JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashwani Kumar Mishra, J.—This second appeal arises out of a suit filed for permanent injunction by the plaintiff-respondent, restraining the defendant-appellant from interfering in his possession and from raising of construction over the suit property. Suit was dismissed by the trial Court on 25.2.1982, but has been decreed by the lower appellate Court, vide judgment and decree dated 11.12.1984, passed in Civil Appeal No. 40 of 1982. Being aggrieved, the defendant-appellant has preferred this appeal. 2. Facts giving rise to filing of the instant appeal are that plaintiff Chhotai filed suit for permanent injunction with the allegation that his uncle Kalicharan was the occupant of suit property since 1331 Fasli, and upon his death the plaintiff has remained in continuous possession. In the plaint, Chhotai set-out the following family tree to explain his relationship with Kalicharan : Badal Baleshwar Kalicharan Chhotai Summer Balgovind Ghurahu Original plaintiff Chhotai died during pendency of the suit and the proceedings have been carried through his legal representatives. 3. According to the plaint averment, plaintiff’s ancestors for a longtime had remained in possession over the suit property and thereafter plaintiff continued to remain in its possession and that defendant had no concern with the land in suit. It has been asserted that on 9.1.1975 Chhotai started getting the foundation dug for the purposes of constructing a house, which has been objected by the defendant-appellant without any right and title, and as the defendant-appellant was bent upon creating trouble, necessity arose for the plaintiff-respondent to file the suit. 4. Defendant-appellant contested the suit, denying the possession of plaintiff-respondent and of his ancestors over the land in suit. It was claimed by the defendant-appellant that he was tenant of the land in suit till the year 1942 when the possession of it was requisitioned for preparation of bricks in connection with the construction of Madho Singh Aerodrome, during second world war, and consequent upon requisition, defendant’s name was deleted and the name of “Sarkar Bahadur Qaisare Hind” got mutated. It is alleged that the scheme for construction of aerodrome was dropped and the defendant-appellant applied to the military authorities for relinquishing the land in favour of defendant-appellant and that in the year 1946 the military authorities relinquished the suit property in favour of defendant-appellant. It is alleged that the scheme for construction of aerodrome was dropped and the defendant-appellant applied to the military authorities for relinquishing the land in favour of defendant-appellant and that in the year 1946 the military authorities relinquished the suit property in favour of defendant-appellant. Pursuant to such decision taken, the defendant-appellant moved the District Magistrate, Varanasi, for delivery of possession to him and orders for delivery of possession over the land in suit came to be passed, pursuant to which on 16.5.1975 possession of defendant was restored over suit property. An objection was also raised with regard to non-joinder of State as a party to the suit, which according to the defendant-appellant was a necessary party, apart from raising other objections. 5. On the basis of respective pleadings made in the suit, trial Court proceeded to frame following 6 issues for adjudication of dispute : “1. Whether the ancestors of the plaintiff were in possession over the land in suit and if the plaintiff was in possession over it now? 2. Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the land in suit on the basis of his possession? 3. Whether the defendant got possession over the land in suit on 16.5.75? 4. Whether the suit was bad for non-joinder of State of U.P.? 5. Whether the suit was undervalue and the Court fee paid was insufficient? 6. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?” 6. Trial Court vide its order dated 24.8.1978 decided issue No. 4 by holding that the suit did not suffer from non-joinder of State as a defendant to the suit. Issue No. 5 with regard to valuation was also decided in favour of plaintiff-respondent. On issue No. 1 a finding was returned by the trial Court that in the facts and circumstances of the case, plaintiff’s ancestors and thereafter the deceased plaintiff and his heirs were in possession over the suit property on behalf of the defendant-appellant and that plaintiff is not its owner. Issue No. 2 was decided by holding that plaintiff was not owner of the land in suit, on the basis of his possession, which was on behalf of the defendant-appellant. On issue No. 3 a finding was returned that the defendant-appellant had not received possession over the land in suit on 16.5.1975. Issue No. 2 was decided by holding that plaintiff was not owner of the land in suit, on the basis of his possession, which was on behalf of the defendant-appellant. On issue No. 3 a finding was returned that the defendant-appellant had not received possession over the land in suit on 16.5.1975. Trial Court in view of the finding returned on issue No. 2 dismissed the plaintiff’s suit as he was held not be in possession over the land in suit as its owner and that the possession held by plaintiff-respondent was on behalf of the defendant-appellant. 7. Aggrieved by the dismissal of suit by the trial vide its judgment and decree dated 25.2.1982, plaintiff-respondent preferred an appeal being Civil Appeal No. 40 of 1982. A cross objection was also filed by the defendant-appellant against the findings of the trial Court on issue No. 1 and 3, and it was asserted that finding of the Court below on the question of possession of plaintiff-respondent over the land in suit was erroneous and that the evidence on record had been misconstrued. The lower appellate Court scanned the evidence on record and a finding has been returned that plaintiff-respondent was in fact in possession over the suit property and the defendant-appellant’s claim of possession was disbelieved. The lower appellate Court noticed contradiction in the plea setup by the defendant-appellant in his written statement and his oral evidence adduced during the course of trial to hold that the alleged transfer of possession to defendant-appellant vide memo dated 16.5.1975 was a paper formality and nobody has been ejected before putting the defendant-appellant in possession. The lower appellate Court also considered the entries of possession maintained by the revenue authorities in order to hold that plaintiff’s uncle Kalicharan was recorded as sub-tenant in 1331 fasli (corresponding to year 1923-24), whereafter such entry of possession in the name of Kalicharan continued in the revenue records for the year 1350 fasli, 1364 fasli and in 1377-79 fasli and in remarks column an order of supervisor Kanoongo dated 8.3.1970 had been referred, which directed name of plaintiff-respondent to be recorded in class 4 as occupant and that in subsequent entries of 1381-1383 fasli plaintiff-respondent was recorded as occupant in class 4. The lower appellate Court was of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the question of title of the parties over the land in suit was immaterial. In the assessment of the lower appellate Court documents evidencing requisition of land under the provisions of Defence of India Act and Rules and the order of the District Magistrate dated 21.12.1942 as well as grant of compensation in respect of 2 bigha 7 biswa 2 dhoor land to the defendant-appellant as well as the plea of release of land in his favour after the period of war was not relevant for the purposes of the controversy raised inasmuch as even if it was to be accepted, as such, as claimed by the defendant, the right of plaintiff in the suit land from before or even on the date of requisition on the basis of possession could not be ignored. It was observed that the right of the defendant-appellant could not be established as he was not the rightful owner and his status was only that of tenant, which right was lost on account of the fact that plaintiff’s ancestors continued in possession over the land in suit as sub-tenant since long. Reliance was placed upon a decision of the Apex Court reported AIR 1968 SC 1165 to observe that a person in possession of land assumes character of owner and exercises ordinary right of ownership against all the world except its rightful owner and that if the true owner does not come forward to assert his title, by the process of law, within the period prescribed by the provisions of statute of limitation, his right is forever extinguished and the possessory owner acquires right of title. Possessory title of the plaintiff-respondent over the suit land consequently was recognized. It was further held that under the statutory scheme pursuant to abolition of zamindari in the State of U.P., the plaintiff acquires the status of Sirdar over the disputed land, and as such, there arose no need for grant of declaration by a revenue Court in favour of plaintiff as Sirdar of the suit property. 8. It was further held that under the statutory scheme pursuant to abolition of zamindari in the State of U.P., the plaintiff acquires the status of Sirdar over the disputed land, and as such, there arose no need for grant of declaration by a revenue Court in favour of plaintiff as Sirdar of the suit property. 8. On behalf of the defendant-appellant before the lower appellate Court, an issue of jurisdiction of Civil Court was also raised but the lower appellate Court refused to entertain it on the ground that no plea on the question of jurisdiction was raised before the trial Court and no issue was framed on that question, and therefore, it was not necessary to enter into that question at the stage of appeal. The cross objection was rejected by the lower appellate Court by observing that the findings of lower Court on the issue of possession was based upon correct appreciation of evidence on record. With such discussions and findings, the appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 25.2.1985 was set aside. The suit was decreed with costs and the defendant-appellant was restrained from making any interference with the plaintiff’s possession over the land in suit, otherwise in due course of law. The cross objection was dismissed. It is against this judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court dated 11.12.1984 that the defendant-appellant had filed the present appeal. 9. I have Shri B.K. Srivastava, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Shri Dheeraj Kumar, counsel for the defendant-appellant and Shri Kunal Ravi Singh, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent at length. Parties have also submitted their written submissions, which have been examined. I have also perused the lower Court’s record. 10. The appeal was admitted on 7.5.1987 on the following substantial questions : “1. When the plaintiff was not in actual possession on the date of suit and the subject-matter of suit was released in favour of the defendant whether the plaintiff could get the relief of injunction? 2. Whether the Civil Court would have jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances of the present case?” 11. When the plaintiff was not in actual possession on the date of suit and the subject-matter of suit was released in favour of the defendant whether the plaintiff could get the relief of injunction? 2. Whether the Civil Court would have jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances of the present case?” 11. Learned counsel for the defendant-appellant submits that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, no relief of injunction could have been granted to the plaintiff-respondent by the Civil Court, as the question of right over the suit property under the provisions of Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 1950’) inextricably interwoven with the claim of possession by either party, which could only be determined by a revenue Court, particularly as various entries relied upon by the parties were seriously disputed and the Civil Court was incompetent to deal with it, by virtue of bar created under Section 331 of the Act of 1950. It is asserted that the defendant was recorded as a tenant right from 1334 fasli over the suit property and at the time when the land got requisitioned the defendant-appellant had been paid compensation and possession was also restored to him under the orders of the District Magistrate, Varanasi. It is submitted that once the factum of requisition of land had been demonstrated on record, the possession over suit land continued in the State since 1942, and ultimately in the year 1975 such possession was restored to the defendant-appellant. Submission is that a finding of continued possession of plaintiff-respondent over the land in suit is unsustainable. It is further submitted that the cross appeal/objection filed by the defendant-appellant has been dealt with in a cryptic manner and no findings on the issues raised therein have been returned. 12. Per contra, Shri Kunal Ravi Singh, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has meticulously taken the Court through the various revenue entries on record, as well as the evidence led by the parties to submit that finding of possession in favour of plaintiff-respondent recorded by both the Courts below was clearly borne out from the record. 12. Per contra, Shri Kunal Ravi Singh, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has meticulously taken the Court through the various revenue entries on record, as well as the evidence led by the parties to submit that finding of possession in favour of plaintiff-respondent recorded by both the Courts below was clearly borne out from the record. Reliance has been placed upon para 12 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of V. Ramachandra Ayyar and others v. Ramalingam Chettiar and another, AIR 1963 SC 302 as well as upon the judgment in the case of M. Nadar Keswvan Nadar v. Narayan Nadar Kunjan Nadar, (2000) 10 SCC 244 , in order to contend that it is beyond the scope of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code to examine the evidence and then reverse the finding returned by the Courts below on the question of possession. It is submitted that such concurrent findings of fact do not require a reassessment by this Court in appeal. On the second question, it is submitted that once possession had been established and necessary pleadings regarding title had been made, then issue of title can also be decided in a suit for injunction, incidentally. However, it is submitted that in a case where title and possession are claimed, the litigant should not be driven to the costlier and more cumbersome remedy of filing of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to encroach upon the property. 13. Shri Singh further submits that possession and title of the plaintiff-respondent is clear from the record and defendant-appellant has failed to prove his title. It is also asserted that mere payment of compensation would not prove title, as the compensation could be given to a wrong person as well, as in the facts of the present case, plaintiff-respondent was in possession. It is submitted that the question of suit being maintainable before the Civil Court had not been specifically addressed by the Courts below and the same cannot be raised at the stage of second appeal, as the question of jurisdiction is a mixed question of law and fact, which could be tried by a Court of fact. It is submitted that the question of suit being maintainable before the Civil Court had not been specifically addressed by the Courts below and the same cannot be raised at the stage of second appeal, as the question of jurisdiction is a mixed question of law and fact, which could be tried by a Court of fact. It is submitted that the plaintiff-respondent was recorded and found to be in possession and upon enforcement of the Act of 1950, he became an Adivasi as per Section 20 of the Act, as such, prima facie title was clearly in favour of plaintiff-respondent and lower appellate Court has rightly decreed the suit. 14. In order to keep the record straight, it is noticed that learned counsel for the defendant-appellant also prayed that an additional substantial question be framed on the issue as to whether the suit was barred under Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 1953’). This prayer was opposed by the counsel for the plaintiff-respondent. The question has been examined by the Court. Perusal of the record clearly goes to show that no bar of maintainability of suit by virtue of Section 49 of the Act of 1953 has been raised by defendant-appellant before either of the Courts below. No such ground was taken while filing the appeal. The appeal has been admitted only on two substantial questions, as noticed above. Although this Court has jurisdiction by virtue of proviso to Section 100(5) of the Code to hear the second appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, upon satisfaction that such question is involved, for reasons to be recorded, but in the facts of the present case, I am of the opinion that prayer of the plaintiff-respondent for formulating additional question with regard to bar of suit under Section 49 of the Act of 1953 is not liable to be entertained. This is so as necessary facts had not been placed before either of the Courts below nor any such issue was framed. The question sought to be raised would require a factual investigation as to whether the nature of dispute raised before the Civil Court would be barred as the dispute had, or could be gone into during consolidation proceedings. This is so as necessary facts had not been placed before either of the Courts below nor any such issue was framed. The question sought to be raised would require a factual investigation as to whether the nature of dispute raised before the Civil Court would be barred as the dispute had, or could be gone into during consolidation proceedings. Necessary factual averment in this regard and the evidence to be led for the purposes is clearly missing. In such factual backdrop, it would not be just and proper for this Court to frame such an issue and permit appellant to address this Court on the additional substantial question regarding bar of suit under Section 49 of the Act of 1953. The plea so raised, is therefore, noticed only to be rejected. The appeal has been heard only on the two substantial questions already formulated for consideration of the present appeal. 15. Out of two substantial questions formulated for consideration in the present appeal, the later one relates to the issue of jurisdiction and is taken up first. The question is as to whether Civil Court would have jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances of the present case to entertain the suit and grant relief as prayed? Law is settled that it is the cause of action, which determines the jurisdiction of a Court. Cause of action has been interpreted to mean every fact, which would be necessary for the plaintiff-respondent to prove if traversed in order to support his right to the judgment. A full bench of this Court in Ram Padarath v. IInd A.D.J., 1989 (1) AWC 290 , after considering the previous Full Bench of this Court in Ram Avalamb v. Jata Shanker, 1968 AWR 731, has observed as under in para 9 to 12, 17 & 41 : “9. The law relating to right, title and interest over the agricultural land is contained in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, hereinafter known as the ‘Act’, which is a complete Code by itself and is wider than the earlier Act, i.e. U.P. Tenancy Act which too was replaced by it. The said Act more particularly the Schedule to it enumerates the suits etc., the cognizance of which is to be taken of by the revenue Court specified therein. The said Act being special Act, its provisions would prevail over the general law. The said Act more particularly the Schedule to it enumerates the suits etc., the cognizance of which is to be taken of by the revenue Court specified therein. The said Act being special Act, its provisions would prevail over the general law. The jurisdiction of Civil Court is ousted if the relief can be granted by the special Act which specifically ousts the jurisdiction of other Courts in respect of all suits, applications etc., enumerated in Schedule II the main emphasis is on the words ‘cause of action and any relief’. The said section reads as under : “Section 331. Cognizance of suits, etc. under this Act—(1) Except as provided by or under this Act no Court other than a Court mentioned in Column 4 of Schedule II shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908), take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceedings mentioned in Column 3 thereof or of which any relief or of a suit, application or proceedings based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application. Provided that where a declaration has been made under Section 143 in respect of any holding or part thereof, the provisions of Schedule II in so far as they relate to suits, applications or proceedings under Chapter VIII shall not apply to such holding or part thereof. Explanation : If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue Court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the Civil Court may not be identical to that which the revenue Court would have granted. Explanation : If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue Court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the Civil Court may not be identical to that which the revenue Court would have granted. (1-A) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), an objection that a Court mentioned in column 4 of Schedule II, or, as the case may be, a Civil Court, which had no jurisdiction with respect to the suit, application or, proceeding, exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by any appellate or revisional Court unless the objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issue are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.” Section 331 of the ct which specifically ousts the jurisdiction of Civil Court in respect of suits etc., enumerated in Schedule II makes the phrase ‘ cause of action’ as pivotal point for determining the jurisdiction of civil or revenue Court. The expression ‘cause of action’ means that every fact would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to support his right of judgment. 10. In the leading case of Reed and Brown, (1899) 22 Q.B.D. 128, it was said, “ The Division Bench consisting of Pollock and Mistry, JJ., had come to the conclusion that the expression ‘cause of action’ and part of ‘cause of action’ had long been judicially defined as meaning respectively of facts and any material fact in the case for the plaintiff. Lord Eshor M.R. in his judgment quoted with approval the definition of that express given in the earlier case in Cook v. Gill, 1873 BCP 107, as every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court, but it does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved”. 11. It is the real ‘cause of action’ which determines the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain particular action notwithstanding the language used in the plaint or the relief claimed. 11. It is the real ‘cause of action’ which determines the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain particular action notwithstanding the language used in the plaint or the relief claimed. The strength on which the plaintiff comes to the Court does not depend upon the defence or relief claimed which could determine the forum for the entertainment of claim and grant of relief. It is the pith and substance which is to be seen and not the language used which may even have been so used to oust the jurisdiction of a particular Court. 12. The expression ‘any relief’ used in Section 331 of the ‘Act is of too wide import and would not only mean the relief claimed but would also include any relief arising out of the cause of action which led the plaintiff to invoke the jurisdiction of a Court of law. The word ‘relief’ is not part of cause of action nor the same is related to the defence set up in the case. The relief is a remedy which the Court grants from the facts asserted and proved in an action. 17. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shanker, 1968 AWR 731 (FB), which was constituted in view of conflict between two Bench decision of this Court observed that “where in a suit, from a perusal only of the relief claimed, one or more of them are ostensibly cognizable only by Civil Court and atleast one relief is cognizable by the revenue Court, further questions which arise are whether all the reliefs are based on the same cause of action and if so, (a) whether the main relief asked for on the basis of the cause of action is such as can be granted only be a revenue Court or (b) whether any real or substantial relief, though it may not be identical with that claimed by the plaintiff could be granted by the revenue Court. There can be no doubt that in all cases contemplated under (a) and (b) above, the jurisdiction shall vest in the revenue Court and not in the Civil Court.” 41. We are of the view that the case of Indra Deo v. Smt. Ram Piari, 1982 (8) ALR 517, has been correctly decided and the said decision requires no consideration, while the Division Bench case, Dr. We are of the view that the case of Indra Deo v. Smt. Ram Piari, 1982 (8) ALR 517, has been correctly decided and the said decision requires no consideration, while the Division Bench case, Dr. Ayodhya Prasad v. Gangotri, 1981 AWC 469 , is regarding the jurisdiction of consolidation authorities, but so far as it holds that suit in respect of void document will lie in the revenue Court it does not lay down a good law. Suit or action for cancellation of void document will generally lie in the Civil Court and a party cannot be deprived of his right getting this relief permissible under law except when a declaration of right or status of a tenure-holder is necessarily needed in which even relief for cancellation will be surplusage and redundant. A recorded tenure-holder having prima facie title in his favour can hardly be directed to approach the revenue Court in respect of seeking relief for cancellation of a void document which made him to approach the Court of law and in such case he can also claim ancillary relief even though the same can be granted by the revenue Court.” 16. The Full Bench judgment in Ram Padarath (supra) has been approved by the Hon’ble Superme Court in Bismillah v. Janeshwar Prasad, AIR 1990 SC 540 , Shri Ram v. Ist Additional District Judge, (2001) 3 SCC 24 and in Kamla Prasad v. Krishna Kant Pathak, (2007) 4 SCC 213 . 17. In the facts of the case, Original Suit No. 13 of 75 has been filed by Chhotai seeking relief of permanent injunction restraining defendant-appellant from interfering with the right of the plaintiff-respondent over the suit property by raising construction over it, and that defendant-appellant may not interfere in his possession. In para 8 of the plaint, plaintiff-respondent asserts himself to the owner of suit land, who is in possession, and therefore, the suit is being filed with the allegation of ownership and possession of plaintiff-respondent over the suit property. Para 8 of the plaint is reproduced : ^^nQk&8 ;g fd oknh fookfnr Hkwfe dk ekfyd gS rFkk oknh fookfnr Hkwfe ij 'kkfUr iwoZd dkfct gSA fygktk gd ekfydkuk rFkk uht gd dCtk ds vk/kkj ij oknh etkt okor ukfy'k gS vkSj eqLrfgd nknjlh eq'rnb;k dk gSA^^ 18. Para 8 of the plaint is reproduced : ^^nQk&8 ;g fd oknh fookfnr Hkwfe dk ekfyd gS rFkk oknh fookfnr Hkwfe ij 'kkfUr iwoZd dkfct gSA fygktk gd ekfydkuk rFkk uht gd dCtk ds vk/kkj ij oknh etkt okor ukfy'k gS vkSj eqLrfgd nknjlh eq'rnb;k dk gSA^^ 18. In the written statement, defendant-appellant denied the plaint averment that an attempt was made by the plaintiff-respondent to start raising of constructions, which got objected, and it was asserted that plaintiff-respondent has no right over the suit property nor he has deposited the land revenue. The accrual of cause as having arisen on 9.1.1975 was specifically disputed. The defendant-appellant has stated in para 4 to 6 of the written statement that he was the real kashtkar (farmer) of the land and in 1942 the suit property got requisitioned vide order dated 21.12.1942, pursuant to which the name of ‘Qaisare Hind’ was recorded and came in possession over the suit property. It is then stated that an application was moved by him before the concerned authorities for return of the possession on the ground that the land was no longer needed for the purposes for which it has been requisitioned and orders for return of land were passed by the concerned military officers of Bihar, U.P. and Odisha region, and ultimately, the District Magistrate, Varanasi, had got the possession delivered to plaintiff-respondent on 16.5.1975. Oral and documentary evidence had been adduced by the parties in support of their claim. Plaintiff and defendant both had relied upon various revenue entries prior to the year 1942. The plaintiff-respondent also relied upon the remarks entered by Supervsory Kanoongo on 8.3.1970, directing name of Chhotai to be recorded as class 4 occupant and katauni of 1381-83 fasli was also produced showing recording of the name of Chhotai as occupant in class 4. The defendant-appellant also adduced documents to show resumption of land in 1942, details of compensation received, and subsequent possession of land getting restored to the defendant-appellant. 19. The rival contentions raised by the parties in this regard have been dealt with by the lower appellate Court in following words : “The name of the plaintiffs’ ancestor Kali Charan was recorded over the disputed land as sub-tenant and thereafter he became chief tenant on the basis of his possession over it as disclosed in Khatauni Part II 1350F. The rival contentions raised by the parties in this regard have been dealt with by the lower appellate Court in following words : “The name of the plaintiffs’ ancestor Kali Charan was recorded over the disputed land as sub-tenant and thereafter he became chief tenant on the basis of his possession over it as disclosed in Khatauni Part II 1350F. After the enforcement of the Z.A. Act in this Tehsil of Gyanpur in the year 1954 his status became that of a Sirdar and there was no question of the plaintiffs being in possession over the disputed land on behalf of the defendant-respondent. It is true that the name of the deceased plaintiff Chhotai could never be recorded as Sirdar in the revenue papers, the main reason of it being the intervening proceedings of requisition by the Military authorities. It may be mentioned that the land in suit was requisitioned in the year 1942, corresponding to 1350F, by the Military authorities. At that time the name of Kali Charan, the ancestor of the plaintiffs, was recorded in Khatauni Part II of 1350F. Of course in Khatauni Part 1 the name of Ashiq Ali, the defendant-respondent, was recorded as tenant of the disputed land. It appears that the Military authorities prepared roll of compensation in the name of Ashiq Ali being chief tenant of the disputed land and they over looked the claim of the real occupant Kali Charan being sub-tenant of the disputed land. But that does not mean that the right and title acquired by the plaintiff’s ancestor Kali Charan by means of his continued possession over the disputed land would be extinguished. The defendant-respondent has filed copy of an order dated 21.12.42 of the Collector and District Magistrate, Bhadohi, whereby the disputed land was requisitioned under Rule 75A(1) of the Defence of India Rules for the period of war and for such period after the war as may be necessary. The copy of consolidated voucher for payment of compensation made on account of land acquired for Madho Singh Aerodrome has also been filed. This shows that a consolidated voucher for payment of compensation was made in favour of defendant-respondent Ashiq Ali in respect of 2 bigha 7 biswas 2 dhurs land, the compensation amount being Rs. 727.14/-. The copy of consolidated voucher for payment of compensation made on account of land acquired for Madho Singh Aerodrome has also been filed. This shows that a consolidated voucher for payment of compensation was made in favour of defendant-respondent Ashiq Ali in respect of 2 bigha 7 biswas 2 dhurs land, the compensation amount being Rs. 727.14/-. This paper has been filed to show that the land in suit was requisitioned from the defendant-respondent and it was released in his favour after the period of war. A great deal of argument has been advanced from the side of the plaintiffs-appellants that his consolidated voucher does not relate to the land in suit and it is in respect of acquisition of some other land and not in respect of the land in suit which was requisitioned and not acquired. I do not want to enter into this controversy. Considering the area of the land given in this voucher, which tallies with the disputed land, I may take it to be for the disputed land itself. Even then, as I have observed earlier, merely payment of compensation to the defendant-respondent regarding requisitioned land would not at all affect the rights of the plaintiffs-appellants if they had any right in the land in suit from before or even on the date of requisition. The learned Munsif did not grant the relief of injunction in favour of the plaintiffs simply under the assumption that a trespasser cannot get the relief of injunction on the basis of his mere possession against the true owner. The learned Munsif lost sight of the fact that in this case the defendant-respondent himself was not a true or rightful owner. His status was only that of a tenant and that right too had expired on account of the plaintiff’s ancestor being in continued possession over the land in suit as sub-tenant.” 20. Based upon the discussions aforesaid, lower appellate Court went on to hold in following words : “In the present case the status of the defendant-respondent is not that of an owner of the land in suit. His status was only that of a tenant and that status too expired by means of continued possession over the disputed land by the ancestors of the plaintiffs-appellants. His status was only that of a tenant and that status too expired by means of continued possession over the disputed land by the ancestors of the plaintiffs-appellants. In this case the plaintiffs-appellants were entitled for the relief of permanent injunction against the defendant-respondent on the basis of their continued possession over the disputed land. The plaintiffs-appellants have got possessory title in their favour. It may also be remarked that the mutation of the name of Qaisare Hind as tenant in view of the requisition of the disputed land by the Military authorities was also against law. Had these entries not been made in favour of Qaisare Hind, then the natural outcome would have been that the names of the plaintiff’s ancestor and thereafter the deceased plaintiff himself would have come on the revenue papers as Sirdar of the land in suit. Only because of these entries, during the course of consolidation proceedings the name of deceased plaintiff Chhotai was recorded as class 4 occupant. A trespasser against a private person’s land is recorded under class 9, whereas a trespasser over the Government or public land is recorded under class 4. Since the name of Qaisare Hind was recorded as tenant over the disputed land at the time of consolidation proceedings, the Consolidation authorities thought it proper to record the name of deceased plaintiff Chhotai as class 4 occupant.” 21. The lower appellate Court not only ruled on the legality of requisition, but also went on to return a finding that but for such illegal recording of requisition, the plaintiff’s ancestors and thereafter plaintiff was liable to be entered as Sirdar over the disputed land, under the provisions of statute. 22. A perusal of the discussions aforesaid clearly goes to show that the lower appellate Court had examined the claim of the plaintiff-respondent not essentially on the basis of possession, but grant of relief to plaintiff was based upon adjudication of the right held by the parties over the suit property. The observation and findings were returned with regard to invalidity of resumption proceedings as well. It is to be noticed that all such findings with regard to validity of the resumption proceedings or incorrect recording of the name of “Qaisare Hind” were returned, although Union of India or the State was not even impleaded as a party to the suit. The observation and findings were returned with regard to invalidity of resumption proceedings as well. It is to be noticed that all such findings with regard to validity of the resumption proceedings or incorrect recording of the name of “Qaisare Hind” were returned, although Union of India or the State was not even impleaded as a party to the suit. The lower appellate Court also determined the nature of right that accrued under the statute. A virtual declaration of Sirdari right in favour of plaintiff-respondent was granted. The grant of relief of injunction, therefore, in the facts of the present case, was based upon determination of title in favour of plaintiff-respondent. 23. Although an objection with regard to jurisdiction of Civil Court had been raised, but it appears that the lower appellate Court proceeded to determine the right of the parties over the suit property, brushing aside such objection in following words : “The learned counsel for the respondent has argued on the question of jurisdiction of the Civil Court in such matter. Since no plea on the question of jurisdiction was raised before the trial Court and no issue was framed on that question, I do not think it necessary to enter into that question at the appellate stage. Moreover, this being a suit for injunction only on the basis of possessory right of the plaintiff’s it was quite within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.” 24. It is to be noticed that it was the lower appellate Court which proceeded to adjudicate the rights held by the plaintiff over the suit property, and at such juncture, a specific objection was raised by the defendant regarding jurisdiction of Civil Court in terms of Section 331 (1-A) of the Act of 1950, which was liable to have been considered. The lower appellate Court was not correct in rejecting such objection on the ground that such a plea was not set up as the issue in this regard was being dealt with by the lower appellate Court for the first time and once such an occasion arose, the defendant had raised the plea of jurisdiction, which required adjudication. 25. The lower appellate Court was not correct in rejecting such objection on the ground that such a plea was not set up as the issue in this regard was being dealt with by the lower appellate Court for the first time and once such an occasion arose, the defendant had raised the plea of jurisdiction, which required adjudication. 25. A perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate Court clearly goes to show that the grant of injunction in favour of plaintiff-respondent is essentially based upon adjudication and declaration of title of the plaintiff-respondent over the suit property, after holding that the requisition made in favour of “Qaisare Hind” and revenue entries in that regard were invalid. The judgment of the lower appellate Court, therefore, grants declaration of plaintiff’s right over the suit property. The question, therefore, is as to whether such a declaration by the Civil Court is within its jurisdiction? 26. Item 34 of Schedule II of the Act of 1950 provides that a suit for declaration of right over agricultural land would lie before the Court of Assistant Collector, First Class. Section 229-B provides for institution of a declaratory suit by a person claiming to be an Asami of the part thereof. Section 229-D confers power to the revenue Court to grant relief of temporary injunction and where necessary to appoint a receiver during the course of pendency of suit under Section 229-B. From the statutory scheme, aforesaid, it is apparent that where a question of grant of relief of declaration in favour of tenure-holder is involved, the jurisdiction of revenue Court is exclusive and to the exclusion of power of the Civil Court. 27. It would be relevant to note that though entries for different fasli years had been brought on record but from either of the sides no entry of the year 1356 fasli and 1359 fasli had been brought on record. The notification abolishing zamindari in the State of U.P. was issued on 1.7.1952. Act of 1950 recognizes entries existing in the revenue records maintained under U.P. Land Revenue Act in 1356 fasli and for the purposes of possession of 1359 fasli. Section 20(b) of the Act of 1950, in this regard, is reproduced : “20. The notification abolishing zamindari in the State of U.P. was issued on 1.7.1952. Act of 1950 recognizes entries existing in the revenue records maintained under U.P. Land Revenue Act in 1356 fasli and for the purposes of possession of 1359 fasli. Section 20(b) of the Act of 1950, in this regard, is reproduced : “20. Every person who- (b) was recorded as occupant- (i) of any land (other than grove land or land to which Section 16 applies) in the khasra or khatauni of 1356 F prepared under Sections 28 and [33] respectively of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, or who was, on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, entitled to regain possession thereof under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 27 of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947, or (ii) of any land to which Section 16 applies, in the [khasra or khatauni of 1356 F. prepared under Sections 28 and 33 respectively of] the United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901, but who was not in possession in the year 1359 F., shall, unless he has become a bhumidhar of the land under sub-section (2) of Section 18 or an asami under clause (h) of Section 21, be called adhivasi of the land and shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be entitled to take or retain possession thereof.” 28. Admittedly, for these relevant fasli years i.e. 1356 and 1359 none of the entries had been filed by either of the parties. It appears that during such relevant period, the land was recorded in the name of Qaisare Hind and possession of the parties was also not established. In such circumstances, the essential question, which required determination by the competent Court, was as to whether any right in favour of either of the parties had at all arisen under the provisions of the Act of 1950. Such determination, moreover, could not have been made when neither the Union of India nor the State or even Gaon Sabha were not made party to the proceedings. It appears from the record that document of possession in favour of defendant-appellant was executed under the order of District Magistrate, Varanasi, during pendency of suit in 1975. Such determination, moreover, could not have been made when neither the Union of India nor the State or even Gaon Sabha were not made party to the proceedings. It appears from the record that document of possession in favour of defendant-appellant was executed under the order of District Magistrate, Varanasi, during pendency of suit in 1975. A question, therefore, also arises as to whether the possession over the suit property was with either of the parties, as claimed by them or was with the State authorities, as it is alleged that possession had been delivered to defendant-appellant under the orders of the District Magistrate, Varanasi. It is further not disputed that compensation in lieu of requisition had been granted to the defendant-appellant. In this factual backdrop, the right of Union of India or State over the suit property could not be ignored and the dispute could be adjudicated only in a proceeding instituted before a competent Court, where Union of India or State were parties to the proceedings. 29. In opinion of this Court, the manner in which the lower appellate Court proceeded to invalidate the proceedings for resumption as well as the entries of the State over the land in question and has granted declaration of right in favour of plaintiff-respondent was clearly beyond the scope of its jurisdiction. 30. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has relied upon following judgments of the Apex Court in order to justify the judgment of the lower appellate Court: 1. In V. Ramachandra Ayyar and another v. Ramlingam Chettiar and others, AIR 1963 SC 302 , para 12 of the decision has been relied upon, which reads as under: “12. It is necessary to remember that Section 100 (1) (c) refers to a substantial error or defect in the procedure. The defect or error must be substantial that is one fact to remember; and the substantial error or defect should be such as may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits-that is another fact to be borne in mind. The error or defect in the procedure to which the clause refers is, as the clause-clearly and unambiguously indicates, an error or defect connected with, or relating to, the procedure; it is not an error or defect in the appreciation of evidence adduce by the parties on the merits. The error or defect in the procedure to which the clause refers is, as the clause-clearly and unambiguously indicates, an error or defect connected with, or relating to, the procedure; it is not an error or defect in the appreciation of evidence adduce by the parties on the merits. That is why, even if the appreciation of evidence made by the lower appellate Court is patently erroneous and the finding of fact recorded in consequence is grossly erroneous, that cannot be said to introduce a substantial error or defect in the procedure. On the other hand, if in dealing with a question of fact, 614 the lower appellate Court had placed the onus on a wrong party and its finding of fact is the result, substantially, of this wrong approach, that may be regarded as a defect in procedure; if in dealing with questions of fact, the lower appellate Court discards evidence on the ground that it is inadmissible and the High Court is satisfied that the evidence was admissible, that may introduce an error or defect in procedure. If the lower appellate Court fails to consider an issue which had been tried and found upon by the trial Court and proceeds to reverse the trial Court’s decision without the consideration of such an issue, that may be regarded as an error or defect in procedure; if the lower appellate Court allows a new point of fact to be raised for the first time before it, or permits a party to adopt a new’ plea of fact, or makes out a new case for a party, that may, in some cases, be mid to amount to a defect or error in procedure. But the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court, however erroneous the said conclusions may appear to be to the High Court, because, as the Privy Council observed, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be there is no jurisdiction under Section 100 to correct that error.” 2. In M. Nadar Kesavan Nadar v. Narayan Nadar Kunjan Nadar, (2000) 10 SCC 244 , it has been observed as under in para 6 of the judgment : “6. In M. Nadar Kesavan Nadar v. Narayan Nadar Kunjan Nadar, (2000) 10 SCC 244 , it has been observed as under in para 6 of the judgment : “6. It appears to us that in second appeal the High Court was in error in examining the evidence and then reversing the finding of the trial Court in the lower appellate Court by holding that the possession of the respondents satisfied the requirements of adverse possession. Both the trial Court and the lower appellate Court had, in no uncertain terms, come to the conclusion that the respondents had failed to establish by positive evidence that their possession of the disputed property was hostile to the real owner and in finding of fact could not be disturbed specially when the High Court has not come to the conclusion that the same was not perverse nor was based on no evidence. The trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court have discussed the evidence on the record and then had come to be conclusion that the defence in Suit No. 645 of 1970, namely, the respondents herein, had failed in showing that they had perfected their title by adverse possession. It is to be noted that the issue in this regard placed the burden of proof on the respondents and as they had not led evidence to show that they had perfected that title, their plea had to fail.” 3. Reliance is also placed upon judgment in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594 , in order to contend that where relief claimed is merely on the strength of possession a suit would lie before the Civil Court and it has been emphasized that where necessary pleadings regarding title were made and appropriate issues have been framed and the matter involved is simple and straightforward the Court may decide upon the issue of title also in a suit for injunction. Para 21 of the decision in this regard is reproduced : 21. To summarize, the position in regard to suits for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, is as under : (a) Where a cloud is raised over plaintiff’s title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. To summarize, the position in regard to suits for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, is as under : (a) Where a cloud is raised over plaintiff’s title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff’s title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with plaintiff’s lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter. (b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will be decided with reference to the finding on possession. But in cases where de jure possession has to be established on the basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title may directly and substantially arise for consideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession. (c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings and appropriate issue regarding title [either specific, or implied as noticed in Annaimuthu Thevar (supra)]. Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title, the Court will not investigate or examine or render a finding on a question of title, in a suit for injunction. Even where there are necessary pleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the Court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction. (d) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and appropriate issue relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the matter involved is simple and straight-forward, the Court may decide upon the issue regarding title, even in a suit for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to the normal rule that question of title will not be decided in suits for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to the normal rule that question of title will not be decided in suits for injunction. But persons having clear title and possession suing for injunction, should not be driven to the costlier and more cumbersome remedy of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to encroach upon his property. The Court should use its discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquire into title and cases where it will refer to plaintiff to a more comprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the facts of the case. 4. Relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Shri Ram and another v. Ist Additional District Judge and others, (2001) 3 SCC 24 , it is held that as plaintiff-respondent was recorded, a prima facie title existed, and as he was in possession, the suit was maintainable before the Civil Court. 5. Learned counsel also submits that law recognizes settled possession. Para 6 to 9 & 11 of the judgment in Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu and another, (2004) 1 SCC 769 , are relied upon, which reads as under : “6. The law in India, as it has developed, accords with the jurisprudential thought as propounded by Salmond. In Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy and others, 1924 PC 144, Sir John Edge summed up the Indian law by stating that in India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court. 7. The thought has prevailed incessantly, till date, the last and latest one in the chain of decisions being Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v. Anil Panjwani, (2003) 7 SCC 350 . In-between, to quote a few out of severals, in Lallu Yeshwant Singh (dead) by his legal representative v. Rao Jagdish Singh and others, (1968) 2 SCR 203 , this Court has held that a landlord did commit trespass when he forcibly entered his own land in the possession of a tenant whose tenancy has expired. The Court turned down the submission that under the general law applicable to a lessor and a lessee there was no rule or principle which made it obligatory for the lessor to resort to Court and obtain an order for possession before he could eject the lessee. The Court turned down the submission that under the general law applicable to a lessor and a lessee there was no rule or principle which made it obligatory for the lessor to resort to Court and obtain an order for possession before he could eject the lessee. The Court quoted with approval the law as stated by a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Yar Mohammad v. Lakshmi Das, ( AIR 1959 All. 1 ,4), “Law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a Court. No person can be allowed to become a judge in his own cause.” In the oft-quoted case of Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander and others, (1968) 3 SCR 163, this Court held that a person in possession of land in assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. When the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides. The Court quoted Loft’s maxim ‘Possessio contra omnes valet praeter eur cui ius sit possessionis (He that hath possession hath right against all but him that hath the very right)’ and said: “A defendant in such a case must show in himself or his predecessor a valid legal title, or probably a possession prior to the plaintiff’s and thus be able to raise a presumption prior in time”. In M.C. Chockalingam and others v. V. Manickavasagam and others, (1974) 1 SCC 48 , this Court held that the law forbids forcible dispossession, even with the best of title. In Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his Lrs. v. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, (1989) 4 SCC 131 , it was held that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. In Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his Lrs. v. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, (1989) 4 SCC 131 , it was held that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. In Nagar Palika, Jind v. Jagat Singh, Advocate, (1995) 3 SCC 426, this Court held that disputed questions of title are to be decided by due process of law, but the peaceful possession is to be protected from the trespasser without regard to the question of the origin of the possession. When the defendant fails in proving his title to the suit land the plaintiff can succeed in securing a decree for possession on the basis of his prior possession against the defendant who has dispossessed him. Such a suit will be founded on the averment of previous possession of the plaintiff and dispossession by the defendant. 8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of he cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner. 9. It is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner. The concept of settled possession and the right of the possessor to protect his possession against the owner has come to be settled by a catena of decisions. Illustratively, we may refer to Munshi Ram and others v. Delhi Administration, (1968) 2 SCR 455 , Puran Singh and others v. The State of Punjab, (1975) 4 SCC 518 and Ram Rattan and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1977) 1 SCC 188 . The authorities need not be multiplied. In Munshi Ram and others’s case (supra), it was held that no one, including the true owner, has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land and in such a case unless he is evicted in the due course of law, he is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner. But merely stray or even intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. The possession which a trespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must be settled possession, extending over a sufficiently long period of time and acquiesced to by the true owner. A casual act of possession would not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. The rightful owner may re-enter and re-instate himself provided he does not use more force than is necessary. Such entry will be viewed only as resistance to an intrusion upon his possession which has never been lost. A casual act of possession would not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. The rightful owner may re-enter and re-instate himself provided he does not use more force than is necessary. Such entry will be viewed only as resistance to an intrusion upon his possession which has never been lost. A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force. In Puran Singh and others’s case (supra), the Court clarified that it is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as to when the possession of a trespasser can mature into settled possession. The ‘settled possession’ must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. The phrase ‘settled possession’ does not carry any special charm or magic in it; nor is it a ritualistic formula which can be confined in a strait-jacket. An occupation of the property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual physical possession. The Court laid down the following tests which may be adopted as a working rule for determining the attributes of ‘settled possession’ (SCC p. 527, para 12): (i) that the trespasser must be in actual physical possession of the property over a sufficiently long period; (ii) that the possession must be to the knowledge (either express or implied) of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser and which contains an element of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the trespasser would, however, be a matter to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case; (iii) the process of dispossession of the true owner by the trespasser must be complete and final and must be acquiesced to by the true owner; and (iv) that one of the usual tests to determine the quality of settled possession, in the case of culturable land, would be whether or not the trespasser, after having taken possession, had grown any crop. If the crop had been grown by the trespasser, then even the true owner has no right to destroy the crop grown by the trespasser and take forcible possession. 11. If the crop had been grown by the trespasser, then even the true owner has no right to destroy the crop grown by the trespasser and take forcible possession. 11. In the present case the Court has found the plaintiff as having failed in proving his title. Nevertheless, he has been found to be in settled possession of the property. Even the defendant failed in proving his title over the disputed land so as to substantiate his entitlement to evict the plaintiff. The Trial Court therefore left the question of title open and proceeded to determine the suit on the basis of possession, protecting the established possession and restraining the attempted interference therewith. The Trial Court and the High Court have rightly decided the suit. It is still open to the defendant-appellant to file a suit based on his title against the plaintiff-respondent and evict the latter on the former establishing his better right to possess the property.” 6. Reliance has also been placed upon para 11 & 12 of the judgment in Ram Daan v. Urban Improvement Trust, (2014) 8 SCC 902 , which reads as under : “11. It is settled position of law laid down by the Privy Council in Perry v. Clissold3: (AC p. 79) “It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the Statute of Limitations applicable to the case, his right is forever extinguished, and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.” The above statement was quoted with the approval by this Court in Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander, (1968) 3 SCR 163. Their Lordships at para 22 emphatically stated: (AIR p. 1175) “22. The cases of the Judicial Committee are not binding on us but we approve of the dictum in Perry v. Clissold3.” 12. The question, therefore, is that in view of the concurrent finding recorded by all the three Courts below that the appellant has been in possession of the property (at least from the year 1959) whether the injunction as prayed for by the appellant can be denied? The question, therefore, is that in view of the concurrent finding recorded by all the three Courts below that the appellant has been in possession of the property (at least from the year 1959) whether the injunction as prayed for by the appellant can be denied? As can be seen from the judgment3 of the Privy Council referred to supra, a person such as the appellant in possession of land has a perfectly good title against the entire world except the rightful owner. However, the rightful owner must assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the statutes of limitation applicable to the case.” 31. Learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, on the other hand, has relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court in Amba Prasad v. Mahboob Ali Shah and others, AIR 1965 SC 54 , Nath Singh v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1968 SC 1351 , Chandrika Prasad v. Pullo, 2000 (91) RD 340, Udai v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR 1990 SC 471 , for the proposition that the person not recorded as occupant in 1356 fasli or on the date of vesting will not get the benefit of Section 20(b)(ii) of the Act of 1950, inasmuch as what is relevant is the recording of entry of occupant in 1356 fasli, which in the facts of the case could not be established by the plaintiff-respondent. Reliance has been placed upon the entry of tenant in favour of defendant-appellant for the fasli year 1334. It is also submitted that the disputed property is an agricultural land, in respect of which revenue entry exists, and a claim for declaration of ownership and injunction would lie before the Civil Court. For the purposes reliance has been upon the judgments in Ram Avalamb (supra), Babu Ram v. District Judge, Varanasi, 2013 (119) RD 73, Kishori Prasad v. IIIrd A.D.J. Varanasi, 2002 (5) AWC 4269. 32. So far as the judgments, which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, to contend that a suit for possession simpliciter would be maintainable before the Civil Court and findings on the factual aspect need not be interfered with by the lower appellate Court, however erroneous the conclusions may be, would not be relevant in the facts of the present case. It is to be observed that in the facts of the present case, the judgment of the lower appellate Court is not being interfered with on any apparent error in appreciation of evidence. Issue which is required to be seen is as to whether the findings returned by lower appellate Court on the issue of grant of declaration or right in favour of plaintiff-respondent was within its jurisdiction or not? It has further to be seen as to whether the lower appellate Court was justified in brushing aside the challenge made to its jurisdiction in the facts of the present case. It has already been noticed that the lower appellate Court has proceeded to grant declaration of Sirdari right in favour of plaintiff-respondent as well as invalidity of resumption proceedings, although it was neither challenged nor the Union of India was a party to the proceedings. The finding on the issue of title was beyond the scope of Civil Court’s jurisdiction, which stood ousted by the provisions of Section 331 of the Act of 1950. In a case where the Court has transgressed its jurisdiction to return a finding, which is beyond its jurisdiction, this Court in a second appeal would be clearly justified in interfering with such patent error of jurisdiction. It is also relevant to note in the facts of the present case that various entries right from 1331 fasli had been relied upon by both the sides and issue of requisition of suit property by “Qaisare Hind” as well as its subsequent release were involved. No plea with regard to invalidity of resumption had been taken, nor any issue in this regard was framed, and therefore, intricate question of title could not be decided by the Civil Court in respect to agricultural land, where grant of declaration of title was necessary. The observation of the Apex Court in the case of Anathula Sudhakar (supra), therefore, would not come to the rescue of the plaintiff-respondent. The other decision relied upon in the case of Rama Gowda (supra) and Ram Daan (supra) also do not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case, as has been noticed above, inasmuch as the plaintiff could not be granted relief in the absence of declaration. The other decision relied upon in the case of Rama Gowda (supra) and Ram Daan (supra) also do not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case, as has been noticed above, inasmuch as the plaintiff could not be granted relief in the absence of declaration. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, main substantial issue requiring adjudication was of title, and possession was only consequential, and for such dispute the Civil Court was not the competent forum. 33. It is also to be noticed that an issue with regard to jurisdiction had been pressed before the lower appellate Court but the same was not gone into by the lower appellate Court on the ground that such an issue was not framed. Perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate Court clearly goes to show that it has adjudicated upon the rights of the parties over agricultural land in question, which was beyond the Civil Court’s jurisdiction. In such circumstances, it will have to be seen as to whether this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code would be justified in interfering with the matter. The jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 of the Code is confined to a substantial question of law. In Achintya Kumar Saha v. M/s. Nani Printers, AIR 2004 SC 1591 , it was held by the Apex Court that where the core issue is not adjudicated upon, it results in a substantial question of law. Para 9 of the judgment in Achintya Kumar Saha (supra) is reproduced : “9. We do not find any merit in the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant. The main issue around which the entire case evolves is : whether the agreement dated 5.7.1976 was a license or a tenancy. This issue was there before the trial Court and the agreement was held to be a license. It was there also before the lower Appellate Court but it was not adjudicated upon. The main issue around which the entire case evolves is : whether the agreement dated 5.7.1976 was a license or a tenancy. This issue was there before the trial Court and the agreement was held to be a license. It was there also before the lower Appellate Court but it was not adjudicated upon. When the core issue is not adjudicated upon, it results in a substantial question of law under Section 100 C.P.C. In the case of Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiward (Dead) by Lrs., AIR 2001 SC 965 , it has been held that whether a question of law is a substantial question of law in a case will depend on facts and circumstances of each case, the paramount consideration being the need to strike a balance between obligation to do justice and necessity to avoid prolongation of any dispute. In that matter, this Court found that an important issue had arisen for determination before the first appellate Court: whether dependent had made out the case of adverse possession and whether the suit filed by the plaintiff was liable to be dismissed as barred by time under Article 65 of the Limitation Act 1963, which issue was decided by a cryptic order passed by the first appellate Court and in the circumstances this Court took the view that failure to decide the core issue gives rise to a substantial question of law. In our view, the judgment of this Court in the case of Santosh Hazari (supra) applies to the facts of this case. Although the core issue of tenancy arose before the first appellate Court the same was not adjudicated upon and in the circumstances the High Court was right in invoking Section 103 C.P.C. Moreover as can be seen from the record, the plea of tenancy was allowed to be argued before the first appellate Court but the said point was not adjudicated upon. Lastly, in the High Court in second appeal, this point was argued by both sides whereupon the High Court gave its finding to the effect that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were tenants and their tenancy cannot be terminated without notice under Section 13(6) and the failure of appellant making out any of the grounds under Section 13(1) of the said Act 1956. Hence, the judgment of this Court in the case of Kshitish Chandra (supra) has no application. 1 and 2 were tenants and their tenancy cannot be terminated without notice under Section 13(6) and the failure of appellant making out any of the grounds under Section 13(1) of the said Act 1956. Hence, the judgment of this Court in the case of Kshitish Chandra (supra) has no application. It is now settled by the judgment of this Court in the case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, AIR 1979 SC 1745 , that in order to get a decree of eviction against the tenancy under any State Rent Control Act, determination of a lease in accordance with the T.P. Act is unnecessary and surplusage as the landlord cannot get the eviction of the tenant even after such determination and the tenant continues to be the tenant even thereafter till the landlord makes out a case under the Rent Act. This position is also indicated by the definition of the word ‘tenant” under Section 2(h) of the said Act 1956. 34. In Anathula Sudhakar (supra), it has also been observed that where complicated issue of title is involved, which cannot be determined without a declaration of title, mere hardship likely to be caused to the plaintiff-respondent by driving him to a fresh round of litigation after the pendency of the suit for three long decades would not matter. Para 32 of the judgment in Anathula Sudhakar (supra) is reproduced : “32. We are conscious of the fact that the suit was filed in the year 1978 and driving the plaintiffs to a fresh round of litigation after three decades would cause hardship to them. But the scope of civil cases are circumscribed by the limitations placed by the rules of pleadings, nature of relief claimed and the Court fee paid. The predicament of plaintiffs, was brought upon themselves, by failing to convert the suit to one for declaration even when the written statement was filed, and by not seeking amendment of issues to include an issue on the question of title. In the absence of a prayer of declaration of title and an issue regarding title, let alone the pleadings required for a declaration of title, the parties cannot be said to have an opportunity to have a full-fledged adjudication regarding title.” 35. In the absence of a prayer of declaration of title and an issue regarding title, let alone the pleadings required for a declaration of title, the parties cannot be said to have an opportunity to have a full-fledged adjudication regarding title.” 35. This Court, therefore, holds that the manner in which finding with regard to invalidity of requisition had been returned without any challenge made to it and without the State even impleaded as a party, and a declaration of Sirdari right in favour of plaintiff-respondent has been granted, has occasioned failure of justice. Jurisdiction of Civil Court was clearly ousted, in view of the provisions of Section 331 of the Act of 1950. 36. It is apparent that core issue of Civil Court to go into the question raised had been pressed, but the same was not answered. It would be relevant to refer to the provisions of 107 of the Code, which deals with the power of appellate Court. Section 107 of the Code is reproduced : “107. Powers of appellate Court.—(1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, an appellate Court shall have power— (a) to determine a case finally, (b) to remand a case; (c) to frame issues and refer them for trial; (d) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. (2) Subject as aforesaid, the appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein." 37. It is apparent that once a issue of jurisdiction had arisen before the lower appellate Court and was specifically pressed, the lower appellate Court had jurisdiction to frame an issue in that regard and refer it for trial, and it also had the jurisdiction to deal with the issue in the manner contemplated under the Code. The lower appellate Court, therefore, was not justified in refusing to entertain the issue, having noticed that such issue had arisen, only because a specific issue in this regard had not been framed by the trial Court. 38. The lower appellate Court, therefore, was not justified in refusing to entertain the issue, having noticed that such issue had arisen, only because a specific issue in this regard had not been framed by the trial Court. 38. In view of the discussions and the findings returned above, this Court is of the opinion that for grant of relief of injunction in favour of plaintiff-respondent, in the facts of the present case, the issue of right held by the parties over the agricultural land in question had to be necessarily gone into and a declaration of right in suit property was essential, which could be granted only by a competent revenue Court. Moreover, such a declaration could not have been granted unless the Union of India and State authorities were impleaded as a party, as the factum of resumption of suit property, was more or less admitted. 39. The second substantial question, therefore, is answered by holding that Civil Court had no jurisdiction in the matter, in the facts and circumstances of the case. In view of the finding returned on the second substantial question, it is not necessary for this Court to deal with first substantial question framed in this appeal, as the appeal is liable to succeed on the second substantial question alone. 40. For the reasons, aforesaid, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court dated 11.12.1984 in Civil Appeal No. 40 of 1982 is set aside, and the plaintiff’s suit is dismissed subject to the observations that it shall be open for the plaintiff-respondent to seek appropriate declaration of his right over the suit property from the revenue Court.

ASHIK ALI v. HARGEN