JUDGMENT 1. The Plaintiffs are members of the co-operative society in which Defendant No.1 is also a member. Defendant No.2 is an advocate practicing in this Court. Defendant No.3 is joined as a formal party and no relief has been claimed against him. 2. Certain disputes arose between plaintiffs and Defendant No.1. Defendant No.2 as an advocate of Defendant No.1, on instructions from Defendant No.1, addressed a complaint to the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Housing Society, KWest Ward, Mumbai making various allegations against the plaintiffs. In view thereof, the plaintiffs state that the plaintiffs received various phone calls from friends and relatives expressing surprise and shock and the plaintiff's claim that their reputation among their friends and relatives was affected. The relief sought in the plaint is as under:- “(a) that the Defendants be ordered and decreed to pay jointly and severally to the Plaintiffs the said sum of Rs.8,00,00,000/- (Rupees Eight Crores Only) together with interest @24% per annum thereon or at prevailing market rate whichever is higher or at such rate as this Hon'ble Court may deems fit and proper from the date of receipt of the Notice of demand dated 14th November 2005 till payment and/or realization;” 3. Defendant No.1 had filed a Chamber Summons bearing No. 498/2006 to direct the Prothonotary and Senior Master to reassess the court fees payable with the suit, call upon the Plaintiffs to pay the deficit court fees and if not paid reject the suit under Order VII Rule 11(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, this Court by an order dated 27th July 2007 directed the Prothonotary and Senior Master to hold an enquiry to ascertain whether the valuation made in the suit was proper and whether the court fee paid by the plaintiffs, was proper after considering the contentions raised by the first defendant of insufficiency of court fee paid by the plaintiffs on the suit claim and file a report. The Prothonotary and Senior Master referred the matter to the Taxing Master to hold an enquiry under Section 8 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 (the said Act). The Taxing Master after hearing the parties came to a conclusion that as there are 8 separate claims in the suit, the plaintiffs will be liable to pay separately on each cause of action but subject to the maximum limit prescribed under the Act, i.e., Rs.3 lacs. The Taxing Master after hearing the parties came to a conclusion that as there are 8 separate claims in the suit, the plaintiffs will be liable to pay separately on each cause of action but subject to the maximum limit prescribed under the Act, i.e., Rs.3 lacs. This order is under challenge in the present Chamber Summons. 4. The admitted position is that the plaintiffs have paid the maximum amount of Rs.3 lacs. It is the contention of the applicants that the plaintiffs have come together to file this suit though each have sought separate relief. In other words, it is alleged that each plaintiff is claiming Rs.1 Crore as damages for the alleged defamation of each of them and therefore each plaintiff should pay court fees separately, subject to the maximum limit as if each plaintiff would have filed a separate suit and maximum limit of court fee of Rs. 3 lacs is not applicable. The applicants submit that the Taxing Master erred in invoking the provisions of Section 18 of the said Act read with proviso to Article 1 of Schedule I thereof. According to the applicants, the same does not apply to the facts of the present suit. Therefore, it is also submitted that individual claim of each plaintiff cannot be aggregated for the purpose of court fees and each claim has to be valued separately and accordingly court fees should be charged on the respective claim. It is the case of the applicants that each of the plaintiff is required to pay Rs.1,33,230/- as court fees and as there are 8 plaintiffs, they have to pay aggregate court fees of Rs.10,65,840/-. Out of that as Rs.3,00,000/- has been paid, there is deficit of Rs.7,65,840/-. If that is not paid, the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs stated that the plaintiffs are claiming a comprehensive relief as stated in prayer clause (a). I do not agree with the submissions of the plaintiffs' Counsel. A plaint has to be read as a whole to make out what is the actual claim. Reading the prayer clause alone is not enough. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the plaint expressly indicates that each plaintiff is seeking to be paid Rs.1 Crore aggregating to Rs.8 Crores. I do not agree with the submissions of the plaintiffs' Counsel. A plaint has to be read as a whole to make out what is the actual claim. Reading the prayer clause alone is not enough. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the plaint expressly indicates that each plaintiff is seeking to be paid Rs.1 Crore aggregating to Rs.8 Crores. Paragraph 15 and 16 of the plaint reads as under:- “15. The Plaintiffs state that by letter dated 14th November 2005, Advocates for the Plaintiffs have while setting out some of the aforesaid facts called upon the Defendants to pay to the Plaintiffs damages @ Rs.1,00,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore Only) per Plaintiff aggregating to Rs.8,00,00,000/- (Rupees Eight Crore Only) with interest of 24% per annum or at prevailing market rate whichever is higher. The Defendants were further called upon to withdraw the false allegation for misappropriation of funds within one week from the receipt of the Notice dated 14th November 2005 failing which appropriate action would be taken. Despite receipt of the said Notice the Defendants have failed and neglected to comply with the requisitions contained in the said Notice. 16. In the circumstances the Plaintiffs are entitled to claim the said aggregate of sum of Rs.8,00,00,000/- (Rupees Eight Crores Only) with interest at the rate and time as aforesaid from the Defendants which the Defendants are bound and liable to pay to the Plaintiffs with interest as demanded and as more particularly stated in particulars of claim.” (emphasis supplied) 6. Moreover, when Plaintiff No.5 died, the other plaintiffs filed a Chamber Summons (L) No. 1005/2014 for deleting the name of Plaintiff No.5 and also to reduce the claim amount from Rs.8 Crores to Rs.7 Crores. If I have to accept the contentions of the Counsel for the plaintiffs that the claim is a comprehensive claim, then there was no need to reduce the claim amount from Rs.8 Crores to Rs.7 Crores. Moreover, in paragraph 15 it is expressly mentioned that the defendant to pay plaintiffs damages of Rs.1 Crore to each plaintiff aggregating Rs.8 Crores. In paragraph 16, it is mentioned that the plaintiffs are entitled to claim the said 'aggregate' sum of Rs.8 Crores. Therefore, it is quite clear that this plaint is filed by 8 individuals who had 8 independent causes of action against common defendants and have decided to come together to file this suit. 7. In paragraph 16, it is mentioned that the plaintiffs are entitled to claim the said 'aggregate' sum of Rs.8 Crores. Therefore, it is quite clear that this plaint is filed by 8 individuals who had 8 independent causes of action against common defendants and have decided to come together to file this suit. 7. The plaintiffs in their affidavit in reply dated 22nd August 2014 have taken a plea that the present Chamber Summons is barred by law of limitation. It is contended that the said report is dated 26th September 2007 and the present Chamber Summons is filed after almost 7 years. It was submitted by the Plaintiffs that revision under the Maharashtra Court Fee Act, 1959 (“said Act”) has to be filed within 30 days of the decision of the concerned Taxing Master/Court Fee Official. The Applicant/Defendant No.1 submits that the said Report was made available to the Applicant only on 17th July 2014 as recorded in the order dated 17th July 2014. This fact is averred in the Affidavit in Rejoinder. The said Revision is therefore filed within 30 days from the date of receipt the impugned report. The Applicant cannot be blamed for the delay in filing the Chamber Summons since the Prothonotary /Taxing Master served the said Report on the Applicant only on 17th July 2014 although the order dated 27th July 2007 in Chamber Summons No. 498 of 2006 specifically directed the Ld. Prothonotary to serve a copy of the report on the Advocate on record of the parties. In any event the issues arising in the present Chamber Summons are essentially issues of law affecting the revenue of the State Government and merit consideration by this Hon'ble Court. Therefore, the Applicant has made out a case for consideration of the present Chamber Summons on merits. 8. The short issue that arises in this suit is, therefore, whether plaintiffs are liable to pay court fees separately on their respective cause of action subject to maximum limit of Rs.3,00,000/- prescribed under the said Act or the maximum limit of Rs.3,00,000/- prescribed in Article 1 of Schedule I of the Act is not applicable and each plaintiff has to pay maximum court fees under their respective claim aggregating to Rs.10,65,840/. 9. To decide this issue, let us reproduce Section 18 and Article 1 of Schedule 1 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959. 9. To decide this issue, let us reproduce Section 18 and Article 1 of Schedule 1 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959. “Section 18: Multifarious suits: Where a suit embraces two or more distinct subjects, the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees to which the plaints or memorandum of appeal in suits embracing separately each of such subjects would be liable under this Act. Nothing in the former part of this section shall be deemed to affect the powers conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Schedule I, Order II, Rule 6.” SCHEDULE-I Ad valorem fees Number 1 ……………….. 2 Proper fee 3 1. Plaint or memorandum of appeal (not otherwise provided for in this Act) or of cross-objection presented to any Civil or Revenue Court. …………. When such amount or value exceeds eleven lakh of rupees, for every one lakh of rupees, or part thereof, in excess of eleven lakh of rupees …………… Provided that, the maximum fee leviable on the plaint or memorandum of appeal or of cross objection shall be three lakh of rupees. …..... One thousand and two hundred rupees. ….. 10. Under Order 1 Rule 1 r/w Order 2 Rule 3, the plaintiffs were justified in uniting in the same suit, their independent causes of action against the same defendant. Therefore there is no harm with the plaintiffs filing the suit together. Each of the plaintiff is alleging defamation against the Defendant Nos.1 and 2 arising out of the notice dated 22nd October 2005 addressed by the Defendant No.2 on instructions from Defendant No.1. Each plaintiffs, therefore, even if act of the defendants is common against each of the plaintiff, has to prove that by lodging the complaint dated 22nd October 2005, the defendant nos. 1 and 2 have defamed each of the plaintiff and each of the plaintiff also has to justify the amount of Rs.1 Crore claimed. In other words, each plaintiff has to not only establish liability of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 to each one of them, but also should establish the quantum with respect to each one of them. It is therefore clear from the plaint that the 7 surviving plaintiffs could have filed 7 separate suit against the defendants without necessity to file one comprehensive suit. 1 and 2 to each one of them, but also should establish the quantum with respect to each one of them. It is therefore clear from the plaint that the 7 surviving plaintiffs could have filed 7 separate suit against the defendants without necessity to file one comprehensive suit. Moreover, even if the evidence could be common for the defendants as against of the plaintiffs, the evidence for each of the plaintiff will have to be separate, because this is a suit for defamation. In a suit for breach of contract, perhaps the situation might be different. As it is a suit for defamation even if each of the plaintiff had filed separate suits, they were likely to be not consolidated because in a defamation action, each plaintiff will have to prove that the act of the defendant defamed them and the quantum of damages claimed. 11. The Taxing Master has given his conclusion based on two judgments relied upon by the plaintiff, one in the matter of Syndicate Bank Vs. M/s S.S. Printers and Ors. ( 1995(2) Mh.L.J. 198 ) and the other an unreported judgment in the matter of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. Trinity Petro-Film Pvt. Ltd. (dated 16.12.2003 in Appeal No. 1026/2003 in Summary Suit No. 165/2002). In both the matters, there was one plaintiff who combined various causes of action and therefore it was held that court fees was required to be assessed on each subject separately and then the aggregate amount of court fees be charged on the plaint subject to maximum prescribed in proviso to Article 1 of Schedule I. Both the judgments are not applicable to the present case in as much as the present suit is filed by 8 different plaintiffs (now reduced to 7) claiming each one to be paid Rs.1 Crore against the Defendant Nos.1 and 2 for complaining to the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies. Section 18 relates to the court fees payable in respect of multifarious suits. In the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959, the words “subject” has not been defined. In Section 8 and Section 11 of the said Act, which relates to enquiry as to valuation of suits and costs of inquiry of valuation and refund of excess fees, respectively, the words used are “subject matter of any suit”. In Section 15 also the words used are “subject matter of the suit”. In Section 8 and Section 11 of the said Act, which relates to enquiry as to valuation of suits and costs of inquiry of valuation and refund of excess fees, respectively, the words used are “subject matter of any suit”. In Section 15 also the words used are “subject matter of the suit”. It is not, therefore clear whether the word “subject” here means and includes subject matter or it means something else. 12. At the same time, I am inclined to accept the view that the term “distinct subjects” used in Section 18 should be read and understood as subject matters as are distinct but which can be clubbed together in a single suit. The intention of Section 18 seems to be provided for suits which involved multifariousness and which do not go against the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure such as misjoinder of causes of action. 13. Whether the items involved in the suit are distinct subjects or one and the same subject may also be decided by the facts as to whether, if one of the plaintiff alone had filed the suit and decree passed therein in favour of such plaintiff, would it ennure to the benefit of the rest of the parties who have not been parties to the suit. 14. It may be convenient for all the plaintiffs claiming for similar relief on a similar cause of action to combine and file a suit. In such a case it is possible to avoid multiplicity of suits by combining causes of action and parties without offending the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. At the same time I find it difficult to see how distinct causes of action which each plaintiff has can be one subject even within the meaning of Section 18. In reality, the plaintiffs are seeking 8 independent decrees of Rs.1 Crore each against the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2. In my view each of the plaintiffs will have to pay separate amounts of maximum court fees as if each of the plaintiff has filed an independent action. I find it difficult to see how distinct causes of action that each plaintiff independently has can ever be distinct subjects within the meaning of Section 18. 1 and 2. In my view each of the plaintiffs will have to pay separate amounts of maximum court fees as if each of the plaintiff has filed an independent action. I find it difficult to see how distinct causes of action that each plaintiff independently has can ever be distinct subjects within the meaning of Section 18. Section 18 in my view takes into account a situation where there is one plaintiff who filed a suit embracing two or more subjects not many plaintiffs who have come together and field a suit for defamation claiming separate damages. 15. None of the parties have cited any precedent or case law which deals with facts that arise in the present matter. In none of the cases cited by the Counsels, the issue of application of ceiling of maximum court fee in case of multiple plaintiffs filing a common consolidated suit has arisen for consideration. It is in this context that the Applicants have pleaded in the chamber summons that Section 18 of the said Act has no application to the facts of the present case. However, even on the basis of settled principle of interpretation of statutes, Section 18 would have to be interpreted in the manner contended by the applicants. 16. It is a settled position of law that statues have to be construed harmoniously. An interpretation which would lead to an incongruous situation ought to be avoided. In the instant case if the plaintiffs were to file individual suits the total court fee payable by the plaintiffs would be around would be Rs.10,65,840/-. In such an event, each plaintiff in his/her suit would have to establish his/her case of defamation by leading evidence. However, in the instant case where each plaintiff, in any event would have to establish his case of defamation by individually leading evidence to justify a decree of Rs.1 Crore each, the plaintiffs collectively have paid court fee only of Rs.3 lacs. 17. It could never been the intention of the legislature to provide for an incongruous situation where parties by joining their causes of action against the common defendant avoid paying court fees which they otherwise would have paid had they filed individual suits. 18. I derive support from judgments in the matter of T.S. Venkatanarayana Iyer Vs. 17. It could never been the intention of the legislature to provide for an incongruous situation where parties by joining their causes of action against the common defendant avoid paying court fees which they otherwise would have paid had they filed individual suits. 18. I derive support from judgments in the matter of T.S. Venkatanarayana Iyer Vs. State of Madras (AIR 1953 MADRAS 888) and judgment of the Kolkata High Court in the matter of Haru Bepari and Ors. Vs. Roy Kshitish Bhusan Roy Bahadur and Ors. (AIR 1935 Kolkata 573) relied upon by the applicants. In fact, in the matter of Cotseeds Corporation, Rajkot Vs. Cotton Corporation of India, Bombay and Ors. (1988(2) Guj. LR 1021) it is held in paragraph 8 as under: “Section 18 provides for charging court fees in respect of multifarious suits. When the suit embraces two or more distinct subjects, the court fees to be levied would be on the basis of calculation on each separate subject and each separate subject is to be clubbed together. In fact such a suit would be bad multifariousness, and the Court may order separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient in the interest of justice. However whether the suit is bad for multifariousness or not, or the Court is required to order separate trials as provided in Order II Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code, is not the question posed before me. The question is whether separate causes of action have been clubbed together in this suit or not. It is obvious that the subject matter of the suit are two different document of sale of cotton seeds, one dated 28th November 1986 and another dated 8th December 1986. Causes of action arising out of both the aforesaid contracts have been clubbed together. Hence, as provided under Section 18 of the Act the court fee has to be levied after evaluating both the subject matters separately. This is what has been done by the Inspecting Officer (Court-fees), Rajkot and by the trial Court. This is in accordance with the provisions of Section 18 of the Act. In such cases the ceiling limit of Rs.15,000/- would not be applicable”. 19. This is what has been done by the Inspecting Officer (Court-fees), Rajkot and by the trial Court. This is in accordance with the provisions of Section 18 of the Act. In such cases the ceiling limit of Rs.15,000/- would not be applicable”. 19. None of the other two Judgments cited by the Plaintiffs i.e. C. P. Syndicate Ltd. v/s. Sardar Naurang Singh (AIR (37) 1950 Nagpur 189) and Raghubir Singh v/s. Dharam Kaur and Another (3 ALL 108 (F.B) are applicable to the facts of the present case. They do not involve in the case of joinder of multiple party seeking a decree against a common defendant. In that context, the ratio of the Bombay High Court in the matter of Indian Oil (supra) as regards applicability of proviso to Article 1 of Schedule 1 of the said Act to Section 18 will not apply to a case involving joinder of plaintiffs/parties and joinder of causes of action. In all the judgments cited by the Plaintiffs, the facts involved only joinder of causes of action by a single plaintiff. 20. The other proposition advanced by the Plaintiffs is that taxing statutes are to be interpreted strictly (Koongaran Mukundan v/s. Thamaravalappil Nalini (AIR 1971 Kerala 183). The facts of the said judgment are distinguishable. The said judgment arises out of a matrimonial dispute. The proposition advanced by the Plaintiff as regards taxing statutes ought to be strictly construed is correct but in the instant case, this Court is called upon to interpret provisions of the said Act which in terms does not cover a situation that arose in the Koongaran Mukundan matter (supra). 21. Therefore, the Plaintiffs cannot, by filing a suit with joinder of parties, avoid paying court fees that they are liable to pay in the event they had filed the suit independently. 22. In the circumstances, the Chamber Summons is allowed. The plaintiffs are directed to pay balance court fees in the sum of Rs.7,65,840/- within four weeks from today.