JUDGMENT S.K. SAHOO, J. 1. This appeal under Section 378 Cr. P.C. has been filed by the appellants challenging the impugned judgment and order dated 30.06.1980 of the learned Sessions Judge, Bolangir-Kalahandi, Bolangir passed in Sessions Case No.37-B of 1976 and Sessions Case No.36-B of 1978 in acquitting all the nine respondents of the charges under sections 120-B, 147, 302/34 and 302/149 Indian Penal Code so also the respondent no.1 of the charge under section 302 Indian Penal Code. At the time of hearing, it was stated at the Bar that respondent no.1-Premlal Suna, respondent no.2-Jagyan Puruseth, respondent no.4-Gunanidhi Ghasi @ Banchhor, respondent no.5-Prafulla Bhoi, respondent no.6-Sugyan Sandh and respondent no.8-Tikaram Agrawalla are dead. The learned counsel for the State on taking instruction from the concerned police station also confirmed the death of the aforesaid respondents. In view of such submissions, this Criminal Appeal stands abated as against respondent nos.1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8 in view of the provisions under Section 394 (1) Cr. P.C. Thus the Criminal Appeal now survives only in respect of respondent no.3-Dhobai Podh, respondent no.7-Prasanna Kumar Pal and respondent no.9-Artatrana Singhdeo. 2. The appellants preferred an application under sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 378 Cr. P.C. for grant of leave to appeal from the impugned judgment and order of acquittal before this Court on 26.09.1980 which was registered as Criminal Misc. Case No.423 of 1980. The said application was dismissed at the stage of admission on 12.01.1982. The appellants preferred an appeal by Special Leave before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the order dated 12.01.1982 of this Court for summarily dismissing the application for grant of leave. The appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was registered as Criminal Appeal No.711 of 1983. The Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 02.12.1983 granted leave under Section 378(4) Cr. P.C. and directed this Court to hear the appeal on merits and dispose of the same in accordance with law. After receipt of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Criminal Misc. Case No.423 of 1980 was re-registered as the present Criminal Appeal No.22 of 1984. 3. The prosecution case, in short, is that the accused-respondents were the members of Yuva Congress Party and they were political adversaries of the deceased Parsuram Satpathy (hereafter “the deceased”), who was the brother of appellant no.1 Hareram Satpathy. Case No.423 of 1980 was re-registered as the present Criminal Appeal No.22 of 1984. 3. The prosecution case, in short, is that the accused-respondents were the members of Yuva Congress Party and they were political adversaries of the deceased Parsuram Satpathy (hereafter “the deceased”), who was the brother of appellant no.1 Hareram Satpathy. The deceased was a Journalist by profession and a staunch supporter of Bharatiya Lok Dal. There was political rivalry between the parties and several criminal litigations cropped up between them prior to the date of occurrence. A case and counter case was instituted between the parties on 16.11.1974 and in that connection the deceased was arrested on 16.11.1974 and he was released on bail on 22.11.1974. Two days prior the occurrence i.e. on 27.11.1974, some of the respondent-accused persons had threatened the informant Hareram Satpathy (appellant no.1). It is the further case of the prosecution that the occurrence took place on 29.11.1974 at about 7.30 p.m. on the road in between P.P. Academy Chhak and Bhagirathi Chhak of Balangir Town. At that time, the deceased and P.W.1 Bibhudananda Udgata were proceeding towards Bhagirathi Chhak. P.W.1 was holding his cycle. The respondents were waiting near P.P.Academy Chhak in a Congress Party Jeep. Someone sitting inside the jeep informed the other occupants about the arrival of the deceased in a loud voice. Being apprehensive of danger, the deceased took the cycle from P.W.1 and speedily proceeded towards Bhagirathi Chhak. The respondents chased the deceased in the Jeep and dashed the Jeep against the cycle of the deceased. The deceased fell down on the ground but even thereafter the respondents in order to kill the deceased brought the Jeep back by reverse gear and deliberately ran over the Jeep on the deceased for which the deceased sustained severe injuries on his person and eventually succumbed to the injuries. It is the further prosecution case that P.W.1 Bibhudananda Udgata, P.W.12 Hrudananda Nanda and P.W.18 Hareram Satpathy (appellant no.1) reached at the spot where the deceased was lying in a pool of blood. On the request of P.W.1, one Advocate of Bolangir namely Shri Hari Bandhu Swain informed the incident to Sadar Police Station, Bolangir over phone. On the basis of such telephonic communication, Station Diary Entry No.691 dated 29.11.1974 (Ext. A) was made. P.W.19 Pabitra Mohan Das, Sub-Inspector of Police along with other police officials proceeded to the spot. On the request of P.W.1, one Advocate of Bolangir namely Shri Hari Bandhu Swain informed the incident to Sadar Police Station, Bolangir over phone. On the basis of such telephonic communication, Station Diary Entry No.691 dated 29.11.1974 (Ext. A) was made. P.W.19 Pabitra Mohan Das, Sub-Inspector of Police along with other police officials proceeded to the spot. At the spot, P.W.18 Hareram Satpathy lodged a written report (Ext. 12/2) at 7.40 p.m before P.W.19. The report was sent by P.W.19 to Sadar Police Station, Bolangir for registration and accordingly Bolangir Sadar P.S. Case No.281 of 1974 was registered on 29.11.1974 at 7.50 p.m. under Section 147/302/149/120-B Indian Penal Code. P.W.19 arranged a police jeep for shifting the cadaver of the deceased to the District Headquarters Hospital, Bolangir in the same night. P.W.19 found the cycle lying in a damaged condition and also skid marks of a vehicle at the spot. After making arrangement to guard the spot till the morning, P.W.19 examined some witnesses, searched for the accused persons in their houses but he could only be able to arrest two accused persons, namely, respondent no.3-Dhobai Podh and respondent no.4-Gunanidhi Ghasi @ Banchhor (since dead). On 30.11.1974 P.W.19 conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased at Bolangir Hospital in presence of the witnesses and prepared inquest report Ext.30. He also sent the dead body for post mortem examination through constables. He further visited the spot and seized blood stained earth and sample earth from the place of occurrence and some human hairs in the presence of the witnesses vide seizure list Ext.15. The cycle was seized under seizure list Ext.16. On 30.11.1974 P.W.22 Arjun Behera who was the Circle Inspector of Police, Sadar, Bolangir took over charge of investigation from P.W.19. He also visited the spot, arrested respondent no.8-Tikaram Agrawalla, received post-mortem report Ext.2, seized the Jeep bearing registration no.DLH-9836 on 2.12.1974 from the garage of the Congress Party which was locked from outside and the lock was sealed and the garage was guarded by the police. The photographs of the Jeep were taken and scientific experts from F.S.L., Rasulgarh, Bhubaneswar also technically examined the Jeep. On requisition of P.W.22, the M.V.I. (P.W.6) also examined the Jeep. The Jeep was seized under seizure list Ext.1. The photographs of the Jeep were taken and scientific experts from F.S.L., Rasulgarh, Bhubaneswar also technically examined the Jeep. On requisition of P.W.22, the M.V.I. (P.W.6) also examined the Jeep. The Jeep was seized under seizure list Ext.1. On 11.12.1974 P.W.22 handed over the charge of investigation to P.W.20 Gadadhar Das, Inspector of Police, CID (C.B.), Cuttack as per the orders of D.I.G., (CID and Railways). P.W.20 also visited the spot, examined the witnesses and after completion of investigation submitted charge-sheet on 10.02.1975 only against six accused persons i.e. respondents no.1 to respondent no.6. So far as the respondents no.7, 8 and 9 were concerned, the police submitted a final report saying that from the investigation carried on by it, no offence appeared to have been made out against them. 4. A protest petition was filed before the learned S.D.J.M., Bolangir and on perusal of the materials available on record, finding a prima facie case made out against the respondents no.7, 8 and 9, process was issued against them vide order dated 20.11.1975. The order of the learned S.D.J.M., Bolangir was challenged before this Court in Criminal Revision Nos.344 and 365 of 1975. A single Judge of this Court after detailed and meticulous scrutiny of the statements, allowed the revision petitions vide order dated 25.8.1976 and set aside the order of issuance of process against the respondents no.7, 8 and 9 holding that there was no material on record to make out a prima facie case against those respondents and the order of the Magistrate issuing process was without jurisdiction. Being dissatisfied with the order of this Court, the appellant no.1-Hareram Satpathy preferred an appeal by Special Leave before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No.551 of 1976. The Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 25.8.1978 set aside the judgment and order of this Court and accordingly respondents no.7, 8 and 9 also faced trial alongwith respondents no.1 to respondent no.6. The appellant no.2-Sitaram Satpathy who is another brother of the deceased during pendency of the protest petition, filed a complaint petition before learned S.D.J.M., Bolangir against 13 accused persons including the nine respondents which was registered as I.C.C. Case No.6 of 1975. The complaint petition was eventually dismissed on 14.2.1977 by the learned S.D.J.M., Bolangir. 5. The defence plea of the respondents nos. 3 and 7 was one of denial. Respondent no.9 took plea of alibi. The complaint petition was eventually dismissed on 14.2.1977 by the learned S.D.J.M., Bolangir. 5. The defence plea of the respondents nos. 3 and 7 was one of denial. Respondent no.9 took plea of alibi. He pleaded that he was absent from Bolangir at the relevant time and had been to Tusra and other places to arrange meetings for the then Chief Minister who was to visit the area shortly. 6. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined 22 witnesses. P.W.1 Bibhudananda Udgata, P.W.12 Hrudananda Nanda, P.W.14 Sankar Tripathy and P.W.18 Hareram Satpathy are the eye witnesses to the occurrence. P.W.2 Bharat Chandra Gouintia was the Executive Magistrate, Balangir who is a witness to the seizure of the Jeep and other articles from the garage of the District Congress Office of Bolangir under seizure list Ext.1. P.W.3 Dr. Rajkumar Mukharjee conducted post mortem over the dead body of the deceased and proved the post mortem report Ext.2. He also gave his opinion on the query of the Investigation Officer separately vide Ext.3 and Ext.4. P.W.4 Arjun Singh was the photographer S.I. of F.S.L., Rasulgarh, Bhubaneswar and he proved some photographs. P.W.5 Kalia Mishra was the constable attached to Bolangir Sadar Police Station who accompanied the dead body for the purpose of post mortem examination and produced the wearing apparels of the deceased before the I.O. after post mortem examination. P.W.6 Ramachandra Das was the Motor Vehicle Inspector, Bolangir who examined the Jeep on the requisition of the Investigating Officer and submitted his report Ext.8. P.W.7 Dasarathi Satpathy is a witness to the seizure of the Jeep and other articles from the garage of the District Congress Office, Bolangir. P.W.8 Bilwa Mangal Das was the constable who carried the dead body for post mortem examination. P.W.9 Arjun Rana was the Building A.S.I. of Police at Bolangir who prepared the sketch map Ext.11. P.W.10 Akhya Kumar Tripathy was the A.S.I. of Bolangir Police Station who drew up formal F.I.R. Ext.12. P.W.11 Kunja Bihari Puruseth is a formal witness. P.W.13 Kamadev Sethi is a witness to the seizure of bloodstained earth, sample earth and some human hairs under seizure list Ext.15 and he is also a witness to the seizure of a cycle under seizure list Ext.16. P.W.15 Dibakar Tandi is a witness to the seizure of front wheel of the Jeep bearing registration no. P.W.13 Kamadev Sethi is a witness to the seizure of bloodstained earth, sample earth and some human hairs under seizure list Ext.15 and he is also a witness to the seizure of a cycle under seizure list Ext.16. P.W.15 Dibakar Tandi is a witness to the seizure of front wheel of the Jeep bearing registration no. DLH 9836 at Bolangir District Congress Office under seizure list Ext.17. P.W.16 Ashok Kumar Misra stated about the extra judicial confession of respondent no.8 inside Bolangir Jail. P.W.17 Panchunath Sahu was the Assistant Regional Transport Officer of Baripada who stated that the Registration Nos. ORM-2184 and DLH-9836 are of the same vehicle. P.W.19 Pabitra Mohan Das was the Sub-Inspector of Police attached to Bolangir Sadar Police Station who is one of the Investigating Officers. P.W.20 Gadadhar Das, Inspector of Police, C.I.D., Crime Branch was another Investigating Officer. P.W.21 Sarat Chandra Mallick proved a letter vide Ext.43. P.W.22 Arjun Behera was the Circle Inspector of Police, Sadar, Bolangir who was also one of the Investigating Officers. During course of trial, the prosecution has exhibited 47 documents. Ext.1 is the seizure list, Ext.2 is the post mortem report, Ext.3 and 4 are the opinions of P.W.3 to the query made by I.O., Exts.5 to 5/9 are the photographs, Ext. During course of trial, the prosecution has exhibited 47 documents. Ext.1 is the seizure list, Ext.2 is the post mortem report, Ext.3 and 4 are the opinions of P.W.3 to the query made by I.O., Exts.5 to 5/9 are the photographs, Ext. 6 to 6/9 are the negative photographs, Ext.7 is the command certificate, Ext.8 is the report of M.V.I., Ext.9 is the seizure list, Ex.10 is the command certificate, Ext.11 is the sketch map, Ext.12 is the formal F.I.R., Ext.13 is the carbon copy of complaint petition filed by P.W.11, Ext.14 is the statement of P.W.12 in 202 enquiry in 1.C.C.No.6 of 1975, Ext.15 is the seizure list of blood stained earth etc., Ext.16 is the seizure list of cycle from the spot, Ext.17 is the seizure list of the wheel of the jeep, Ext.18 is an affidavit, Ext.19 is the Temporary Registration Certificate of the Jeep, Ext.20 is the registration book, Ext.21 is the F.I.R. in S.C. No.19-B of 1974, Ext.22 is the certificate issued in favour of Parasuram Satpathy, Ext.23 and 24 are the station diary entries, Ext.25 is the carbon copy of petition to the Governor of Orissa, Ext.26 is the endorsement and signature of deceased, Ext.27 is the original petition dated 28.11.74, Ext.28 is the letter of P.W.18 to the Collector of Bolangir, Ext.29 is the requisition for medical examination, Ext.30 is the inquest report, Ext.31 is the dead body challan, Ext.32 to 36 are the station diary entries, Ext.37 is the order sheet, Ext.38 is the P.R. in Crl. M.C. No.480 of 1972, Ext.39 is the order sheet dated 29.12.1972, Ext.40 is the forwarding letter for chemical examination, Ext.41 and 42 are the carbon copy and original statement of A.K. Patnaik respectively, Ext.43 is the letter dated 2.12.1974, Ext.44 is the opinion of the chemical examiner, Ext.45 is the opinion of the serologist, Ext.46 is the certified copy of order dated 16.7.1976 in T.S. No.31/75 and Ext.47 is the carbon copy of the petition dated 28.7.1976. The prosecution also proved 11 material objects. The prosecution also proved 11 material objects. M.O.I is a pair of boot, M.O.II is the blue suit (A coat and a full pant), M.O.III is the cycle, M.O.IV is the Godrej Lock, M.O.V is the Tiger Lock, M.O.VI is the Turkish Towel, M.O.VII is the Sishu Lathi, M.O.VIII is the left side wheel of Jeep (front), M.O.IX is the human hairs, M.O.X is the Jeep, M.O.XI is the under-wear of deceased. 7. In order to substantiate the defence plea, the respondents examined nine witnesses. D.W.1 Sradhananda Panigrahi proved certain leaflets. D.W.2 Lalit Mohan Nanda proved the plaint copy in T.S. No.31/75 of the Court of Munsif, Bolangir. D.W.3 Narsingh Prasad Nanda was a member of Rajya Sabha who was examined in support of the plea of alibi taken by respondent no.9. D.W.4 Bimal Prasad Rath proved a letter issued by Municipal Council, Bolangir. D.W.5 Lingaraj Padhi was an Advocate of Bolangir who proved some documents under the signatures and handwritings of Hari bandhu Swain, Advocate. D.W.6 Ambika Charan Sharma proved some news items published in an Oriya weekly magazine. D.W.7 Kusa Nag was the Tax Daroga, Bolangir Municipality who stated that no licence for any cycle was issued during 197374 and 1974-75. D.W.8 Niranjan Das is a formal witness. D.W.9 Hrudananda Das was the Officer-in-Charge of Bolangir Town Police Station who stated to have conducted some confidential inquiry on an affidavit of Shri Ashok Misra as per the direction of S.P., Bolangir. The defence also exhibited certain documents. Ext.A and B are the station diary entries, Ext.C is the copy of protest petition, Ext.D is the certified copy of Vakalatnama, Ext.E is the certified copy of order in I.C.C. No.42 of 1975, Ext.F is the certified copy of Suit register, Ext.G is the certified copy of Misc. Case register, Ext.H of the signature of Sri Mrutyunjaya Panda, Principal, Ext.I is the photo of Governor of Orissa in Rajendra College, Ext.J is the L.I.C. receipt granted in favour of Tikaram Agrawala, Ext.K is the licence no.2 in favour of Tikaram Agrawala to act as Insurance agent, Ext.L is the signature of P.W.14 on the memorandum of Bhagawat Kalaparisad, Ext.M is the signature of P.W.14 on the Minute of proceeding of Bhagabat Kalaparisada, Ext.N is the certified copy of order sheet, Ext.P is the complaint petition in I.C.C. No.6 of 75 of the Court of S.D.J.M., Bolangir, Ext. Q to Q/4 are the statement of Hareram Satpathy U/s. 202 Cr. P.C. in I.C.C. No.6 of 1975, Ext.R is the statement u/s. 161 Cr. P.C. of Kamdeb Seth, Ext.S is the order sheet dated 27.07.74 in Crl. M.C. No.480 of 1972 of the Court of Executive Magistrate Bolangir, Ext.T is the show-cause in complaint proceeding in I.C.C. No.6 of 75, Ext.U is the order-sheet dt.4.3.75 in I.C.C. No.6 of 75, Ext.V & V/1 are the statement under Section 161 Cr. P.C. of Shankar Prasad Tripathy, Ext.W is the leaflet regarding Bolangir Municipality Election dated 31.3.73, Ext.W/1 is a pamphlet of Janata Party for Bolangir Municipality Election, Ext.X is the plaint in T.S. No.31 of 1975 of the Court of Munisif, Bolangir, Ext.Y is the letter no.3105 dated 27.11.1979 of the Executive Officer, Bolangir, Ext.Z to Z/3 are the signatures of H.B. Swain in the memorandum in Crl. Rev. No.365 of 75 of the Hon’ble Court, Ext.AA is the affidavit filed by Hareram Satpathy in Crl. Rev. No.365 of 75 before the Hon’ble Court, Ext.BB is the news and views item in a weekly, Ext.BB/1 and Ext.BB/2 are the captions, Ext.CC is the signature of Sri C.S. Rao, Advocate on the paper book, Ext.DD is the order sheets in 1.C.C. No.6 of 75 and Ext.EE is the order sheet in G.R. Case No.437 of 74 of the S.D.J.M., Bolangir. Cause of death of the deceased 8. Adverting at the outset as to the whether the prosecution has proved that the deceased Pursuram Satpathy died a homicidal death, we found that the prosecution, apart from relying upon the Inquest Report (Ext.30), has examined P.W.3 Dr. Rajkumar Mukharjee who had conducted post-mortem examination over the cadaver of the deceased on 30.11.1974. Cause of death of the deceased 8. Adverting at the outset as to the whether the prosecution has proved that the deceased Pursuram Satpathy died a homicidal death, we found that the prosecution, apart from relying upon the Inquest Report (Ext.30), has examined P.W.3 Dr. Rajkumar Mukharjee who had conducted post-mortem examination over the cadaver of the deceased on 30.11.1974. The doctor had noticed the following ante mortem injuries:- (i) An abrasion on the right side of the face and forehead measuring 5 ½” x 4 ½” extending from the angle of the forehead transversely extending from a point 1” anterior to the right ear to a point medial angle of the eye-brow; (ii) An abrasion of the size of 2 ½” x ¼” on the extensor aspect of the left arm situated vertically extending from lateral epicondyle to above; (iii) Multiple abrasions within 2” and ½” on the extensor aspect of the left hand over the third, fourth and fifth knuckle; (iv) An abrasion of the size of 1/10” x 1/10” over the second, fourth and fifth fingers from the extensor aspect of left hand on the first interphalangeal joints; (v) An abrasion of the size of ½” x ½” on the middle of the extensor aspect of the left arm 6” above the olecranon; (vi) An abrasion of the size of 1 ½” x ½” on the left patella; (vii) An abrasion of the size of 2 ½” x 1” over the medial aspect of the left leg 6” above medial malleolus; (viii) An abrasion of the size of ½” x ½” on the posterior aspect of the left lateral malleolus; (ix) An abrasion of the size of ¼” x ¼” on the left leg over the head of the fibula; (x) An abrasion of the size of ½” x ¼” on the right palm on the thenar eminence; (xi) An abrasion of the size of ½” x ¾” on the right knee just above patella; (xii) An abrasion of the size of 1” x ½” on the right side of the back at the level of 10th thoracic spine 1” lateral to the mid line. On dissection of the face and skull injury, P.W.3 found that blood clots were present over the pericranium and the frontal bone and both the parietal bones were fractured into pieces with laceration of the meningeal and underlying brain tissue. On dissection of the face and skull injury, P.W.3 found that blood clots were present over the pericranium and the frontal bone and both the parietal bones were fractured into pieces with laceration of the meningeal and underlying brain tissue. The injuries were all ante-mortem in nature and in the opinion of the doctor, the death of the deceased was due to compression and laceration of the brain as a result of fracture of the skull. Ext.2 is the P.M. report. To the query of the I.O., P.W.3 opined under Ext.3 that the cause of the injury on the head of the deceased by running over of the wheel of a jeep cannot be ruled out. To the further query, the doctor has opined under Ext.4 that the head injury was grievous and might have been caused by hard and blunt substance. The prosecution put some questions to the doctor for clarification who opined that before the head injury was caused, the deceased must have been lying on the ground. He further opined that his head must have been bent towards the right side and lying in a standstill position when it was sandwitched by two heavy hard and blunt substances. He further opined that the head injury on the deceased could not be caused by an accidental dash of a Jeep. According to him, if after the dash of Jeep, the injured falls down on the ground and the Jeep is drawn backwards by reverse gear and again it is run over the head of the injured, then the head injury could be caused. To the Court’s questions, the doctor opined that in case of dash of a Jeep to the victim while riding a cycle, the first impact would result in the fall of the victim on the ground and the head injury as described in the post mortem report of the deceased would be caused only after the wheel of the Jeep is dashed for the second time and runs over a part of the head. The doctor further opined that if a man was dashed against a Jeep and the man fell down on the ground and becomes immobile due to shock, injury or otherwise, the head injury of the type on the deceased might be caused if the head of the victim only comes in direct contact with the wheel of the Jeep and crushed between the hard ground and the wheel. The defence put a pertinent question to the doctor as to whether the head injury as sustained by the deceased was possible if a vehicle is dashed against a person from behind while he was riding a cycle at a great speed and the cyclist violently falls down on the ground at a distance of about 30 ft. and a part of his face comes in violent contact with the ground tangentially? The doctor has given a specific reply that even then also the head injury as sustained by the deceased could not be possible. The learned trial Court after discussing the evidence of the doctor and post mortem report held that from the nature of injuries and medical opinion, the death of the deceased appears to be homicidal and it was due to the head injury i.e., the compression and laceration of the brain as a result of the fracture of the skull and the head injury was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. However, the learned trial Court in the ultimate analysis summarized his findings in Para-40 of the judgment wherein he has held that the death of the deceased took place as a result of head injury which might have been caused by running over of a vehicle or by any other mode. The learned counsel for the appellants Mr. Swain contended that the conclusions of the learned trial Court that the death of the deceased took place “or by any other mode” is nothing but a mere assumption without any reasonings or materials available on record to that effect. It is further contended that the defence has neither elicited anything from the doctor’s evidence nor brought any independent materials to arrive at such a finding that the death was possible by any other mode. The learned counsel for the respondents Mr. It is further contended that the defence has neither elicited anything from the doctor’s evidence nor brought any independent materials to arrive at such a finding that the death was possible by any other mode. The learned counsel for the respondents Mr. Palit on the other hand contended that the opinion evidence of the doctor is hardly decisive and it is advisory in nature and not binding upon the Court. He further contended that the Court has to form its own opinion considering the material data available on record. The learned counsel placed some extracts by specialist authors to challenge the medical evidence. It is the settled principle of law that if the defence/prosecution intends to contradict the version of the medical expert by some opinion expressed in any text books or literature then such materials should be confronted to the concerned medical expert. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunder Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 28 and Bhagwan Dass v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1957 SC 589 held that findings of an expert cannot be set aside by a Court by making a reference to some literature/book without confronting the expert with them and directing his opinion on it. In the case of Gambhir v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1982 SC 1157 , it was held that the Court should not usurp the function of an expert by arriving at its own conclusions contrary to the one given by the expert witness. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Sanjay Rai, 2004 Criminal Law Journal 2006, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed at Para 17 of the judgment as follows:- “17. It cannot be said that the opinions of these authors were given in regard to circumstances exactly similar to those which arose in the case now before us nor is this a satisfactory way of dealing with or disposing of the evidence of an expert examined in this case unless the passages which are sought to be relied to discredit his opinion are put to him. This Court in Sunderlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 28 , disapproved of Judges drawing conclusions adverse to the accused by relying upon such passages in the absence of their being put to medical witnesses. Similar view was expressed in Bhagwan Das and Another v. State of Rajasthan, (1957) 1 SCR 854. This Court in Sunderlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 28 , disapproved of Judges drawing conclusions adverse to the accused by relying upon such passages in the absence of their being put to medical witnesses. Similar view was expressed in Bhagwan Das and Another v. State of Rajasthan, (1957) 1 SCR 854. Though opinions expressed in text books by specialist authors may be of considerable assistance and importance for the Court in arriving at the truth, cannot always be treated or viewed to be either conclusive or final as to what such author says to deprive even a Court of law to come to an appropriate conclusion of its own on the peculiar facts proved in a given case. In substance, though such views may have persuasive value cannot always be considered to be authoritatively binding, even to dispense with the actual proof otherwise reasonably required of the guilt of the accused in a given case. Such opinions cannot be elevated to or placed on higher pedestal than the opinion of an expert examined in Court and the weight ordinarily to which it may be entitled to or deserves to be given”. Thus it should always be kept in mind that the opinions given in books are not circumstance-specific and they will have only persuasive value and they cannot be made binding unless the experts are confronted to give answer to such opinions of authors expressed by them in their textbooks. It cannot be forgotten that the experts of certain specialized field are expected to be well conversant with the opinions of authors expressed in various textbooks, to suitably answer the questions, if asked to them in their cross-examination. No doubt, opinions expressed in the text books by specialist authors are of considerable assistance but such opinions cannot be relied upon unless put to the said expert witness during his cross-examination. In the present case, since the literature produced before us by the learned counsel for the respondents were not confronted to P.W.3 for his opinion, we cannot rely upon the same. In the present case, since the literature produced before us by the learned counsel for the respondents were not confronted to P.W.3 for his opinion, we cannot rely upon the same. After going through the evidence of P.W. 3, post mortem report Ext.2, the opinion of the doctor to specific queries of the I.O., Public Prosecutor and the trial Court so also giving our anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective parties, we are of the opinion that there is no inherent defect in the medical evidence and as such the learned trial Court was not justified in substituting its own opinion in addition to the opinion given by the doctor and coming to the conclusion that the death of the deceased took place as a result of head injury “or by any other mode”. We are of the view that the prosecution has successfully established that the death of the deceased took place due to compression and laceration of the brain as a result of fracture of skull which was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death and the head injury had been caused not on account of any accidental dash of the vehicle but after the deceased fell down on the ground due to dash, the head of the deceased was ran over by the vehicle again by drawing the vehicle backwards by reverse gear and therefore the death of the deceased is homicidal in nature. Date, Time and Place of occurrence. 9. According to the prosecution case, the occurrence took place on 29.11.1974 at about 7.00 p.m. to 7.30 p.m. on the road running from Puja Mandap Chhak in the East to Bhagirathi Chhak on the West locally known as Dhobapada under Sadar Police Station in the district of Balangir. The Investigating Officer P.W.19 arrived at the spot on 29.11.1974 immediately after receipt of the telephonic message which according to him was less than a furlong from Sadar Police Station, Bolangir. At the spot, he found the deceased was lying on the Kalamandala Road (Dhobapada Road) near the house of Indrajit Seth. The road was leading from east to west and the deceased was lying on the southern side of the road outside the pitch portion of the road. The face of the deceased was towards south and right side of the body touched the ground and left side was upwards. The road was leading from east to west and the deceased was lying on the southern side of the road outside the pitch portion of the road. The face of the deceased was towards south and right side of the body touched the ground and left side was upwards. Blood was coming out from the head of the deceased. He also found a cycle in a damaged condition lying at the spot as well as a skid mark of a vehicle on the spot. On the next day i.e. on 30.11.1974, P.W.19 revisited the spot and found the spot to be guarded by police personnels. According to P.W.19, the place of occurrence was on the road running from Puja Mandap Chhak in the East to Bhagirathi Chhak on the West. On both the sides of the pitch portion of the road, the width of the non-mental road was 5 ft. and according to him, the deceased was lying at a distance of 2 ft. from the end of the pitch road on the southern side. He also marked flow of blood up to the length of 6 ft. from north to south. Some hairs were found at the spot, at a distance of 9 ft. towards the east of blood stains. A black coloured old cycle was lying in a damaged condition at a distance of 35 ft. from the blood stain on the east which was at a distance of 1 ½ ft. on the southern side of the pitch portion. P.W.19 also marked the right wheel mark on the pitch road at a distance of 5 ft. from non-mental portion of the southern side. The length of the wheel mark was 85 ft. i.e. 60 ft. length on the eastern side of the blood stain and 25 ft. on the western side of the blood stain. He also found another skid mark at a distance of 18 ft. from the place where the cycle was lying on the north-eastern side and skid mark was on the pitch road away from the non-mental portion by 1 ½ ft. on the northern side. P.W.19 also seized some blood stained earth and some sample earth from the place of occurrence and some human hairs (M.O.IX) under seizure list Ext.15. He also seized the damaged cycle M.O.III under seizure list Ext.16. on the northern side. P.W.19 also seized some blood stained earth and some sample earth from the place of occurrence and some human hairs (M.O.IX) under seizure list Ext.15. He also seized the damaged cycle M.O.III under seizure list Ext.16. P.W.4 was the photographer S.I. of F.S.L., Rasulgarh, Bhubaneswar who took photographs on 2.12.1974 as per the direction of S.P., Balangir. He proved the photograph Ext.5/6 of the damaged cycle lying at the place of occurrence and some skid marks. Ext.5/4 and 5/5 are the photographs of the place of occurrence from both the sides of the road. Ext.5/7 is the photograph of blood stains on the place of occurrence. Ext.5/8 is the view of the place of the occurrence and Ext.5/9 is the photograph of the skid mark. P.W.9, the Building A.S.I. of Police at Bolangir prepared the sketch map of the place of occurrence on 6.12.1974 vide Ext.11 and according to him the blood stains were found at a distance of 5 ft. from the pitch road on the southern side and there was mark of wheel on the pitch road which was 85 ft. long which he had shown in the map. P.W.6 was the M.V.I. of Bolangir visited the spot on 2.12.1974 and according to him skid mark of the length 4 ft. was visible on the right side of the road. From the evidence of the four eye witnesses i.e. P.Ws.1, 12, 14 and 18, it is apparent that the occurrence has taken place on 29.11.1974 at about 7 p.m. to 7.30 p.m. at Dhobapada on the road running from Puja Mandap Chhak to Bhagirathi Chhak. Apart from the ocular testimonies of the eye witnesses, from the evidence of P.W.4, P.W.6, P.W.9 and P.W.19 also coupled with the sketch map and photographs, it is very clear that so far as the date, time and place of occurrence is concerned, there is no infirmity in the prosecution case. The learned counsel for the respondents during argument did not seriously challenge on such aspects. Thus, we are of the view that from the evidence on record, it is clear that the occurrence took place on the road running from Puja Mandap Chhak in the East to Bhagirathi Chhak on the West locally known as Dhobapada near the house of Indrajit Seth on 29.11.1974 at about 7.00 p.m. to 7.30 p.m. Involvement of the Jeep M.O.X 10. Coming to the involvement of the Jeep M.O.X in the occurrence in question, we found that the learned trial Court has discussed the evidence on record for the purpose of deciding whether the Jeep was used at the material time or not in para-6 of the Judgment. The Jeep M.O.X was used by Congress Party Members in Bolangir Town. D.W.3 has stated that the Jeep bearing Registration No.DLH-9836 belonged to Chaitanya Prasad Majhi who was the Ex-Congress M.P. and he had acquired the Jeep from the Military disposal and spared the vehicle for use by Congress Party. The learned trial Court has held that it was no more controversy that the Jeep M.O.X at the material time was used by the Congress Party Members in Bolangir Town. So far as the seizure of the Jeep is concerned, P.W.22, Circle Inspector of Police, Sadar, Bolangir who took over the charge of investigation on 30.11.1974 has stated that he seized the Jeep bearing No.DLH-9836 on 2.12.1974 from the garage of Congress and the garage was locked from outside and the lock was sealed previously. The garage was guarded by police and in presence of a Magistrate P.W.2, he broke open the lock, opened the garage and seized the Jeep. P.W.2 was the Executive Magistrate posted at Bolangir Town who has also stated about the breaking open of the doors of garage and seizure of Jeep from inside the garage under seizure list Ext.1. P.W.19, the first investigating officer has stated that on 29.11.1974 between 11.00 p.m. to 12.00 mid-night, he was searching for the Jeep involved in the occurrence and on that day, it was not brought to his notice that the Jeep suspected to have been involved in the occurrence was kept under seal in a garage which he came to know on the next day. There is absolute no evidence on record as to who kept the Jeep in question inside the garage and sealed the lock of the garage. P.W.19 seized the rear wheel of the Jeep (M.O.VIII) which appeared to have contained human blood. The scraping of the tyre was sent for chemical examination. The serologist report Ext.45 indicates that the stain from the rear tyre shows human blood although blood group could not be determined. P.W.19 seized the rear wheel of the Jeep (M.O.VIII) which appeared to have contained human blood. The scraping of the tyre was sent for chemical examination. The serologist report Ext.45 indicates that the stain from the rear tyre shows human blood although blood group could not be determined. P.W.6 who was the M.V.I. examined the Jeep and visited the place of occurrence and his opinion was that the incident might have taken place for the reasons other than the mechanical defects of the vehicle. At the time of seizure of the Jeep, it was found that canvas hood of the Jeep was intact as per the photographs vide Ext.5/2 and 5/3. The learned counsel for the respondents Mr. Palit contended that since as per the evidence of the eye witnesses, the Jeep which was used in the crime was without any canvas hood but the Jeep which was seized from the garage was having canvas hood, the involvement of the Jeep (M.O.X) is highly doubtful. We are not at all impressed by such contentions raised by Mr. Palit inasmuch as there was sufficient time and opportunity for the accused persons to place the canvas hood of the Jeep and it is the common knowledge that much time is not taken for placing such canvas hood. The learned counsel for the respondents Mr. Palit pointing out the evidence of P.W.6 contended that use of the vehicle in the crime is falsified in as much as P.W.6 has stated that there was no scratch and violence or any mark of damage, injury or assault externally visible on the Jeep and further stated that the vehicle is bound to leave some scratch or mark, if running in a high speed, it hits any hard substance. We are not inclined to accept the contentions raised by Mr. Palit as P.W.6 has stated that scratch or mark on the Jeep would depend on the weight, size and volume of the hard substance. P.W.6 had noticed the reflector and the socket of the Jeep in a damaged condition. Merely because P.W.6 has not noticed any scratch or mark of violence externally on the Jeep, it does not improbabilise the prosecution case regarding the dashing of the Jeep with the cycle. P.W.6 had noticed the reflector and the socket of the Jeep in a damaged condition. Merely because P.W.6 has not noticed any scratch or mark of violence externally on the Jeep, it does not improbabilise the prosecution case regarding the dashing of the Jeep with the cycle. We are of the view that the learned trial Court was not justified in holding that, absence of any mark of impact on the frontal portion of the jeep militates against the theory of dashing of jeep M.O.X against cycle M.O.III and that the absence of any mark of violence or black mark of the cycle on the jeep supports the defence contention that the jeep was not used in the incident in question. The learned trial Court should have taken note that the reflector and the socket of the Jeep were in a damaged condition. There is no evidence as to which particular portion of the jeep came in contact with the cycle at the time of dashing though due to impact of dashing, the cycle which was lying in a damaged condition at the spot was seized by police. The learned trial Court also equally erred in observing that the wheel running over the head of the victim was expected to have contained not only blood but also some portion of flesh and hair of the head which was found to be not sticking to the left rear wheel of the jeep M.O.X. We are bewildered with such observations in as much as the jeep had moved from the place of occurrence at least to the garage from where it was seized. The possibility of removal of hairs or flesh etc. during such movements of the vehicle and also the probability of the culprits removing such incriminating materials from the rear wheel to cause disappearance of evidence can also not be ruled out. P.W.19, the first Investigating Officer who immediately reached at the spot getting information over telephone found not only the deceased was lying with bleeding injuries at the spot but also the damaged cycle lying at the spot. He also found the skid mark of a vehicle at the spot. He made arrangement to guard the spot as it was night time. On the next day he found the right wheel mark on the pitch road at a distance of 5’ from non-metal portion of the southern side. He also found the skid mark of a vehicle at the spot. He made arrangement to guard the spot as it was night time. On the next day he found the right wheel mark on the pitch road at a distance of 5’ from non-metal portion of the southern side. The wheel mark was found at a distance of 5 feet from the edge of the pitch road and the length of the wheel mark was 85 ft. The length of the wheel mark was 60 ft. on the eastern side of the blood stain and 25 ft. on the western side of the blood stain. He found another skid mark at a distance of 18 ft. from the place where the cycle was lying on the north-eastern side and that skid mark was on the pitch road away from the non-metal portion by 1½ ft. on the northern side. P.W.6, the M.V.I. on his visit to the place of occurrence also found skid mark of length of 4 ft. visible on the right side of the road. The visible skid mark was 5 ½ ft. wide and according to him the same might have been due to reversing of the rear wheel and the skid mark was that of the type of a wheel of a Jeep. The photographer P.W.4 of F.S.L. who took photographs at the spot stated that Ext.5/6 is the photographs of the damaged cycle lying at the place of occurrence and some skid marks and Ext.5/9 is the photograph of the skid mark. P.W.9 who prepared the sketch map Ext.11 stated that there was mark of wheel on the pitch road which was 85 ft. long and he has shown its position in the map. P.W.20, the I.O. who took over the charge of investigation on 11.12.1974 stated that he found wheel mark of a Jeep starting from the southern end on the pitch road from the eastern side and running towards the western side of the pitch road for a distance of 85 ft. The concept of skid marks has been explained in Forensic Science in “Criminal Investigation & Trial” by Dr. B.R. Sharma. The relevant para of same is reproduced as under: “16.6.3. Skid Marks When brakes are applied to a vehicle, they lock the wheels and stop them from revolving. The concept of skid marks has been explained in Forensic Science in “Criminal Investigation & Trial” by Dr. B.R. Sharma. The relevant para of same is reproduced as under: “16.6.3. Skid Marks When brakes are applied to a vehicle, they lock the wheels and stop them from revolving. When a vehicle traverses a certain distance with locked wheels, the vehicle is said to skid. The marks created by the tyres without revolving are called skid marks. The friction between the tyres and the surface abrades the tyres and black tyre material is deposited at the surface, which makes the skid marks easily discernible and conspicuous. When the vehicle is moving on soft earth, the sudden application of brakes ploughs through the earth. The skid marks in such cases are identified from the displacement of earth from the track. When a vehicle is moving in dust or dirt, the skidding tyres removes the dirt from its path and creates the marks. If the tyre is moving on a tarry road, it creates the marks in the tar, by pushing away the tar from its path”. The concept of the skid marks has also been explained in the book title as “Introduction to Criminalistics” by Charles E. O’Hara & Dr. James W. Osterburg, published by the Macmillan Company, New York in the following manner: “SKID MARKS When the brakes of a moving car are forcefully applied, the friction between tire and roadway heats the rubber, depositing a thin layer in the path of the tyres. Sometimes a black mark is formed by displaced surface materials-dust, tar, etc. Some synthetic tires of high heat resistance exert a cleaning action on the road surface. These lines are called skid marks. In a motor vehicle accident, the problem which confronts the investigator is the determination of deficiencies in the brakes or of negligence on the part of the driver due to excessive speed. Usually the only evidence present is a set of skid marks. These marks may be shown to be a measure of the probable stopping distance”. In a motor vehicle accident, the problem which confronts the investigator is the determination of deficiencies in the brakes or of negligence on the part of the driver due to excessive speed. Usually the only evidence present is a set of skid marks. These marks may be shown to be a measure of the probable stopping distance”. Summing up of the evidence on record to decide the involvement of the Jeep M.O.X in the crime, we found that apart from the ocular testimonies of the eye witnesses, the visible skid marks of the vehicle at the spot, the condition in which the deceased was found lying at the spot, the seizure of the damaged cycle at the spot, the blood stains found on the tyre of the jeep and above all the findings of the post-mortem report indicating the possibility of the injuries on the deceased by the jeep, we are of the view that death of the deceased had taken place due to dashing of the Jeep M.O.X in the manner projected by the prosecution. The finding of the learned trial Court that the Jeep M.O.X has not been proved to the hilt to be the vehicle used for running over the deceased is contrary to the evidence on record and such a finding is manifestly erroneous, quite unreasonable, and suffers non-application of mind. Omission of registration number of jeep in FIR and in the Station Diary Entry 11. The learned trial Court has given undue importance to the non-mentioning the registration number of the jeep either in the station diary entry Ext. A or in the FIR Ext.12/2. It is pertinent to quote the station diary entry No.691 dated 29.11.1974 of Bolangir Police Station in extenso:- “691-7.35 p.m. (Phone message) A phone message is received from Haribandhu Swain, Advocate, Bolangir that, the Bolangir Congress Jeep ran over Parsuram Satpathy on the road at Dhoba Pada as informed by Bibudananda Udgata of Club Pada. Parsuram Satpathy is lying on the road side at the spot. On this S.I. P.M. Das with A.S.I. M. Tripathy, A.S.I. H.B. Sahoo, C/307 J.R Hota and the G.R. proceeded to spot in Jeep ORR 790 for verification and necessary action”. Not only in the station diary entry Ext. A but also in the FIR Ext.12/2, it is clearly mentioned that Congress Jeep was used in killing the deceased. On this S.I. P.M. Das with A.S.I. M. Tripathy, A.S.I. H.B. Sahoo, C/307 J.R Hota and the G.R. proceeded to spot in Jeep ORR 790 for verification and necessary action”. Not only in the station diary entry Ext. A but also in the FIR Ext.12/2, it is clearly mentioned that Congress Jeep was used in killing the deceased. The learned trial Court has observed that since the registration number of the Jeep was not mentioned in the FIR as well as in the station diary entry, the inference that can legitimately be drawn is that P.Ws.1, 12 and 18 did not actually see the registration number of the Jeep involved in the incident and the second inference is that the Jeep M.O.X was not the jeep involved in the incident. When the informant P.W.18 was lodging the FIR within few minutes after the death of his brother occurred in a ghastly manner, it was not expected of him to maintain calm and composure in a highly grave and provocative situation to narrate everything in the FIR including mentioning the registration number of the Jeep. Such omission of the registration number cannot be given undue importance as given by the learned trial Court. The principal object to the First Information Report is to set the criminal law into motion. Any telephonic message about commission of cognizable offence irrespective of nature and details of such information cannot be treated as FIR if the telephonic message is cryptic in nature and the Officer-In-Charge proceeds to the place of occurrence on the basis of such information to find out the details of the nature of the offence itself, as happened in this case. The telephonic message was given not to lodge the FIR but to request the police officials of the police station to reach the place of occurrence. It is the further settled principle of law that FIR is not the encyclopedia or be all and end all of the prosecution case. It is not a verbatim summary of the prosecution case. Non-mentioning of some facts or details or meticulous particulars is not a ground to reject the prosecution case. It is the further settled principle of law that FIR is not the encyclopedia or be all and end all of the prosecution case. It is not a verbatim summary of the prosecution case. Non-mentioning of some facts or details or meticulous particulars is not a ground to reject the prosecution case. In case of Rattan Singh v. State of H.P. 1997 Supreme Court Cases (Criminal) 525, it is held as follows:- “Criminal Courts should not be fastidious with mere omissions in the first information statements, since such statements cannot be expected to be a chronicle of every detail of what happened, nor to contain an exhaustive catalogue of the events which took place. The person who furnishes first information to authorities might be fresh with the facts but he need not necessarily have this skill or ability to reproduce details of the entire story without anything missing therefrom. Some may miss even important details in a narration. Quite often the police officer, who takes down the first information, would record what the informant conveys to him without resorting to any elicitatory exercise. It is voluntary narrative of the informant without interrogation which usually goes into such statement. So any omission therein has to be considered along with the other evidence to determine whether the facts so omitted never happened at all”. In our opinion, the omission of the registration number of the jeep either in the station diary entry Ext.A or in the FIR Ext.12/2 are not of much importance in the facts and circumstances of the case and such omission does not falsify the involvement of the Congress Jeep bearing registration No. DLH 9836 in the crime. Extrajudicial confession 12. The learned trial Court discussed the extrajudicial confession of the respondent no.8 Tikaram Agrawalla before P.W.16 inside Bolangir Jail and held that in view of the political differences between P.W.16 and the respondent Tikaram Agrawalla, it is very difficult to believe that such a disclosure was made. P.W.16 also did not disclose about the extrajudicial confession either to his lawyers or to others immediately after his release from Jail. There was no corroboration to the evidence of P.W.16. The learned trial Court held that the evidence of P.W.16 is not worthy of any credit and the story of the extrajudicial confession as put forth by the prosecution is extremely difficult to be believed. There was no corroboration to the evidence of P.W.16. The learned trial Court held that the evidence of P.W.16 is not worthy of any credit and the story of the extrajudicial confession as put forth by the prosecution is extremely difficult to be believed. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence and requires appreciation with a great deal of care and caution. Extra-judicial confession must be established to be true and made voluntarily and that to in a fit state of mind. The words of the witnesses must be clear, unambiguous and should clearly convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The extra-judicial confession can be accepted, if it passes the test of credibility. The extra-judicial confession should inspire confidence and the Court should find out whether there are other cogent circumstances on record to support it. If an extrajudicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances or comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be biased or inimical to the accused or in respect of whom it is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive of attributing an untruthful statement to the accused, needless to say that its credibility becomes doubtful and consequently it loses its importance. Analysing the evidence of P.W.16 with utmost care and caution and the reasonings assigned by the learned trial Court, we found that the learned trial Court has properly assessed the evidence of P.W.16 and rightly disbelieved his evidence relating to the extrajudicial confession and we concur with the view of the learned trial Court that the evidence relating to extrajudicial confession does not inspire confidence. Political dispute between parties 13. There is no dispute that there was previous hostile relationship between the parties and they belonged to different political parties. The accused persons belonged to Congress Party and the deceased was a member of Bharatiya Lok Dal and he was in-charge of the Youth Wing of the party. The deceased had passed M.A. in Political Science and was a Diploma Holder in Journalism. It has also come on record that the deceased was very popular among the young people for which the Youth Congress Workers were jealous. The deceased had passed M.A. in Political Science and was a Diploma Holder in Journalism. It has also come on record that the deceased was very popular among the young people for which the Youth Congress Workers were jealous. While it is the prosecution case that due to political hostility, the accused persons committed the murder of the deceased, it is the case of the accused persons that due to political hostility, they have been falsely entangled in the case. Where there are party fractions, there is a tendency to include the innocent persons with the guilty and it is extremely difficult for the Court to guard against such a danger. The only real safe-guard against the risk of condemning the innocent with the guilty lies in insisting on acceptable evidence which in some measure implicates such accused and satisfies the conscience of the Court. (Ref: Bajwa v. State of U.P. AIR 1973 SC 1204 ; Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P. AIR 1952 SC 159 , Bhuboni Sahu v. The King, AIR 1949 P.C. 257 ). Previous enmity between the parties is admitted. There is an incurable tendency in the factionists to rope in the innocent persons of the opposite faction along with the guilty and to twist and manipulate the facts in regard to manner of occurrence, so as to make their case appear true so far as innocent members of the opposite factions are concerned. It cannot be assumed that interested witnesses are necessarily false witnesses. However, the evidence of such witnesses must be subjected to close scrutiny and no evidence should be discarded simply because it came from the interested party. Perfunctory investigation 14. Before discussing the evidence of the oral testimonies of the eye witnesses P.Ws.1, 12, 14 and 18, it is to be kept in mind that the Congress Party was in power in the State at the time of occurrence and the accused persons are also the members of Congress Party. One of the Investigating Officer i.e. P.W.20 who took charge of the investigation on 11.12.1974 and submitted charge-sheet on 10.12.1975 against six accused persons was declared hostile by the prosecution for conducting perfunctory investigation and cross-examined by the prosecution at length. One of the Investigating Officer i.e. P.W.20 who took charge of the investigation on 11.12.1974 and submitted charge-sheet on 10.12.1975 against six accused persons was declared hostile by the prosecution for conducting perfunctory investigation and cross-examined by the prosecution at length. P.W.20 admits that the finger print expert detected some finger prints from the mirror of the Jeep and he received message on 23.1.1975 from the Director of the Finger Print Bureau, Rasulgarh, Bhubaneswar to send the finger prints of all the suspects of the case but he did not send the same as the Jeep belonged to the Congress Party and the suspected persons were workers of the Congress Party. He further submits that he did not search the house of any of the accused persons during the period of his investigation and before filing charge sheet, he did not request the Court to issue non-bailable warrants or other process against the accused persons who had not been arrested. He did not send any message to other police stations for search of the accused persons who had not been arrested. Suggestion was given by the prosecution to P.W.20 that during his investigation, he attempted to demolish the prosecution. Lengthy cross-examination of P.W.20 by the prosecution has brought on record how he had conducted perfunctory investigation in a sensational case just because of political pressure and it appears that it is because of the political pressure from the ruling party, he has conducted such perfunctory investigation. The observations of the learned trial Court that the police investigation cannot be said to be wholly perfunctory and at any rate no benefit accrues to the prosecution is thoroughly misconceived and not sustainable in the eyes of law. Law is well settled as held in case of Dr. Krishna Pal v. State of U.P. 1996 Criminal Law Journal 1134 (SC) that it would not be proper to acquit the accused in case of defective investigation if the case is otherwise established conclusively as it would tantamount to be falling in the hands of an erring investigating officer. In case of State of Rajasthan v. Kishore, 1996 Supreme Court Cases (Criminal) 646, it is held that it would not cast doubt on the prosecution case proved by trustworthy and reliable evidence even if I.O. committed irregularity and illegality during investigation. In case of State of Rajasthan v. Kishore, 1996 Supreme Court Cases (Criminal) 646, it is held that it would not cast doubt on the prosecution case proved by trustworthy and reliable evidence even if I.O. committed irregularity and illegality during investigation. It is held in case of Paras Yadav v. State of Bihar, 1999 Supreme Court Cases (Criminal) 104 that lapses on the part of the investigating officer should not be taken in favour of the accused. Prosecution evidence should be examined dehors such omissions to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not. It is held in case of State of Karnataka v. K. Yarappa Reddy, 1999 (4) Crimes 171 (SC) that if the court is convinced that the testimony of a witness to the occurrence is true, the Court is free act on it albeit investigating officer’s suspicious role in the case. It is held in case of Dhanaj Singh v. State of Punjab, 2004 Supreme Court Cases (Criminal) 851 that accused cannot be acquitted solely on account of defective investigation were ocular testimony is found credible and cogent. In the case of a defective investigation, the Court has to be circumspect in evaluating the evidence. In case of Kasinath Mondal v. State of W.B. (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases (Criminal) 467, it is held that irregularities or deficiencies in conducting investigation by the prosecution is not always fatal to the prosecution case. If there is sufficient evidence to establish the substratum of the prosecution case, then irregularities which occur due to remissness of the investigating agency, which do not affect the substratum of the prosecution case, should not weigh with the Court. In case of Sheo Shankar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2011) 49 Orissa Criminal Reports (SC) 485 that deficiencies in investigation by way of omissions and lapses on the part of the investigating agency cannot in themselves justify a total rejection of the prosecution case. The observation of the learned trial Court that the police investigation cannot be said to be wholly perfunctory and at any rate no benefit accrues to the prosecution is contrary to the materials available on record as well as the settled principle of law. The observation of the learned trial Court that the police investigation cannot be said to be wholly perfunctory and at any rate no benefit accrues to the prosecution is contrary to the materials available on record as well as the settled principle of law. The investigation of the case was deliberately conducted in a perfunctory manner under political pressure to create grounds for acquittal for the accused persons and the same is to be kept in mind while assessing the testimonies of the eye witnesses. Testimonies of the eye witnesses 15. Analysing the oral testimonies of the four eye witnesses P.Ws.1, 12, 14 and 18, the learned trial Court has held that their testimonies are unworthy of credit and does not inspire confidence. The learned trial Court has discussed the evidence of P.W.1 in paragraphs 23 and 24 of the judgment, P.W.12 in paragraph 25 of the judgment, P.W.14 in paragraph 26 of the judgment and P.W.18 in paragraph 27 of the judgment. The complicity of the respondents no. 3, 7 and 9 now rests upon the credibility of the aforesaid eye witnesses P.Ws.1, 12, 14 and 18. Three distinct theories of occurrence The learned trial Court while discussing the evidence of the eye witnesses relating to the manner in which the occurrence had taken place, has held that three distinct theories have been set up by the prosecution from the initiation of the prosecution till the trial stage. The learned trial Court held that in the initial stage, when the FIR was drawn up, it was a case of single impact. We are bewildered as to how the learned trial Court has made such an observation which is apparently an error of record. P.W.18 who has lodged the FIR has mentioned that while the deceased was speedily riding the cycle of P.W.1 on Dhobapada Road in order to save his life, the accused persons shouting to kill the deceased, followed him in a Jeep and killed him by running over the Jeep on the deceased. In the FIR, there is no mention that it was a case of single impact. The learned trial Court has further held that in the complaint petition, it is stated that the deceased was first knocked down by dashing of the Jeep and then he was done to death by severe assaults by means of lethal weapons. In the FIR, there is no mention that it was a case of single impact. The learned trial Court has further held that in the complaint petition, it is stated that the deceased was first knocked down by dashing of the Jeep and then he was done to death by severe assaults by means of lethal weapons. It is pertinent to note that one Sitaram filed the complaint petition who has not been examined during trial. The contents of the complaint petition have been confronted to P.W.18 by the defence during cross-examination and the contradictions have been utilized by the learned trial Court. Law is well settled that the contents of a first information report or complaint petition are to be confronted to the maker thereof. We are of the view that permission should not have been granted by the learned trial Court for confronting the contents of the complaint petition filed by one Sitaram to P.W.18 and the contradictory statements in the complaint petition should not have been utilized to disbelieve the version of the eye witnesses. The approach of the learned trial Court is wholly illegal. The earlier statement made by the complainant in a complaint petition, sworn initial statement of the complainant recorded under section 200 Cr. P.C. or his statement, if any, recorded under section 202 Cr. P.C. by the Magistrate or recorded during an investigation being directed under Section 202 Cr. P.C. can be used as previous statements for the purpose of contradicting the complainant in view of the provisions under section 145 of the Evidence Act, to impeach his credit under Sec. 155(3) of the Evidence Act, to corroborate his testimony under Section 157 of the Evidence Act and to refresh his memory under Sec. 159 of the Evidence Act, if the complainant is examined during trial. In absence of examination of the complainant during trial, the use of such statements by the learned trial Court to discredit the prosecution version is quite unjustified. The learned trial Court has further held that P.W.1 has stated about the single impact whereas the other eye witnesses P.Ws.12, 14 and 18 have spoken regarding reverse gear theory. On careful reading of the evidence of P.W.1, we found that he has stated that after the deceased speedily proceeded towards Bhagirathi Chhak, the accused persons followed the deceased in the Congress Jeep. On careful reading of the evidence of P.W.1, we found that he has stated that after the deceased speedily proceeded towards Bhagirathi Chhak, the accused persons followed the deceased in the Congress Jeep. P.W.1 further stated that after he proceeded 10 to 12 steps, he heard the sound collusion of the Jeep and the cycle and then he ran to the spot and found that after the collusion, the Jeep sped away towards Bhagirathi Chhak. Thus it appears that P.W.1 arrived at the spot just after the dashing of the Jeep and he has not seen the actual dashing of the Jeep with the cycle. Thus we are of the view that the observations of the learned trial Court that three distinct theories have been set up by the prosecution is wholly inappropriate, perverse and quite unreasonable. Electricity at the spot The learned trial Court while discussing on the question of identification of the accused persons inside the Jeep, has held that though there were three electric light poles on the road, there was bar light in one pole, electric bulb in another and the third pole was without any bar light or bulb. The learned trial Court further held that since there was lunar eclipse on the date of occurrence, it would be very difficult for the passer-by to identify the persons sitting in the speeding vehicle. P.W.1 has stated that the date of occurrence i.e. 29.11.1974 was Kartika Purnima day and there was lunar eclipse and by the time of occurrence the lunar eclipse had not set in. P.W.12 has stated that just before the lunar eclipse set in, the occurrence took place. He has further stated that because of burning street light and as it was a moonlit light, he could identify the persons who were sitting on the front side of the Jeep, whom he had known earlier. P.W. 14 has stated that the lights on the light posts along the road up to Bhagirathi Chhak were burning so also the light of Puja Mandap. At the Puja Mandap Chhak, two to three such bar lights were burning and near the place where the injured was lying, a street light was burning. P.W. 14 has stated that the lights on the light posts along the road up to Bhagirathi Chhak were burning so also the light of Puja Mandap. At the Puja Mandap Chhak, two to three such bar lights were burning and near the place where the injured was lying, a street light was burning. Thus when the date of occurrence was a full moon night and lunar eclipse had not set in at the time of occurrence and there was electric lights on and around the spot and the accused persons were well known to the witnesses and the Jeep was an open one without canvas hood, it cannot be said that there would have been any difficulty on the part of the witnesses to identify the occupants of the open Jeep. Analysis of the evidence of P.W.1 The learned trial Court has discarded the evidence of P.W.1 on the following grounds:- (a) He had not accompanied the deceased to his place of destination and left him alone in a cycle; (b) He has not gone to police to report about the incident; (c) He stated to have deposed in police cases on two to three occasions prior to the case in question and therefore, he is a stock witness of the police; (d) He was not cited as a witness in the complaint petition lodged by Sitaram; (e) There was delay in examination of P.W.1 by police; (f) The evidence of P.W.1 that he heard occupants of the Jeep uttering to kill the deceased is highly improbable. The reasonings assigned by the learned trial Court to hold that the version of P.W.1 is unworthy of credit and cannot be believed is highly perverse and not acceptable. P.W.1 allowed the deceased to escape from the spot and provided him cycle on request. The conduct of P.W.1 is quite natural. Escaping of one person in a cycle was easier than carrying another person in the cycle. That might have been the consideration for P.W.1 not to accompany the deceased. Moreover P.W.1 was returning home from his relation’s house at that point of time and therefore it was not expected of him to accompany the deceased in the cycle. Escaping of one person in a cycle was easier than carrying another person in the cycle. That might have been the consideration for P.W.1 not to accompany the deceased. Moreover P.W.1 was returning home from his relation’s house at that point of time and therefore it was not expected of him to accompany the deceased in the cycle. Similarly when on arrival of police immediately at the spot after the occurrence, P.W.18 lodged the FIR before P.W.19 and immediately thereafter P.W.19 examined P.W.1 in the police station, it cannot be said that there was any delay in the examination of P.W.1 or his evidence is to be discarded as he had not lodged the FIR. Merely because P.W.1 deposed as witness in the police cases on two to three occasions, it cannot be said that he was a stock witness of the prosecution and his evidence should be discarded for that reason. A stock witness is a person who is at the back and call of the police. He obliges police with his tailored testimony. A person may get several opportunities during his life time to depose in Court in different circumstances and the evidence of such a person cannot be discarded as an untruthful witness. If an independent witness joins police proceedings having some knowledge about the crime, then he cannot be labeled as a stock witness of the police. No suggestion has been given by the defence to the Investigating Officer that P.W.1 is a stock witness. Why complainant Sitaram has not mentioned the name of P.W.1 as a witness in his complaint petition, it is he who could have thrown light on such aspect. Sitaram has not been examined during trial. In absence of examination of Sitaram during trial, creating doubt on the version of P.W.1 by the learned trial Court is highly illegal and suffers from perversity. P.W.1 has specifically stated as to what he had heard from the occupants of the Jeep while he was close to the Jeep and there is nothing improbability in the same. He has stated that when he and the deceased were proceeding, someone from the occupants of the congress Jeep shouted, “Sala! Parsu has come. Turn the vehicle”. Again he has stated that when the Jeep proceeded towards Bhagirathi Chhak, he heard the occupants of the Jeep saying, “Let us go and run over the vehicle”. He has stated that when he and the deceased were proceeding, someone from the occupants of the congress Jeep shouted, “Sala! Parsu has come. Turn the vehicle”. Again he has stated that when the Jeep proceeded towards Bhagirathi Chhak, he heard the occupants of the Jeep saying, “Let us go and run over the vehicle”. Therefore the reasonings assigned by the learned trial Court in discarding the evidence of P.W.1 as not credit worthy is not at all acceptable in the eye of law and we are of the view that P.W.1 is a truthful witness. Analysis of the evidence of P.W.12 The learned trial Court has discarded the testimony of P.W.12 as unworthy of credit and unreliable on the following grounds:- (a) P.W.12 admits that he had been to the office of B.L.D. at Bolangir on more than ten occasions in the years 1973 and 1974. This shows the interestedness of the witness for the prosecution party. (b) P.W.12 with a view to claim a status for him has deposed blatant falsehood. (c) It would appear from the spot map Ext.11 that P.W.12 saw the incident from a distance of not less than 350 ft. It is extremely difficult to believe that this witness could have seen the incident in such details as narrated by him from such a distance. (d) When there was short cut route from Rugudipada to Tikarapada via Pratapasagarpada, it is not understood as to why P.W.12 did not chose this route while returning from his sister’s house Rugudipada to his house at Tikarapada via Bhagirathi Chhak. (e) P.W.12 was examined for the first time by the second I.O. P.W.22 on 30.11.1974 i.e. about 24 hours after the incident. No reasons have been ascribed by the prosecution as to why the first I.O. P.W.19 did not examine him on 21.11.1974. (f) There is a substantial difference between the statement of P.W.12 made in the Court and the statement made by him before the I.O. The explanation given by P.W.12 that he did not state the full facts before the police because the police wanted him to speak the gist of the fact relating to the occurrence cannot be accepted. (g) P.W.12 did not state before the Magistrate in his statement recorded under Section 202 Cr. P.C. vide Ext.14, the facts stated by in para 1 to 4 of his chief examination. (g) P.W.12 did not state before the Magistrate in his statement recorded under Section 202 Cr. P.C. vide Ext.14, the facts stated by in para 1 to 4 of his chief examination. He has also not stated about the facts mentioned in para 6, 7, 8 and 9 of his chief examination before the police or in his examination during inquiry under Section 202 Cr. P.C. The explanation given by P.W.12 can hardly be accepted. (h) There are material omissions in his statement made in Court vis-à-vis before the Investigating Officer. When admittedly the prosecution case as well as the defence plea is that the occurrence has taken place due to political hostility between the parties, merely because a witness belongs to a particular political party cannot be a ground to discard the evidence if his evidence is otherwise acceptable on close scrutiny. Even if P.W.12 has made some wrong statements regarding his election dispute with one Himanshu Sekhar Mishra as President of Rajendra College Students’ Union in 1974-75, that by itself is not sufficient to discard the evidence of P.W.12. It appears from the evidence of P.W.12 that he has seen the occurrence from a very close distance. P.W.12 has stated that when he saw the Jeep, it was at a distance of 30 to 40 cubits from the place of alleged occurrence and the deceased was at a distance of 15 to 20 cubits from the R.C.M.S. Office. In case of Rameswar Dayal v. State of U.P. AIR 1978 Supreme Court 1558, it is held that documents like inquest report, seizure list or the site plans consists two parts-one of which is admissible and the other is inadmissible. That part of such documents which is based the actual observation of the witness at the spot being direct evidence in the case is clearly admissible under Section 60 of Evidence Act whereas the other part which is based on information given to the Investigating Officer or on the statement recorded by him in the course of investigation is inadmissible under Section 162 Cr. P.C. except for the limited purpose mentioned in that section. P.C. except for the limited purpose mentioned in that section. In case of Jagdish Narain v. State of U.P. 1996 (1) Crimes 174, it is held as follows:- “9………………While preparing a site plan, an investigating police officer can certainly record what he sees and observes, for that will be the direct and substantive evidence being based on his personal knowledge; but as, he was not obviously present when the incident took place, he was to derive knowledge as to when, where and how it happened from person who had seen the incident. When a witness testify about what he heard from somebody else, it is ordinarily not admissible in evidence being hearsay, but if the person from whom he heard is examined to give direct evidence within the meaning of Section 60 of the Evidence Act, the former evidence would be admissible to corroborate the latter in accordance with Section 157 Cr. P.C…………….That necessarily means that if in the site plan P.W.6 had even shown the place from which the shots were allegedly fired after ascertaining the same from the eye witnesses, it could not have been admitted in evidence being hit by section 162 Cr. P.C. In case of State of Rajasthan v. Bhabani, (2003) 26 OCR (SC) 358, it is held as follows:- “10……………..The High Court has extensively relied upon the site plan prepared by the Investigating Officer for discarding the prosecution case and for this purpose has referred to the place from where the accused are alleged to have entered the Nohera, the place from where they are alleged to have fired upon the deceased and also has drawn an inference that the place wherefrom the accused are alleged to have fired upon the deceased, the shot could not have hit the houses on the eastern site of the Nohera. Many things mentioned in the site plan have been noted by the Investigating Officer on the basis of the statements given by the witnesses. Obviously, the place from where the accused entered the Nohera and the place from where they resorted to firing is based upon the statement of the witnesses. These are clearly hit by Section 162 Cr. P.C. What the Investigating Officer personally saw and noted alone would be admissible”. Obviously, the place from where the accused entered the Nohera and the place from where they resorted to firing is based upon the statement of the witnesses. These are clearly hit by Section 162 Cr. P.C. What the Investigating Officer personally saw and noted alone would be admissible”. In view of the settled principle of law, we are of the view that merely because in the spot map Ext.11, the I.O. has shown that P.W.12 saw the incident from a distance of not less than 350 ft., it was not proper on the part of the learned trial Court to reject the testimony of P.W.12 particularly when the evidence of P.W.12 indicates that he was very close to the place of occurrence at the relevant point of time. Why P.W.12 had chosen a particular route to return to his house from his sister’s house could have been answered by him alone if he would have been specifically asked about the same. When the same has not been done by the defence and nothing has been elicited from P.W.12 on this point, it was not proper for the learned trial Court to say that P.W.12 is a chance witness. When the occurrence had taken place on the public road, the passerby are the natural witnesses and their evidence cannot be discarded on the ground that they are chance witnesses. In the case of Ranapratap v. State of Hariyana reported in A.I.R.1983 SC 680, it is held as follows:- “3………….We do not understand the expression ‘chance witnesses’. Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses; soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a brothel, prostitutes and paramours are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a street, only passersby will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere ‘chance witnesses’. The expression ‘chance witnesses’ is borrowed from countries where every man’s home is considered castle and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man’s castle. It is a most unsuitable expression in a country where people are less formal and more casual. The expression ‘chance witnesses’ is borrowed from countries where every man’s home is considered castle and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man’s castle. It is a most unsuitable expression in a country where people are less formal and more casual. To discard the evidence of street hawkers and street vendors on the ground that they are ‘chance witnesses’, even where murder is committed in a street, is to abandon good sense and take too shallow a view of the evidence. It appears that the first I.O. P.W.19 took up investigation after receipt of the FIR at the spot and he was extremely busy not only in making arrangement for removal of the deceased from the spot to Bolangir Hospital but also examining witnesses, instructing other police officials to guard the spot as well as the dead body, in searching the houses of the accused persons, in holding inquest over the dead body and sending the same for post-mortem examination, visiting the spot, making necessary seizures at the spot, arresting the accused persons and forwarding them to Court on 29.11.1974 and 30.11.1974 and P.W.22 who took over the investigation of the case on 30.11.1974 at 4.00 p.m. from P.W.19, examined P.W.12 on 30.11.1974. Therefore it cannot be said that there was any inordinate delay in the examination of P.W.12 and on that score, his evidence is to be discarded. The contradictions/omissions which appear in the evidence of P.W.12 are mainly relating to the election dispute of College Union, the political disputes between the parties as well as the position of the spot. So far the occurrence part is concerned, the evidence is clear, cogent and trustworthy and whatever contradictions/omissions have been elicited, do not affect the prosecution case in any manner. Therefore, we are of the view that the conclusions arrived at by the learned trial Court in discarding the testimony of P.W.12 is quite unreasonable and not reasonably probable and suffers from non-application of mind. Therefore, we are of the view that the conclusions arrived at by the learned trial Court in discarding the testimony of P.W.12 is quite unreasonable and not reasonably probable and suffers from non-application of mind. Analysis of the evidence of P.W.14 The learned trial Court has discarded the testimony of P.W.14 holding that the credibility of this witness was at the lowest ebb on the following grounds:- P.W.14 has stated that he had not known either the deceased or any of the accused persons as on the date of occurrence and further stated that after the Jeep was driven in a high speed towards Titilagarh Chhak, it was taken to the left hand side of the road and then he heard a dashing sound and thereafter the Jeep was drawn backwards by reverse gear and ran forward when he heard dashing sound again and then the Jeep ran towards Titilagarh Chhak and then he found a cycle was lying on the ground and the Jeep had run over the cycle and a man was lying in a senseless and bleeding condition. When the (a) Though P.W.14 stated to have heard the dashing sound and found the Jeep speeding forward towards Bhagirathi Chhak but he has not tried to identify the Jeep or the occupants of the Jeep. (b) The credibility of this witness is open to grave doubt, as he has deposed to certain vital facts at the trial though omitted the same before the investigating officer. (c) The evidence of P.W.14 that street lights were burning near the spot is not acceptable as the I.O. P.W.20 states that there was interruption of electricity in the Palace line which was supplied by Feeder No.1 between 5.45 p.m. and 9.20 p.m. (d) P.W.14 ran away from the place after the incident without waiting to see what had happened or without disclosing the fact to anyone or to any public authority, although he was not chased or threatened by any of the miscreants occurrence took place all on a sudden while P.W.14 was passing on the road and after the crime was committed, the Jeep left the spot speedily, merely because P.W.14 was unable to say the description or colour of the Jeep or about the identity of the occupants of the Jeep with whom he had no prior acquaintance, it cannot be said that he had no idea about the incident. The omissions pointed out by the defence during cross-examination of P.W.14 are very insignificant and trivial in nature and such omissions do not affect the credibility of the witness. P.W.14 has specifically stated that there was no failure of electricity and there was electric light on the roads as well as in the houses. P.W.20 has stated that in between 5.30 p.m. to 7.04 p.m. on 29.11.1974, there was interruption of electricity at Dhobapada on four occasions and on each occasion, the interruption was for less than 5 minutes. Similarly so far as Feeder No.1 is concerned, which was interrupted according to him from 5.40 p.m. to 9.20 p.m., he has stated that he has not mentioned specifically as to the start and end of the area to which Feeder No.1 supplied energy. When none from the electricity officials has been examined and no document regarding specific time for interruption of electricity has been proved and when there is absolutely no material that the place of occurrence was in darkness due to electricity failure at the time of occurrence, the observation of the learned trial Court that the evidence of P.W.14 on electricity aspect is not at all acceptable is highly ridiculous. Apart from electricity light, it was a full moon light and the lunar eclipse had not set in at the time of occurrence and therefore there would not have been any visibility problem. P.W.14 has stated that after reaching home, he told the incident what he saw to his wife and similarly on the next day he disclosed the incident to his colleagues in the office. He has further stated that when he was still at the place of occurrence, the police reached at the spot but he had not voluntarily gone to the police station to report about the incident till his statement was recorded on 2.12.1974. The conduct of P.W.14 cannot be said to be unnatural, impairing the creditworthiness of his evidence. The post-event conduct of a witness varies from person to person. It cannot be a cast iron reaction to be followed as a model by everyone witnessing such event. Different persons would react differently on seeing any serious crime and their behaviour and conduct would, therefore, be different. The post-event conduct of a witness varies from person to person. It cannot be a cast iron reaction to be followed as a model by everyone witnessing such event. Different persons would react differently on seeing any serious crime and their behaviour and conduct would, therefore, be different. The observation of the learned trial Court that P.W.14 ran away from the spot and did not disclose the incident before anybody is an error of record. Therefore, we are of the view that the conclusion arrived at the learned trial Court in discarding the testimony of P.W.14 is manifestly perverse, contrary to the evidence on record and suffers from non-application of mind. Analysis of the evidence of P.W.18 The learned trial Court has discarded the testimony of P.W.18 holding that he is not a witness who can be implicitly believed on the following grounds:- (a) P.W.18 has not given the number of the Jeep in the FIR though he is the informant in the case. (b) There are lot of contradictions between his statement made in Court vis-à-vis the statements made before the I.O. and his statement recorded under section 202 Cr. P.C. in the complaint case. (c) Non-approaching the police and lodging Station Diary Entry is a circumstance to belie the assertion of P.W.18 that threats were given to the deceased by some of the accused on 26.11.1974 and 27.11.1974. We have already held that non-mention of the registration number of the Jeep in the FIR by P.W.18 is not at all fatal to the prosecution case considering his state of mind at the relevant point of time. We have gone through the contradictions and omissions in the statement of P.W.18 that was given in Court as well as in 161 Cr. P.C. and statement recorded under Section 202 Cr. P.C. These contradictions are mainly relating to the background of the case in which the occurrence has taken place so also the post-occurrence details. So far as the main part of the occurrence is concerned, the contradictions/omissions are very insignificant and therefore the learned trial Court should not have given undue weight to the same to discard the evidence of P.W.18. So far as the main part of the occurrence is concerned, the contradictions/omissions are very insignificant and therefore the learned trial Court should not have given undue weight to the same to discard the evidence of P.W.18. P.W.18 has specifically stated that on 24.11.1974 when the deceased was released on bail, one Bikramananda Bohidar told him that boys of Yuva Congress were planning to murder him and that he should be cautious and on 27.11.1974 the deceased made a Station Diary Entry at Bolangir Police Station to the above effect. Ext.23 is the Station Diary Entry dated 27.11.1974 made by the deceased. He has further stated that one Durga Charan Behera who belong to Bharatiya Lok Dal also made a Station Diary Entry at Bolangir Police Station which was written by the deceased and Ext.24 is that the Station Diary Entry. Thus the observation of the learned trial Court that nobody approached the police in spite of the occurrence dated 26.11.1974 and 27.11.1974 is an error of record. Therefore, we are of the view that the conclusions arrived at by the learned trial Court in discarding the testimony of P.W. 18 is wholly perverse, quite unreasonable and suffers from non-application of mind. Identification of respondents no. 3, 7 and 9 16. Out of the four eye witnesses, admittedly P.W.14 has not identified any of these three respondents who are now alive. (i) P.W.1 has stated that the Jeep was driven by Premlal Suna (R-1, dead). At the extreme end of the front seat was sitting accused Tikaram Agrawala (R-8, dead). He has further stated that in between R-1 and R-8, two more persons were sitting on the front seat but he could not identify them. He has further stated that when the Jeep proceeded towards Titilagarh Road, he saw accused Dhobai Podh (R-3), Gunanidhi Ghasi (R-4, dead), Jagnya Puruseth (R-2, dead), Sugyan Sandh (R-6, dead) and Prafulla Bhoi (R-5, dead) were sitting on the backside of the Jeep. Thus, out of the three surviving respondents, P.W.1 has named only respondent no.3 Dhobai Podh to be present in the Jeep at the time of occurrence and sitting on the backside of the Jeep alongwith respondents nos. 2, 4, 5 and 6 (all dead) and respondent no.8 (dead) to be on the front seat. Thus, out of the three surviving respondents, P.W.1 has named only respondent no.3 Dhobai Podh to be present in the Jeep at the time of occurrence and sitting on the backside of the Jeep alongwith respondents nos. 2, 4, 5 and 6 (all dead) and respondent no.8 (dead) to be on the front seat. (ii) P.W.12 has stated that when the Jeep crossed him, he saw that it was driven by accused Premlal Suna (R-1, dead) and he could identify that accused Tikaram Agrawalla (R-8, dead), Prasanna Kumar Pal (R-7) and Artatrana Singdeo (R-9) were sitting on the front side of the Jeep. He has further stated that he could identify the persons who were sitting on the front side on the Jeep as he had known them earlier. Thus, out of the three surviving respondents, P.W.12 has named respondent no.7 Prasanna Kumar Pal and respondent no.9 Artatrana Singdeo to be present in the Jeep and sitting on the front side of the Jeep alongwith respondents nos. 1 and 8 (both dead). (iii) P.W.18 has stated that the Jeep was driven by accused Premlal Suna (R-1, dead) and in the front seat accused Artatrana Singhdeo (R-9), Prasanna Kumar Pal (R-7) and Tikaram Agrawal (R-8, dead) were sitting. He has further stated that on the back seat of the Jeep, accused Dhobei Podh (R-3), Jagnya Puruseth (R-2, dead), Gunanidhi Ghasi (R-4, dead) and two to three other persons were sitting. P.W.18 has stated the names of these persons on number of occasions. Thus, out of the three surviving respondents, P.W.18 has named respondent no.7 Prasanna Kumar Pal and respondent no.9 Artatrana Singhdeo to be present in the Jeep and sitting on the front seat of the Jeep alongwith respondents nos. 1 and 8 (both dead) and respondent no.3 sitting on the back seat of the Jeep alongwith respondents nos. 2 and 4 (both dead). Analysing the evidence of P.Ws.1, 12 and 18, we find that that there was sufficient source of light at the spot to identify the culprits. The fact that the accused persons were closely known to these witnesses and they were moving in an open Jeep, there would not have been any identification problem. It appears that the identification of respondents no.3, 7 and 9 are not based on single identification but each of them has been named by two eye witnesses. The fact that the accused persons were closely known to these witnesses and they were moving in an open Jeep, there would not have been any identification problem. It appears that the identification of respondents no.3, 7 and 9 are not based on single identification but each of them has been named by two eye witnesses. We are of the view that from such evidence, it is clear that at the time of occurrence the respondents no.7 and 9 were sitting in the front seat of the Jeep alongwith respondents nos. 1 and 8 (both dead) and respondent no.3 was sitting on the back seat of the Jeep alongwith respondents nos. 2, 4, 5 and 6 (all dead). The finding of the learned trial Court that the identification of the accused persons in the Jeep at the material time could not have been possible is fallacious and based on speculation. Thus the prosecution has successfully established the identity of all these three respondents i.e. respondents no.3, 7 and 9 to be the occupants of the Jeep M.O.X at the relevant time alongwith other six respondents (all dead) and further established that being the members of an unlawful assembly and in prosecution of their common object, they committed murder of the deceased firstly by dashing the Jeep against the deceased while he was riding the bicycle and then after he fell down on the ground, in bringing the Jeep by reverse gear and running over the deceased as a result of which he succumbed to the injuries at the spot. Principle in appeal against acquittal 17. It is the settled principle of law as held in the case of Main Pal and Another v. State of Haryana and Others, AIR 2004 SC 2158 that there is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. As a matter of fact, in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court as the court of first appeal is obligated to go into greater detail of the evidence to see whether any miscarriage has resulted from the order of acquittal, though has to act with great circumspection and utmost care before ordering the reversal of an acquittal. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or not. In the case of Basappa v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 2 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 497, it is held that the exercise of the power under section 378 Cr. P.C. by the court is to prevent failure of justice or miscarriage of justice. There is miscarriage of justice if an innocent person is convicted and if the guilty let scot-free. If the judgment of the trial Court is based on no material and it suffers from any legal infirmity in the sense that there was non-consideration or mis-appreciation of the evidence on record, only in such circumstances, reversal of acquittal by the High Court would be justified. In case of Chandrappa and Others v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 2 Supreme Court cases (Criminal) 325, it is held as follows:- “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court”. Thus there can be no limitation on our part as an appellate court to review the entire evidence upon which the order of acquittal has been passed and to come to our own conclusion and review the trial Court’s conclusion on both facts as well as law. 18. Keeping the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of interference in case of appeal against acquittal, we analysed the evidence on record with all care and caution and after deep scrutiny, we are of the view that the conclusions arrived at by the learned trial Court are not possible and such conclusions are perverse, against the weight of evidence, quite unreasonable, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous and suffers from misreading of evidence. We are quite conscious of the fact that the order of acquittal was passed on 30.06.1980 and out of the nine respondents, six respondents are already dead and three surviving respondents are septuagenarians but merely because of delay in adjudicating the appeal even though it is pending before this Court since 1984 after remand by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 1983, the same cannot be a ground not to interfere with the illegal order of acquittal. In case of Shyam Babu v. State of U.P. AIR 2012 SC 3311 , it is held that the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to criminal proceedings unless there is express and specific provision to that effect. It is also settled law that a criminal offence is considered as a wrong against the State and the Society even though it is committed against an individual. We are satisfied that there has been flagrant miscarriage of justice by pronouncing the order of acquittal substantially and compelling reasons are there to interfere with the conclusions arrived at by the trial Court and therefore in order to prevent miscarriage of justice, the finding of acquittal should be disturbed. 19. In view of what we have found from the evidence and our analysis leads us to conclude that the prosecution has successfully anointed to the guilt of the accused-respondents for the charge under sections 302/149 IPC and therefore, we do not find any viable reason to absolve respondent Nos.3, 7 and 9 who are only surviving of the aforesaid offences. Prosecution has successfully brought home their guilt without any doubt and learned trial Judge not only erred but also misread the evidence and gave undue benefit to the respondents while acquitting them and therefore in our view the impugned judgment of acquittal qua respondent No.3 Dhobai Podh, respondent No.7 Prasanna Kumar Pal and respondent No.9 Artatrana Singh Deo deserves to be set aside and is hereby set aside and they are found guilty of the offence under sections 302/149 IPC. Adverting to the question of sentence, it is indisputable that occurrence had occurred four decades ago. The respondents are septuagenarians. It is not one of the rarest of rare cases which falls in the category to impose death penalty on the accused-respondents. There are very mini-mollifying circumstances, which need not be recorded as we are of the opinion that the minimum statutory possible sentence should be awarded to the accused-respondents and therefore we hereby sentence to each of the accused-respondents i.e. respondent No.3 Dhobai Podh, respondent No.7 Prasanna Kumar Pal and respondent No.9 Artatrana Singh Deo to the minimum possible sentence of life imprisonment with fine of Rs.5000/- and in default of payment of fine to serve additional imprisonment of one year. The respondent No.3 Dhobai Podh, respondent No.7 Prasanna Kumar Pal and respondent No.9 Artatrana Singh Deo are on bail by virtue of the order of this Court dated 6.2.1985. The bail bonds furnished by the respondents are cancelled. They are directed to be arrested forthwith and lodge in jail to serve out the sentence awarded hereinabove. Let a copy of the judgment be communicated to the trial Judge forthwith for compliance, who is directed to report the compliance of the order within a period of two weeks from today. The appeal is allowed as above.