrying operation towards avoiding a bad name in the ensuing Loksabha elections. People do not vote for us. On their instructions, everybody stopped the work and left the place. Thereafter, nobody conducted quarry operations.” In each of the statements of LWs.27 to 31, the following verbatim reproductions are found: Roughly translated, they inform thus: “I questioned Muralidharan whether he is having licence to conduct quarry operation in Government poramboke land. Muralidharan shouted at me by uttering 'who you are to ask me, now we are the ruling party, Minister I.Periyasamy is supporting me, I am doing this work without licence only and I am doing this on the instructions of I.Periyasamy. Out of the income derived from the business, Minister I.Periyasamy is getting lakhs and lakhs rupees through Thangavel, his Personal Assistant. That's why none of the officials are questioning us'. He shouted at us asking on what authority we were questioning him and also threatened to do away with us, if we repeat the same. Out of fear, we left the place.” Hearsay also is the statement of LW-39, an earlier licencee, who has informed of having stopped quarrying operations upon his licence being cancelled and who rather unnaturally informs of having visited the place with his uncle in the year 2010 and of having been informed of the involvement of petitioner. The verbatim reproductions lay bare the attempt of the prosecution to rope in the petitioner as an accused. (iii) Petitioner is sought to be roped in with the aid of Section 120-B IPC. This Court in K.S. Narayanan and others v. S. Gopinathan [1982 Cri.L.J. 1611] has observed as follows: “12. ... The verbatim reproductions lay bare the attempt of the prosecution to rope in the petitioner as an accused. (iii) Petitioner is sought to be roped in with the aid of Section 120-B IPC. This Court in K.S. Narayanan and others v. S. Gopinathan [1982 Cri.L.J. 1611] has observed as follows: “12. ... Merely levelling a charge of conspiracy, without mentioning how, where, when and which of the conspirators hatched the conspiracy and for what purpose, or circumstances warranting an inference of existence of a conspiracy, is not enough to bring persons like A-8, retired Reserve Bank of India Governor, and A-9, retired I.C.S. officer to face the trial in a criminal court. ...” This Court would follow the dictum of the Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority v. Lila D.Bhagat, AIR 1975 SC 495 , wherein it has been informed that “In an appropriate case, it may be rather, is, permissible to protect a person from illegal and vexatious prosecution by grant of an appropriate writ or in exercise of the inherent or revisional powers of the High Court.” This Court would also follow the rationale of the decision of the Supreme Court in Central Bureau of Investigation, Hyderabad v. K.Narayana Rao [ 2012 (9) SCC 512 ], wherein it has been informed thus: “24. The ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy are that there should be an agreement between the persons who are alleged to conspire and the said agreement should be for doing of an illegal act or for doing, by illegal means, an act which by itself may not be illegal. In other words, the essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both and in a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available. Accordingly, the circumstances proved before and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. Even if some acts are proved to have been committed, it must be clear that they were so committed in pursuance of an agreement made between the accused persons who were parties to the alleged conspiracy. Inferences from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only when such circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. Even if some acts are proved to have been committed, it must be clear that they were so committed in pursuance of an agreement made between the accused persons who were parties to the alleged conspiracy. Inferences from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only when such circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. In other words, an offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion and surmises or inference which are not supported by cogent and acceptable evidence.” In the result, Crl.O.P.(MD) Nos.14908 and 14668 of 2012, 16107, 16108, 6597, 6595, 6596, 6410, 6430, 6681, 6682, 6683, 6436, 6438, 7581, 7595, 12970, 15862, 15863, 15864, 16484, 6667, 6668, 6669, 7268 of 2013, 22808, 22813, 5431, 22247 of 2014, 5200, 5201, 3316, 5146, 4521 and 3080 of 2015, 7644, 7481 & 7482 of 2013, shall stand dismissed. Crl.O.P.(MD)No.6206 of 2013 shall stand allowed and the proceedings in P.R.C.No.11 of 2013 on the file of learned Judicial Magistrate, Nilakottai, shall stand quashed insofar as the petitioner/A2 is concerned. As the case in Crime No.146 of 2012, quash of which has been sought, has resulted in filing of a charge sheet, Crl.O.P.(MD)No.4774 of 2013 is dismissed as infructuous. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.