ORDER : 1. This revision petition arises out of dismissal of I.A.No.185 of 2011 by the learned District Judge, Karur. 2. The respondent/plaintiff sued the defendants/revision petitioners in O.S.No.86 of 2004 for specific performance of sale agreement with respect to the suit property. The defendants hotly contested the suit. 3. Trial went on. Plaintiff won, defendants lost. The plaintiff levied execution petition. I.A.No.185 of 2011 in A.S.S.R.No.8089 of 2011 was filed by the defendants with a delay of 212 days stating certain reasons, namely, jaundice and other connected matters. 4. The plaintiff opposed the said I.A contending that there was no medical proof to show that the defendants was afflicted with jaundice. 5. The Appellate Court agreed with this and dismissed the delay condonation petition. 6. According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioners/appellants that reasons have been stated, but the Appellate Court was too technical rather than practical. Atleast one opportunity should have given. 7. In this connection, the learned counsel cited Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others [2013 (5) LW 20]. 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the defendants participated in the trial proceedings. They were aware of the implications of the Judgment, only after filing the E.P, they filed the appeal. 9. I have anxiously considered the rival submissions, perused the materials on record, impugned order of the Tribunal and the decision cited. 10. The reasoning of the first Appellate Court may be correct, about 5 to 10 years ago, because during the earlier period, the Courts were stingy even in the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. They started counting the days and the reason with almost with tinged glasses. They mainly counted the length of it and not the substance. 11. But, in fact what is contemplated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is 'sufficient cause' being shown. Court can show its indulgence, earlier 'sufficient cause' was misunderstood, as length of delay subsequently pragmatism prevailed in the mind of the Court. 12. Courts started thinking that too much bookish English would defeat justice. They started thinking of pragmatic approach on the anvil of 'advancing of cause' of justice. It is a justice oriented approach. Court can show its indulgence, earlier 'sufficient cause' was misunderstood, as length of delay subsequently pragmatism prevailed in the mind of the Court. 12. Courts started thinking that too much bookish English would defeat justice. They started thinking of pragmatic approach on the anvil of 'advancing of cause' of justice. It is a justice oriented approach. In this perspective, they have given up their altitude towards the phraseology 'sufficient cause' employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act for their jolly ride dragging 'havenots' to tactics, 'haves' Court, Court entry of Court birds. If person has got substantial cause to be adjudicated, even the delay may be huge, they started condoning it. But, Section 5 petition intended to the parties wasting Court and public time. Vexatious litigations, petitions lacking bonafides, petitions intended to practice delaying tactics were not encouraged even the delay is very short. 13. Law should not be, cannot be static. It must be dynamic in tune with transportation, thinking process of society. It is 'march of law'. But legal fraternity has inertia to cope up with trend of law and still stick on to their old thought, as in the present case, jaundice has been stated on a reason. In this regard, the learned Appellate Judge is also second to none as he expected medical certificate for motive and treatment of jaundice. Both have not approached the matter in proper perspective. 14. In Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others [2013 (5) LW 20], the Hon'ble Supreme Court reviewed many decisions rendered on the exercise of their judicial discretion by the Court in Section 5 Limitation application and laid down certain guiding principles. They runs as under:- “15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:-a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters. 15. Now, in this case, plaintiff/respondent projected his case based on a written sale agreement containing certain terms and conditions. The defendants have filed up their written statement, actually the sale agreement is given by way of a security for a loan transaction and certain connected and related aspects. Defendants have to establish these aspects by adducing relevant legal evidence. 16. So far as admission of an appeal is concerned, the appellate Court can see whether the appeals involves some eminently arguable points. Whether there is a case for further adjudication, it need not be misunderstood as a good case or a strong case. There should be some substance in the appeal, whether the findings of the Courts below are perverse, for these aspects the grounds of appeal can be perused and they will supply 'sufficient cause' to condone the delay. 17. In this connection it is relevant to extract paragraph No.7 of the Judgment in Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others [2013 (5) LW 20] and the same reads thus:- 7. 17. In this connection it is relevant to extract paragraph No.7 of the Judgment in Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others [2013 (5) LW 20] and the same reads thus:- 7. In G. Ramegowda, Major and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore [2], Venkatachaliah, J. (as his Lordship then was), speaking for the Court, has opined thus:- “The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a number of pronouncements of this Court. See : Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd., [ (1962) 2 SCR 762 ]; Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [ (1969) 1 SCR 1006 ]; Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi [ (1979) 3 SCR 694 ]; Lala Mata Din v. A.Narayanan [ (1970) 2 SCR 90 ]; Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji etc. There is, it is true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fide on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay.” 18. Now, in this case, grounds have been filed and it is almost going to be redoing in the Appellate Court with some (golden) by the lawyer's at the Appellate Court. The first Appellate Court has the power to reappraise the entire materials on record afresh. 19. In this case, in the facts and circumstances, there is sufficient cause, scope for further adjudication by an appellate forum and specific performance an opportunity to far further. It is quite natural that the decree holder/plaintiff, who succeeded, will be very much interested in pursuing execution petition. Therefore, on filing of the execution petition itself, the Appellate Court need not be carried away that the application under Section 5 Limitation Act is whimsical. It is quite natural that the decree holder/plaintiff, who succeeded, will be very much interested in pursuing execution petition. Therefore, on filing of the execution petition itself, the Appellate Court need not be carried away that the application under Section 5 Limitation Act is whimsical. I am of the considered view that an opportunity can be given. 20. Of course, prejudice caused to the respondent/plaintiff can be compensated by appropriate cost. 21. When I proposed to inflict of cost of Rs.1,000/-(Rupees One Thousand Only), the learned counsel for the petitioner offered the payment of cash on hand and the learned counsel for the respondents also readily received the same in his hand. So ended this Section 5 Limitation Act matter so smoothly. 22. In view of the foregoings, this Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The impugned order of the learned District Judge, Karur passed in I.A.No.185 of 2011 is set aside and I.A.No.185 of 2011 stand allowed. The Appeal Suit in A.S.S.R.No.8089 of 2011 shall be processed as per rules and proceeded further as per law. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is also closed.