ORDER 1. The present first appeal is arising out of the judgment and decree dated 3.4.1998 passed by the District Judge, Ujjain in Civil Suit No.129-A/1990. 2. Facts of the case reveal that the plaintiff has filed a suit claiming himself to be the owner of a house situated at Ujjain. It was stated by the plaintiff that the State of Madhya Pradesh, in exercise of powers conferred under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, has acquired the house in question for the purpose of widening of the road and the land was given to the Ujjain Municipal Corporation. It was stated by the plaintiff that possession was wrongly taken by the respondents and a declaration was sought for possession of the house and for compensation for constructing the house. 3. A reply has been filed on behalf of the respondents and it was stated therein that the property has been acquired for public purposes under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for widening the road and the house in question was originally owned by one Hazi Gulmohammad, who died on September 28, 1982. It was also stated that after acquisition of the said house, the entire procedure was followed and an award was delivered by the Land Acquisition Officer and during the life time of the father of the plaintiff, an application was preferred under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for enhancement of the compensation and the same was dismissed on 5.3.1982. The trial Court, after hearing the parties at length, has arrived at a conclusion that the Land Acquisition proceedings have taken place as per the provision of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the land was acquired for public purpose, i.e., for widening of the road. The award was pronounced and the father of the plaintiff even filed an application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for enhancement of the compensation. The application preferred under section 18 was also dismissed and in those circumstances the trial Court has observed that the trial Court does not have the jurisdiction to decide the civil suit in respect of the land acquisition proceedings keeping in view section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 4. The application preferred under section 18 was also dismissed and in those circumstances the trial Court has observed that the trial Court does not have the jurisdiction to decide the civil suit in respect of the land acquisition proceedings keeping in view section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the judgment delivered in the case of Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 1969 JLJ 1= AIR 1969 SC 78 ; The State of West Bengal v. The Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., reported in AIR 1970 SC 1298 ; Vedlapatla Suryanarayana v. Province of Madras, reported in AIR (32) 1945 Madras 394; Ganga Bishnu Swaika and another v. Calcutta Pinjrapole Society and others, reported in ( AIR 1968 SC 615 ); State of Andhra Pradesh v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao, reported in AIR 2000 SC 2220 ; and lastly upon the judgment delivered by this Court in the case of Ramabhilash Tripathi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 2008 MP 217 =MPJR-2008-2-327. Contention of the learned senior counsel is that the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil Court, cannot be made applicable in a mechanical manner and where some fraud has been played or where contingencies are made out, as discussed in the case of Dhulabhai (supra), the civil Court can certainly entertain a civil suit. He has also argued that in the light of the aforesaid judgment, in case a fraud has been played, a civil suit is maintainable. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent Ujjain Municipal Corporation has vehemently argued before this Court that the land in question was acquired after following the due process as provided under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Award was delivered and thereafter an application was also preferred by the father of the appellant for enhancement of the awarded amount under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It has been further stated that after acquiring the land in question, a road has also been constructed and the remaining portion is now being used for widening the road and for constructing the pavement. It has been further stated that after acquiring the land in question, a road has also been constructed and the remaining portion is now being used for widening the road and for constructing the pavement. His contention is that in the light of the judgment delivered in the case of The Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority and another v. Brijesh Reddy and another, reported in 2013(I) MPACJ 218, the question of interference by this Court does not arise. 6. This Court has very carefully gone through the aforesaid judgment and paragraphs 15 and 17 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under : 15) Having regard to the fact that the acquisition proceedings had been completed way back in 1960-70, the plaintiffs who purchased the suit land in 1995 cannot have any right to maintain the suit of this nature particularly, against defendants No.1 and 2, namely, the BDA. The High Court clearly erred in remanding the matter when the suit was not maintainable on the face of it. The High Court failed to take note of the fact that even in the plaint itself, the respondents herein/plaintiffs have stated that the suit land was acquired and yet they purchased the suit land in 1995 and undoubtedly have to face the consequence. The possession vests with the BDA way back in 1969 and 1978 and all the details have been asserted in the written statements, hence the remittal order cannot be sustained. 17) The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs. 7. This Court, in the light of the fact that the land was acquired in the year 1998, the procedure was duly followed by the State Government, is of the considered opinion that no fraud has been played by the State Government of whatsoever kind and in light of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the trial Court has rightly arrived at a conclusion in respect of the jurisdiction. 8. This Court is of the considered opinion that the judgment delivered by the trial Court, keeping in view the provisions of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 read with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, does not warrant any interference. The trial Court has rightly dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.