JUDGMENT : Sambuddha Chakrabarti, J. Heard Ms. Atasi Ghosh, led by Mr. Saumya Majumder, the learned advocates for the petitioner and Mr. Soumitra Banerjee, the learned advocate for the respondents. 2. The issue involved in the writ petition raises a very important point of law about the period of limitation for taking out an appeal from an order passed by a statutory authority. Since the entire issue revolves on a pure question of law and the facts of the case are not in dispute no affidavit is required. Mr. Banerjee, the learned Advocate for the respondents, also does not insist on it. 3. A proceeding under Section 45A of the Employees' State Insurance Act was initiated against the petitioner in the year 2013. Two orders were passed by the respondent authorities. The order that has created the problem for the present petitioner was passed on September 25, 2014 by which a sum of Rs.2,01,346/- was determined as contribution in respect of the concerned establishment for the period from February 05, 2014 to March 30, 2014 as a final determination. 4. The petitioner alleges that, though passed on September 25, 2014, it has received a copy of the same on November 21, 2014. Such allegation appears to have a basis from the communication made by the Assistant Director of the Employees' State Insurance Corporation (the Corporation for short). The date of the communication is November 19, 2014. As such, the statements of the petitioner that it had received it on November 21, 2014 stands corroborated from the date of communication. 5. Not being satisfied with the order passed under Section 45A of the said Act the petitioner filed an appeal under Section 45AA of the Act on January 20, 2015. 6. By a letter dated, January 21, 2015, the Assistant Director of the concerned Corporation intimated the petitioner that since the appeal had been filed beyond 60 days which is the period of limitation, the appeal could not be "considered for review of the order by the appellate authority". Subsequently, the petitioner had also taken out an application for recalling the said order. Again by a communication dated February 17, 2015 the petitioner was intimated that the appellate authority has perused the submission of the petitioner and the judgments relied on. He had not found sufficient reason for admitting the petitioner's time barred appeal and decided to reject the same. 7. Again by a communication dated February 17, 2015 the petitioner was intimated that the appellate authority has perused the submission of the petitioner and the judgments relied on. He had not found sufficient reason for admitting the petitioner's time barred appeal and decided to reject the same. 7. This has compelled the petitioner to approach this Court. 8. Before the point of law involved in the writ petition is taken up for consideration it is necessary to pause here and to make an observation. It appears from the annexure P-7 and annexure P-9 to the writ petition to which reference has been made earlier, that the order of the appellate authority had been communicated in the form of an intimation by the Assistant Director of the Corporation. The petitioner has stated on oath that no copy of the order had been supplied to them. That apart, it appears that while rejecting the application for recalling the petitioner was not even given a hearing. But nonetheless the said application was rejected as without merit. Apart from the fact that the procedure adopted by the ESI authority is against the principles of natural justice it is imperative that the orders passed by the appropriate authorities should be communicated to a party. Mere intimation will not serve any purpose. A party has a right to know the contents of the order, particularly if the order is passed against him or her. If the order under Section 45A of the Act could be communicated to the petitioner - one wonders - why the orders under Section 45AA were not. 9. Mr. Banerjee has concerned the point of grievance made by the petitioner as an undeniable proposition of law. 10. Now about the merits of the writ petition. It appears that the appellate authority under the Act had committed a serious under the Act had committed a serious mistake in dismissing the appeal of the petitioner as time barred. Section 45AA of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 says that if an employer is not satisfied with the order referred to in Section 45A he may prefer an appeal to an appellate authority as may be provided by regulation within sixty days from the date of such order after depositing 25% of the contribution so ordered or the contribution as per his own calculation, whichever is higher, with the Corporation. 11. 11. Thus the time limit for filing an appeal is 60 days from the date of the order. It cannot be glossed over that under the Limitation Act as well the period of limitation starts running from the date of the order. But there the period for obtaining a copy of the decree or order impugned is excluded in counting the period of limitation. Where, as here, there is no such procedure for exclusion of the period taken for getting a certified copy or a copy of the order must the period of limitation equally start from the date of the order itself ? 12. This question assumes importance when an aggrieved employer obtains a copy of the order much after the period of limitation as provided in the Act. In the present case if the period of limitation is to start from the date of the order, i.e. September 25, 2014, it must end on November 24, 2014 and the date of communication of the order was November 19, 2014 which was received by the petitioner on November 21, 2014. In such a case an aggrieved employer is left with only three days' time to file an appeal and if the appellate authority insists on strictly construing the period of limitation without any regard to other facts standing in the way of the aggrieved party that will be a clear case of denial of justice. The period of limitation as provided in Section 45AA of the Act cannot be construed in isolation without any corresponding consideration of the date on which the order was communicated. 13. One does not have to go very far to seek for the logic behind it. In the present case the petitioner had only three days' time to prefer an appeal. There may be cases when the petitioner might not have been left with any time at all. Only five days before the period of limitation was to expire the communication was made. If the petitioner had received it three days later he would have had only a theoretical consolation of filing an appeal which had been time barred by the respondents. 14. The ESI authorities by not communicating the order in time should not have taken the point about the delayed approach to the appellate authority. The appellate authority in turn before rejecting the appeal should have taken that into consideration. 14. The ESI authorities by not communicating the order in time should not have taken the point about the delayed approach to the appellate authority. The appellate authority in turn before rejecting the appeal should have taken that into consideration. Even if it was not taken into consideration. What is still more surprising is that when the petitioner had taken out an application for recalling the earlier order of rejection of appeal the appellate authority did not consider the same as a sufficient ground for admitting the appeal. 15. The law on the point is very well settled that in all fairness the actual date must run from the date of the knowledge of the order and not the date on which the communication is made by a statutory authority. In the case of Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. M.M Rubber & Co., Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 1991 SC 2141 , it has been held by the Supreme Court - though in the context of Central Excise Act, however, the principle applies to the present case - that the party who is affected by the order or decision for seeking his remedies against the same should be made aware of passing of such order. Courts have laid down as a rule or law that for seeking the remedy the limitation starts from the date the order was communicated to him or the date on which it was pronounced or published. In such circumstances the parties affected by it have a reasonable opportunity of knowing the order passed and what it contains. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive is thus an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be said to have been concluded and binding on him. Otherwise, the party affected by it will have no means to obey the order or appealing against it. This application of the rule, the Supreme Court clarified, so far as the aggrieved party is concerned is not dependant on the provisions of a particular statute. But it is so under the general law. Otherwise, the party affected by it will have no means to obey the order or appealing against it. This application of the rule, the Supreme Court clarified, so far as the aggrieved party is concerned is not dependant on the provisions of a particular statute. But it is so under the general law. The Supreme Court went that far to lay down the principle of law that if the intention or design of the statutory provision was to protect the interest of the person adversely affected by providing a remedy against the order or decision any period of limitation prescribed with reference to invoking such remedy shall be read as commencing from the date of communication of the order. 16. It may be mentioned that while deciding the case of Collector of Central Excise (supra) the Supreme Court had relied on the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, reported in AIR 1961 SC 1500 where a similar question relating to construction of period of limitation under the Land Acquisition Act came for consideration. In that case it was held that six months' period would have to be calculated from the date of communication of the Award. 17. It appears that the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra) was relied on by the petitioner before the appellate authority in the application for recalling. 18. I agree with the submission of Ms. Ghosh that the second order and the order recalling the petitioner's application was passed in derogation of the settled principle of law. 19. In a comparatively recent judgment in the case of Bhagwan Das & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in (2010) 3 SCC 545 the Supreme Court has again upheld the same view in unambiguous language. Relying on various cases on the point, the Supreme Court reiterated the same principle for calculating the period of limitation. Although delivered in the context of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act the principles laid down therein applies to the facts of the present case with equal force. The Supreme Court held that if the period of limitation as mentioned in the said provision of the Land Acquisition Act should be literally interpreted as the date of the Award and not the date of knowledge of the Award, it will lead to unjust and absurd result. The Supreme Court held that if the period of limitation as mentioned in the said provision of the Land Acquisition Act should be literally interpreted as the date of the Award and not the date of knowledge of the Award, it will lead to unjust and absurd result. The Supreme Court decided to give an example to clarify the position. The Collector may choose to make an Award but not to issue a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, either due to negligence or oversight or due to any ulterior reason. Or he may send a notice but may not bother to ensure that it is served on the landowner. If the words "date of the Collector's Award" are literally interpreted the effect would be that on the expiry of six months from the date of Award, even though the claimant had no notice of the Award, he would lose the right to seek a reference. That will lead to arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination between those who are notified of the Award or those who are not notified of the Award. 20. This is exactly what has happened in the present case. The petitioner having received the order passed under Section 45A of the Act only three days before the period of limitation was to expire if it is mechanically calculated from the date of the order, it had been rendered virtually without a remedy and in turn rendering the period of limitation provided in Section 45AA of the Act nugatory, meaningless and an empty formality. 21. I quite agree with the grievance of the petitioner that the appellate authority should have taken this aspect into consideration before successively rejecting the stand of the petitioner. 22. The orders impugned in the writ petition are against the well settled principles of law and are as such set aside. 23. I direct the appellate authority to reconsider the period of limitation afresh in the light of the observation made hereinabove taking into account the date on which the communication was received by the petitioner. 24. The writ petition is dismissed. 25. The petitioner is directed to redeposit the amount within seven days from. 26. There shall be, however, no order as to costs. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on usual undertaking.