ORDER Heard both sides. 2. This petition has been filed for quashing the First Information Report lodged against the petitioners in Crime No.10 of 2009 on the file of the first respondent, stating that the property is originally owned by one Shanmugaraja, the predecessor of the petitioners herein. He has also executed a gift deed in favour of Raja Doraisingam Memorial College in respect of Survey No.63/1, an extent of 215.69 acres in Melavaniyangudi, in the year 1950. After the Estate Abolition Act, 1948, came into effect, the Settlement Tahsildar has made an enquiry and granted a Ryotwari patta in favour of Shanmugaraja in the year 1950 in respect of Survey No.63/5 and that has not been challenged. But, suddenly, the petitioners received a letter from the Thasildar, directing them to execute a Relinquish Deed in respect of Survey No.63/5. Immediately, the petitioners have filed an application before the Tahsildar for mutation of revenue records and seeking transfer of patta in their names, but, that has been negatived by the Tahsildar, by his proceedings dated 20.11.2000 and despite such an order, they had sold a portion of the land, by way of two sale deeds to one V.M.P.S.Meera Hussain and V.M.P.S.Zakir Hussain. 3. After the said purchase, the purchasers applied to the Tahsildar for patta on 27.08.2001, but no action was taken. Therefore, they filed a Writ Petition before this Court in W.P.No. 24177 of 2003, wherein, this Court issued a direction to the Tahsildar, to pass suitable orders on the petition filed by the petitioners for issuance of patta. The Tahsildar, sensing that earlier there was an order dated 21.11.2000, rejecting the prayer of the vendors' predecessor-in-title, for change of patta, forwarded the application to the Revenue Divisional Officer, who, in turn, by his order dated 18.11.2003, directed transfer of patta in favour of the purchasers. However, the Tahsildar, by-passing the said order, failed to comply with it. Thereupon, another Writ Petition has been filed in W.P.No.2345 of 2004, wherein, this Court, by order dated 30.09.2004, issued a direction to the Tahsildar to issue patta. Thereafter, the Tahsildar issued patta, but, as against which, the Rural Welfare Works and Family Welfare Department, preferred an appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer, stating that they are in possession of a part of the land, who, by his order, confirmed the order passed by the Tahsildar and dismissed the appeal. Thereafter, the Tahsildar issued patta, but, as against which, the Rural Welfare Works and Family Welfare Department, preferred an appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer, stating that they are in possession of a part of the land, who, by his order, confirmed the order passed by the Tahsildar and dismissed the appeal. Thereupon, the said department preferred a revision before the District Revenue Officer, who, by his proceedings dated 05.12.2005, set aside the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer in granting patta in favour of the purchasers. Therefore, they have filed a Writ Petition in W.P.No.11676 of 2005, for setting aside the order of the District Revenue Officer, dated 05.12.2005. This Court, by order dated 13.11.2007, set aside the order of the District Revenue Officer and remitted the matter to him for fresh consideration and before arriving at any conclusion, he was directed to re-visit the property in question and demarcate the property in accordance with the description found in the two sale deeds executed in favour of the purchasers. 4. Inter alia, on the basis of the complaint given by the Tahsildar, Sivagangai District, the second respondent herein, the present case has been registered, stating that the property belongs to the Government, since Shanmugaraja has executed a gift deed in favour of Raja Doraisingam Memorial College, which was, subsequently, taken by the Government in the year 1981, as per G.O.Ms.No.1045, Education Department, dated 08.06.1981. While so, the petitioners sold a portion of the property in favour of one V.M.P.S.Meera Hussain and V.M.P.S.Zakir Hussain on 01.12.2000 and, thereby, cheating the Government and on that basis, the First Information Report has been registered. 5. The first and foremost argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the disputed property, namely Survey No. 63/5 originally belonging to Shanmugaraja was not gifted to the college. 6. The second limb of argument is that after the Estate Abolition Act 1948, came into effect, the Settlement Tahsildar has made an enquiry and granted patta in favour of Shanmugaraja and that has not been challenged and after his demise, the property devolved upon Karthikeya Venkatachalapathi, the husband of the first petitioner herein and after his demise, the petitioners applied for change of patta and during the pendency of the patta proceedings, he they sold the property to third parties, which will not amount to commission of the offence. 7. 7. Thirdly, a case has been registered under Section 420 IPC, but, whereas, in the case on hand, on the basis of the averment found in the First Information Report, it is seen that the ingredients of Section 420 IPC have not been made out and stating so, he prayed for quashing the complaint. 8. To substantiate his contention, he relied upon the following decisions: (i) Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar [2009(8) CC 751]; (ii) Dalip Kaur & Ors. vs. Jagnar Singh & Anr. [ 2009 14 SCC 696 ]; and (iii) Ramesh Dutt & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. [ 2009(15) SCC 429 ]. 9. Resisting the same, the learned Government Advocate (Criminal side) would submit that the Tahsildar allotted 4.75 acres of land for the construction of Additional Building for Medical Department. That has been challenged by Rani Rajalakshmi Raguraj in C.R.C.No.l14/96, and the same has been dismissed, vide order dated 04.08.1999. The petitioners, knowing very well that the property belongs to Government, had sold the property to V.M.P.S.Meera Hussain and V.M.P.S.Zakir Hussain. As such, they committed the offence punishable under Section 420 IPC. Now, the investigation is going on. He would further submit that even though case has been registered initially under Section 420 IPC, during the investigation, Section may be altered, in accordance with the ingredients made out in the complaint. Hence, it is too premature to quash the First Information Report. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of this petition. 10. I have considered the rival submissions made on both sides and perused the case diary. 11. It is an admitted fact that on the basis of the complaint given by the second respondent, a case has been registered against the petitioners in Crime No.10 of 2009 on 10.03.2009, in which, it was stated that for the occurrence said to be taken place on 05.12.2000, the case has been registered against the petitioners under Section 420 IPC. It is also admitted that originally the properties are belonging to Shanmugaraja. It is also not disputed that Shanmugaraja has executed a settlement deed on 02.11.1950, in which, the description of property was specifically mentioned as "63/1a 215.C69 in V.No.44, Melavanaiyankudi". The disputed property is situated at Survey No.63/5, having an extent of 5.75 acres. It is also admitted that originally the properties are belonging to Shanmugaraja. It is also not disputed that Shanmugaraja has executed a settlement deed on 02.11.1950, in which, the description of property was specifically mentioned as "63/1a 215.C69 in V.No.44, Melavanaiyankudi". The disputed property is situated at Survey No.63/5, having an extent of 5.75 acres. It is also admitted that Ryotwari patta has been issued in favour of Shamugaraja in the year 1950 and till now, it was not challenged. It is true that the Estate Abolition Act came into effect and the estate has been vested with the Government and pursuant to which, the Settlement Tahsildar has made an enquiry and issued a patta in respect of Survey No.63/5, to an extent of 5.75, in favour of Shanmugaraja and that has also not been challenged. A perusal of the affidavit filed in support of the petition would go to show that the Government passed G.O.Ms.No.1045, Education Department, dated 08.06.1981 and the college in question has been taken over by the Government. The petitioners herein have filed an application for change of patta in their favour, which was negatived on 20.11.2000. It is also admitted by both sides that in the 'A' register, in respect of Survey No.63/5, patta stands only in the name of Shanmugaraja and after his demise, in the name of his son Karthikeya Venkatachalapathi. During the pendency of the patta proceedings only, the petitioners executed the sale deeds in favour of V.M.P.S.Meera Hussain and V.M.P.S.Zakir Hussain on 01.12.2000. 12. At this juncture, it is useful to refer to the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, which are as follows: (i) The Supreme Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar [2009(8) CC 751], observed thus: "18. Let us now examine whether the ingredients of an offence of cheating are made out. 12. At this juncture, it is useful to refer to the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, which are as follows: (i) The Supreme Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar [2009(8) CC 751], observed thus: "18. Let us now examine whether the ingredients of an offence of cheating are made out. The essential ingredients of the offence of "cheating" are as follows: (i) deception of a person either by making a false or misleading representation or by dishonest concealment or by any other act or omission; (ii) fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that person to either deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce that person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) such act or omission causing or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind,reputation or property. 19. To constitute an offence under section 420, there should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the accused should have dishonestly induced the person deceived (i) to deliver any property to any person, or (ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a valuable security (or anything signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security). 20. When a sale deed is executed conveying a property claiming ownership thereto, it may be possible for the purchaser under such sale deed, to allege that the vendor has cheated him by making a false representation of ownership and fraudulently induced him to part with the sale consideration. But in this case the complaint is not by the purchaser. On the other hand, the purchaser is made a co-accused. 21. It is not the case of the complainant that any of the accused tried to deceive him either by making a false or misleading representation or by any other action or omission, nor is it his case that they offered him any fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce him to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived. Nor did the complainant allege that the first appellant pretended to be the complainant while executing the sale deeds. Therefore, it cannot be said that the first accused by the act of executing sale deeds in favour of the second accused or the second accused by reason of being the purchaser, or the third, fourth and fifth accused, by reason of being the witness, scribe and stamp vendor in regard to the sale deeds, deceived the complainant in any manner." (ii) In Dalip Kaur & Ors. vs. Jagnar Singh & Anr. [ 2009 14 SCC 696 ], the Supreme Court observed thus: "11. The ingredients of Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code are : "(i) Deception of any persons; (ii) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property; or (iii) To consent that any person shall retain any property and finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit." 12. The High Court, therefore, should have posed a question as to whether any act of inducement on the part of the appellant has been raised by the second respondent and whether the appellant had an intention to cheat him from the very inception. If the dispute between the parties was essentially a civil dispute resulting from a breach of contract on the part of the appellants by non-refunding the amount of advance the same would not constitute an offence of cheating. Similar is the legal position in respect of an offence of criminal breach of trust having regard to its definition contained in Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code. {See Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [ (2003) 3 SCC 11 ]}. 13. There cannot furthermore be any doubt that the High Court would exercise its inherent jurisdiction only when one or the other propositions of law, as laid down in R. Kalyani v. Janak C.Mehta & Ors. [(2009 (1) SCC 516] is attracted, which are as under: "(1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a First Information Report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence. [(2009 (1) SCC 516] is attracted, which are as under: "(1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a First Information Report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence. (2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence. (3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus. (4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue." Yet again, in Hira Lal & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [2009 (5) SCALE 418], this Court held : "10. The parameters of interference with a criminal proceeding by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code are well known. One of the grounds on which such interference is permissible is that the allegations contained in the complaint petition even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, commission of an offence is not disclosed. The High Court may also interfere where the action on the part of the complainant is mala fide." {See also Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. [ 2009 (7) SCALE 85 ]}" (iii) The Supreme Court in Ramesh Dutt & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. [ 2009(15) SCC 429 ], held thus: 15. Title in or over an immoveable property has many facets. Possession is one of them. Unless there exists a statutory interdict, a person in possession may transfer his right, title and interest in favour of a third party. [See Vinash Kumar Chauhan v. Vijay Krishna Mishra [ (2009) 2 SCC 532 ] 16. Mr. Title in or over an immoveable property has many facets. Possession is one of them. Unless there exists a statutory interdict, a person in possession may transfer his right, title and interest in favour of a third party. [See Vinash Kumar Chauhan v. Vijay Krishna Mishra [ (2009) 2 SCC 532 ] 16. Mr. Grover, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, may not be correct in contending that only because the order of mutation made in favour of the appellants had been cancelled, the same ipso facto would lead to the conclusion that they have no title over the property. It is now a well settled principle of law that entry in a Revenue Record of rights merely is an evidence of possession. [See Faqruddin (Dead) through LRs. v. Tajuddin (Dead) through LRs. [(2008) 8 SCC 12]. 17. Such an entry does not create title; absence thereof does not extinguish the same. Furthermore, it is one thing to say that the appellants had committed acts of criminal misconduct while trying to obtain orders of mutation but it is another thing to say that only because they filed such an application, the same by itself would tantamount to commission of a criminal offence. In the facts and circumstances of this case, in our opinion, only because appellants are said to have transferred a portion of the property without having complete ownership over them by itself do not satisfy the ingredients of Sections 467, 468 and 469. This aspect of the matter is covered by a recent decision of this Court in Devendra & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr. [2007 (9) SCC 613]." 13. To lodge an F.I.R., under Section 420 IPC, there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him. Here, in this case, it is not the case of the prosecution that the Tahsildar, the defacto complainant was dishonestly induced by the petitioners by parting with the money and, therefore, none of the ingredients have been made out. 14. Therefore, applying the decisions cited supra to the case on hand, I am of the view that the ingredients of Section 420 IPC have not been made out. Further, there are disputes in respect of the property in question. Further, in the case of Ramesh Dutt & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. 14. Therefore, applying the decisions cited supra to the case on hand, I am of the view that the ingredients of Section 420 IPC have not been made out. Further, there are disputes in respect of the property in question. Further, in the case of Ramesh Dutt & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. [ 2009(15) SCC 429 ], the ingredients of the offences under Sections 467, 468 and 469 IPC have not been made out, but, the above citation is not applicable to the case on hand, because it is is not the case of the prosecution that the petitioners herein have forged the documents. The only averment is that they cheated the Government, by transferring the property belonging to the Government, to the third party, without having title. 15. Therefore, as already stated, the ingredients of Section 420 IPC have not been made out. It is a case of civil dispute and as such, no purpose will be served by proceeding with the matter further. Even going for criminal breach of trust, there must be entrustment, but, here, there is no entrustment. Further, this will not come under the provisions of misappropriation. 16. At this juncture, it is appropriate to incorporate paragraph No.108 of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal], which reads thus: "108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 1. 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 17. Applying the dictum laid down in the above citation to the case on hand, I am of the view that allegations made in the First Information Report registered in Crime No.10 of 2009 do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the petitioners herein. 18. In the result, this Criminal Original Petition is allowed and the case registered in Crime No.10 of 2009 on the file of the first respondent in respect of the petitioners alone is, hereby, quashed. 18. In the result, this Criminal Original Petition is allowed and the case registered in Crime No.10 of 2009 on the file of the first respondent in respect of the petitioners alone is, hereby, quashed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.