JUDGMENT : Tapash Mookherjee, J. The present criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Andaman & Nicobar Islands in Sessions Case No. 34 of 2010 (Session Trial No.15 of 2010). The appellant Gopal Debnath has been found guilty for the offence of murder under section 302 IPC and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 5000/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for two years more in the aforesaid case. 2. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with such judgment and order of conviction, and sentence the accused/convict has filed the present appeal. 3. The facts leading to the present appeal, in short, are as follows:- The appellant is the husband of Shefali Debnath, since deceased, and they used to reside in their house at Petcher Nallah APWD colony. 4. In the night of 3rd March, 2010, there was massive fire in the house of the appellant and the appellant's wife Shefali sustained severe burn injuries in the fire, and on her screaming, the local people came to the house, doused the fire, rescued Shefali, called for an ambulance, and shifted Shefali to the local hospital. In the hospital, Shefali made a statement in which she stated clearly that her husband i.e. appellant poured kerosene on her person and bed while she was asleep and set her ablaze. She succumbed to her injuries, within a short period, after giving such statement, which was considered as her dying declaration and on the basis of it, at first a case under section 307 IPC was initiated against the appellant, subsequently the case was converted to a case under section 302 IPC. 5. During trial, charge under section 302 IPC had been framed against the appellant and 18 witnesses had been examined by the prosecution to establish the charge. The appellant did not tender any evidence whatsoever. Having considered the evidence on record learned trial court found the appellant guilty of the charge under section 302 of the IPC and passed the sentence of life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 5000/- against the appellant and the present appeal has been filed against such judgment and conviction and order of sentence. 6. Having considered the evidence on record learned trial court found the appellant guilty of the charge under section 302 of the IPC and passed the sentence of life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 5000/- against the appellant and the present appeal has been filed against such judgment and conviction and order of sentence. 6. Admittedly appellant's wife Shefali died in Billiground PHC due to severe burn injuries caused by the fire in their house in the night of 3rd March, 2010. The allegation against the appellant is that the appellant himself intentionally set fire in the body of his wife to get rid of her. 7. The prosecution's case rests mainly on two sets of evidence produced during the trial. One such set of evidence is the dying declaration by the deceased and the other set of evidence is the conduct of the appellant during and immediately after the incident of fire in his house. 8. S.I. K.N. Mishra (PW 18) was posted at Bambooflat PS and he investigated the case from beginning to end. He stated that on 3rd March, 2010 at about 11.05 PM having received an information over telephone from Billiground PHC that one Shefali Debnath wife of Gopal Debnath (appellant) was admitted in the hospital with severe burn injuries, he along with other policemen rushed to the Billiground PHC and found the deceased admitted there with severe burn injuries, after which he sent for requisition for an Executive Magistrate to record the statement of the victim. But, since no Magistrate could reach the hospital and the condition of the victim was gradually deteriorating, he sought for opinion of the attending Doctor on the point whether the victim was in condition to make any statement, and after getting a positive reply from the Doctor, he recorded the statement of the victim in presence of the attending Doctor and other two witnesses. S.I. Mishra proved the statement allegedly made by the victim and the statement is marked as exhibit-26 which would be hereinafter mentioned as the dying declaration. 9. Mr. Rakesh Pal Gobind, learned advocate appearing for the appellant submitted that the alleged dying declaration had not been recorded strictly according to law and as such the conviction of the appellant based on it is bad in law. 9. Mr. Rakesh Pal Gobind, learned advocate appearing for the appellant submitted that the alleged dying declaration had not been recorded strictly according to law and as such the conviction of the appellant based on it is bad in law. The main ground of his assailing the dying declaration was that it had been recorded by PW 18 without any certificate from the Doctor to the effect that the victim was in fit state of mind to make any statement. Mr. Gobind tried to differentiate between consciousness and the fitness of mind to make any statement and he cited the following decisions in support of his contentions:- 1) 1999 (7) Supreme 640 (Paparambaka Rosamma & others v. State of Andhra Pradesh) 2) 2001 Vol.3 Supreme 238 (Uka Ram v. State of Rajasthan) 3) 2004 (1) Supreme 909 (Narain Singh and another v. State of Haryana). 10. On the other hand Mr. Mandal, learned advocate appearing for the State argued that the dying declaration of the victim have been recorded by PW 18 complying with all legal formalities. It was his further submission that such dying declaration alone is sufficient to find the appellant guilty of the murder of his wife. Mr. Mandal also cited two decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court on the point one reported in (2006) 9 Supreme Court Cases (Ashok Laxman Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra) and the other reported in (2005) 9 Supreme Court Cases 113 (Muthu Kutty and another v. State By Inspector of Police T.N.) 11. The conflict of view regarding certificate of fitness of the statement maker has been settled down by the decisions of five Judges Constitutional Bench in the cases reported in (2002) 6 Supreme Court Cases 710 (Laxman v. State of Maharashtra), and relied on by the learned Trial Court. In the aforesaid case the decision in Paparambaka Rosamma has been overruled and it has been held in the aforesaid Constitutional Bench of five Judges that the dying declaration can be recorded in any form and what is needed is that the person recording dying declaration must be satisfied that the person making such dying declaration is in fit state of mind to make such statement and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. The same view has been reinstated in the decision (2010) 8 Supreme Court Cases 514 Lakhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh. 12. The same view has been reinstated in the decision (2010) 8 Supreme Court Cases 514 Lakhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh. 12. In the present case the Investigating Officer i.e. PW 18 stated that after watching the condition of the victim in the hospital he requested over telephone Shri. P.M. Mishra then posted as the Executive Magistrate at Mayabunder to record the statement of the victim and in reply Shri. Mishra told him that he would be sending the Deputy Tehsildar K. Ramachandran Pilllai to the hospital for the purpose. Billiground PHC where the victim was admitted at that time is at a long distance from Mayabunder. Meanwhile the condition of the patient was deteriorating as disclosed by the attending Dr. Purnima Burman. Hence PW 18 recorded the dying declaration of the victim in presence of Dr. Purnima Burman and two other witnesses present as stated by PW 18. PW 18 stated further that even after recording the dying declaration he waited for the Executive Magistrate to come and after arrival of the Executive Magistrate Mr. K. Ramachandran Pillai, he submitted a written requisition requesting Mr. Pallai to record the dying declaration but by that time the victim was in sedation due to sedative injection as disclosed by the attending Doctor and hence Mr. Pillai left the place without recording statement of the victim and within very short period thereafter the victim died. Exhibit-27/1 and 27/2 lend supports to such claims of PW 18. 13. Dr. Purnima Burman (PW 2) was posted as the Chief Medical Officer of PHC Billiground at the relevant time. She stated that on 03.03.2010 one Smti. Shefali Debnath was admitted in their hospital with burn injuries and the police wanted to know from her whether Smti. Shefali Debnath was in free state of mind to make any statement or not and that she give her opinion in writing stating that the patient was in the stage of giving statement. Exhibit-3 was the said requisition by the police and Exhibit-3/1 was such written opinion of Dr. Burman. 14. Exhibit-26 is the said dying declaration and Exhibit 26/2 is endorsement of Dr. Burman stating that the statement had been recorded in her presence. 15. So from the evidence on record discussed above it is clear that PW 18 had taken all possible steps before recording the dying declaration of the victim. Burman. 14. Exhibit-26 is the said dying declaration and Exhibit 26/2 is endorsement of Dr. Burman stating that the statement had been recorded in her presence. 15. So from the evidence on record discussed above it is clear that PW 18 had taken all possible steps before recording the dying declaration of the victim. Prior to the recording of the dying declaration the attending Doctor certified that "at present patient is in the state of giving statement" and dying declaration had been recorded in presence of the attending Doctor. As held in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (supra) and Lakhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) there is no specific mode or form to give such certificate of fitness. It is further held in the Laxman's case that dying declaration need not be recorded by Magistrate only and that it could be recorded by any authority according to the situation of the case. 16. Some of the facts stated in the dying declaration find support from some other evidence. In the dying declaration the deceased stated that on the day of the incident she called Rupna's wife to assist her in preparation of a Brinjal plate. 17. Sangita Kujur (PW 15) was the wife of Rupna Ekka named by the deceased and Sangita stated that on the night of the occurrence she had gone to the house of the deceased and chopped Brinjals. The deceased stated that in the night of the incident her husband, out of intoxication picked up quarrel with her due to which she slept without taking any food in the night. During PM examination the autopsy surgeon found the stomach of the victim 'empty'. According to the dying declaration the kerosene oil was poured while the victim was lying and fire ignited in the body of the deceased in such condition. According to the PM report the entire body was burnt except a portion of the buttock and some hairs in the skull. This fact also support the statement of the deceased. Dr. Purnima Burman (PW 2) in one place of her cross examination stated that due to 95% burn the skin was uprooted. Taking cue from such statement Mr. Gobind argued that if the deceased had no skin in her arms or fingers, then how her RTI could be taken on her dying declaration? Mr. Dr. Purnima Burman (PW 2) in one place of her cross examination stated that due to 95% burn the skin was uprooted. Taking cue from such statement Mr. Gobind argued that if the deceased had no skin in her arms or fingers, then how her RTI could be taken on her dying declaration? Mr. Gobind has also cited the decision reported in 1998 (3) Supreme 179 (State of Punjab v. Gian Kaur and another) on the point. In the aforesaid case it was clearly stated in the PM report that both the thumbs of the deceased were burnt and the Doctor performing PM examination failed to explain the inconsistencies. But in the present case no such clarification was sought for from PW 2 in whose presence the dying declaration was recorded and who had subsequently performed the PM examination. It should be mentioned here that in the inquest report (Exhibit-6) it is noted that the skin of the body was found burn and rough and it is not noted that the entire skin of the body including the skin of the thumb was peeled off. So, aforesaid contention of Mr. Gobind is not acceptable to us. 18. In Uka Ram's case (supra) deceased was mentally retarded prior to her death and in Narain Singh's case (supra) Doctor certified that the patient was not in a condition to make any statement and inspite of that the statement of the victim was recorded as dying declaration. So, none of these judgments has any application in the present case. 19. To assail the legal value of the dying declaration Mr. Gobind has cited the following decisions also:- 1) 1982 AIR Supreme Court 1021 (Kake Singh alias Surendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh) 2) 1998 Vol. IX Supreme Court Cases 353 (Bhola Prasad v. State of Maharashtra) 3) 2003 Vol. IV Supreme 375 (Cherlopalli Cheliminabi Saheb & Another v. State of Andhra Pradesh). 4) 2006 Vol. II Supreme 415 (P Mani v. State of Tamil Nadu) 5) 2011 Vol. IV ULJ 189 Supreme Court (Surinder Kumar v. State of Harayana) 6) 2013 CrLR Supreme Court 576 (State of Rajasthan v. Shravan Ram and another) 7) 2005 Vol. IV CHN 77 (Haraka Bahadur Rai v. State of West Bengal). 20. 4) 2006 Vol. II Supreme 415 (P Mani v. State of Tamil Nadu) 5) 2011 Vol. IV ULJ 189 Supreme Court (Surinder Kumar v. State of Harayana) 6) 2013 CrLR Supreme Court 576 (State of Rajasthan v. Shravan Ram and another) 7) 2005 Vol. IV CHN 77 (Haraka Bahadur Rai v. State of West Bengal). 20. In Kake Singh's case there were some absurdities and some of the vital injuries other then the burn injuries had not been mentioned at all in the dying declaration. So, the Hon'ble Apex Court discarded the value of such dying declaration. 21. In Bhola Prasad's case there was serious contradiction between dying declaration and oral evidence regarding identity of the assailant and hence Hon'ble Apex Court refused to accept the value of the dying declaration. 22. In Cherlopalli Cheliminabi Saheb's case the dying declaration was recorded by the police officer although Magistrate was available nearby and that apart there were two dying declarations and some other inconsistencies were found in the case. So, the dying declarations were discarded. 23. In P. Mani's case it is held that if any suspicious circumstances are found in any dying declaration then the court should look for some corroborative evidence. 24. In Surinder Kumar's case the dying declaration was found totally in conflict with the version of the prosecution case and hence the dying declaration was not considered to be trustworthy. 25. In State of Rajasthan v. Shravan Ram and another case, there were three dying declarations and one of them had not been produced. There were gross contradictions between the dying declarations produced and in the first such dying declaration the assailant was not identified, because of such circumstances Hon'ble Apex Court rejected the versions in both the dying declarations produced. 26. In Haraka Bahadur's case the dying declaration was oral and the evidence of PW 1 before whom the alleged dying declaration was made was full of inconsistencies. So, the dying declaration was discarded. 27. So, none of the reasons for which the dying declaration have been discredited in the aforesaid cases cited for the appellant is present in the present case as discussed earlier. 28. It has been mentioned earlier that PW 18 had taken all possible guards before recording the dying declaration of the deceased. So, the dying declaration was discarded. 27. So, none of the reasons for which the dying declaration have been discredited in the aforesaid cases cited for the appellant is present in the present case as discussed earlier. 28. It has been mentioned earlier that PW 18 had taken all possible guards before recording the dying declaration of the deceased. It had been recorded after the Doctor found the victim in a fit state of mind to make any statement and the dying declaration was recorded in presence of the Doctor. The dying declaration in this case had been recorded in such a situation where there was no scope for tutoring or subjecting the victim to any kind of pressure. There was no difficulty for the deceased to identify the assailant. Over and above all, some of the relevant facts stated in the dying declaration find support from other source as well, as discussed earlier and no inconsistencies or contradiction is found between the dying declaration and other evidence on record. So, looked from any angle the dying declaration in the present case can be relied upon without any hesitation. 29. There is no dispute to the fact that the deceased received burn injuries inside her house. The appellant is the husband of the deceased and there is no dispute also to the fact that the appellant used to live with the deceased in the same house. Shri R. Tulsidhasan (PW 9) is the adjacent neighbour of the appellant. He stated that in the night of the incident he found fire inside the house of the appellant and heard the screaming 'Bachao Bachao' and 'Pani-Pani' coming out from inside the appellant's house. He further stated that doors and windows of the appellant's house were closed and after the door was opened by someone in the gathering the appellant came out from inside of his house. PW 9 has no enmity whatsoever with the appellant and he happens to be the colleague of the appellant. In this circumstances, his version can be safely relied upon. 30. Since the appellant was inside the house where his wife sustained severe burn injuries, the onus lies upon the appellant under section 106 of the Evidence Act to explain as to how his wife sustained such kind of severe burn injuries. In this circumstances, his version can be safely relied upon. 30. Since the appellant was inside the house where his wife sustained severe burn injuries, the onus lies upon the appellant under section 106 of the Evidence Act to explain as to how his wife sustained such kind of severe burn injuries. The appellant was perhaps aware of such onus and during his examination under section 313 Cr.P.C, in his reply to question No.103 the appellant stated that at the time of the incident he was in the market and as such he was not aware of what happened inside his house and during his reply to question No.109 the appellant further narrated that in the night of the incident he suddenly got the information at about 12 O'clock in the night that his wife died due to burning and police arrested him at about 11 O'clock in that night. The appellant failed to produce any evidence in support of his claims. PW 9 in his cross-examination stated that in their area nobody remain out of the house after 7 O'clock in the night. So, it remains unexplained by the appellant as to what the appellant was doing in the market at about 10 O'clock in the night. It is true that in a criminal trial the accused has no liability to prove any fact in support of his innocence. But, whenever the accused takes up any specific case in his defence the accused invites the burden on his own shoulder to prove such fact, especially when such fact is within the exclusive knowledge of the accused and failure to discharge such onus, as in the present case, definitely strengthen the prosecution's case. 31. It was the contention of Mr. Gobind that prosecution has failed to prove any motive of the appellant to kill his wife and as such the prosecution case does fail as a whole. Motive is not important when a case is proved by direct evidence like the present one. Mr. Gobind also pointed out some minor discrepancies and deficiencies in the prosecution's case, which in our view, are insignificant. 32. It is now a settled law that a dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires full confidence of the court. Mr. Gobind also pointed out some minor discrepancies and deficiencies in the prosecution's case, which in our view, are insignificant. 32. It is now a settled law that a dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires full confidence of the court. In the present case, the dying declaration of the deceased inspires our full confidence and its credibility cannot be doubted in to on any reasonable ground. In addition to such a dying declaration there is another very strong circumstances against the appellant as discussed in detail earlier. Learned Trial Court has analysed the evidence on record in the right direction and nothing wrong is found in the judgment and order of the learned Trial Court impugned in this appeal, to interfere with. 33. The present appeal is, therefore, dismissed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court in Sessions Case No. 34 of 2010 (ST No 15 of 2010) are hereby affirmed. 34. Let the lower court records be sent back to the Trial Court along with the copy of the judgment and order. Let the copy of this judgment and order be also sent to the appellant who is in jail.