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2015 DIGILAW 290 (MP)

Suman Shukla v. State of M. P.

2015-03-11

K.K.TRIVEDI

body2015
JUDGMENT : K.K. Trivedi, J. 1. By this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has called in question the action of respondents in not making payment of honorarium to her in terms of the circular issued by the competent authority increasing the rate of honorarium. It is contended that the petitioner was appointed on selection on the post of Guruji by order dated 10.7.2001 and was performing the duties as Guruji. She was paid the honorarium @ Rs.1,000/- per month. The respondents have revised the rate of honorarium by their orders so issued on time to time, but have not paid the amount of enhanced honorarium to the petitioner. A writ petition was filed by the petitioner before this Court seeking a direction against the respondents to pay the honorarium at the revised rate. The said Writ Petition No. 12898/2007 (s) was disposed of vide order dated 28.9.2007, directing the respondents to consider the representation of the petitioner and to decide the same expeditiously, within a period of three months. The said representation was not decided timely, therefore, a Contempt Petition was required to be filed. A compliance report was filed by the respondents stating that arrears of honorarium is already paid to the petitioner, therefore, the Contempt Case No. 1053/2008 was disposed of vide order dated 19.12.2008 giving liberty to the petitioner to challenge such an order of making payment of arrears of honorarium if the same was not rightly paid to the petitioner. It is contended that the representation was made by the petitioner, but the said representation was not decided, therefore, the writ petition was required to be filed. 2. The respondents on service of the notice have filed their return categorically contending that the rate of honorarium were increased from different dates. A clarificatory circular was issued on 7.10.2009 by the Rajya Shiksha Kendra, stating that the increase of honorarium would be available to those who were appointed prior to 1.7.2001 and in whose respect the agreement was already executed prior to the aforesaid date, with effect from 1.7.2003 @ Rs.2500/-. Those who were engaged after 1.7.2001 would be paid the enhanced honorarium with effect from 1.4.2007 @ 1,750/- and would be paid the honorarium @ Rs.2,500/- with effect from 1.4.2008. Similarly, enhancement was made in respect of those who were appointed on different dates. Those who were engaged after 1.7.2001 would be paid the enhanced honorarium with effect from 1.4.2007 @ 1,750/- and would be paid the honorarium @ Rs.2,500/- with effect from 1.4.2008. Similarly, enhancement was made in respect of those who were appointed on different dates. In terms of this circular calculation of arrears of enhanced honorarium was made and the same was paid to the petitioner. It is contended that the petitioner in the year 2009 had taken part in the election of Janpad Panchayat and has been elected as member of the Janpad Panchayat, and is presently not working as Guruji and, therefore, is not entitled to payment of any other amount towards the enhanced honorarium. It is, thus, contended that the entire petition is misconceived and is liable to be dismissed. 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 4. In fact, when the enhancement of the honorarium was ordered, certain persons who were appointed prior to 1.7.2001 as Guruji, have approached this Court calling in question the different rates of enhanced honorarium. One such petition was filed by Shri Brajesh Kumar Tiwari, which was decided by this Court on 9.5.2008 Brajesh Kumar Tiwari Vs. C.E.O. Zila Panchayat [: 2008(4) M.P.H.T. 496 ]. The claim was considered by this Court in the said case. Considering various aspects and the dispute raised, this Court recorded the facts and findings in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10 & 11, which read thus :- "7. Undisputed facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Guruji in accordance with M.P. Education Guarantee Scheme, Annexure P-2 vide order dated 20.10.1999. Since then the petitioner has been performing the work of Guruji at the EGS Centre, Amarpura. The petitioner stated in the petition that he is teaching upto 5th class students. In education Guarantee Scheme there is a provision for Shiksha Karmi. Subsequently, it has been designated as Guruji. It has further been mentioned in the policy that Shiksha Karmis shall be entitled for Honorarium or stipend which shall be paid to them every month. In the aforesaid scheme there is no provision to pay different Honorarium to different Gurujis. Rajeev Gandhi Shiksha Mission issued another Circular dated 26.7.2003 Annexure R-1. Subsequently, it has been designated as Guruji. It has further been mentioned in the policy that Shiksha Karmis shall be entitled for Honorarium or stipend which shall be paid to them every month. In the aforesaid scheme there is no provision to pay different Honorarium to different Gurujis. Rajeev Gandhi Shiksha Mission issued another Circular dated 26.7.2003 Annexure R-1. It has been mentioned in the Circular that enhanced rate of Honorarium shall be paid to the Guruji who had been working at EGS Centre and fulfill following conditions :- (1) That the education centre must has been sanctioned prior to 31.3.2001. (2) From the 1st standard to Vth standard classes shall be conducted at the centre. (3) There must be the agreement between Guruji and Palak Shikshak Sangh before 1.7.2001. From the aforesaid Circular, it is clear that Rajeev Gandhi Shiksha Mission had created two classes of Gurujis. One class is of those who fulfills the conditions as mentioned in Annexure R-1 and another class is of those who do not fulfill the conditions. However, there is no such condition mentioned in the Scheme. Apart from this, it is clear that it is not within the control of the Guruji to fulfill the conditions. Although in the present case, petitioner fulfill all the conditions because he has been working at EGS Centre since 1999. The doctrine of Article 14gives power for classification but it forbids class legislation. 8. The Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Lachhman Dass Vs. State of Punjab (supra) has held as under :- "............The law is now well settled that vide Article 14 prohibits discriminatory legislation directed against one individual or class of individuals, it does not forbid reasonable classification, and that for this purpose even one person or a group of persons can be a class. Professor Willis says in his Constitutional Law p. 580 "a law applying to one person or one class of persons is constitutional if there is sufficient basis or reason for it." This statement of the law was approved by this Court in Chiranjit Lal Choudhary Vs. Union of India, : 1950 SCR 869 , AIR 1951 SC 41 . There the question was whether a law providing for the management and control by the Government of a named company the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd. Was bad as offending Article14. Union of India, : 1950 SCR 869 , AIR 1951 SC 41 . There the question was whether a law providing for the management and control by the Government of a named company the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd. Was bad as offending Article14. It was held that even a single Company might, having regard to its features, be a category in itself and that unless it was shown that there were other Companies similarly circumstanced, the legislation must be presumed to be constitutional and the attack under Article 14 must fail. In Ram Krishan Dalmia Vs. S.R. Tendolkar, : 1959 SCR 279 at p. 297 : AIR 1956 SC 538 at p. 547 this Court again examined in great detail the scope of Article 14 and in enunciating the principles applicable in deciding whether a law is in contravention of that Article observed : "that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others that single individual may be treated as class by himself." 9. Further, another Constitution Bench of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in State of Mysore Vs. P. Narsinga Rao (supra), has held as under :- "It is well settled that though Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. When any impugned rule or statutory provision is assailed on the ground that it contravenes Article 14, its validity can be sustained if two tests are satisfied. The first test is that the classification on which it is founded must be based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things grouped together from others left out of the group, and the second test is that the differentia in question must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the rule or statutory provision in question. In other words, there must be some rational nexus between the basis of classification and the object intended to be achieved by the statute or the rule. As we have already stated, Articles 14 and 16 form part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and supplement each other. In other words, there must be some rational nexus between the basis of classification and the object intended to be achieved by the statute or the rule. As we have already stated, Articles 14 and 16 form part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and supplement each other. In other words, Article 16 is only an instance of the application of the general rule of equality laid down in Article 14 and it should be construed as such. Hence, there is no denial of equality of opportunity unless the person who complains of discrimination is equally situated with the person or persons who are alleged to have been favoured Article 16(1) does not bar a reasonable classification of employees or reasonable tests for their selection." 10. The aforesaid principle of law as laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further been followed by subsequent Benches of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Markendeya Vs. State of A.P. (supra) and also in Mewa Ram Kanojia Vs. All India Institute of Medical Sciences (supra). 11. From the above principle of law as laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, it is crystal clear that under Article 14 a valid classification is permitted but class legislation is not permitted. In the present case, the respondents are trying to create two classes of Guruji. However, it is neither in accordance with the Education Guarantee Scheme nor the respondents have mentioned sufficient reasons in the return for the same. Hence, the aforesaid classification and the conditions laid down by the Circular (Annexure R-1) dated 26.7.2003) are illegal and arbitrary. The arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the State that there is delay and laches on the part of the petitioner cannot be accepted because this Court has struck down the Circular on the basis of arbitrariness." 5. The finding was categorically recorded by this Court that the law laid down by the Apex Court contemplates that there can not be class within the class without any reasonable basis. A perusal of circular issued by the State Shiksha Mission on 7.10.2009 (Annx.R/1) makes it clear that conditions were prescribed that the enhanced rate of honorarium would be available to only those who have been appointed prior to 1.7.2001. A lesser rate of enhanced honorarium would be available to the persons who were appointed after 1.7.2001. A perusal of circular issued by the State Shiksha Mission on 7.10.2009 (Annx.R/1) makes it clear that conditions were prescribed that the enhanced rate of honorarium would be available to only those who have been appointed prior to 1.7.2001. A lesser rate of enhanced honorarium would be available to the persons who were appointed after 1.7.2001. What is the justification for making such prescription of condition or making of a class is not clear from the entire circular. If a Guruji is appointed after 1.7.2001, and the enhanced rate of honorarium is already made available to those who were appointed prior to 1.7.2001, the new appointee cannot be discriminated in the matter of grant of honorarium without any justified reason. In fact, the circular dated 7.10.2009 was not the subject matter of challenge in the writ petition, since the said writ petition was decided much before the issuance of the circular R/1. Therefore, in fact, the circular should not have been issued to circumvent the law laid down by this Court. It is clear that the circular itself runs contrary to the law laid down by this Court in the case of Brajesh Kumar Tiwari (supra). It is not the case of the respondents that the law laid down by this Court in the case of Brajesh Kumar Tiwari (supra) was water down or set aside by any higher forum and, therefore, the circular was issued. Nothing in this respect is said in the return. In fact, the circular is just contrary to law and, therefore, the same cannot be sustained. 6. Even if the petitioner has subsequently left the job of Guruji and was elected as member of Janpad Panchayat, till the date she was working as Guruji, she was entitled to grant of payment of honorarium on unified enhanced rate as she could not have been discriminated only because of the date of appointment in the matter of grant of enhanced rate of honorarium. As a result, such a stand taken by the respondents cannot be sustained. 7. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed. As a result, such a stand taken by the respondents cannot be sustained. 7. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to examine whether the law laid down by this Court in the case of Brajesh Kumar Tiwari (supra) has been set aside by any higher forum or not and if not to grant sanction to petitioner to receive honorarium at unified enhanced rate to the petitioner from the date it was made applicable to those who were appointed prior to 1.7.2001, calculate the entire arrears and after adjusting the amount already paid, pay the arrears of honorarium to the petitioner for the period she was serving as Guruji in the EGS School, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order passed today. 8. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein above. There shall be no order as to costs.