Judgment Rajesh H. Shukla, J. 1. The present petition is filed by the petitioner under Arts. 14 and 226 of the Constitution of India as well as under the provisions of Ayurved University Act, 1965 and the Ordinances made thereunder for the prayers, inter alia, that appropriate writ, order or direction may be issued declaring that the impugned disciplinary proceeding culminating in cancellation of the result of the exams in two subjects and issuance of the Statement of Marks dated 21-2-2014 showing the petitioner in Ayurvedacharya (B.A.M.S.)-Second Professional Examination, 2013 as A.T.K.T., as arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the provisions of Ordinance 121A. It is also prayed that the respondent-University may be directed to declare the result of the two subjects of the petitioner on the basis of the results and issue a fresh Statement of Marks, on the grounds stated in the memo of petition in detail. Heard learned Advocate Ms. Vidhi Bhatt for the petitioner and learned Sr. Counsel Shri Percy Kavina appearing with learned Advocate Shri P.M. Dave for the respondent-University. 2. Learned Advocate Ms. Bhatt referred to the papers at length and particularly to the communication dated 10-2-2014 by the respondent-University regarding the charges for the irregularity and submitted that the charges are vague as no specific charges have been mentioned. It was submitted that it is not even stated that the petitioner has copied from the book or the paper of the other students. She tried to submit that as the charge itself is vague, the decision taken based on such charge cannot be sustained. It was contended that though the charges for the irregularity or unfair means has been made, the same are not specifically stated in the charges, and therefore, the opportunity to meet with such charges has been denied. She tried to submit that in the affidavit-in-reply referring to the judgment of me Hon'ble Apex Court, it is alleged that it is not any particular individual who is charged for unfair means, but it is the conduct of the students in copying at a mass-scale: However, learned Advocate Ms. Bhatt submitted that the statement is contradictory. It was further submitted that in any case the petitioner could have been proceeded under the provisions of Ordinance 121A of the respondent-University and the respondent-University is under an obligation to hold the inquiry proceedings in accordance with law as provided in Ordinance 121A. Bhatt submitted that the statement is contradictory. It was further submitted that in any case the petitioner could have been proceeded under the provisions of Ordinance 121A of the respondent-University and the respondent-University is under an obligation to hold the inquiry proceedings in accordance with law as provided in Ordinance 121A. Learned Advocate Ms. Bhatt submitted that as there is no such inquiry, the decision which has been taken is arbitrary, illegal and in violation of the rules of natural justice. 3. Learned Advocate Ms. Bhatt strenuously submitted that on what basis the respondent has come to the conclusion about "unfair means" is not explained, and therefore, the rules of natural 'justice are denied. She emphasised that otherwise it would have been possible for the petitioner to explain. She has also referred to Ordinance 121 produced on record and also Ordinance 121A and submitted that the procedure has been prescribed which has not been followed. She has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1970 SC 1269 in the case of Bihar School Examination Board v. Subhas Chandra Sinha, and emphasised the observations made in Paras 13 and 14. "It was also said that even if the inquiry involved a large number of persons the Committee should frame proper regulations for the conduct of such inquiries but not deny the opportunity." She has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1962 SC 1110 in the case of Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P. Allahabad v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta, and referred to the observations made in Paras 11-13. It was submitted that when there is exercise of power under the statutory provision, it is a quasi-judicial exercise, and therefore, the rules of natural justice have to be followed providing an opportunity to meet with the charges. 4. Learned Advocate Ms. Bhatt submitted that an application under R.T.I, was made by the petitioner and the reply has been received by the petitioner produced at Annexure-F. 5. Learned Advocate Ms. Bhatt, therefore, submitted that the conclusion for the A.T.K.T. is not based on any evidence. She pointedly referred to the grounds and the averments in the petition. 4. Learned Advocate Ms. Bhatt submitted that an application under R.T.I, was made by the petitioner and the reply has been received by the petitioner produced at Annexure-F. 5. Learned Advocate Ms. Bhatt, therefore, submitted that the conclusion for the A.T.K.T. is not based on any evidence. She pointedly referred to the grounds and the averments in the petition. It was emphasised that the similarity in writing or the contents or the language style in an answer may be sufficient to raise suspicion, but it cannot constitute an evidence for recording the finding of guilt on the charge of unfair means. Therefore, it has been contended that the conclusion reached by the Committee is based not on any legal evidence but on irrelevant consideration and suspicion which is evident from the charge itself. She has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat, reported in 1982 GLH 648 in the case of Siddharth Mohanlal Sharma v. South Gujarat University, and submitted that the doctrine of "no evidence" propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment in the case of Union of India v. H.C. Goel, reported in AIR 1964 SC 364 , would apply to the facts of the case. It was submitted that it is not a question of procedural requirement but it is non-compliance with the mandatory requirement or the statutory provision of the Ordinance which would make the decision arbitrary and illegal. 6. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Kavina appearing with learned Advocate Shri Dave for the respondent-University referred to the papers including the affidavit-in-reply. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Kavina submitted that the petition has become infructuous and no real harm is caused to the petitioner in spite of his indulgence in the unfair practice of mass-copying. He referred to the affidavit-in-reply and submitted that as explained in detail the petitioner along with the other students had indulged in the malpractice of mass-copying at Parul Institute of Ayurved, Limda, which led to further inquiry. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Kavina submitted that the submission regarding violation of principles of natural justice contending that no opportunity has been given is baseless. He submitted that as it is evident, a statutory body had given the findings and on the basis of that further decision has been taken. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Kavina submitted that the submission regarding violation of principles of natural justice contending that no opportunity has been given is baseless. He submitted that as it is evident, a statutory body had given the findings and on the basis of that further decision has been taken. He submitted that a committee of three members, as stated in detail in the affidavit, was formed after the scrutiny of various answer-sheets of different students was made. He submitted that as explained in the affidavit-in-reply, mindful of the fact that this issue of mass-copying is having effect on the career of the students, two other committees were constituted and it was submitted that dummy numbers were given to the answer-sheets and all the three committees on the basis of scrutiny were asked to examine. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Kavina therefore submitted that care was taken to see that the slightest possibility of arbitrariness is removed. Thereafter, as per Ordinance 121A the show-cause notice was issued to the students individually including the petitioner and after providing an opportunity to remain present and submit any clarification the decision was taken and the conclusion was arrived at which cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal. 7. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Kavina therefore submitted that the submissions with regard to violation of the principles of natural justice or not providing any opportunity of any clarification is thoroughly baseless and it is contrary to the record. He submitted that care has been taken that no prejudice is caused even at the end of the entire exercise, and therefore, only A.T.K.T. is given, meaning thereby, the students are not debarred. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Kavina submitted that instead of taking further harsh disciplinary action which could lead to debarring the students, only A.T.K.T. has been given which does not affect their future career. He submitted that therefore no grievance could be made. 8. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Kavina pointedly referred to Ordinance 121A to support his submission with regard to compliance with the rules of natural justice. He submitted that mere is no specific charge or charge is vague is also contrary to the record inasmuch as in case of mass-copying it has been specifically stated in the charge about the unfair means adopted in the exam. He submitted that mere is no specific charge or charge is vague is also contrary to the record inasmuch as in case of mass-copying it has been specifically stated in the charge about the unfair means adopted in the exam. He submitted that the expert body having undertaken a detailed and thorough investigation into the matter and having formed the opinion, the Court may not disturb the findings in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Art. 226. He submitted that the scope of judicial review in such matter would also have some self-restraint. In support of this submission he has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Madhyamic Shiksha Mandal, M.P. v. Abhilash Shiksha Prasar Samiti, reported in 1998 (9) SCC 236 , and submitted that it has been observed that even if some student may have suffered due to cancellation, interference was declined. Similarly, he has emphasised the observations made in a judgment reported in 1992 (2) GLH 140 in the case of Controller of Examinations v. G.S. Sunder, and submitted that as observed the order of the High Court interfering with the disciplinary action regarding malpractice in the exams was not approved. Observations have been made that the technicalities of law or the contention based on principles of natural justice should not be allowed to support the cause of such students who had indulged in malpractice in the exam. He emphasised the observations made in this judgment, "...One thing must put beyond doubt, in matters of enforcement of discipline, this Court must be very slow in interference. After all, the authorities in charge of education whose duty it is to conduct examination fairly and properly, know best how to deal with the situations of this character. One cannot import fine principles of law and weigh the same in golden scales. In me present system of education, the system of examinations is the best suited to assess the progress of the student so long as they are fairly conducted. Interference by Court in every case may lead to unhappy results making the system of examination a farce. For instance, we cannot but strongly condemn copying in the examination which has grown into canker of mass-copying. Interference by Court in every case may lead to unhappy results making the system of examination a farce. For instance, we cannot but strongly condemn copying in the examination which has grown into canker of mass-copying. Such unhealthy practices which are like poisonous weeds in the field of education must be rooted out in order that the innocent and the intelligent students are not affected." 9. He, therefore, strenuously submitted that the Court may decline to exercise any discretion in such matters. He has also referred to and relied upon the judgment reported in 2009 (1) SCC 59, [Director (Studies), Dr. Ambedkar Institute of Hotel Management, Nutrition & Catering Technology, Chandigarh v. Vaibhav Singh Chauhan. He emphasised that as observed, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the functioning and the order of educational institutions. 10. In rejoinder, learned Advocate Ms. Bhatt referred to the affidavit-in-rejoinder and submitted that as the examination has not been cancelled, it cannot be said to be a case of mass-copying. She submitted that if the case is of any irregularity or unfair means adopted by individual students, it has to be dealt with providing sufficient opportunity to the respective students. She reiterated that the stand taken is contrary to these facts and it has been stated to be mass-copying which is not the case. She pointedly referred to the affidavit-in-rejoinder and the averments in Para 6. It was submitted that though contention has been raised that the petition has become infructuous, it cannot be said to be infructuous as it has a stigmatic effect. It was submitted that the respondent-University has to appreciate that a social responsibility is cast upon it to take the decision in fairness providing opportunity to the students and it may not cause any prejudice to the students. She submitted that the case of the petitioner should have been dealt with individually in compliance of the rules of natural justice providing an opportunity to submit any clarification. However, as the same has not been done such a decision is in violation of the rules of natural justice and it is based on no evidence. 11. Learned Advocate Ms. She submitted that the case of the petitioner should have been dealt with individually in compliance of the rules of natural justice providing an opportunity to submit any clarification. However, as the same has not been done such a decision is in violation of the rules of natural justice and it is based on no evidence. 11. Learned Advocate Ms. Bhatt has also referred to Ordinance 121A with regard to the procedure and submitted that as the inquiry has not been conducted properly after providing an opportunity of hearing or giving the clarification, it cannot be said to be an inquiry in the eye of law. She therefore, submitted that the present petition may be allowed. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2014 (9) SCC 105 in the case of Gorkha Security Services v. Government (N.C.T. of Delhi), to emphasise about the submission with regard to the rules of natural justice and also the judgment reported in 1982 GLH 648 in the case of Siddharth Mohanlal Sharma v. South Gujarat University. 12. In view of these rival submissions, it is required to be considered whether the present petition deserves any consideration. 13. As the background suggests, it is a case with regard to irregularity in the examination which has led to further proceedings Culminating into the impugned order. Much emphasis given by the learned Advocate for the petitioner referring to the communication dated 10-2-2014 at Annexure-G contending that the charge is vague and sufficient opportunity to meet with the charge is denied, is required to be considered. However, the argument which may seem appealing in the first blush has no merit as it transpires from scrutiny of the papers. As stated in detail in the affidavit-in-reply, admittedly, the issue was with regard to the malpractice of mass-copying at the Limda Centre of Parul Institute of Ayurved, Limda, Dist. Vadodara. The charge for the irregularity was given to the respective candidates or students in exercise of powers under Ordinance 121A. The provisions of Ordinance 121A empower the respondent-University to take appropriate disciplinary proceedings regarding misconduct during the exam. Therefore, as referred to in Ordinance 121A a committee was constituted which had examined the issue on the basis of material and the decision has been arrived at. The provisions of Ordinance 121A empower the respondent-University to take appropriate disciplinary proceedings regarding misconduct during the exam. Therefore, as referred to in Ordinance 121A a committee was constituted which had examined the issue on the basis of material and the decision has been arrived at. However, as stated in detail in the affidavit-in-reply, no prejudice is caused to the students and care has been taken with detailed scrutiny. It has been observed in Para 5.3 of the affidavit-in-reply: "Therefore, the respondent-University immediately referred the said issue to the Examination Disciplinary Committee duly constituted under Ordinance 121A of Gujarat Ayurved University Act, 1965. The said committee comprise of three members namely Dr. A.B. Thaker, M. D., Ph.D, Dr. Manan Mehta, B.S.A.M. and Dr. G.D. Gohil, M. D., Ph.D who are syndicate members and are duly appointed by syndicate. Further, the said committee in accordance with provisions of Ordinance 121A issued the show-cause notice to all the concerned students individually including petitioner, wherein the gist of the charge was specifically mentioned. The students were asked to remain present for submission in the form of written or oral statement before the committee on the date of hearing fixed by the committee. The petitioner and other students who remained present were shown the answer-sheets individually and clarification was sought for the similarity in the answers. However, as no satisfactory clarification before the disciplinary committee was offered, therefore after hearing of the case and after appreciating the evidence, material available and the circumstances of the case, the committee came to the conclusion that charge of en-masse-copying at a particular centre, against 74 students of all the three years course of Ayurvedacharya, including the petitioner, is held to be proved. Therefore, the decision of the committee was conveyed to all concerned students through the Principal of the concerned college i.e. Parul Institute of Ayurved by Deputy Registrar in compliance of the Ordinance. It is respectfully submitted that from bare perusal of decision it clearly transpires that least harsh penalty has been imposed upon the students by the Examination Disciplinary Committee considering the career and future prospects of the students." 14. Therefore, when the notice has been given individually to the concerned students calling upon him/her to give explanation the submissions made by learned Advocate Ms. Bhatt cannot be readily accepted. Therefore, when the notice has been given individually to the concerned students calling upon him/her to give explanation the submissions made by learned Advocate Ms. Bhatt cannot be readily accepted. It is required to be mentioned at this stage that the Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed in the judgment in the case of Bihar School Examination Board, [ AIR 1970 SC 1269 ], which has been referred to and relied upon by learned Advocate Ms. Bhatt for the petitioner: "If there is sufficient material on which it can be demonstrated that the university was right in its conclusion that the examinations ought to be cancelled then academic standards require that the university's appreciation of the problem must be respected. It would not do for the Court to say that you should have examined all the candidates or even their representatives with a view to ascertaining whether they had received assistance or not. To do this would encourage indiscipline if not also perjury." 15. Further, a useful reference can also be made to the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment reported in AIR 1972 SC 1408 in the case of Prem Prakash Kaluniya v. Punjab University, referring to similar charges with regard to irregularity or malpractice, and the scope of interference with the decision of the University. It has been observed: "...These, however, are matters on which the Court cannot entertain a petition under Art.226. It was for the Standing Committee to arrive at its own conclusion on the evidence before it, and the same cannot be reexamined except on very limited grounds which have not been established. We are also unable to see how the finding of the Standing Committee could be regarded as vague or as having been based on no evidence." (Emphasis supplied) 16. This judgment has also been considered by the Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat in a judgment in the case of Siddharth Mohanlal Sharma v. South Gujarat University, 1982 GLH 648 (P.D. Desai and D.H. Shukla, JJ.). This judgment has been referred to and relied upon by the learned Advocate for the petitioner on the ground of fair-play and compliance with the rules of natural justice to emphasise that natural justice is only fair-play in action, and therefore, whether sufficient opportunity could have been granted or not is required to be considered. This judgment has been referred to and relied upon by the learned Advocate for the petitioner on the ground of fair-play and compliance with the rules of natural justice to emphasise that natural justice is only fair-play in action, and therefore, whether sufficient opportunity could have been granted or not is required to be considered. The submissions have been made that the charge was vague and the opportunity of hearing and/or making representation has been denied. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also emphasised about the scope of judicial review that if the order is in violation of principles of natural justice, discretion under Art. 226 could be exercised. However, as could be seen from the observations made in this judgment, the Division Bench has also made observations referring to the scope of exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Art. 226 and the concept of judicial review that the Court exercising such jurisdiction cannot sit in appeal over the ultimate decision in the disciplinary inquiry based on findings of fact. However, it has been stated that it could be subject to the exception that there is evidence or finding is perverse or unreasonable which no reasonable man could have arrived at based on the material and evidence. In the facts of the case, it can hardly be said that there is no material and evidence when more than one committee has scrutinized the material. Again, care has been taken to ensure that prejudice is not caused by applying dummy numbers and so as to make it more objective, another committee has examined the same independently. 17. Further, in a judgment reported in AIR 1963 SC 1723 , in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Ram Rao, referring to the scope of discretion under Art. 226 on the ground of violation of rules of natural justice, it has been observed: "Where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Art. 226 to review me evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.... if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution." 18. It is in this background, the reliance placed by the learned Advocate for the petitioner referring to the few observations -of this judgment by the Division Bench would not help the petitioner. 19. It is well-settled that it is the decision-making process which is required to be considered. The Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of judicial pronouncements has made observations on this aspect with regard to the decision-making process. Thus, if the decision making process is fair and reasonable, it cannot be rejected on the ground of violation of rules of natural justice and fair-play as sought to be canvassed. 20. Again, the rules of natural justice do not apply in abstract and it has to be considered in background of facts. A useful reference can be made to the observations made by the Apex Court in a judgment reported in 2000 (7) SCC 529 in the case of Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, wherein observations have been made referring to the principles of natural justice. It has been observed: "The principle that in addition to- breach of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has been developed in several cases. In K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India, 1984 (1) SCC 43 , Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) also laid down the principle that not mere violation of natural justice but de facto prejudice (other man non-issue of notice) had to be proved. It was observed, quoting Wade's Administrative Law (5th Edn., pp. 472-75), as follows: "It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as to their scope and extent... There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. 472-75), as follows: "It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as to their scope and extent... There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirement of natural justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with, and so forth." Since then, this Court has consistently applied the principle of prejudice in several cases. The above ruling and various other rulings taking the same view have been exhaustively referred to in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, 1996 (3) SCC 364 . In that case, the principle of "prejudice" has been further elaborated. The same principle has been reiterated again in Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P., 1996 (5) SCC 460 ." At the same time, it has also been observed: "The "useless formality" theory, it must be noted, is an exception. Apart from the class of cases of "admitted or indisputable facts leading only to one conclusion" referred to above, there has been considerable debate on the application of that theory in other cases. The divergent views expressed in regard to this theory have been elaborately considered by this Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1999 (6) SCC 237 referred to above. This Court surveyed the views expressed in various judgments in England by Lord Reid, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord Bingham, Megarry, J. and Straughton, L.J. etc. in various cases and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs. Garner, Craig, de Smith, Wade, D.H. Clark etc. Some of them have said that orders passed in violation must always be quashed for otherwise the Court will be prejudging the issue. Some others have said that there is no such absolute rule and prejudice must be shown. Yet, some others have applied via media rules. We do not think it necessary in this case to go deeper into these issues. In the ultimate analysis, it may depend on the facts of a particular case." 21. Some others have said that there is no such absolute rule and prejudice must be shown. Yet, some others have applied via media rules. We do not think it necessary in this case to go deeper into these issues. In the ultimate analysis, it may depend on the facts of a particular case." 21. Thus, it has been emphasised that the doctrine of prejudice is evolved in order to ascertain whether any breach is caused or is likely to cause even if there is some lapse in compliance with the rules of natural justice. In the facts of the case, as rightly submitted by learned Sr. Counsel Shri Kavina, on the contrary, the university has not taken a stricter view considering the future of the students and they have not imposed punishment debarring them from appearing in the exam for future and have only confined to cancellation of the result which does not affect them, as thereafter, they have been permitted to appear in the exam and clear the same. The submissions which have been made with much emphasis by learned Advocate Ms. Bhatt for the petitioner on a judgment in the case of Gorkha Security Services v. Government (N.C.T. of Delhi), 2014 (9) SCC 105, to emphasise about the show-cause notice and the natural justice inasmuch as the facts in the present case are totally different than the facts referred to in the said judgment with regard to blacklisting. Similarly, the observations made in the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Siddharth Mohanlal Sharma, [1982 GLH 648] would not be of any assistance to the petitioner. 22. Further, the scope of judicial review under Art. 226 is very well laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of judicial pronouncements. Normally, the High Court would not disturb the findings of fact arrived at by the authority based on the material and evidence. Again, the High Court would not substitute the decision arrived at by the authority. It can only examine whether the decision which is arrived at based on the evidence could be arrived at by a reasonable man. Therefore, it is not for the Court to have a further scrutiny or minute appreciation of the evidence as it will be depending upon the facts of the case and the material on the basis of which the authority would arrive at a conclusion. Therefore, it is not for the Court to have a further scrutiny or minute appreciation of the evidence as it will be depending upon the facts of the case and the material on the basis of which the authority would arrive at a conclusion. Therefore, it is the decision making process which is more relevant which is required to be considered as to whether such decision-making process is fair and reasonable or not based on some material or not and from the facts of the case as stated above it can hardly be said that the decision-making process is unfair or arbitrary and/or it is not based on any material on the basis of which a reasonable man could arrive at the conclusion. As stated in the affidavit-in-reply in detail, sufficient care has been taken and opportunity has been given to the students in compliance with the rules of natural justice for which no grievance could be now made in the present petition. In fact, if on such ground the petitions are entertained, it would give a wrong signal for such malpractice resulting in encouragement for such foul action which is not in public interest. Therefore, considering the rival submissions and the background of facts as recorded hereinabove, the present petition deserves to be dismissed, and accordingly stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief stands vacated. No order as to costs. Petition Dismissed.