JUDGMENT Akil Abdul Hamid Kureshi, J. 1. This appeal is filed by the State challenging the judgment of acquittal rendered by the Sessions Court, Godhra, in Sessions Case No. 111 of 1993. As per charge Exh. 2, prosecution version was that between the night of 3-4-1993 and 4-4-1993, accused No. 1 - Pravinsinh, husband of the deceased and rest of the accused who were his relatives committed murder of deceased Swarupben by strangulating her with the help of a rope and also caused death of her son Pintu by beating him up and smashing him several times on the ground. These accused thereafter, to pass of the incident as one of suicide, hung the dead body of Swarupben from a wooden plank on the ceiling of the house. Accused No. 1 - Pravinsinh thereafter, reported to the nearby police station at Rajgadh falsely claiming that his wife had committed suicide after killing the son. All the accused were therefore, charged with offences punishable under Secs. 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sec. 34 of the I.P.C. 2. We may briefly summarise the evidence on record. 2.1. Dr. Chandrahas Keswavrao Shikkenawis, P.W. 1, Exh. 8 had carried out the post-mortem of both the deceased persons. In the post-mortem report (Exh. 10) of Swarupben, he had noticed a ligature mark two inches below the neck which extended two inches up to the ear on the left side. This mark was beginning from mastoid bone. On the back of the neck also, ligature marks were present. Such mark was 12 inch long, half inch broad. There were also abrasions around the region. He had also noticed the following another injuries: "2. Another ligature mark is situated above the first one. It is extending from below the right mastoid bone (1" below) to the front of neck over the bruised cartilage to the left side of neck below the left mastoid bone (1" below). It is absent on the back side of neck. Ligature mark is faint. No abrasions on the base of furrow and about 9" in length." According to him, the first injury was ante mortem whereas second injury was post-mortem. In his opinion, the death was caused by strangulation with a rope. In the post-mortem, he had recorded cause of death as asphyxia following strangulation. He was specific that death of Swarupben was not suicidal but homicidal. In his opinion, the death was caused by strangulation with a rope. In the post-mortem, he had recorded cause of death as asphyxia following strangulation. He was specific that death of Swarupben was not suicidal but homicidal. Doctor had also examined the dead body of the child. He had in his post-mortem report (Exh. 11) recorded the following injuries: "1. Contusion 1" x 1 1/2" on left side of forehead just above the left eye and left side of face in front of left ear. 2. Pressure mark 1/2" x 1" on lower part of chin. 3. Pressure mark 3/4" x 1 1/2" on right side of neck below the right side of mandible." According to him, cause of death was shock due to haemorrhage due to fracture of skull bones. Such injuries were consistent with the assault on the boy by banging him on the ground. In the cross-examination, he agreed that body of deceased Swarupben did not carry other external injuries or signs of assault. He agreed that the bangles of the deceased were not broken. The cotton pad inserted by her due to menstruation was also not disturbed. According to him, it was not necessary that due to strangulation, fracture of mastoid bone must occur in every case. 2.2. Bhimsinh Bhavsinh, P.W. 2, Exh. 12, was the police officer at Rajgadh, when accused No. 1 Pravinsinh had come for disclosure of unnatural death. He had recorded his declaration which was produced at Exh. 13. In his statement, Pravinsinh had declared that he was employed in army and was at the relevant time posted at Kashmir. On the night of the incident, he was sleeping outside the house. His wife Swarupben and son Pintu were sleeping inside. At about 4-00 O'clock in the morning, he had gone to collect Mahuda from the fields and returned home thereafter. When he opened the door of the house, he found his wife hanging from the wooden plank. She was dead. His son Pintu was lying dead nearby. 2.3. Kantilal Umedbhai Patel, P.W. 3, Exh. 14, was also posted at Rajgadh Police Station. After the declaration by accused Pravinsinh, he had proceeded to the scene of the incident. He found that the lady was hanging from the ceiling. Her feet were half a inch above the ground. The feet were parallel. His son Pintu was lying dead nearby. 2.3. Kantilal Umedbhai Patel, P.W. 3, Exh. 14, was also posted at Rajgadh Police Station. After the declaration by accused Pravinsinh, he had proceeded to the scene of the incident. He found that the lady was hanging from the ceiling. Her feet were half a inch above the ground. The feet were parallel. There was no object such as a table which she could have used for climbing. There was a rope around the neck with a knot at the back. There was blood on the floor nearby and there were blood spots on the way to the Wada next to the house. In the Wada, one shirt and lengha soiled with blood were recovered. The shirt and the lengha were freshly washed. In the same house on a cot, an injured child was lying. His inquiries revealed that there was discord between the husband and the wife. He was of the opinion that it was a case of murder and not suicide. He therefore, lodged an F.I.R. which was produced at Exh. 15. In the cross-examination, he stated that there was a cot near the wall in the room which was about 4 to 5 feet away from the hanging body. The cot was 1 and 1/2 feet high. He denied that from a hole in the wall, it was possible to climb up and reach the plank on the ceiling. In the F.I.R. Exh. 15, he had disclosed similar version stating that when he reached the scene of incident, dead body was hanging half an inch above the ground. There was no object like a stool for climbing. 2.4. The inquest panchnama was produced at Exh. 17. Karansinh Sardarsinh, P.W. 4, Exh. 16 was the inquest witness. Panchnama also showed that the dead body was hanging half an inch above from the ground. There was a distance of 1 and 1/2 feet between the wooden plank and the dead body. The cot was 2 and 1/2 feet away from the body. There were marks of injury on the upper back in the nature of bruises. Around the neck there were two independent ligature marks of the rope. 2.5. Inquest panchnama of the dead body of Pintu was produced at Exh. 18. At Exh. 19, panchnama of the scene of incident was produced. There were marks of injury on the upper back in the nature of bruises. Around the neck there were two independent ligature marks of the rope. 2.5. Inquest panchnama of the dead body of Pintu was produced at Exh. 18. At Exh. 19, panchnama of the scene of incident was produced. It showed that body of Swarupben was hanging from the wooden plank. The floor had blood spots. The soil was collected from outside the house. Shirt and lengha both freshly washed but showing blood marks were recovered. 2.6. Bheravsinh Fatesinh, P.W. 5, Exh. 29, was the uncle of accused No. 1 - Pravinsinh. His house was situated opposite the house of Pravinsinh. He deposed that on the date of incident, Pravinsinh had returned home from duty about four months back. Through out from the evening to the next morning of the date of incident, he was at home. At 6 in the morning, he found that Pravinsinh was crying. When inquired, Pravinsinh told him that his wife had committed suicide after killing the son. He and other neighbours therefore, had gone to his house. This witness however, did not thereafter, support the prosecution and disowned the police statement where he had apparently stated that relations between accused No. 1 and his wife were strained; they were frequently quarrelling and there were Court cases between them also; the quarrels were because the husband doubted fidelity of the wife. He was cross-examined by the prosecution. 2.7. Laxmansinh Gumansinh Thakor, P.W. 6, Exh. 31, was the Sarpanch of the village. He deposed that on 4-4-1993 when he was at home, accused had come to his house crying at about 6 to 7 in the morning claiming that his wife had killed his son and then committed suicide. He was also declared hostile since he did not support his police statement disclosing his knowledge about the strained relations between the husband and the wife. 2.8. Vijaysinh Daulatsinh, P.W. 7, Exh. 32, was Pravinsinh's neighbour. He came to know about the incident at 6 in the morning when he heard Pravinsinh crying loudly. He also thereafter, turned hostile and did not support the version of the strained relation between the husband and the wife. 2.9. Chhatrasinh Abhesinh, P.W. 9, Exh. 34, though was declared as hostile, had deposed before the Court that he lived on the field. He also thereafter, turned hostile and did not support the version of the strained relation between the husband and the wife. 2.9. Chhatrasinh Abhesinh, P.W. 9, Exh. 34, though was declared as hostile, had deposed before the Court that he lived on the field. He had gone to the house of accused No. 1 in the morning at 6-00 O'clock on being called. 2.10. Kashiben Kalubhai, P.W. 10, Exh. 39, was the mother of Swarupben. She deposed that the marriage had taken place about 11 years back. The accused No. 1 used to often beat up her daughter. The daughter had therefore, come back to her house but the husband had taken her back. They had also filed case before Kalol Court which was later on compromised. Her daughter had come back to their house at-least twice. 2.11. Kalubhai Adesinh, P.W. 11, Exh. 40, the father of the deceased also deposed about the ill-treatment of the daughter by her husband and the fact that his daughter had filed a case for maintenance. 2.12. Mukund Prahladrai Buch, P.W. 13, Exh. 42, was the Investigating Officer who had conducted the detailed investigation. He gave the detailed account of the steps he took during the course of such investigation. 2.13. The F.S.L. report Exh. 27 did not detect presence of blood on the shirt and lengha recovered from near the dead body. 3. This in the nutshell was the evidence on record. 4. Learned Sessions Judge acquitted all the accused. Upon perusal of the judgment, he was influenced by the following factors: (1) That deceased Swarupben had not received any other external injuries which was not consistent with the accusation of strangulation since an able-bodied person would put up resistance leading to some injuries. (2) The mastoid bone was not fractured which would be more consistent with the possibility of suicide. (3) The F.I.R. was lodged without prior investigation merely on suspicion. (4) Several witnesses from the neighbourhood had turned hostile and had not supported the prosecution case of strained relations between husband and wife, particularly, on account of suspected fidelity of the wife. 5. The learned Judge also noticed certain defects in prosecution and ultimately concluded that accused including husband were not guilty summarizing the following factors: (a) The deceased was alone in the house. Husband was not at home. 5. The learned Judge also noticed certain defects in prosecution and ultimately concluded that accused including husband were not guilty summarizing the following factors: (a) The deceased was alone in the house. Husband was not at home. There was therefore, no evidence to link him with the death of the deceased. (b) There was no evidence that accused Nos. 1 to 3 had strangulated Swarupben with the help of a rope. (c) There were no injuries on the body of the deceased lady. Her bangles were also intact. There was thus no sign of struggle. 6. Learned A.P.P. Ms. C.M. Shah assailed the judgment submitting that there was a clear motive attributed to the husband. He suspected fidelity of his wife and had serious doubt about the paternity of their son Pintu. He was alone in the house with wife and the child. His conduct of trying to pass of the incident as suicide must be seen in the background of provisions contained in Sec. 8 of the Evidence Act. He owed a duty to explain the circumstances adverse to him which were pointed out during the recording of statement under Sec. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. His total denial and failure to explain the circumstances was a strong adverse factor which the trial Court completely ignored. His presence at the scene of incident was established. His attempt to claim that he was away was falsified by several witnesses, who saw him early in the morning at his house. 6.1. Counsel relied on the following decisions: (1) In case of Shyamal Ghosh v. State of Bengal, reported in 2012 (7) SCC 646 , was cited to highlight that the chain of circumstantial evidence in the present case was complete. Husband and wife were last seen together and were in fact occupying the same premises exclusively. (2) In case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2006 (10) SCC 681 , to highlight that the nature of burden of proof in cases where offence is committed in secrecy inside a house would be lesser. It was observed that there would be burden on inmates of the house to give cogent explanation about how the crime was committed. They cannot get away by keeping quiet. 7. On the other hand, learned Counsel Shri Barot for the accused strongly opposed the appeal. It was observed that there would be burden on inmates of the house to give cogent explanation about how the crime was committed. They cannot get away by keeping quiet. 7. On the other hand, learned Counsel Shri Barot for the accused strongly opposed the appeal. He contended that being an acquittal appeal, the scope is extremely narrow. Appeal cannot be converted into one of conviction merely because on appreciation of evidence, the Court finds another view is possible. He contended that in absence of any evidence of struggle, the case of murder of the deceased lady must be ruled out. Even the injuries around her neck were more consistent with the theory of suicide and not murder. There was no evidence of any ill-will between the husband and the wife. There was thus complete absence of any motive. Even the presence of the husband in the house at the time of death was not established since precise time of death could not be ascertained. 7.1. Counsel relied on the following decisions: (1) In case of Rakeshkumar Damodarji Acharya v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2014 (3) GLR 2334, where the Court finding that the evidence on record did not rule out death by hanging and thus a possible suicide, acquitted the accused of the charge of murder. (2) In case of Mohammed Ashif Gulamkadar Shaikh v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2009 (3) GLR 2214 , in which the Court finding that there was no conclusive evidence of the presence of the accused in the house where the incident had taken place, reversed the conviction recorded by the trial Court. (3) In case of Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in 2009 (14) SCC 415 , in which the Court observed that in case of homicidal death, the burden is on the husband to explain the circumstances. However, this by itself is not sufficient, in absence of other evidence of violence on the deceased, or conclusive of guilt of the husband. (4) In case of Sohel Mehaboob Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2009 (12) SCC 588 , in which in background of purely circumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court held that in absence of evidence to show that accused was present in the room at the time of occurrence of the incident, his conviction through circumstantial evidence was not justified. (4) In case of Sohel Mehaboob Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2009 (12) SCC 588 , in which in background of purely circumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court held that in absence of evidence to show that accused was present in the room at the time of occurrence of the incident, his conviction through circumstantial evidence was not justified. (5) In case of State of Gujarat v. Bhikabhai Dhulabhai Parmar, reported in 2005 (2) GLH 732 : [ 2005 (3) GLR 1969 ], in which on facts of the case, it was found that circumstances were not sufficient to convict the accused. (6) In case of Dhan Raj alias Dhand v. State of Haryana, reported in 2014 (6) SCC 745 , in which it was observed that to establish the guilt of the accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence, it has to be taken into account that the chain of circumstances must be complete. On facts, it was held that there was no such evidence. 8. Since we are dealing with the acquittal appeal, we must recognize the scope of such appeal and the inherent limitations on the appellate Court in converting the acquittal recorded by the trial Court into one of conviction. The criminal jurisprudence in our country proceeds on the premise of innocence of an accused till proved guilty through evidence which establishes his involvement beyond reasonable doubt. The concept of presumption of innocence and requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt are firmly entrenched in our criminal jurisprudence. When the appellate Court therefore, is examining a judgment of acquittal, it proceeds further on the footing that by virtue of a Court of competent jurisdiction having recorded finding of acquittal, the presumption of innocence of the accused gets further enlarged. In terms of Sec.378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, though there are no statutory limitations on the appellate Court in exercise of powers in appeal against acquittal, through series of judicial pronouncements, it has been recognized that the acquittal granted by the trial Court would not be lightly reversed by the appellate authority, unless the findings are shown to be plainly contrary to the evidence, and therefore, perverse. Mere possibility of another opinion or a different view point would not justify allowing the acquittal appeal. Mere possibility of another opinion or a different view point would not justify allowing the acquittal appeal. Even when the appellate Court were to exercise such powers, it would be necessary that each factor which weighed with the Court below in acquitting the accused, is examined and found incongruent. 9. In case of Surinder Singh v. State of U.P., reported in 2003 (10) SCC 26, the Supreme Court held that the High Court in appeal against acquittal has full power to review the evidence upon which order of acquittal is founded. But it is obligatory on the High Court while reversing an order of acquittal to consider and discuss each of the reasons given by the trial Court to acquit the accused and then to dislodge those reasons. 10. In case of State of Punjab v. Phola Singh, reported in 2003 (11) SCC 58 , the Court held that where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence even where the accused has been acquitted. In such case, the principle to be followed is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference. It was observed as under: "9. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or not. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or not. (See Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P., 2003 (3) SCC 21 ). The principle to be followed by the appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, 1973 (2) SCC 793 , Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, 1996 (9) SCC 225 , Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana, 2000 (4) SCC 484 , State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh, 2003 (11) SCC 271 ." 11. In case of Chandrapa v. State of Karnataka, reported in 2007 AIR SCW 1850, the Supreme Court referring to large number of previous decisions culled out the general principles applicable to acquittal appeals as under: "39. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 12. Bearing in mind these principles, we would address the evidence on record. While doing so, we must also be conscious of the fact that entire case rests on circumstantial evidence. In case of State of Haryana v. Jagbir Singh, reported in 2003 (11) SCC 261 , the Supreme Court observed that where a case is based solely on circumstantial evidence, the conviction would be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P., reported in AIR 1990 SC 79 , it was laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests: "(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence." 13. Coming back to the evidence on record, we may recall that accused No. 1 husband was residing with deceased wife along with their child Pintu. The husband was employed in Indian army. Coming back to the evidence on record, we may recall that accused No. 1 husband was residing with deceased wife along with their child Pintu. The husband was employed in Indian army. Admitted position was that he was on leave since sometime before the date of the incident and was thus at home. The incident took place between the night of 3-4-1993 and the morning of 4-4-1993. Inside the house, Swarupben was found hanging from a wooden plank by a rope. Her son was lying dead carrying multiple injuries. This much is established beyond any doubt. In fact, these factors are not even in serious dispute. 14. What further comes on record through evidence is that the husband first lodged an accidental death report before the police in which he had stated that he was sleeping outside the house and after waking up in the morning at about 4-00 O'clock, had gone in the fields to collect Mahuda. When he returned home and opened the door, he saw the wife hanging and son lying dead besides her. Thus, accused No. 1 tried to create a defence of being away from home at the time of incident and that the case was one of suicide and not murder. These factors need closer scrutiny on the basis of other evidence on record. 15. Let us first examine the question of absence of husband from home. Several witnesses' versions conflict with husband's theory of being away in the morning. 16. As noted, Bheravsinh Fatesinh, P.W. 5, uncle of accused No. 1 who has a house right opposite of that of the accused had deposed that he heard accused crying loudly at 6 in the morning. Upon inquiry, he disclosed about the deaths in the house. Though, this witness turned hostile and did not support prosecution insofar as strained relations between husband and wife are concerned, his evidence with respect to the presence of accused No. 1 early in the morning at his house need not be discarded. Laxmansinh Gumansinh Thakor, P.W. 6, was the Sarpanch of the village. He disclosed that accused No. 1 had gone to his house between 6 to 7 crying and informed him about death of his husband. Laxmansinh Gumansinh Thakor, P.W. 6, was the Sarpanch of the village. He disclosed that accused No. 1 had gone to his house between 6 to 7 crying and informed him about death of his husband. Yet another witness Vijaysinh Daulatsinh, P.W. 7, who also had a house in the neighbourhood had learned about the incident at about 6 in the morning when he had heard accused No. 1 crying loudly. Chhatrasinh Abhesinh, P.W. 9 was also relative of the accused and had a house in the same locality. He stated that on the date of the incident, Pravinsinh was at home. He had gone to his house early in the morning at 6-00 O'clock upon which Pravinsinh had told him about the death of his wife and son. 17. Thus, several witnesses had seen accused No. 1 at his house early in the morning at 6-00 O'clock. He was crying loudly. His version therefore, that early in the morning he had gone to collect Mahuda and returned only at about 7-00 O'clock was thus completely falsified. Even otherwise his assertion that he had left home at about 4-00 O'clock for such purpose does not seem plausible. Even in the month of April, 4-00 O'clock in the morning would be pitch dark. No work of collecting Mahuda could be done under such conditions. In any case, all witnesses had seen Pravinsinh at his house crying loudly at 6 in the morning. No suggestion was made by the defence to any of these witnesses that Pravinsinh could have returned after collecting Mahuda at such time. 18. The moot question in the present case is whether the death of Swarupben was suicidal or homicidal? The defence rests heavily on no sign of struggle or evidence of assault on the deceased just before the death to Contend that it was a clear case of suicide. As highlighted by the Counsel for the defence, even the nature of injury on neck would be more consistent with the theory of suicide. However, such theory has to be tested on the basis of evidence on record. We may recall that Chandrahas Keshavrao Shikkenawis, P.W. 1 had recorded two ligature marks around the neck of deceased lady. He was emphatic that first injury was ante mortem, second injury was post-mortem. According to him, the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation. However, such theory has to be tested on the basis of evidence on record. We may recall that Chandrahas Keshavrao Shikkenawis, P.W. 1 had recorded two ligature marks around the neck of deceased lady. He was emphatic that first injury was ante mortem, second injury was post-mortem. According to him, the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation. Such injury was consistent with the strangulation of the lady with the help of a rope. Additionally according to Karansinh Sardarsinh, P.W. 4 who had first visited the scene of incident upon accused No. 1 giving a report of accidental death, found that the dead body of the lady was hanging with a rope tied to a wooden plank. Her feet were parallel to ground and barely half an inch above. There was no other instruments such as table on which she could have climbed. Even the inquest panchnama and panch witnesses P.W. 4, Exh. 16 would support these factors. It was recorded in the panchnama that body was half an inch above from the floor. The wooden plank on which it was hanging was 1 and 1/2 feet high. The lady had bruises on the upper back portion. 19. The following factors emerge from such evidence: (1) There were two separate and distinct ligature marks on deceased Swarupben. (2) First such ligature mark related to injury which according to the doctor was ante mortem. Second ligature mark around the same region related to post-mortem injury. (3) The lady was hanging with her feet parallel to the ground barely half an inch away. (4) The wooden plank from which she was found hanging with the rope was 1 and 1/2 feet high. (5) There was no object such as stool or table which could have been used for climbing. 20. All these factors are totally inconsistent with the theory of suicide. If the lady had committed suicide as defence wants us to believe, there was simply no possibility of two separate ligature marks appearing around her neck distinct and separate. More importantly, Doctor's opinion of one injury being ante mortem and another being post-mortem is totally incongruent with the theory of suicide. Further, when the dead body is found hanging parallel to the ground barley half an inch away from the floor, it clearly belies the death by hanging. More importantly, Doctor's opinion of one injury being ante mortem and another being post-mortem is totally incongruent with the theory of suicide. Further, when the dead body is found hanging parallel to the ground barley half an inch away from the floor, it clearly belies the death by hanging. A human being's instinct of survival is so strong that instinctively a person would try to save himself or herself if possible. It is therefore, well established that a swimmer can never commit suicide by drowning. If the lady's feet were hanging half an inch above the floor, she could have easily stretched her feet and supported herself and avoided suffocation. The fact that she did not do so would only point out at the sole possibility of being hung after being killed. This would also be in consonance with the medical opinion that around the neck, the lady carried a post-mortem injury which caused ligature marks. This would be consistent with the death first and hanging later. 21. If this much was not enough, there are additional factors which completely ruled out suicide by hanging. If she had to commit suicide by hanging herself, she had to first tie the rope on the wooden plank which was 1 and 1/2 feet over her head. There was no object like stool or table found nearby on which she would have climbed. Even after tying the rope around the wooden plank and her neck, she would need some object to stand upon and to kick away to cause hanging effect. A cot was found 2 and 1/2 to 3 feet away from her. Suggestion of the defence to the witness that the hole in the wall could have been used for climbing was denied. All these factors, unerringly point to only one possibility namely, that deceased Swarupben was first done to death, and thereafter, was hung from the wooden plank, possibly with the same rope to make a show of suicidal death. 22. These important factors when seen in light of our earlier conclusion that accused No. 1 was at home when the incident took place, would cast a burden on the accused to explain the circumstances under which the unnatural death of his wife and son occurred in the confines of house shared exclusively by him with them. 22. These important factors when seen in light of our earlier conclusion that accused No. 1 was at home when the incident took place, would cast a burden on the accused to explain the circumstances under which the unnatural death of his wife and son occurred in the confines of house shared exclusively by him with them. All these factors were put to him during the recording of his statement under Sec. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. His line of defence was of total denial. In short, he did not make any attempt to explain any of these circumstances. 23. In case of Nar Singh v. State of Haryana, reported in 2015 (1) SCC 496, the Court observed as under: " 11. The object of Sec. 313(1)(b) Cr.P.C. is to bring the substance of accusation to the accused to enable the accused to explain each and every circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. The provisions of this Section are mandatory and cast a duty on the Court to afford an opportunity to the accused to explain each and every circumstance and incriminating evidence against him. The examination of accused under Sec. 313(1)(b) Cr.P.C. is not a mere formality. Section 313 Cr.P.C. prescribes a procedural safeguard for an accused, giving him an opportunity to explain the facts and circumstances appearing against him in the evidence and this opportunity is valuable from the standpoint of the accused. The real importance of Sec. 313 Cr.P.C. lies in that, it imposes a duty on the Court to question the accused properly and fairly so as to bring home to him the exact case he will have to meet, and thereby, an opportunity is given to him to explain any such point." 24. Under the circumstances, in our appreciation of evidence, the trial Court committed a serious error in acquitting accused No. 1, husband of the deceased lady. The factors which weighed heavily against accused No. 1 and the circumstances which in our opinion complete the chain of events and point unerringly to his guilt eliminating any other possibility to the contrary are as under: (1) It was established that accused No. 1 was at home during the night when the incident took place. The factors which weighed heavily against accused No. 1 and the circumstances which in our opinion complete the chain of events and point unerringly to his guilt eliminating any other possibility to the contrary are as under: (1) It was established that accused No. 1 was at home during the night when the incident took place. (2) He tried to create a false impression that he was away, left home early in the morning to collect Mahuda and returned only at 7, which was falsified through evidence of several eyewitnesses who had seen him at his house crying loudly at 6 in the morning. Even the Sarpanch of the village reported that accused had reported to him about sudden death between 6 and 7 in the morning. (3) His conduct therefore, must be seen in light of the provisions of Sec. 8 of the Evidence Act. (4) The incident happened thus in the close confines of the house exclusively occupied by the husband, wife and the child. (5) The death of deceased lady was by all accounts a homicidal death and not a suicidal one which was established through following evidence: (a) The medical evidence which suggested two ligature marks relatable to two separate injuries one ante mortem and another post-mortem. (b) The position of the body was found barely half an inch from the floor with feet parallel to the ground. (c) There was no object like a stool or table in the room which could have been used to climb. (d) Plank was 1 and 1/2 feet higher than the height of the lady making it impossible to tie a rope and hang herself without any aid of any object. There was no other foothold in the room which could have been used for climbing. (6) The husband thus tried to project the theory of suicide when clearly the lady was first done to death before she was hung. Contrary to what was recorded by the trial Court, she had bruises on her back clearly indicating violence before death. (7) Accused No. 1 was not in a position to explain any of these adverse circumstances though he was confronted with them while recording his statement under Sec. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Contrary to what was recorded by the trial Court, she had bruises on her back clearly indicating violence before death. (7) Accused No. 1 was not in a position to explain any of these adverse circumstances though he was confronted with them while recording his statement under Sec. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He did not even suggest the reason why the lady could have taken such an extreme step of first killing her own son, and thereafter, taking her own life. It was not even the suggestion of the defence that there was any cause which would drive the lady to such an extreme step. There was no suggestion of quarrel between husband and wife shortly before the incident. In fact, the defence has been consistent about projecting rather cordial relations between the husband and wife. 25. We may now refer to the factors which weighed with the trial Court in acquitting the accused. Absence of other external injuries would not be conclusive in face of the overwhelming evidence noted above. The lady being surprised while in sleep or husband having other help could be two easy explanations for absence of any other injuries on the body of the deceased. In any case, her dead body did carry bruises on the back. 26. Absence of any fracture of mastoid bone also according to doctor was not conclusive. He opined that whether there would be a fracture or not would depend on the force with which the rope is tied around the neck. Merely because the police agency has lodged an F.I.R. on the basis of suspicion rather than previously collecting evidence, cannot be fatal to the prosecution. 27. It is true that number of witnesses, residents of locality, have turned hostile and not supported the prosecution version of strained relations between the husband and wife. However, their entire evidence need not be discarded in toto. Their evidence was consistent with at least one aspect of the matter, namely, presence of accused No. 1 at his residence early in the morning at about 6-00 O'clock. Mere absence of previous quarrel between the husband and wife, would not be sufficient to discard other voluminous evidence. However, their entire evidence need not be discarded in toto. Their evidence was consistent with at least one aspect of the matter, namely, presence of accused No. 1 at his residence early in the morning at about 6-00 O'clock. Mere absence of previous quarrel between the husband and wife, would not be sufficient to discard other voluminous evidence. In any case, father and mother of the deceased lady had given idea about the strained relations between the couple in the past for which wife on couple of occasions had gone away to her parents house and had in fact lodged the claim for maintenance. This would clearly establish that the matrimonial relations between the husband and wife were not entirely cordial. 28. In view of such discussion, we find that findings of the trial Court that deceased Swarupben was alone at the house and accused No. 1 was not present was totally inconsistent with the evidence on record and finding which cannot be sustained. The conclusion that there was no evidence to link him with the incident is also totally unsustainable. To the limited extent of involvement of other accused, we however, uphold the findings of the trial Court. There was no evidence at all about their presence during or shortly after the incident. None of the witnesses referred to their presence early in the morning or at previous night. They were admittedly not staying with the husband and wife. In absence of any other evidence linking them to the incident, their involvement is not established. Nevertheless, this would not mean that accused No. 1 was not involved. We have given our detailed reasons for our coming to such a conclusion. In our opinion these are compelling reasons to reverse the findings of the trial Court. 29. Even the death of the child must be attributed to the accused No. 1. His death was undisputedly homicidal. When we believe that the wife was done to death by the husband, everything else falls in line. His declaration that his wife killed the son was completely falsified. 30. Charge under Sec. 201 of the I.P.C. would also stand established. However, it is not necessary to impose separate sentence for the said offence. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed only qua accused No. 1. His acquittal is converted into one of conviction under Sec. 302 of Indian Penal Code. 30. Charge under Sec. 201 of the I.P.C. would also stand established. However, it is not necessary to impose separate sentence for the said offence. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed only qua accused No. 1. His acquittal is converted into one of conviction under Sec. 302 of Indian Penal Code. He is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. He would have time upto 30-4-2015 to surrender. Appeal qua rest of the accused is dismissed. Judgment of the trial Court to that extent is confirmed. Appeal is disposed of. R. & P. be sent back to the concerned trial Court.