JUDGMENT Manoj Kumar Gupta, J. The petitioners instituted Original Suit No. 35 of 2015 for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in their possession and in their right to raise constructions over the suit property. According to the plaint case, the petitioners purchased the suit property by five different sale-deeds from Ansar Ahmad and others. It is admitted in the plaint that portion shown with letters E D G H in the plaint map was given to the police on license. It is however, alleged that the license of the defendants was revoked by the erstwhile owner on 10.6.2005 orally and thus, the defendants have no concern with the suit property. However, they are wrongly interfering in the possession of the petitioners and in their right to raise constructions over it. 2. The suit was contested by the defendants, interalia, on the plea that the suit property is being used as a Police Chowki for last 50 years and is in tenancy of the police department on payment of Rs.21/- per month as rent. It is further pleaded that the premises is still being used by them as Police Chowki and the same has not been shifted to any other place, as contended by the plaintiffs. 3. During the pendency of the suit, the petitioners filed an application for temporary injunction, which was allowed by the trial court by order dated 28.2.2015 and the defendants were restrained from interfering in the possession of the petitioners, except in accordance with law. 4. The lower appellate court on an appeal preferred by the defendants, allowed the appeal, and set aside the order of the trial court dated 28.2.2015. The appellate court held that even if the case of the plaintiffs is accepted that the defendants were occupying the premises on license, there is no material on record to establish that the possession of the defendants had come to an end. It has further been noted that merely on account of transfer of the suit property in favour of the petitioners, it cannot be assumed that they have also got actual physical possession of the suit property. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the appellate court erred in placing reliance on a letter filed by the defendants allegedly bearing signatures of Jahangir son of the erstwhile landlord mentioning that the rent is being paid to him.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the appellate court erred in placing reliance on a letter filed by the defendants allegedly bearing signatures of Jahangir son of the erstwhile landlord mentioning that the rent is being paid to him. It is urged that he denied having written any such letter by filing his affidavit. Thus, appellate court erred in placing reliance on the same. 6. As observed above, the appellate court, apart from referring to the said documents, has mainly relied on the pleadings made by the plaintiffs themselves in the plaint, according to which, the erstwhile owner had given the premises on license to the police in connection with night patrolling. The appellate court rightly held that in the absence of evidence on record to establish that the defendants have surrendered possession of the premises, mere fact that the plaintiffs had obtained sale-deeds in their favour, does not establish their physical possession. The finding recorded in this regard is a pure finding of fact and the petitioners are unable to show how such finding is perverse, as to warrant interference in exercise of supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution. 7. In the end, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that only a portion of the suit property shown with letter E D G H was being used by the police authorities, during the night patrolling, thus, the appellate court had erred in setting aside the entire order of the trial court. It is urged that the petitioners are in possession of the remaining part of the suit property and are under threat of dispossession, even therefrom. 8. The learned standing counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents very fairly stated that since it is in dispute between the parties as to who is in possession over which part, it would serve the interest of justice, if order of status quo is passed. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also very fairly stated that order of status quo, during the pendency of the suit, will protect the interest of both the parties. 10. In view of the aforesaid submissions, the order of the lower appellate court dated 1.9.2015, is modified to the extent that the parties shall maintain strict status quo over the suit property as regards possession, nature and character, during the pendency of the suit. 11.
10. In view of the aforesaid submissions, the order of the lower appellate court dated 1.9.2015, is modified to the extent that the parties shall maintain strict status quo over the suit property as regards possession, nature and character, during the pendency of the suit. 11. It is further desirable that the suit be decided by the trial court expeditiously. The petition stands disposed of accordingly.