ORDER The Petitioner has come forward with this Writ Petition for issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records from the respondent pertaining to the impugned proceedings in Na.Ka.No. 738/UKoA/Sath/2015, dated 12.08.2015 dated 12.08.2015 issued by the respondent and to quash the same and consequently to direct the respondent to grant permission to the Petitioner to conduct the conference at her own patta land bearing No.971 23 1B2, Spread over 3 Hectares on 20.08.2015 at Chinna Odaipatti, Sathur Taluk, Virudhunagar District. 2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents. 3. The Petitioner has filed this Writ Petition stating that the Petitioner is the Secretary of District Women Wing of “Mallar Meetpu Kazhagam' which is called as Kazhagam hereinafter. The Kazhagam has been functioning for social, cultural and economical up-gradation of Pallars which is one of the scheduled case community contemplated under the constitutional order 1950. 4. He would further submit that now they are trying to get minimum and respectable social status. Therefore they are making demand against the Government that Pallar community should be removed from the scheduled case list and to be added with Backward communities. Hence to make awareness among the community, they have decided to convene a conference for enhancement of social status with separate reservation, they propose to conduct a meeting on 29.08.2015.In this regard, the Petitioner has given a representation on 07.07.2015 which was rejected by the impugned order dated 12.08.2015. 5. The learned counsel would submit that the impugned order is un-sustainable because it is illegal, unjust, arbitrary and in violation of principles of natural justice. The learned counsel would submit that the reason mentioned in the impugned order is un-sustainable because the alleged occurrence said to be taken place in Sattur Taluk, Virudhunagar District in the year 1992-1995. He would further submit that the Petitioner's husband has published a book called “Meendelum Pandiar Varalaru” which was banned by G.O.Ms.No.25 SC, dated 30.5.2013. In this regard, a Writ Petition has been filed which has been pending. The learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that after the Government Order has been passed, they have not sold the book Meendhelum Pandiar Varalaru. In this regard, a Writ Petition has been filed which has been pending. The learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that after the Government Order has been passed, they have not sold the book Meendhelum Pandiar Varalaru. He further submitted that they are ready to give an undertaking not to publish or sell the above book and also ready to given an undertaking that they will not publish any pamphlet provoking the public. He would further submit that they are ready to give an alternative place/venue for conducting the meeting. Hence he prayed for allowing of this petition. 6. The learned Additional Advocate General would submit that even though the said G.O has been passed, the Petitioner's husband and her father in law had sold the book, so a case in Crime No.333 of 2013 has been preferred against them under Sections 124(a), 153(b) and 294(b) IPC and one Perumal Sami, father of the Petitioner was arrested. So they apprehended that the said book should be published/released in that meeting. He further submitted that since the Petitioner has made publication in wall, some people has made objection for the same. He further submitted that this will cause apprehension in the minds of Hindu People, so invoking Section 30(2) of Police Act, the respondent has rejected the same. Admittedly, the respondent has filed a detailed counter incorporating all these averments and prayed for dismissal of the petition. 7. The citations relied on by the learned Additional Advocate General, namely: 1. AIR 2004 Supreme Court 2081(State of Karnataka and another .vs. Dr.Praveen Bhai Thogadia) 2. 2012(2) CTC 705 (P.Pugalenthi .vs. State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Chief Secretary to Government Secretariat, Chennai-9 3. (2013) 6 MLJ 137 (Thol Thirumavalavan vs. The Government of Tamil Nadu and others and prayed for dismissal of the Petition. 8. Considering the rival submissions and the decisions relied on by both sides, it is true that this petitioner's husband is the author of the book called “Meendhelum Pandiar Varalaru” that has been banned by G.O.Ms.No.525/SC dated 30.5.2013. So they were prevented from selling the book. 9. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the Petitioner fairly conceded that he is ready to give an undertaking that they will not sell the above said book and also undertake not to distribute any pamphlets or notices in similar nature provoking the minds of the general public. So they were prevented from selling the book. 9. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the Petitioner fairly conceded that he is ready to give an undertaking that they will not sell the above said book and also undertake not to distribute any pamphlets or notices in similar nature provoking the minds of the general public. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the Petitioner would submit that instead of the place presently mentioned in this Writ Petition, they are ready to conduct their meeting at Vepplilaipatti Village, Sattur Taluk. 10. At this juncture, the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondent/State would submit that the petitioner shall mention exact place in vepplilaipatti village where they proposed to conduct the meeting. At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider the decision relied on by the learned Additional Advocate General reported in AIR 2004 Supreme Court 2081(State of Karnataka and another .vs. Dr.Praveen Bhai Thogadia), In that he relief upon para 7 of the judgement. There is no quarrel over the proposal on the above judgement and the facts of the above judgement is not applicable to the facts of the present case because therein the learned Additional District Magistrate of Dakshina Kannada passed the order restraining the respondents to enter the said District and they have participated in the function in the District for a period of 15 days on 10.2.2003 to 25.2.2003. A function was organized at Mangalore on 13.2.2003 where several religious leaders were shown as the likely participants. So they were apprehended for the grant of permission. The learned Additional Advocate General relied on para 3 of the said judgement which runs as under: “The respondent by an order of Additional District Magistrate(in short the “ADM), Dakshina Kannada was restrained from entering the said district and from participating in any function in the district for a period of 15 days I.e., from 10.2.2003 to 25.2.2003.The order was dated 7.2.2003. A function was organized at Mangalore on 13.2.2003 where several religious leaders were shown as the likely participants. On 7.2.2003, a permission for holding the meeting was obtained by the organizers from the District Magistrate, Mangalore. Permission was also granted by the Police authorities and the Corporation. A function was organized at Mangalore on 13.2.2003 where several religious leaders were shown as the likely participants. On 7.2.2003, a permission for holding the meeting was obtained by the organizers from the District Magistrate, Mangalore. Permission was also granted by the Police authorities and the Corporation. The ADM at this stage passed an order dated 7.2.2003 in MAG(Z) CR 352/2002-03.D and restrained the respondent as aforesaid on the ground that the district had become communally sensitive and there were several communal clashes starting from 1988 resulting in several deaths and damage to public and private properties. It was indicated in a detailed order passed which was under challenge before the High Court of Karnataka that the respondent during his visit to another place on 18.12.2002, had delivered an inflammatory speech which incited communal feelings and the communal harmony was greatly affected. The ADM felt that a similar speech by the respondent would result in stoking communal feelings vitiating harmonious social and communal atmosphere. The respondent challenged the order in a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(in short the Code) before the High Court taking the stand that the ADM had no jurisdiction, because he was not an Executive Magistrate or had not been conferred with powers of an disharmony. The were made with reference to political issues which have been the subject matter of debate for several years. Only for political reasons a case was registered against him. The Petition was resisted on several grounds; firstly it was pointed out that an alternate remedy was in built under Section 144 of the Code and without exhausting that statutory remedy, the present respondent should not have rushed to the High Court for exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code. The stand of the present respondent that the time available was very short and result of the so-called alternate remedy would not have yielded any fruitful results is incorrect. Secondly, reference was made to several instances where on account of the action of the respondent, and his speeches and acts of organizers of the function there were communal clashes and the District Administration had to intervene to avoid disturbances of social tranquility and communal harmony.” 11. Secondly, reference was made to several instances where on account of the action of the respondent, and his speeches and acts of organizers of the function there were communal clashes and the District Administration had to intervene to avoid disturbances of social tranquility and communal harmony.” 11. The learned Additional Advocate General also placed reliance on para 7 of the above said judgement, which is incorporated hereunder: “7.Courts should not normally interfere with matters relating to law and order which is primarily the domain of the concerned administrative authorities. They are by and large the best to assess and to handle the situation depending upon the peculiar needs and necessities, within their special knowledge. Their decision may involve to some extent an element of subjectivity on the basis of materials before them. Past conduct and antecedents of a person or group or an organization may certainly provide sufficient material or basis for the action contemplated on a reasonable expectation of possible turn of events, which may need to be avoided in public interest and maintenance of law and order. No person, however, big he may assume or claim to be, should be allowed irrespective of the position he may assume or claim to hold in public life to either act in a manner or make speeches which would destroy secularism recognized by the Constitution of India, 1950(in short the 'constitution').Secularism is not to be confused with communal or religious concepts of an individual or a group of persons. It means that State should have no religion of its own and no one could proclaim to make the State have one such an endeavour to create a theocratic State. Persons belonging to different religions live throughout the length and breadth of the country. Each person whatever be his religion must get an assurance from the State that he has the protection of law freely to profess, practice and propagate his religion and freedom of conscience. Otherwise, the rule of law will become replaced by individual perceptions of ones own presumptuous good social order. Therefore, whenever the concerned authorities in charge of law and order find that a person's speeches or actions are likely to trigger communal antagonism and hatred resulting in fissiparous tendencies gaining foothold undermining and affecting communal harmony, prohibitory orders need necessarily to be passed, to effectively avert such untoward happenings.” 12. Therefore, whenever the concerned authorities in charge of law and order find that a person's speeches or actions are likely to trigger communal antagonism and hatred resulting in fissiparous tendencies gaining foothold undermining and affecting communal harmony, prohibitory orders need necessarily to be passed, to effectively avert such untoward happenings.” 12. But in the case on hand, in the impugned order it was stated that the proposed place/venue is sensitive area which will create law and order problem. So in such circumstances I am of the view that the above citation is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 13. He also relied on a decision reported in 2012(2) CTC 705 (P.Pugalenthi .vs. State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Chief Secretary to Government Secretariat, Chennai-9 in which the relevant portion is extracted hereunder: 14. In these writ petitions, we are not concerned about the establishment of the Power Plant or its functioning. The challenge to the impugned order is on the ground that it does not satisfy the requirements essential for invoking the power under Section 144(1) CrPC. 15. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the In Re-Ramlila Maidan, referred supra, the scope of an order made under Section 144 CrPC, has been stated. It has been held that an order passed in anticipation by the Magistrate empowered under Section 144 Cr.P.C is not an encroachment of the freedom granted under Article 19(1) (a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution and it is not regarded as an unreasonable restriction. It is an executive order, open to judicial review. It has been further held that the entire basis of an action under Section 144 is the urgency of the situation and the power therein is intended to be availed for preventing disorder, obstructions and annoyance with a view to secure the public weal by maintaining public peace and tranquillity. The decision of the Supreme Court in case of Gulam Abbas, referred supra, was referred to and stated that preservation of public peace and tranquility is the primary function of the Government and the aforesaid power is conferred on the executive and in a given situation a private right must give in to public interest. That an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C, though primarily empowers the executive authorities to pass Prohibitory orders vis-a-vis a particular facet, but is intended to serve large public interest. That an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C, though primarily empowers the executive authorities to pass Prohibitory orders vis-a-vis a particular facet, but is intended to serve large public interest. Their Lordship's further held that the legislative intention to preserve public peace and tranquility without lapse of time, acting urgently, if warranted, giving thereby paramount importance to the social needs by even overriding temporarily, private rights, keeping in view the public interest, a patently in-built in the provisions under Section 144 Cr.P.C. After referring to the decision in Dr.Thogadia's case (supra), it was observed that Court should not normally interfere with matters relating to law and order which is primarily the domain of the concerned administrative authorities and they are by and large the best to assess and handle the situation depending upon the peculiar needs and necessities within their special knowledge. It has been further held that if the authority anticipates an eminent threat to public order or public tranquility, it would be free to pass desirable directions within the para meters of reasonable restrictions on the freedom of individual and the provision is attracted only in emergent situation for the purpose of maintaining public order. The order should be in writing referring to the facts and stating the reasons for imposition of such restriction. The Supreme Court in Dr.Thogadia's case, held that the Court was not acting as an appellate authority over the decision of the official concerned and unless the order is patently illegal, without jurisdiction or with ulterior motives and on extraneous consideration of political victimization by those in power, normally interference should be the exception and not the Rule. The Court cannot in such matters substitute its view for that of the competent authority. The basic requirements for passing an order under Section 144were held to be as follows:- (i) It is an executive power vested in the officer so empowered; (ii) There must exist sufficient ground for proceeding; (iii) Immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable; (iv) An order, in writing, should be passed stating the material facts and be served the same upon the concerned person. 16. 16. The Constitution Bench held that the gist of the action under Section 144 is the urgency of the situation, its efficacy in the likelihood of being able to prevent some harmful occurrences and it is possible to act absolutely and even ex parte, the emergency must be sudden and consequences sufficiently grave. It was further held that there is no general rule that an order under the Section cannot be passed without taking evidence. Further, it was held that the restraint imposed by the order is temporary and the aggrieved person has an opportunity to have the order rescinded and there are sufficient safeguard available to the person affected by the order and the restrictions are therefore reasonable and the mere fact that the power under the section may be abused is no ground to strike it down. 17. As noticed above, the power under Section 144 is an executive power and for exercise of such powers, there must be sufficient ground for proceeding and the next aspect would be immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable and the order is required to be in writing by directing any person to abstain from a certain Act or to take certain order with respect of certain property in his possession or under his management, if such Magistrate considers that such direction is likely to prevent or tends to prevent obstructions, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed or danger to human life, health or safety or a disturbance of the public tranquility or a riot or an affray. The above citation is not applicable to the facts of the present case because Prohibitory order for preventing political parties, organizations and others who assist movement against Atomic Energy and to prevent such activity which would be detrimental to tranquility of public at Koodankulam and to prevent such persons from obstructing employees in power plant from attending their duties and in order to give protection to life and property of public and with view to prevent riots and preserve peace and tranquility and to prevent suchb of those persons helping agitators against power plaint and to restrain them from instigating agitators from entering limits of Radhapuram Taluk from 3.00 p.m. Of 19th March 2012 till 3.00 p.m. Of 2nd April 2012 has been passed. But here, the Petitioner want to convene a meeting only on a particular day I.e., on 29.8.2015 from 5.00 p.m. To 9.00 p.m. In such circumstances, the above citation is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 14. He also relied on (2013) 6 MLJ 137 ( Thol Thirumavalavan vs. The Government of Tamil Nadu and others. In this decision, the facts of the case is entirely different. The facts of the case is that one Dalith Boy Elavarasan married one Divya belonging to Vanniar Community and that was opposed by the said community due to which the said Elavarasan died in a suspicious circumstances and hence this petitioner can sought for permission to conduct meeting in a certain area. In such circumstances, the above said order has been passed. But the Petitioner herein has sought for conducting a public meeting which is entirely different from the above and in such circumstances, the decision relied on by the learned Additional Advocate General is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 15. Now in this case, the Petitioner is willing to give an undertaking and also ready to change the avenue of meeting and also willing to give an undertaking that no untoward incident will took place. 16. Considering the same and also various decisions of this Court as well as the Division Bench cited above, I am of the view that the respondent has passed the impugned order has curtailed the freedom of speech and the right of assembling peacefully without arms as contained as envisaged under Article 19 of the Constitution of India. Considering the same, I am forced to mention some portion of the Judgement in Durai Shankar vs. The Secretary to Government reported in 2015 (1) CTC 49, wherein in para 11, my Learned Brother Judge Mr. Justice Ramasubramanian would consider Section 41 of the Chennai City Police Act with Section 30 of the Police Act, 1961.In that it was specifically mentioned that the grant of permission for convening an assembly or meeting and promoting a procession, is the Rule and the refusal of permission is the exception. So it is relevant to extract para 11 of the said judgement, which reads as follows: 11. So it is relevant to extract para 11 of the said judgement, which reads as follows: 11. A careful comparison of Section 41 of the Chennai City Police Act, 1988, with Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861 would show that the power to prohibit any assembly, meeting or procession is available only to the Commissioner, under Section 41(2) of the Chennai city Police Act, 1888. Thus power is also restricted by the proviso thereunder. Under Section 41(3)(a) a person intending to take out a procession, may make an application to the Commissioner seeking permission, even if a Prohibitory Order is in force under Section 41(2). A careful reading of the Clause (b) of Sub-section(3) of Section 41 of the Chennai City Police Act, 1888 would show that the grant of permission for convening an assembly or meeting and promoting a procession is the Rule and the refusal of permission is the exception. Even if the Commissioner decides to refuse permission under clause (b) of Sub-Section(3), he cannot refuse, without affording an opportunity of appearing in person or through pleader and showing cause against the proposal to refuse. This is interms of sub-section (4).” But in the similar circumstances, the Division Bench of this Court has passed order with conditions. Considering the same I am of the view that it is a fit case for setting aside the impugned order passed by the respondent as unsustainable. 17. Consequently, the order impugned herein is set aside and the petitioner herein is directed to give fresh representation mentioning the ne place for conducting the meeting and other necessary particulars and undertaking. 18. Accordingly, this Court directs the respondent to issue orders granting permission to hold a public meeting for the Petitioner on 29.8.2015 between 5.00 p.m. 9.00 p.m at a place mentioned by the Petitioner in his fresh representation, which will not cause any inconvenience to the public and also does not cause breach of peace. Besides, the respondent shall indicate all conditions required for smooth and proper conduct of the meeting which may include the following: 1. The meeting shall be permitted to be held on 29.8.2015 between 5.00 p.m to 9.00 p. m. 2. The proposed meeting shall be conducted be yond the above said time limit: 3. Besides, the respondent shall indicate all conditions required for smooth and proper conduct of the meeting which may include the following: 1. The meeting shall be permitted to be held on 29.8.2015 between 5.00 p.m to 9.00 p. m. 2. The proposed meeting shall be conducted be yond the above said time limit: 3. In the meeting, there should not be any indictment to any expressions against any political party/leader, any religious or community leaders, groups or individuals either by words or deeds, which would affect their sentiments; 4. The volume of speakers provided should be at a minimum level, so as not to cause any disturbance to neighbors; 5. The people who come to participate in the meeting, should come quietly without causing any disturbance or hindrance to the public at large; 6. The people who come to participate in the meeting should come in a open van or sitting on tope of the buses. van, which would certainly cause laws and order problem; 7. There should not be any procession on account of this meeting; 8. There should not be bursting of any crackers or erection of any flex boards ; 9. The respondent Police shall provide adequate police protection for the safety and security of the persons, who attend the meeting and the property and the general public; 10. The speakers of the meeting shall address only on the general issue sand shall not speak on any other topics, which would affect the sentiments of other religious or political or communal parties/leaders; 11. After the proposed meeting, the participants shall quietly disburse without causing any disturbance to people in and around and to the general public. 12. The participants should cooperate and abide by all the conditions of the respondents Policed and their vehicles should be in the parking place and the vehicles should not be brought to the place of meeting. 13. Strict discipline should be maintained and all the participants should cooperate with the respondents police for the peaceful conduct of the meeting. 14. The speakers and the participants of the meeting should ensure safety and security of the public property. 15. The speakers and the participants should adhere to the duration of the meeting viz., 5.00 p.m to 9.00 p.m. And they cannot extend the meeting beyond the said time. 16. 14. The speakers and the participants of the meeting should ensure safety and security of the public property. 15. The speakers and the participants should adhere to the duration of the meeting viz., 5.00 p.m to 9.00 p.m. And they cannot extend the meeting beyond the said time. 16. Besides the above, at the time of giving representation to the respondent, the petitioner is permitted to give an undertaking that he should not publish the above book and no to publish any pamphlets or books of similar nature. 17. The Petitioner is also directed to give an undertaking that if any untoward incident took place, he will be held responsible for the same. 19. On the above or such other conditions the respondent police shall give permission to the Petitioner to conduct the public meeting on 29.8.2015 between 5.00 p.m to 9.00 p.m. 20. It is made clear if any untoward incident or any issue with regard to law and order problem is created or the conditions violated, either by the participants or by the speakers in the meeting the respondent police is at liberty to take action in accordance with law. 21. The Writ Petition is allowed in above terms. No costs.