JUDGMENT : Hasnain Massodi, J. 1. Petitioner was in the year 1981, appointed as Sub-Inspector in Central Reserve Police Force. He in the year 1991 earned promotion as Inspector. However, in 1994, when he was posted at 105 Battalion Punjab, an incident of theft occurred in kote of the Battalion and some arms and ammunitions were stolen from the kote. The incident led to Court of Enquiry. The enquiry report prompted Competent Authority to impose penalty of withholding 3 increments of the petitioner. Petitioner filed appeal before Director General CRPF, Lodi Road, New Delhi against the order though without any success. He claims to have filed a revision (-a claim disputed by the respondent), questioning the initial order and order of Appellate Authority. The petition seemingly a representation-a claim disputed by the respondents was rejected vide order dated 12th April 2013. 2. Aggrieved with order of Deputy Inspector General of Police, RAF CRPF, New Delhi dated 9-6-1995, whereby penalty was imposed and the communication dated 12-04-2013 rejecting his representation for grant of seniority/promotion for the reasons set out in the order, petitioner has filed writ petition on hand. He on the grounds urged in the petition seeks following relief : "i. A writ of Certiorari, quashing the impugned punishment of the withholding of the three increment of the petitioner from 1996, 1997 and 1998, as illegal without any authority of the law besides being ultra vires to the procedure and practice not to read as against the petitioner. ii A writ of Certiorari, quashing the impugned letter dated 12-04-2013 as illegal, de hors and in derogation to the practice and procedure besides being against the mandate of the law, statues and the constitutional mandate. iii A writ of Mandamus, commanding the respondents to promote the petitioner against the post of the Commandant retrospectively from the year 2003 when his juniors have been prompted for the said post and put him at par with the batch mates of the petitioner and give the all consequential benefits. iv A writ of Mandamus commanding the respondents to give all benefits including the arrears of salary, as also arrears in consonance of pay revision and the seniority to the petitioners as Assistant Commandant, Deputy Commandant, commandant from the date the petitioners is due for the same as per his seniority as inspector in the department." 3. iv A writ of Mandamus commanding the respondents to give all benefits including the arrears of salary, as also arrears in consonance of pay revision and the seniority to the petitioners as Assistant Commandant, Deputy Commandant, commandant from the date the petitioners is due for the same as per his seniority as inspector in the department." 3. The writ petition is opposed by the respondents on the ground that it suffers from delay and laches and amounts to reopening of a settled issue, in violation of law laid down in K.R. Mudgal v. R.P. Singh & Ors. (1986) 4 SCC 531 and Malcom Lawrence D'Souza v. UOI AIR 1975 SC 1269 . It is pointed out that the petitioner was considered and subsequently declared as unfit by the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) in the year 1998-99 and 2001 and the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the issue more than a decade after the cause accrued to him to invoke the writ jurisdiction. The Communication No. G.II.2/2013-Pers(A/C), dated 12-04-2013, impugned in the petition whereby petitioner's representation has been rejected, according to the respondents would not give a fresh cause to the petition. 4. The respondents controvert all the factual averments made in the petition. It is pleaded that the enquiry was held in accordance with rules and all the procedural safeguards available to the petitioner were adhered to and followed during and after the enquiry. The writ petition is also said to be not maintainable because of petitioner's failure to question the order of the Appellate Authority, whereby his appeal against the impugned order dated 09-06-1995 was dismissed. 5. I have gone through the pleadings as also record placed on the file. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. 6. The petitioner as record made available by the respondents would reveal, filed statutory appeal against the order dated 9th June 1995, The appeal was dismissed on 1st January 1996. Petitioner withheld this aspect of the case while invoking writ jurisdiction. The order of the Appellate Authority dated 1st January 1996, is not questioned in the present writ petition. It is well settled law that where an appeal is preferred against the order, the order impugned in the appeal merges with the order whereby the appeal is disposed of and it is necessary for the person aggrieved with the order to question the Appellate Authority order. It is well settled law that where an appeal is preferred against the order, the order impugned in the appeal merges with the order whereby the appeal is disposed of and it is necessary for the person aggrieved with the order to question the Appellate Authority order. Petitioner by not questioning the Appellate Authority order dated 1st January 1996, has himself dealt a death blow to his case. Reference in this regard may be made to law laid down in Somnath Sahu v. State of Orissa 1969 (3) SCC 384 . It would be appropriate to extract following from the reported Judgment: "The appellant was heard by the State Government in support of his appeal and ultimately the State Government dismissed the appeal in its order dated the 02-01-1962. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the order of respondent No. 4 dated 11-03-1960 has merged in the appellate order of the State Government dated 02-01-1962 and it is the appellate decision alone which subsists and is operative in law and is capable of enforcement. In other words the original decision of respondent No. 4 dated 11-03-1960 no longer subsists for it has merged in the appellate decision of the State Government and unless the appellant is able to establish that the appellate decision of the State Government is defective in law the appellant will not be entitled to the grant of any relief. There can be no doubt that if an appeal is provided by a statutory rule against an order passed by a tribunal the decision of the appellate authority is the operative decision in law if the appellate authority modifies or reverses it. In law the position would be just the same even if the appellate decision merely confirms the decision of the tribunal. As a result of the confirmation or affirmance of the decision of the tribunal by the appellate authority the original decision merges in the appellate decision and it is the appellate decision alone which is subsisting and is operative and capable of enforcement." 7. Petitioner's case is that as Rule 27 of CRPF Rules 1955, Item 7 refers to "stoppage of increment," it was not open to the Disciplinary Authority (DIG Police, RAF, CRPF New Delhi) to order stoppage of 3 increments with cumulative effect. Petitioner's case is that as Rule 27 of CRPF Rules 1955, Item 7 refers to "stoppage of increment," it was not open to the Disciplinary Authority (DIG Police, RAF, CRPF New Delhi) to order stoppage of 3 increments with cumulative effect. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Disciplinary Authority could at the most direct withholding one increment. The argument is specious and bereft of any merit. The expression "stoppage of increment" used in Rule 27, Item 7 would include more than one increment. The impugned order therefore cannot said to be one without jurisdiction and therefore open to question irrespective of limitation. Principle laid down in Ghulam Mohammad Baqal v. State of J&K & others 1998 SLJ 97 : JKJ Soft JKJ/7130 and M.V. Janardan Reddy v. Vijaya Bank and others (2008) 7 SCC 738 does not support petitioner's case. 8. Petitioner as evident by now calls in question the order dated 9th June 1995, passed by Deputy Inspector General of Police RAF, CRPF at New Delhi. The order imposed the penalty of cessation of 3 increments with cumulative effect upon the petitioner. The order was therefore to be questioned before the court having territorial jurisdiction, having regard to the place of issue of the order. The cause of action to invoke the writ petition accrued to the petitioner at New Delhi. Petitioner in other words was to assail the order in a writ petition to be filed before the Delhi High Court. In Zahoor Ahmad Baba v. Union Of India & others 2012 (3) JKJ 119 [HC], this court after scanning the case law on the subject has held that cause of action in a case like one at hand would arise at the place where the order imposing penalty is passed. It would be advantageous to reproduce para 6 of the Judgment: "In order to determine whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain and deal with the petition, we have to find out whether the cause of action or any part thereof has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this court." The cause of action, as observed by Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots and Alloys limited v. Union of India, (2002) 6 SCC 254 implied a right to sue. In the worlds of Supreme Court: the material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. In the worlds of Supreme Court: the material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if transversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that every thing which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action, its importance is beyond any doubt. For every action, there has to be a cause of action. If not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily. The entire bundle of the facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved before the petitioner can obtain a decree is the material facts. The expression material facts is also known as integral facts. All necessary facts must form an integral of the cause of action. The principle laid down in Zahoor Ahmad Baba's case squarely applies to the facts of this case. This court lacks jurisdiction to deal with the cause agitated in the petition inasmuch as the order impugned, as already stated, has been passed at New Delhi. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that as the copy of the order was served on the petitioner while he was posted in 106 Battalion, RAF CRPF stationed at Srinagar, he has right to maintain the writ petition before this court. Reliance in this regard is based on Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 9 SCC 329. Whether receipt of the copy of the order would entitle a person to question the order before the High Court having territorial jurisdiction over the place of receipt of the order was also dealt with in Zahoor Ahmad Baba's case. Para 7 and 8 of the Judgment deserve to be noticed in this regard. "7. It is well settled that the court has jurisdiction to exercise its power under Article 226, Constitution of India, even if only a; small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the court. Para 7 and 8 of the Judgment deserve to be noticed in this regard. "7. It is well settled that the court has jurisdiction to exercise its power under Article 226, Constitution of India, even if only a; small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the court. So viewed, the focus of controversy in the case on hand is to be on the cause of action having accrued to the petitioner within the territorial jurisdiction of this court to maintain the writ petition. The petitioner, as already stated, is aggrieved with the order passed by Commandant 108th BN BSF Ajnal (Punjab), the cause of action to question the impugned order obviously has arisen within the jurisdiction of court at Punjab. The ground set up and arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner that as the dismissal order in question was served on or conveyed to the petitioner at Ganderbal, i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of this court, the writ petition is maintainable before this court, whether service of the dismissal order on or its receipt by or communication to the petitioner would constitute a part of the cause of action, is the question that calls for answer. 8. We have to again to the observations of the Apex Court in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Limited's case(supra) to find out whether communication of the order is part of the cause of action. It needs to be reiterated that the communication of the order of dismissal would constitute part of the cause of action only if the petitioner to succeed in the petition is required to prove such communication or service of the order. The petitioner undoubtedly is not required to prove that the order of dismissal was communicated to him or even served on him to maintain the writ petition and successfully seek its quashment. The communication of the dismissal order, therefore, does not constitute even a smaller fraction of cause of action so as to enable the petitioner to invoke writ jurisdiction of this court." 10. In the present case, receipt of copy of the order dated 9th June 1995, does not constitute part of the cause of action. Petitioner to successfully throw challenge to the order was not required to prove that the copy of the order was provided to him by the Commandant, 106 Battalion RAF CRPF. In the present case, receipt of copy of the order dated 9th June 1995, does not constitute part of the cause of action. Petitioner to successfully throw challenge to the order was not required to prove that the copy of the order was provided to him by the Commandant, 106 Battalion RAF CRPF. The receipt of copy of the order therefore would not confer jurisdiction on this court. The facts of Nawal Kishore Sharma's case are distinguishable from the facts of the present case. The petitioner in said case denied disability pension was suffering from serious heart muscle disease (dilated cardiomyopathy) and breathing problem which forced him to move back to his native place in Bihar, wherefrom he had been making all correspondence with regard to his disability pension allegedly due from SCI, having rendered almost 23 years of service before being declared permanently unfit for service on medical grounds. All replies including rejection of claim for disability pension were addressed to him at his native place in Bihar. Respondents had not raised any objection to the jurisdiction while responding to the writ petition. It is in these circumstances that a part of cause of action was held to have arisen within territorial limits of Patna High Court. Nawal Kishore Sharma's case therefore would not be attracted in the present case as events that had taken place in said case within jurisdiction of Patna High Court did not take place in the present case within jurisdiction of this court. What is true about order dated 9th June 1995, is true about Communication dated 12th August 2013. Petitioner has in the circumstances chosen a wrong forum to question the impugned order dated 9th June 1995 and the Communication dated 12th April 2013. 11. The above discussion apart, petitioner through medium of writ petition on hand questions the order dated 9th June 1995, after a gap of a little less than 18 years. Petition, therefore, is badly hit by delay and laches. Petitioner worked out a statutory remedy against the impugned order. However, the appeal against the order did not meet any success. Petitioner still did not find it necessary to invoke writ jurisdiction of the court. Petitioner, therefore, cannot be allowed to rake up a issue, 18 years after the cause to raise it accrued to him. Petitioner worked out a statutory remedy against the impugned order. However, the appeal against the order did not meet any success. Petitioner still did not find it necessary to invoke writ jurisdiction of the court. Petitioner, therefore, cannot be allowed to rake up a issue, 18 years after the cause to raise it accrued to him. The law, as emphasized time and again, is on the side of vigilant and does not favour one who sleeps over his right. The principle that delayed claims should not be entertained is in tune with the dictates of public policy. The record as the years pass on gets lost or is otherwise destroyed under rules. It therefore would not be possible for the public functionaries to deal with a stale claim, because of non-availability of the record. This court in State of J&K and Ors. v. Mohd. Syed Khan 2013 (1) JKJ 99 [HC] held: "By a catena of judgments, it is now well settled that the maximum period for filing a writ petition cannot be more than the period prescribed for filling a civil suit. In case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Bhailal Bhai AIR 1964 SCC 1006, a 5-Judge Constitution Bench of Hon'ble the Supreme Court has authoritatively held that the maximum period fixed for filing a suit in a Civil Court must also be read as a reasonable period for filing the writ petition. The aforesaid view is discernible from a bare perusal of para No. 21, which deserves to be set out in extenso: "learned counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Article 226. It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. This court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the court to hold that it is unreasonable." (Emphasis added) 12. This court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the court to hold that it is unreasonable." (Emphasis added) 12. It is important to note the representation filed by the petitioner that has generated communication dated 12th April 2013, addressed by Inspector General of Police to Inspector General of Police Northern Sector, CRPF New Delhi, is not made against the order dated 9th June 1995. The representation does not question the punishment imposed. It only voices petitioner's grievance that after the period for which annual increments were withheld came to an end, he deserved to be considered for promotion in the year 1998 and that there was no justification in delaying consideration till 2001. The representation therefore cannot be taken to extend period of limitation or give rise to new cause of action. Otherwise also as held in S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1990 SC 10 , a person cannot get the period of limitation extended by filing one or more representations. Reliance on law laid down in Ghulam Mohammad Baqal v. State of J&K & Ors. 1998 SLJ 97 : JKJ Soft JKJ/7130 and Bashir Ahmad Bhat v. State of J&K and Ors. 2005(1) SLJ 1: 2004 (3) JKJ 189 [HC] is grossly misplaced. The case law is of no help to the petitioner. The facts of the reported cases are distinguishable from the facts of the present case. 13. For the reasons discussed, the petition is without merit and liable to be dismissed. Petition is accordingly dismissed. Record be returned back. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that petitioner except for the penalty imposed, has excellent and unblemished service career to his credit. Learned counsel in this regard refers to petitioner's distinguished service as part of United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the UN medal awarded to him and Commendation letter issued in his favour by Director General of Police, Meghalaya, Shillong on 26th April 2005. Reference is also made to other awards, Commendation Certificates to his credit. Learned counsel in this regard refers to petitioner's distinguished service as part of United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the UN medal awarded to him and Commendation letter issued in his favour by Director General of Police, Meghalaya, Shillong on 26th April 2005. Reference is also made to other awards, Commendation Certificates to his credit. Learned counsel further states that the petitioner having regard to his excellent track record deserved to be given promotion much before the date it came to his way and to be considered for the next promotion giving effect to his promotion from the earlier date i.e. 1998. The record placed on file extends support to the argument advanced in this regard. Petitioner, as the record would reveal undoubtedly has outstanding service record. It is for the respondents to review the penalty imposed on the petitioner, restrict the period for which the annual increments were withheld or at least accord consideration immediately after the period of punishment and consider him for promotion that may be due to him having regard to his service record.